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Why the Islamic democracy rocked ties with Israel and the West

Dr. Robert O. Freedman

Special to the Jewish Times

Ideally, relations between two allied countries are composed of
common interests and values. This has been the case in U.S.-Israeli
relations since 1967, when strategic cooperation against the Soviet
Union and its Arab allies was reinforced by the fact that both the
United States and Israel were vibrant democracies.

When only common interests hold two countries together, the
relationship is far less solid, as in the case when the United States
cooperated with the Soviet Union during World War II against Nazi
Germany, only to drift into the Cold War immediately thereafter when
Germany had been defeated.

In the case of Israel and Turkey, initially there were both
common interests and common values when the relationship between
the two countr ies reached its zenith in the late 1990s, as both
countries opposed Syria and were the only genuine democracies in the
authoritarian Middle East. In the last decade, however, and especially
since the coming to power of the Islamic AKP (Justice and Development)
Party in 2002, relations between the two countries have deteriorated
as their common interests disappeared, and Turkey was transformed from
a secularist democracy to an increasingly intolerant Islamic state.

Indeed, the future of the Turkish-Israeli relationship appears to
depend upon whether the AKP is again victorious in next year’s Turkish
election. How did we come to this point?

Turkish-Israeli Alliance Formsâ~@¨Following the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991, Turkey, which had prided itself as being the southern
bastion of NATO against the Soviet Union, looked around for a new
foreign policy focus. There were two goals:

â~@¢ Entry into the European Union, which Turkey had been seeking
for several decades.

â~@¢ Step into what Turkish leaders thought would be a political vacuum
in Central Asia and Azerbaijan following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, and the emergence of the independent states of Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan — all of whom
had a Turkic heritage.

The Turkish leaders quickly found, however, that the leaders of the new
states had no desire to replace one “big brother” (Russia) with another
“big brother” (Turkey). In any case, the Turkish leadership soon found
itself embroiled in the rapidly escalating civil war with its Kurdish
community, led by the terrorist PKK organization, particularly in the
southeast part of Turkey. The Kurdish revolt was aided and abetted by
Syria, which harbored the Kurdish opposition leader, Abdullah Ocalan.

The defensive agreement between Greece — another enemy of Turkey —
and Syria in 1995 prompted Turkey to respond. The next year, a major
defense agreement between Israel and Turkey was signed. As a result,
Syria, which borders Turkey on its north and Israel on its southwest,
was forced to divide its military forces. The agreement also enabled
Israeli pilots to train in Turkey, Turkish pilots to train in Israel,
and provided for extensive anti-terrorism cooperation.

A Pact’s Benefitsâ~@¨The growing defensive relationship led to major
Israeli arms deals with Turkey, particularly of refurbished and
upgraded tanks and planes. By the late 1990s, the Turkish-Israeli
pact was paying Turkey major dividends. In 1998, Turkey issued an
ultimatum to Syria to expel Ocalan or face a Turkish invasion. With
Israeli military forces on its southern border on the Golan Heights,
Syria had no choice but to comply; Ocalan was expelled, later to
be captured by the Turks with the help of both U.S. and Israeli
intelligence, which led to a Turkish- Kurdish ceasefire.

There were other benefits as well:

â~@¢ In the late 1990s, Diaspora Armenians began pressuring the U.S.

Congress to pass a resolution stating that the Ottoman Empire, the
Turkish Republic’s predecessor, had committed genocide against its
Armenian population during World War I. With the help of the American
pro-Israel lobby, Turkey prevented the passage of the resolution.

â~@¢ The pro-Israel lobby helped to partially neutralize the
anti-Turkish American Greek lobby, which opposed American arms sales
to Turkey.

â~@¢ Israeli rescue crews came to the aid of Turkey after its 1999
earthquake.

â~@¢ The two countries — with U.S. forces — began a series of joint
military exercises, code-named Reliant Mermaid.

â~@¢ Israeli visitors flocked to Turkey and trade between the countries
rose rapidly, crossing the $1 billion mark in 2002 and reaching $3.5
billion in 2008. Israel was exporting military equipmentâ~@¨to Turkey
and Turkish construction firms were undertaking projects in Israel.

Course Change

This warm relationship, however, changed in the first decade of
the 21st century. That came in part because of a change of Turkish
interests, and in part because of the increasingly Islamic focus of
Turkey’s new leadership.

A number of changes came before the AKP’s 2002 rise to power, but
were enhanced by the party’s political triumph.

