Turkish Forum

Tag: Local elections

  • Istanbul Armenian Woman Sets Her Sights to be Mayor of Prince Islands

    Istanbul Armenian Woman Sets Her Sights to be Mayor of Prince Islands

    Sako Arian

    32919
    “I’ll win if Armenians back me,” she says. “But Armenians here are used to voting for their executioners”

    Kayuş Çalıkman Gavrilof, an Armenian from Istanbul, has thrown her hat in the race for the mayor of the Prince Islands((Turkish: Prens Adaları); a chain of nine islands off the coast of her native city.

    She’s running as a member of Turkey’s Peoples’ Democracy Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP for short) in the March 30 Turkish local elections.

    An admirer of the Armenian woman writer and social activist Zabel Yesayan, Kayuş says her chances of winning are good if the local Armenian community supports her. That support, however, is questionable, as she notes later in our conversation.

    “With her drive, written word and essence, she [Yesayan] was a pivotal figure and it is in her footsteps that I walk today, with the hope that I do not meet with the same fate,” says Kayuş.

    (Zabel Yesayan was accused of nationalism in the Stalinist purges. Arrested in 1937, the writer died of unknown circumstances in Siberia – S.A.)

    Kayuş Çalıkman has translated Yesayan’s 1911 book Averagneru Mech (Among the Ruins) into Turkish.  Recently published by Aras Publishers, the book tells of the tragic fate of the Armenians in Cilicia during the Adana massacres of 1909.

    The would-be mayor says she first got involved in politics when she joined the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), a pro-Kurdish party, in Turkey. The HDP is considered pro-minority and women’s rights and Kayuş says there are other Armenians running for seats from the party.

    Q: Mrs. Çalıkman, will the HDP be contesting local elections throughout all of Turkey?

    A: No. Other Kurdish organizations will be participating in elections in the eastern provinces, while the HDP will run candidates in the west.

    Q: You are running for the post of mayor in Istanbul’s Prince Islands. Can you tell us about this municipality?

    A: There are nine islands in the district of which six are inhabited. Two of them are private property. The ninth belongs to a cooperative union.

    Q: Are there any Armenians living on the islands?

    A: Yes. At one time, one of them [Kınalıada], was called the Armenian Island. We have a church there and until recently, a school. The Armenian presence was much stronger in years gone by. Sadly, the island has lost its Armenian reputation today.

    Q: Who are you competing against in the election?

    A: I’m up against candidates from the two major Turkish parties; the AKP (Justice and Development Party) Party and the CHP (Republican People’s Party). I think you know that the AKP is Prime Minister Erdoğan’s party.

    Q: And the CHP is the party of the Kemalists?

    A: Yes, but in fact, deep down, the CHP doesn’t know what it actually represents. It’s the oldest political party in Turkey founded by Ataturk.

    Q: Which of them is your strongest competition?

    A: The Kemalist party doesn’t stand for much and I can say that it’s pretty weak. As for the other, it’s quite strong and can present problems for me. Nevertheless, I should add that my chances of winning are good.

    Q: Why do you say so?

    A: To be honest, I’ll win if the Armenians there vote for me.

    Q: They’ll surely vote for you, right?

    A: No, you’re mistaken. Unfortunately, the reports I’ve received say that most Armenians will vote for the candidate of Erdoğan’s party.

    Q: Why?

    A: Because Armenians are used to giving their votes to their executioners. (A moment of silence)

    You know, I have travelled to many Armenian communities, and if you want to know the     truth, the Armenians of Istanbul underwent grave pressures in the recent past and continue to experience such a state today. This is the result of policies crafted by the state.

    Q: But haven’t visible changes occurred in recent years in Istanbul and turkey as a whole?

    A: I should say that the Istanbul Armenian community experienced a shock in recent years, especially after the killing of Hrant [Dink]. I think you know the rest of the story. Hidden Armenians began to search for their identity and return to their roots. And those living in the ghetto started to leave their closed quarters. Sadly, however, the process of opening up took the wrong path. This opening up wasn’t political but had more to do with the sexes.

    Q: Could you clarify what you mean?

    A: Today, mixed marriages between Armenians and Turks comprise a large percentage in the community. It seems that many Armenians were waiting for this chance to make such a choice. Before, mixed marriages were much less. Today, they have reached 80%. Don’t get me wrong, but it’s as if Hrant’s murder was wrongly understood and that after he died people felt freer to marry Turks.

