Tag: Lisbon summit

  • Erdogan Discusses Missile Defense with Obama Ahead of NATO’s Summit in Lisbon

    Erdogan Discusses Missile Defense with Obama Ahead of NATO’s Summit in Lisbon

    Erdogan Discusses Missile Defense with Obama Ahead of NATO’s Summit in Lisbon

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 207

    November 15, 2010

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey’s reserved position on the US-led missile shield ahead of NATO’s Lisbon Summit on November 19-20 continues to remain a major issue affecting Turkish-US relations. Since the US values this project as part of its overall policy on the Iranian nuclear program and its agenda of transforming NATO, Turkey’s rather reluctant attitude has raised questions about its commitment to the Alliance and its relations with the United States (EDM, October 21).

    There is growing consensus among foreign and domestic observers that pressure has been building on Turkey to clarify its position, especially at a time when most other NATO members (as well as Russia) seemingly adopted a cooperative position. If Turkey still treats NATO as the centerpiece of its defense and security policies, according to the argument, Turkey cannot diverge from its allies at this critical juncture.

    Earlier, Turkish officials dismissed any suggestion that Turkey is being pressured to support the project. However, one cannot deny the requirement of acting in concert with its allies, which is increasingly forcing Turkey to make a decision. In preparation for the Lisbon Summit, President Abdullah Gul convened a meeting, bringing together Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, and other top officials (Anadolu Ajansi, November 5). Recent statements by Turkish leaders reflect a broad consensus at the apex of the Turkish state, formed through such meetings. Overall, it appears that Turkey is unlikely to yield to pressure, and will perhaps continue to negotiate until the Lisbon summit to have its demands recognized by its allies.

    The missile shield also emerged on the agenda during Erdogan’s meeting with President Barack Obama at the G20 Summit in Seoul, where he conveyed Turkey’s sensitivities regarding the project (www.cnnturk.com, November 13). Commenting on his meeting with Obama, Erdogan reiterated Ankara’s position on the missile shield. First, he emphasized that as a NATO member, Turkey would take part in the project provided that it is developed within the NATO umbrella. Second, in Ankara’s view, the plans for the missile shield should not list any country as the potential target. Third, the project should provide protection for the entire Turkish territory as well as other members, underscoring the principle of the indivisibility of security. Moreover, the US needs to offer Turkey clarifications about the location of the system, and the technical details about its deployment and decision-making procedures.

    Erdogan also added that Turkey has yet to reach a decision. However, Erdogan underlined that he found the US responsive to Turkish demands for further clarification in the ongoing talks, and the points he listed would constitute the basis of Ankara’s position. At the Lisbon summit, Turkey will be represented by Gul, Davutoglu and Defense Minister, Vecdi Gonul. Depending on whether NATO officials satisfy Turkish concerns, Ankara would make a decision on participation in the program.

    During a hearing in the Turkish parliament on the foreign ministry’s budget, Davutoglu, ruled out any pressure on Turkey, yet admitted that NATO is justified to make contingency plans against the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. However, Davutoglu made a nuanced point, which he has been reiterating for some time. Davutoglu accepts that as a member of the Alliance, Turkey will act in coordination with its allies, but he emphasized that as an equal partner, or “owner” as he described it, of the Alliance, Turkey wants its voice to be fully heard since decisions in NATO are taken collectively (Anadolu Ajansi, November 12, Hurriyet Daily News, October 30).

    In other words, Davutoglu believes that Turkey’s role in NATO is not solely confined to saying “yes” or “no” to a decision already taken; rather it wants to take part in making critical decisions that will affect the future of the Alliance as a whole. Davutoglu rejects the presentation of Turkey as an outlying country that needs to be convinced by the rest of the allies. Rather, Turkey is at the center of Alliance and wants to actively shape its threat perceptions. In that regard, the missile shield debate has a broader meaning for Turkish foreign policy. It provides a major test for the sustainability of Davutoglu’s new foreign policy doctrine that emphasizes independent action and agenda-setting in international affairs.