â~@¢ Turkey sent aid to Greece following the latter’s 1999 earthquake,
as had been the reverse following Turkey’s earthquake that same year.

This led to a gradual rapprochement between the one-time enemies.

â~@¢ Following Ocalan’s ouster from Syria, Turkish-Syrian relations
gradually improved. That accelerated when Bashar Assad succeeded his
father, Hafez Assad, in June 2000.

â~@¢ Russian-Turkish relations, which were in a state of confrontation
during most of the 1990s due to differences over the Kurds and
Chechens, and Russian military aid to Greece improved as the Russians
agreed to sell Turkey large amounts of natural gas.

â~@¢ Although in 1999 Turkey was accepted for European Union candidacy
— and was told to undertake domestic reforms to gain admittance — the
Turks began realizing that the chance for EU membership was dimming.

That was because of the 9/11 al-Qaida attacks on the United States,
similar Islamic bombings in London and Madrid, the murder of a Dutch
filmmaker by an Islamic terrorist, and Europe’s Muslim riots following
the publication of cartoons of Muhammad in a Dutch newspaper. All of
that convinced increasing numbers of Europeans that Islamic values
— even those of a “secularized” Muslim state such as Turkey —
were not congruent with Europeans ones, reinforcing the opposition
of some European leaders to Muslim Turkey’s entry into the EU.

Under these circumstances, Turkish leaders began to look to the
Middle East as a new focus for their trade and foreign policy. This
was reinforced when the AKP Party, led by Recep Erdogan, took power
in 2002. He had come from an Islamic background — and had been
jailed for his Islamic views, but ran on a platform of moderation;
the AKP victory came in large part because of a backlash against the
extensive corruption of the secular parties.

Soon after taking office, Erdogan was confronted by a major foreign
policy problem — the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Its three major negative
consequences for Turkey and for U.S.-Turkish relations were:

â~@¢ The U.S. invasion raised the possibility of an independent
Kurdistan bordering southeast Turkey, which could have a major
irredentist pull on the loyalty of the Turkish Kurds;

â~@¢ Perhaps seeing a new opportunity, the Turkish Kurds renewed
their guerrilla war against Turkey’s government;

â~@¢ And the U.S. was angry that the Turkish Parliament did not
approve the entry of U.S. forces into Iraq via Turkey.

This all led to a deterioration of U.S.-Turkish relations and to
a sharp rise in state-supported anti-American propaganda in the
Turkish media.

Meanwhile, the AKP government kept improving relations with its
neighbors, Greece, Syria and Russia, which had been begun by its
predecessors.

One consequence was that Turkey appeared to have less need for a
strong army, which remained highly suspicious of Erdogan and was the
main bastion of Turkish secularism. Erdogan also added an Islamic
dimension to this “Zero Problems” policy. He sought to improve
relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran and embraced Hamas —
despite both having openly called for Israel’s destruction.

Thus, in 1994, Erdogan made a formal visit to Iran and when, in the
same year, Israel killed Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin, Erdogan called
the Israeli act “state terrorism” and temporarily withdrew the Turkish
ambassador from Israel. When Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian Legislative
Council Election, its leaders were invited to visit Turkey.

To Erdogan, an Islamic foreign policy meant not only Islamic
solidarity,but also the concept that Muslims can do no wrong — and
that non-Muslims who act against Muslims should be severely censured.

This view was increasingly evident on state-controlled TV, leading the
American Council on Jewish-Turkish relations to issue the following
declaration when Erdogan visited the United States in June 2005:
“As we voice our support for Turkey, we hope to hear Prime Minister
Erdogan’s confirmation of Turkey’s commitment to a strong and durable
alliance with the United States, his unequivocal denunciation of
frequent anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism in the Turkish media,
and his determination to curb them.”

Erdogan, however, did not curb the Turkish media’s anti-Americanism
and the anti-Semitism, which set the scene for a further deterioration
of both Turkish-American and Turkish-Israeli relations.

Domestically, Erdogan sought to bolster Turkey’s potential entry to
the EU by implementing reforms such as improving the conditions of
the Kurds, curbing the power of Turkey’s secular military, allowing
women to wear headscarves in state buildings (including universities)
and at state events, but was rebuffed on the headscarves issue by
the Turkish courts, also major advocates of secularism.