    Q: What was the reaction of Istanbul Armenians to your candidacy?

    A: Honestly, it’s still too easy to say.

    Q: Will you have meetings with Istanbul-Armenians as part of the campaign?

    A: I haven’t planned anything yet. To date, I’ve only met with members of the Sepastia Compatriotic Union. It was quite fruitful.

    Q: Getting back to the elections, what are the aims of your party, the HDP? You said there were other Armenian candidates as well.

    A: Yes, there are. There are some ten Armenians running for the HDP in various Istanbul districts. We have an important candidate running in the Şişli district and another in Bakırköy. I should note that some will be running for seats as members in municipal councils as well.

    Q: And what about Armenian candidates in the other parties?

    A: I know that there are two candidates in the CHP, but their chances of winning are slim.

    Q: Any concluding thoughts?

    A: I would ask that in future Istanbul is also considered a part of the diaspora.

    Q: But, as you know, many Armenians are insulted when Istanbul is seen as the diaspora.

    A: Let them be insulted. That’s their problem. The fact is that Istanbul isn’t our homeland. All of us, or at least the vast majority, have roots in western Armenia. This is the simple fact. Today, Istanbul is just another diaspora colony. Everyone should accept this reality.

    The land of our birth is the provinces, western Armenia. In my case, even though my ancestors came to Istanbul in the distant past, I still regard the city as a colony.

    Photos: Kayuş Çalıkman Gavrilof’s Facebook page

  • Erdogan Refuses to Negotiate IMF Deal for Turkey

    Erdogan Refuses to Negotiate IMF Deal for Turkey

    Erdogan Refuses to Negotiate IMF Deal for Turkey

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 63
    April 2, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Official data released after the local elections in Turkey shows that the global financial crisis has affected the economy more severely than the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has acknowledged. Turkey’s economic growth dropped sharply in the last quarter of 2008, and its exports declined by around 35 percent last month. These developments have increased the pressure on the government to conclude a prompt loan deal with the IMF, but Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan remains unconvinced.

    Many analysts attribute the decline in the AKP’s electoral fortunes in the local elections to the government’s failure to either acknowledge or take action over the economic crisis. Many economic indicators, including unemployment reaching its highest level in recent years, have undermined the government’s claims that the crisis was not affecting Turkey as badly as other developing economies. Indeed, the AKP’s loss of votes within major industrial centers such as Denizli, Kayseri, Bursa and Gaziantep was caused by soaring local unemployment rates, and if the government fails to redress these trends, it could face a rapid collapse in its popular support.

    Turkey’s official statistics agency (TUIK) announced on March 31 that GDP fell by 6.2 percent in the last quarter of 2008, while the annual rate of growth dropped to 1.1 percent (www.tuik.gov.tr, March 31). This sharply contrasts with the Turkish economy’s average 7 percent annual growth rate, and marks the first contraction of the economy since the AKP came to power in 2002. These figures also indicate that private investments shrank significantly, while government spending increased ahead of local elections. Although the government introduced various small-scale stimulus packages to help support public investments and prevent a sharper decline in GDP, this also increased the current account deficit.

    Additional evidence of the impact of the economic crisis on Turkey appeared in the unofficial export figures released by the Association of Turkish Exporters (TIM) on March 30 (Anadolu Ajansi, April 1). According to the TIM, Turkey’s exports fell in March by 34.92 percent to $7.1 billion compared with last year. Official statistics released by TUIK also confirmed that in February, the country’s exports declined by 24.9 percent to $8.3 billion, whereas imports fell by 47.6 percent (www.tuik.gov.tr, March 31). Exports in the automotive industry, Turkey’s flagship export, continued to drop during the past six months, plunging by 53.8 percent in the first quarter of 2009, according to the local exporters association in Bursa (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 1).

    A comparison of Turkey’s economic downturn with other developing economies reveals it is among the most rapidly shrinking economies in the world. Noting that other countries have managed to grow, or contract at lower rates despite the global crisis, Turkey’s economic slowdown may have started even before the present crisis, and the government should admit its own failures and take urgent measures (www.cnnturk.com, April 1). Indeed, given the shrinking domestic demand and declining exports, some forecast that the annual growth rate will continue to drop, and fall behind the government’s projected growth rate of 4 percent in the 2009 budget. The budget deficit is expected to widen in response to lower industrial output and falling tax revenues. In the first quarter of 2009, the government reached its budget deficit estimates for the entire year (Hurriyet Daily News, April 1).

