Tag: Mavi Marmara Investigation commission

  • Understanding the Turkish-Israeli row

    Understanding the Turkish-Israeli row

    Understanding the Turkish-Israeli row

    by Şaban Kardaş*

    The deterioration of the relationship between Turkey and Israel has become a conspicuous element not only of Turkey’s foreign policy but also the overall course of recent affairs in the Middle East, raising questions about the future of the region’s security.
    The most immediate issue of contention in the relationship is Turkey’s demand that Israel apologize and compensate appropriately for the killing of eight Turkish citizens and one Turkish-American by Israeli commandos aboard the Mavi Marmara humanitarian aid ship in May 2010. The ship was part of a flotilla which was trying to break Israel’s naval blockade of the Gaza Strip and raise awareness of the humanitarian tragedy caused by the blockade. A proper explanation of the causes of the current stalemate, however, requires going beyond this singular event and undertaking a more nuanced analysis into the underlying dynamics shaping Turkish-Israeli relations in recent years, which also paved the way for the Mavi Marmara raid and the subsequent rapid deterioration of bilateral ties.

    The Mavi Marmara incident and the ensuing crisis grew out of a complex background characterized by the Turkish government’s constant criticism, increasing in recent years, of Israel’s Palestinian policies, which especially gained momentum after Israel’s brutal offensive into the Gaza Strip in the winter of 2008-2009. Other events in the intervening period, including the Davos incident and “low chair” crisis, only accelerated the tensions. Efforts to find a solution through mediation or secretly discussing the ways in which Israel could issue an apology to Turkey failed.

    Given the high-level domestic stakes involved, both parties refrained from backing down and instead opted to continue their confrontational approach. Apparently, given their lack of urgency about reaching a compromise, they must also have calculated strategically that they could tolerate the costs of a breakdown in the relationship.

    Looking at the Palmer report

    Complicating matters further, the conclusions reached in the Palmer report, commissioned by the UN secretary-general to bridge the parties’ competing claims, have to the contrary risked deepening the divisions. The report’s controversial findings not only undermined Turkey’s efforts to internationalize the issue but also argued dubiously for the legality of the naval blockade of Gaza. In response, Turkey announced a series of punitive measures, intended to hold Israel accountable for the Mavi Marmara incident and challenge the legality of the blockade. Turkey’s statement that it would deploy its navy to ensure safe passage in the eastern Mediterranean was arguably the most contentious measure, as it could potentially escalate into a direct military confrontation.

    To understand Turkey’s perspective in the sequence of events culminating in the current standoff, one must look at a number of interrelated factors pertaining to the transformations of the strategic outlook of the Turkish foreign policy elite towards the new Middle East, and Israel’s role and place in it.

    First, Turkey has been working to redefine its priorities in response to what it perceived as a shift in the regional balance of power to its advantage. Second, Turkey viewed the declining influence and power of the United States, as well as President Barack Obama’s promise of a new American foreign policy in the Middle East, as an opportunity for regional powers to assert their influence. Third, and related to these points, Turkey has operated on the assumption that it has not only more space in which to maneuver but also a greater ability to develop autonomous policies in the region. Fourth, Turkey’s perception of threats from the Middle East has declined, reflected in the famous “zero problems with neighbors” policy, as Turkey pursued economic and political rapprochement with countries in the region.

    All these interrelated factors have coalesced in ways which have fostered a perception on the part of Turkish decision makers that a new Middle East is being built, one that is based on justice, equality and freedom, whereas Israel, with its power-based policies, remains stuck in a mentality representing the old Middle East. Turkish leaders saw themselves tasked with a project to build a peaceful and stable regional order based on principles of cooperative security, economic interdependence and universal moral standards. In this environment, the state of exception that Israel represented in the region, as reflected in Israel’s unjust policy toward the Palestinians, its defiance of UN decisions, its noncompliance with the non-proliferation regime and its protection by the US, was construed as an obstacle to Turkey’s regional aspirations. Unable to adapt to the new reality, Israel, in the Turkish perception, has increasingly isolated itself in the region and emerged as the source of regional instability.

    Believing that Israel can no longer afford to act in a business-as-usual fashion in the new Middle East, Turkey has moved to adopt moral politics, seeking to correct Israel’s policies. Consequently, the shared ground and joint strategic outlooks that enabled the Turkish-Israeli partnership of the 1990s has been replaced by a rather confrontational and competitive dynamic, which provide the background for the recent successive crises, especially since 2008. Through its moral politics, Turkey hoped that it could publicize Israel’s inhumane treatment of the Palestinians in various international forums, make it accountable before the international community, and eventually force it to recognize the Palestinians’ rights. Turkey somehow hoped the new foreign policy vision promised by the Obama administration would facilitate its pursuit of a moral politics with regard to Israel.