Erdogan Cements Powerâ~@¨Re-elected in 2007 with 47 percent of the
vote (compared to 37 percent in 2002), Erdogan set out immediately to
attack and weaken the Turkish military, which had strongly opposed his
election.â~@¨He commenced an investigation of the so-called Ergenekon
plot of the Turkish Military, which Erdogan claimed sought to overthrow
his government. Not only were high-ranking military officers arrested,
so also were a number of his secular opponents. This angered and
worried Turkish secularists.

Next, Erdogan’s government imposed a multi-billion-dollar fine on the
owner of a Turkish media outlet that opposed him, raising questions
at home and in the EU about Turkey’s freedom of the press.

Some thought this was related to attempts to stifle discussion of
corruption charges against members of the AKP, which both sullied its
reputation and lessened its chances to be re-elected.â~@¨Erdogan then
tried to push a series of amendments through the Turkish Parliament
that, among other things, would enable him and the AKP majority to add
their supporters to secular dominated judicial institutions such as
the Turkish Supreme Court. While the effort failed, Erdogan secured
sufficient votes to put them to a national referendum, which will
take place in September 2010.

In foreign policy, Erdogan embarked on a more radical Islamic policy.

He publicly welcomed Sudanese President Hassan al-Bashir, who had
been indicted by the International Criminal Court for genocide. “It
is not possible for a Muslim to commit genocide,” Erdogan said.

He also sought to mediate (with Brazil’s help) a solution to the
Iranian nuclear problem. This angered the United States, which
saw a possible diversion from its desired U.N. sanctions against
Iran. When Turkey subsequently voted against the sanctions resolution,
U.S.-Turkish relations were chilled further.

Erdogan, now seeing Turkey as a major Middle East mediator, sought
to mediate between Israel and Syria. This effort ended in December
2008 when Israel invaded Gaza to end Hamas rocket attacks, an action
severely condemned by Erdogan.

The Turk’s other foreign policy initiatives included signing a
preliminary treaty with Armenia in October 2009.

Once signed, an AKP leader reportedly said, “Now we don’t need the
Jews anymore,” a reference to the aid American Jews, as part of the
pro-Israel lobby, had given to Turkey in the U.S. Congress to prevent
the passing of an Armenian genocide resolution.

Erdogan then offered amnesty to members of the PKK who returned to
Turkey peacefully from their bases in Iraqi Kurdistan.

However, the major change in Turkey’s foreign policy came in the
sharp deterioration of relations with Israel, which appears Erdogan
himself carefully orchestrated.

In January 2009, following Israel’s invasion of Gaza, Erdogan bitterly
attacked Israeli President Shimon Peres at the Davos World Economic
Forum. “When it comes to killing, you well know how to kill,” he
said before storming out of the meeting. Upon returning home, Erdogan
was greeted with cheers, perhaps convincing him that an anti-Israeli
policy would play well in Turkish politics.

Then, during 2009, an anti-Israel, anti-Semitic TV series depicting
Israeli soldiers deliberately murdering Palestinian babies was telecast
on Turkish national TV.

Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon confronted the Turkish
ambassador about this and Erdogan responded by calling Israel “the
greatest threat to peace in the Middle East.”

Erdogan then canceled Israeli participation in the joint military
exercise with the United States, which was to take place, in part,
in Turkey.

Most recently, in the aftermath of the recent May flotilla incident,
the only ship that resisted the Israeli takeover was organized
by the IHH, an Islamic “charity” association in Turkey that had
been involved in past terrorism (including, according to a French
magistrate, an attempt to blow up Los Angeles International Airport,
as well as ties with al-Qaida).

The IHH clearly sought to provoke a conflict with Israel and Erdogan
seized on the deaths of nine members of the organization to escalate
his conflict with Israel. He demanded an apology from Israel,
and threatened to cut all ties with Israel unless the apology was
forthcoming.

Initially, it appeared he could exploit the conflict for major domestic
political gain, as even the main Turkish opposition parties, the CHP
and the MHP, also condemned the Israeli attack.

Nonetheless, it remained to be seen if Erdogan can ride an anti-Israeli
policy to re-election in next year’s Turkish elections, given the
major domestic and foreign policy problems now plaguing the AKP.

What The Future Holds

In the last year, Erdogan has encountered a series of foreign policy
and domestic problems that threaten the chances of the AKP in next
year’s elections.

First, his initiative to improve relations with Armenia appears to
have foundered as the Armenians have refused to make concessions
to Azerbaijan. As Turkish-Armenian relations began to deteriorate,
Diaspora Armenians again raised the genocide issue in the U.S.