    Representatives of the working class and the businessmen are now repeating their criticisms of the government’s economic policies. They believe that the election results should be viewed as a warning sign for the AKP, consequently forcing it to prioritize the economy. The government is facing growing pressure to revise its spending plans and modify the 2009 budget in order to resume talks with the IMF, which were suspended over disputes relating to financial regulations and the government’s spending and tax policies. The head of the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association, Arzuhan Dogan Yalcindag, called on the government to revise the budget so that it realistically reflects the conditions of the Turkish economy (www.haber7.com, April 1). Many observers expected the government to conclude an agreement with the IMF after the elections, because IMF loans might ease Turkey’s fiscal problems and stimulate the economy. Last month, the IMF forwarded revised proposals to Turkey aimed at addressing Erdogan’s concerns about the contents of the standby agreement (EDM, March 16).

    Before his departure for the G20 summit in London, Erdogan said that he objected to an IMF condition that Turkey should adopt strict tax auditing measures requiring a comparison of individuals’ wealth and their spending. These measures were most likely intended to prevent tax evasion and increase state revenues. However, fearing that such measures might reduce cash flows to the markets, Erdogan challenged the IMF by saying “we will not sign such a thing” (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, April 1). Erdogan and his economic minister might be meeting IMF officials in London, but there is still no indication as to whether Turkey will resume direct talks. Although the AKP is expected to be more cooperative towards the IMF, especially following the outcome of the local elections, Erdogan appears determined to maintain his populist pre-election rhetoric, adding to the uncertainty about the future of the Turkish economy.

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-refuses-to-negotiate-imf-deal-for-turkey/

  • Turkey’s Local Elections Forces Reconsideration of Domestic and Foreign Policies

    Turkey’s Local Elections Forces Reconsideration of Domestic and Foreign Policies

    Turkey’s Local Elections Forces Reconsideration of Domestic and Foreign Policies

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 62
    April 1, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    The mixed results of the Turkish local elections on March 29 raised questions over the future direction of the governing Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) policies (EDM, March 31). The government is unlikely to call a snap election, but the relative decline in the AKP’s share of the vote will have significant implications for Turkey’s political landscape, compelling more recognition of public opinion and limiting the scope for assertive domestic and foreign policies.

    Turkey’s local elections directly affect national politics, and have been traditionally considered as a de facto vote of confidence for the incumbent government. Moreover, prior to the March 29 elections, the AKP pursued an aggressive campaign, which effectively turned the local elections into a national referendum on its policies (EDM, December 3). Now, having fallen below the thresholds it set for itself, the AKP is seeking to redefine its priorities in Turkish politics.

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan convened meetings with his cabinet ministers and party members to assess the causes of the decline, while considering a cabinet reshuffle and other changes within the party (Star, March 31). Beyond these short term changes, the elections are likely to have an enduring resonance on the AKP’s domestic and foreign policies. Though it remains to be seen what path it will choose, there appears to be two alternatives: either the AKP will follow a reformist line and initiate major change, or it will prefer prudence and avoid proactive policies.

    The AKP’s core supporters, conservative center-right voters and liberals, expect the government to abandon its complacency, and resume domestic reforms. The EU and western observers also share similar views. They believe that the AKP owes its past electoral success to the pro-democratization agenda, which it adopted at the outset. For them, the AKP’s recovery depends on its ability to revive its former reformist image. If the AKP chooses this alternative, it will have to refocus on constitutional changes, and intensify the EU membership process in order to satisfy the reformists’ demands (Sabah, March 30).

    Reformists also want the AKP to pursue a more proactive foreign policy. Many observers had argued that following the local elections, the government would press ahead with ambitious foreign policy initiatives, including normalizing its relations with Armenia. EU officials have suggested Turkey might take further steps in this process, such as opening the border with Armenia following President Barack Obama’s visit to Turkey on April 6-7 (Hurriyet, March 30).