    Unwilling to yield to Turkey’s new posture, however, Israel refused to back down. At the same time, the complex dynamics of Israeli domestic politics limited the prospects for a negotiated settlement with Turkey, including some form of an apology and compensation to the victims of the Mavi Marmara raid. In this environment, Turkey’s insistence on linking the Mavi Marmara dispute with its demand that the Gaza blockade be lifted further pitted the two countries against each other, as the Israeli side was apparently unconvinced that the closure of the Mavi Marmara incident alone would settle the dispute. Last but not least, though the United States has not come out against Turkey’s increasingly assertive stance against Israel, it has not joined Turkey’s bandwagon either, rendering Turkey’s moral politics largely ineffective. The declining influence of the US has in effect meant that there is no actor capable of mediating between the parties. Turkey’s constructive role in the recent Hamas-Israel prison swap deal and its implementation raised expectations that the Turkish-Israeli tension might ease, as well. After all the events that have transpired, however, there will be no easy going back, and it will be hard to salvage the relationship without a significant transformation in the strategic outlooks of both sides. Turkey expects Israel to change drastically, which is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future.

    *Şaban Kardaş is an assistant professor of international relations at TOBB University of Economics and Technology in Ankara.

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  • Turkey Seeks to Internationalize Mavi Marmara Dispute With Israel

    Turkey Seeks to Internationalize Mavi Marmara Dispute With Israel

    Turkey Seeks to Internationalize Mavi Marmara Dispute With Israel

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 163
    September 7, 2011
    By: Saban Kardas
    Turkey has announced various measures, in an effort to punish Israel for its failure to meet its demands for the Mavi Marmara incident last year, in which nine Turkish citizens were killed by Israeli soldiers. Ankara’s decision came on the eve of the announcement of the Palmer Commission’s report on the incident, established by the United Nations to investigate the competing claims by the parties. Previously, the announcement of the report was postponed for several months in the hope that it could be fine-tuned to live up to both sides’ expectations, and a diplomatic solution could be orchestrated to dampen tensions. While the report was finally due to be officially announced on Friday, it was leaked to the US press, which sparked Ankara’s reaction.

    Though Turkey’s move appeared sudden, it has been in the works for some time. Since the Mavi Marmara incident, on the one hand, the Turkish government has made an apology an essential condition for normalizing relations with Israel, and, on the other hand, it questioned the legality of the Gaza blockade. Israel’s refusal to compromise on both points has gradually deteriorated Turkish-Israeli relations, raising concerns in Washington over the implications of the rift between the two key US allies. Meanwhile, its inability to persuade Israel to change position has put the Turkish government in a difficult position domestically, as nationalist forces have criticized it for failing to protect the nation’s interests and prestige.

    Though severing bilateral ties through the initiation of some low-key measures, Turkey’s strategy was based on the internationalization of the issue to the extent possible to make Israel accountable before the international community. The initial statement from the UN Security Council and the Goldstone Report on the Gaza conflict released in September 2009 were in line with Turkey’s position. Turkey, thus, invested high hopes on the Palmer Commission’s inquiry, expecting that a decision favoring its position will result in confirmation of the nonconformity of the Gaza embargo with international law, and further generate worldwide pressure on Israel, forcing it to accommodate Turkey’s demand for apology.

    While waiting for the conclusion of the Palmer Commission’s work, the Turkish government considered more forceful measures against Israel, since the indications were such that the report might fail to live up to Ankara’s expectations (EDM, May 19). Moreover, although attempts were underway to find a negotiated solution –four secret talks in six sessions were held- and there was even speculation that the Israeli government was considering an apology, this process did not seem promising, either. Days before the submission of the Palmer report to the UN Secretary-General last month, Tel Aviv made it clear to Washington that it would not issue an apology, to which Ankara responded by saying that Turkey would go ahead with forceful measures, should Israel fail to apologize, pay compensation to the victims, and end the blockade (Radikal, August 17).

    As a head-on collision became imminent, Washington was reportedly seeking ways to avert a total collapse of the Turkish-Israeli relationship. Having managed to reestablish a collegial working relationship with Washington in the context of the Arab Spring, Ankara was keen to give a chance to Washington’s efforts. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu reportedly agreed to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s last-ditch offer to postpone the report until the end of September during their face-to-face meeting in Paris. However, the leak of the report to the US media a few hours later angered Turkish leaders, who interpreted this development as the work of the Israeli lobby, seeking to undermine any prospects of a compromise deal including some form of apology (www.ntvmsnbc.com, September 3).

    The tipping point was naturally the content of the report, as it was in disagreement with the Turkish theses. While the report described the Israeli use of force as excessive and unreasonable, it also found Turkey and the organizers of the flotilla partly responsible for what happened aboard the Mavi Marmara. Making no mention of an apology, the report asked Israel to make only “an appropriate statement of regret … in respect of the incident in light of its consequences,” and pay “a sufficient amount” to the injured and the victims’ families. The report also found Israel’s blockade to be a legitimate security measure.