Congress, and without the pro-Israeli lobby willing to assist Turkey on
the issue — which it is not, given Erdogan’s anti-Israeli rhetoric —
the resolution now has a much greater chance of passing.

Second, Erdogan’s opening to the Kurds has backfired. His amnesty offer
to the PKK led to a Kurdish political rally welcoming returning PKK
guerrillas, and the Kurdish party in Turkey’s parliament was banned.

Even worse, the PKK rebellion has heated up with strikes against
Turkish officials and army officers all over Turkey; one of the major
attacks originated in Syria, and the Erdogan government has been
hard put to suppress the rebellion. Also, recent polls show that 58
percent of Turks oppose Erdogan’s Kurdish policy.

A great irony is that Turkey remains dependent on Israeli-supplied
drones to track the Kurds. For this reason alone, it is doubtful that
whatever his bluster, Erdogan will cut all ties with Israel.

It should also be noted that not only has Erdogan alienated the Kurds,
he is also unpopular with Turkey’s Alawite community, which fears
increasing Sunni Islamization of Turkey. Both groups are likely to
oppose the AKP in next year’s election. Indeed, before the flotilla
incident, the AKP polled only 29 percent — a sharp drop from its
2007 gains.

Finally, the main Turkish opposition party, the CHP, has a new and
vibrant leader in Kemal Kilicdaroglu. He has criticized Erdogan’s
domestic policy as creating an “empire of fear” in Turkey, and has
gone so far as to accuse the Erdogan government of being fascistic. He
also has raised questions about Erdogan’s links to  the IHH and has
suggested that the Turkish government could have prevented the flotilla
confrontation. Even one of the CHP’s spiritual leaders, Fethullah
Gulen, has questioned Erdogan’s policy in the flotilla incident.

In sum, as next year’s Turkish election draws closer, Erdogan may
wish to play the Israel card in his re-election bid. Nonetheless,
given his domestic and foreign policy problems, even vitriolic attacks
on the Jewish state might not suffice to guarantee an AKP victory.

Turkey-Israel Dates

1949 — formal relations established

1996 — military cooperation accord signed

1998 — joint naval maneuvers

1999 — large Israeli rescue team sent after Turkey’s earthquake

2000 — free trade agreement signed

2002 — Recep Tayyip Erdogan wins Turkish prime ministership

2009 — Erdogan storms off stage at Davos Summit as Israel’s Shimon
Peres speaks

2009 –Turkey calls Israeli actions in Gaza “crimes against humanity”

2010 — popular Turkish soap opera depicts Israeli agents kidnapping
Turkish babies

2010 — Turkey recalls ambassador from Israeli following Gaza-bound
flotilla raid

2010 — Turkey suspends 16 bilateral agreements with Israel

Dr. Robert O. Freedman is Peggy Meyerhoff Pearlstone Professor of
Political Science Emeritus at Baltimore Hebrew University and is
visiting professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University,
where he teaches courses on the Arab-Israeli conflict and Russian
foreign policy. Among his recent books are: “Russia, Iran And The
Nuclear Question: The Putin Record” and “Contemporary Israel.”

Comments

Turkey’s Tarnish

Sadly, by their supporting Turkey’s denial and diminishment of the
Armenian genocide, Jewish American groups such as the ADL, AJC, JINSA,
and others have lost all moral credibility.

Imagine, helping a country like Turkey cover up mass murder. It does
not get much worse than that. The author sees this as a mere political
shortcoming, but it is much much more.

Specifically, these Jewish groups and their constituents have lost
credibility when it comes to genocide. It is now clear that such
organizations, being demonstrably insincere about genocide, use the
Holocaust only for political purposes. That harms not just them but
the cause of genocide prevention. How can the ADL, AJC, etc. now speak
against Holocaust denial when they themselves have engaged in the
same or worse behavior? And let’s be clear that neitherthe national
ADL nor the AJC has ever issued a truly unambiguous acknowledgment
of the Armenian genocide. Moreover, they continue to say that they
are neutral concerning the Armenian genocide resolution.

Neutral? You mean that after having done incredible damage to the
cause of genocide recognition and to Armenians, the ADL and AJC are
now content to just sit back and be neutral? Amazing.

In the end, their collusion with Turkey proved to be highly damaging
to themselves and of little benefit. It’s sad.

Much of the story is here: .