    It is unclear whether the AKP can fufil these expectations. The AKP was founded as a party representing diverse interests, and, since its establishment, Erdogan’s charismatic leadership has united the various factions within the party. The sense of over-confidence imbued by successive election victories and the presence of a strong leader, led the AKP to develop a top-down approach to politics. The party’s largely unchallenged dominance enabled it to conduct domestic and foreign policies in an unrestricted manner.

    The new voting patterns, however, are a stark reminder to the AKP that the Turkish electorate is sensitive to the implications of the government’s policies, and may withdraw their support when necessary. The pre-occupation with re-election in the next national elections, slated for 2011, will be the AKP’s main concern. Equally, it will tread a fine line between satisfying the demands of its core constituencies and responding to the challenges posed by the opposition. Since the AKP cannot take its popular support for granted, it might be more circumspect in its domestic and foreign policies. These pressures, in turn, might curb the AKP’s activism, and force it to adopt more conformist policies.

    The government will need to form broad based coalitions with opposition parties in order to implement its domestic reforms. However, having gained ground on the AKP, major opposition parties such as the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), have little incentive to cooperate with the government. Moreover, Erdogan’s antagonistic attitude during the election campaign will complicate building coalitions with his rivals, who have already announced their opposition to his position on constitutional amendments (EDM, March 4). Against this background, relations between the government and the opposition are likely to remain tense, and it is questionable whether the AKP can deliver radical democratization reforms (Radikal, March 30).

    The AKP’s leftist, nationalist, secularist and Islamist opponents are united in their objection to its foreign policy. They view the AKP’s policies as a “betrayal of Turkey’s national interests,” and they are critical of the AKP’s policy of rapprochement with Armenia. Previously, the AKP largely ignored any negative public reaction and the opposition, in its efforts to normalize relations with Yerevan. However, now that the AKP is more vulnerable to public scrutiny, faced with pressure from a stronger opposition, it may adopt a cautious approach and avoid foreign policy risks. Therefore, although normalizing relations with Armenia will continue, it may be premature to expect radical steps, such as opening the border or establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia (ANKA, March 30).

  • Local Elections Herald a New Era For The AKP

    Local Elections Herald a New Era For The AKP

    Local Elections Herald a New Era For The AKP

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 61
    March 31, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey’s local elections on March 29 produced mixed results, with the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) emerging victorious, yet underperforming compared with earlier elections. The AKP received a 38.86 percent share of the vote, while the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) gained 23.10 and 16.08 percent respectively. The AKP’s support fell from 46.6 percent in the 2007 general elections and 41.7 percent in 2004 local elections (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, March 30). While retaining its popularity within major cities, it failed to further expand this and lost several mayoral posts. The gains made by opposition parties raise the specter of imminent changes in Turkish politics.

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, acknowledging his party’s losses, emphasized that the AKP did not fall below its performance in the local elections in 2004. It received almost the total percentage of votes cast for its two rival parties (www.cnnturk.com, March 29). The representatives of the opposition parties, in contrast, referred to their increases in the share of the vote, and the “erosion” of the incumbent party’s popular support.

    The results exposed wide regional variations and followed an apparent trend in previous elections: whereas the AKP controlled central Anatolia, the CHP and MHP were popular in the Aegean and Mediterranean coastal provinces as well as in the northwestern provinces in the Thrace region. Significantly, the MHP regained some of its past strength in central Anatolia, challenging the AKP’s dominance over center-right voters. In addition to the defeat it suffered vis-à-vis the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) in the southeastern provinces, the AKP’s support also declined in some northern regions. The Islamist Felicity Party (SP), an alternative to the AKP for some conservative voters, also increased its vote to 5.17 percent.

    The local elections marked the first decline in the AKP’s share of the vote since the general elections in 2002. Despite surpassing its major rivals by a clear margin, the psychological effect of this decline is undeniable. Previously, the party claimed to be the only viable choice for the electorate. However, a series of electoral victories arguably bred a sense of overconfidence, which left the AKP in general, and Erdogan in particular, open to accusations that they have grown insensitive to criticism, either from society or opposition parties, and developed an authoritarian style of leadership. Faced with losing popular support, the AKP will likely soften its discourse, and foster compromise with the opposition.