    Turkish leaders denounced the report, maintaining that it would not be a binding UN document, and for Turkey it was non-existent (www.tccb.gov.tr, September 3). Davutoglu outlined a five-point strategy, which Turkey hopes will make Israel pay for the incident. First, diplomatic ties with Israel will be downgraded to a second-secretary level. Second, all military agreements with Israel will be suspended. Third, Turkey will take all measures deemed necessary to ensure the safety of maritime navigation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Fourth, renouncing Israel’s right to the Gaza blockade, Turkey will work to mobilize the UN General Assembly to bring this issue before the International Court of Justice. Fifth, Turkey will support legal action against Israel to be undertaken by the families of Mavi Marmara victims (Anadolu Ajansi, September 2). The Israeli side welcomed the report and insisted that they would not apologize and continue to enforce the blockade, signaling their readiness to face the consequences of Turkey’s precautions and confront Ankara where necessary (www.ntvmsnbc.com, September 4).

    As Turkey seeks not only retribution for the Mavi Marmara incident but also correction of Israel’s policy towards the Palestinians, to which Israel obviously will continue to object, these developments risk leaving irreparable damage to bilateral ties. The most critical aspect of Ankara’s intended measures appears to be the decision to boost the Turkish naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean for the purpose of ensuring safe navigation. Taken together with Turkey’s rejection of the Gaza blockade, it might risk escalation of the crisis into a direct military confrontation. Moreover, Turkey’s preparation to bring Israel before the International Court of Justice will also further heighten the tensions on the political front. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s plans to visit Gaza as well as the upcoming vote on Palestinian statehood at the UN General Assembly will only aggravate these tensions.

    Whether Turkish-Israeli relations can be salvaged and who will mediate between the sides remain more uncertain than ever, and surprisingly the United States could exert little influence, if any, on both sides. But one thing remains certain: Turkey has so far failed to internationalize its disputes with Israel and will perhaps have difficulty in achieving this in the coming weeks.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-seeks-to-internationalize-mavi-marmara-dispute-with-israel/
  • UN Fact-Finding Mission Says Israelis “Executed” US Citizen Furkan Dogan

    UN Fact-Finding Mission Says Israelis “Executed” US Citizen Furkan Dogan

    by: Gareth Porter, t r u t h o u t | Report

    Furkan Dogan, a 19-year-old US citizen of Turkish descent, was aboard the Mavi Marmara when he was killed by Israeli commandos. (Photo: freegazaorg; Edited: Jared Rodriguez / t r u t h o u t)
    Furkan Dogan, a 19-year-old US citizen of Turkish descent, was aboard the Mavi Marmara when he was killed by Israeli commandos. (Photo: freegazaorg; Edited: Jared Rodriguez / t r u t h o u t)

    The report of the fact-finding mission of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on the Israeli attack on the Gaza flotilla released last week shows conclusively, for the first time, that US citizen Furkan Dogan and five Turkish citizens were murdered execution-style by Israeli commandos.

    Source: truth-out

    The circumstances of the killing of at least six of the passengers were in a manner consistent with an extra-legal, arbitrary and summary execution. Furkan Doğan and İbrahim Bilgen were shot at near range while the victims were lying injured on the top deck. Cevdet Kiliçlar, Cengiz Akyüz, Cengiz Songür and Çetin Topçuoğlu were shot on the bridge deck while not participating in activities that represented a threat to any Israeli soldier. In these instances and possibly other killings on the Mavi Marmara, Israeli forces carried out extralegal, arbitrary and summary executions prohibited by international human rights law, specifically article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
    Source: Human Rights Council Report, Page 38, Item 170
    https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/15session/A.HRC.15.21_en.pdf
  • Turkey sets up its own inquiry into Israeli raid

    Turkey sets up its own inquiry into Israeli raid

    Turkey has set up a commission to carry out its own investigation into Israel’s raid on Gaza-bound aid ships which left nine Turks dead, the foreign ministry said Thursday.

    turkey sets its own inquiry israeli raid
    The Turkish ship Mavi Marmara was part of an aid flotilla raided by Israeli soldiers on May 31

    The commission, which will work under the prime minister’s office, will “investigate the attack and the treatment the activists faced” before writing a report on its findings, the ministry said in a statement.

    The report will be presented to the international inquiry set up by the United Nations earlier this month to look into the Israeli operation, it added.

    The Turkish commission will include bureaucrats from the foreign, justice, interior and transport ministries as well as officials from the maritime agency.

    The statement did not say when the commission would finish its report.

    The May 31 raid by Israeli commandos on the flotilla of six ships in international waters triggered international criticism of Israel and plunged bilateral ties with Turkey into a crisis.

    In June, Turkish prosecutors also launched an investigation against top Israeli leaders, which could result in them pressing charges, among them murder, injury, attacking Turkish citizens on the open seas and piracy, according to press reports.

    Israel has set up two internal investigations into the raid, but Turkey has dismissed them, expressing doubt over their impartiality.

    Ankara says it is confident the UN commission will shed light on the incident, but Israel has threatened to pull out of the probe if the UN commission insists on grilling Israeli soldiers.

    Israel says its commandos resorted to self-defence after they came under attack from the activists on board. The activists say the soldiers fired as soon as they boarded the vessels.

    , 12.08.2010