    Turkish opposition parties, however, are now seeking to capitalize on the AKP’s apparently declining support, claiming that it has entered a period of rapid decay (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, March 29). Whether such drastic erosion is occurring remains to be seen, but the results may force the AKP to reconsider its policies. Indeed, Erdogan expressed dissatisfaction with the polls and admitted that the AKP must assess the causes of its decline. Meanwhile, he is expected to reshuffle his cabinet, possibly replacing some high-profile ministers involved in preparing the AKP’s discredited election strategy (www.cnnturk.com, March 29; www.ensonhaber.com, March 30). The AKP will also need to reevaluate its economic policies as well as the Kurdish question and the pursuit of political reforms.

    Thus far, the government has ignored charges that the Turkish economy has been badly impacted by the global financial crisis. Although some of the AKP’s populist policies helped cushion the full effects of the crisis, economic considerations played a major role in the local elections. Particularly, the declining performance of the AKP in the Marmara, Aegean, and Thrace regions, as well as some Anatolian cities, reflected the impact of the crisis in Turkey’s industrial heartlands. In this context, the AKP will come under intense pressure to secure a loan from the IMF which it has tried to avoid, consequently leaving the country in a weaker bargaining position than before.

    Moreover, the results represent a blow to the image of the AKP as an inclusive party, representing not only conservative Turks and Kurds but also liberal and secular voters. There appear to be limits to the AKP’s appeal to the Turkish people. Its failure to gain support within the western coastal provinces and in the Thrace region, and the traditionally less conservative central Anatolia, shows that the AKP has been unable to diversify its appeal. The DTP’s strong performance in the southeastern provinces is a setback for the AKP’s policies on the Kurdish issue. It shows that “identity politics” remains on the popular agenda, and the AKP’s policy of providing services and socioeconomic incentives alone cannot resolve the Kurdish problem. Crucially, the higher profile of the DTP suggests it cannot be ignored as a major stakeholder in any resolution of the Kurdish problem. Paradoxically, the AKP’s initiatives on the Kurdish issue, though failing to satisfy Kurdish voters, alienated some Turkish voters in the west, in turn boosting the MHP’s popularity.

    The AKP has been a largely populist party, attracting votes from across the political spectrum. Since it is potentially losing ground to its rivals, it will come under pressure to address the deeper causes of these failures, or risk the further erosion of its popular support. Whether it can formulate consistent policies to address these multiple challenges, particularly over the looming economic crisis, will be an immediate and major test for the AKP’s government.

    https://jamestown.org/program/local-elections-herald-a-new-era-for-the-akp/

  • Six Armenians Elected in Turkish Local Polls

    Six Armenians Elected in Turkish Local Polls

    Azbarez .. Published: Monday March 30, 2009

    ISTANBUL (Marmara)–During this weekend’s municipal election in Turkey, six Armenians were elected to local and regional bodies in and around Istanbul, including a seat in the Istanbul City Council, making this one of the most unprecedented local elections in recent history for Turkey.

    Some 12 candidates of Armenian descent took part in the elections representing both the ruling and opposition parties.

    In the end, Raffi-Hermon Araks, Hovhannes Garabedian, Yervant Ouzouzian, Harutiun Edgunes, Bedros Avedikian and Vazken Baren were elected to various local and regional bodies, with the latter two garnering a seat in the Istanbul City Council.

    yerel-secim

  • A Race to the Bottom for Turkish Democracy

    A Race to the Bottom for Turkish Democracy

    Bickering Between Erdogan and Baykal: A Race to the Bottom for Turkish Democracy?

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 42

    March 4, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    The quality of political discussions in Turkey is hitting the bottom as local elections, slated for March 29, approach. Although candidates will be running for municipal posts, the aggressive campaigning by political parties has turned the election race into a national referendum on the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s performance in power (EDM, December 3). The importance attached to the election results has, in turn, heightened the debate between not only the mayoral candidates but also party leaders, leading to an exchange of harsh verbal attacks. The latest row in this war of words was between Deniz Baykal, the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of the AKP and the current prime minister.

    Determined to win a decisive victory in the municipal elections, Erdogan’s AKP began the election marathon earlier than its rivals. Talking to large crowds at election rallies, Erdogan challenged the leaders of the opposition parties and accused them of being afraid to go to the people. In response, Baykal and Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the Nationalist Action Party, started to appear in election meetings organized by their parties. Bahceli rejected Erdogan’s charges and maintained that his party was always in harmony with the people. He claimed, moreover, that Erdogan was using the state’s resources, including planes and helicopters, to mobilize support for his own party’s candidates (Milliyet, March 2). Similar charges against the government are being made by other parties as well, as the AKP’s use of state resources puts opposition candidates at a disadvantage (Radikal, February 24; EDM, February 2).

    In the last week of February, the bickering between Erdogan and Baykal took a confrontational and nasty turn, with both leaders using very harsh words. Baykal maintained that the crowds Erdogan talked to were brought together by state resources, and he invited Erdogan to a TV debate so that they both could discuss everything openly. Erdogan declined the invitation and challenged Baykal to meet people on the ground (ANKA, February 22).

    Against this background, at an election rally on February 28, Baykal lambasted Erdogan’s indifference to criticism and maintained that by constantly bashing the opposition and the media in the election rallies, Erdogan avoided talking to the people about the real economic and social problems. Baykal also maintained that although his party had used a cooperative approach and proposed a package of suggestions about how to deal with the economic crisis in response to Erdogan’s earlier challenge, Erdogan ridiculed Baykal and simply responded to him by saying “mind your own business,” implying that Baykal would never come to power. Baykal went on to say that “this demeanor is maganda style. This is not the demeanor expected from a prime minister… We are used to seeing the elegance, kindness, and respect of past leaders. This kulhanbeyi style, this maganda style may look good on Erdogan [as a person], but it does not look good on [Erdogan as] the Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic.” In addition to his use of the words maganda (a pejorative term in Turkish to describe crass, rude and uncultured persons) and kulhanbeyi (rowdy), Baykal quoted a popular Turkish saying to disparage Erdogan: “You have become a prime minister, but you could not become a man (adam). You will hardly become a man, because you don’t know what you are talking about. You say one thing today, quite another thing tomorrow” (www.nethaber.com, February 28).

    Speaking at his own party’s rallies in other towns on Sunday, Erdogan said that although he knew very well how to respond to Baykal, his code of ethics and upbringing would not allow him to use such words in office. He said that he would remain a gentleman and seek redress in the courts. Maintaining a polemical tone, however, Erdogan says that after he quits politics, he might respond to Baykal with similar language. “My nation chooses a real man as its prime minister,” Erdogan added (Cihan Haber Ajansi, March 1; Aksam, March 2).

    On March 2 Erdogan’s attorneys filed defamation lawsuits against Baykal and Mustafa Ozyurek, the speaker and chief accountant of the CHP, who also used the word maganda during a press conference on February 27 to describe Erdogan’s conduct. The attorneys maintained that Ozyurek “aimed to attack Erdogan’s personal rights and [make] completely erroneous accusations of the most insulting nature” that could not be considered freedom of speech (Anadolu Ajansi, March 2; Today’s Zaman, March 3).

    Responding to these developments in an address to the CHP’s parliamentary group, Baykal defended his remarks and maintained that he had not insulted Erdogan personally in any way. Citing several instances in which Erdogan had insulted him and others, Baykal said that although Erdogan had sued him several times in the past for minor things, he himself had avoided resorting to the courts as a means of resolving their disputes. He noted that he had only criticized the prime minister’s behavior and words and would continue to do so as long as Erdogan acted in a this manner. Referring to Erdogan’s words that he would watch his deportment as long as he was prime minister, Baykal added that his reaction to Erdogan might have served a purpose after all by reminding the prime minister of his responsibilities in office (www.cnnturk.com, March 3).

    This case of bickering between Erdogan and Baykal is neither the first nor the last one. The history of Turkish political life is rich in similar episodes of political leaders engaging in a war of words against each other. This recent row, however, perhaps more than any previous one, amounts to a race to the bottom for Turkish democracy. The entire election campaign has been dominated by calls for duels, charges of corruption, and mutual accusations about the leaders’ demeanor—all overshadowing substantive public deliberation on political issues. It is, moreover, ironic that local election campaigns are being hijacked to such a great extent by national political considerations and populism. Regardless of which party wins the next elections, Turkish democracy might being the biggest looser.

    https://jamestown.org/program/bickering-between-erdogan-and-baykal-a-race-to-the-bottom-for-turkish-democracy/