    Likewise, Davutoglu maintains that the US-led missile shield should not undermine Turkish relations with its neighbors. As Erdogan emphasized, Turkey opposes mentioning any country as the target of the anti-ballistic system. Although ballistic missile programs of many countries are cited as posing a risk of proliferation, hence they are used in justifying developing a NATO missile shield, it is no secret that Iran has been viewed as the most immediate source of such a threat. Since Turkey raised reservations about referring to Iran as a potential threat during an earlier NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels last month, there have been signs of acknowledging Ankara’s concerns by US and NATO officials. In an interview, NATO Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, declined to name Iran as a potential threat that the planned missile shield is designed to counter (The New York Times, November 2).

    Turkish concern over the impact of the missile shield for relations with its neighbors again shows how another pillar in the new Turkish foreign policy affects Turkey’s thinking on this issue. Turkey has been working to overcome historical rivalries and build friendlier relations with its neighbors, as summarized in the “zero-problems-with-neighbors” doctrine. Turkey is concerned that if the proposed missile shield ends up singling out Iran or Syria, it might compromise its regional policy. Therefore, Davutoglu has been repeatedly arguing that NATO should avoid taking action that might draw new lines of division, making Turkey a “frontier country” as in the Cold War.

    Granted, Turkey so far has refrained from categorically rejecting the project, which adds some degree of predictability to its response in Lisbon. Turkey also has laid out its priorities unequivocally, which seem to be appreciated by other NATO members. It will be up to the other Allies to reach a common understanding with Turkey, so that a joint position is adopted in Lisbon.

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-discusses-missile-defense-with-obama-ahead-of-natos-summit-in-lisbon/

  • Turkey Maintains Reservations About US Missile Defense

    Turkey Maintains Reservations About US Missile Defense

    Turkey Maintains Reservations About US Missile Defense

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 190

    October 21, 2010 02:11

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey’s position on US efforts to create a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in Europe has emerged as another source of tension in US-Turkish relations. The Bush administration originally contemplated the installment of a missile shield in Eastern Europe, yet failed to achieve its stated objectives in the face of strong Russian opposition. At the time, Turkey expressed a cautious position on such proposals, arguing that it should not proceed in a manner threatening to Russia. Recently, the Obama administration revived the idea as a central component of its policy of containing the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program.

    Turkey has been considered as a possible location for the system, possibly hosting a radar battery on its soil, which would detect missiles launched from its surrounding regions so that they could be intercepted by missiles stationed in Turkey or Eastern Europe. The US also moved to present the revamped program as a joint NATO project, in obvious attempts to garner wider diplomatic support, and perhaps ease Ankara’s concerns. However, given Turkey’s position on the Iranian nuclear issue, which already had pitted it against the US, Ankara has remained lukewarm towards invitations from Washington to join the project. The recent trend in Turkish foreign policy towards pursuing independent policies and growing questions as to whether it is still committed to the Alliance and its traditional relations with the US has made Turkey’s position all the more puzzling.

    This issue has been at Turkey’s doorsteps visibly at least since Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Turkey in early September (EDM, September 8). Similarly, during his visit to Turkey in early October, NATO Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, discussed this issue (www.cnnturk.com, October 8). Ankara’s position was again one of the main items when NATO foreign and defense ministers met on October 14 in Brussels to discuss the Alliance’s new strategic concept, which will be adopted at the NATO summit in Lisbon next month. Rasmussen urged alliance members to consider the proposal for adopting a missile shield seriously against threats from rogue states, as underlined in the draft strategic concept.

    In Brussels, Turkish foreign and defense ministers, Ahmet Davutoglu and Vecdi Gonul, respectively, held a separate meeting with their US counterparts Hillary Clinton and Robert Gates. They conveyed Turkish concerns, especially its uneasiness with the proposed system being perceived as targeting Iran and Syria. They emphasized that the project must proceed as a defensive system, without designating any country as a potential aggressor. Otherwise, it could make these countries feel encircled and heighten tensions in the region. Turkey also reportedly expressed its desire to place the system under NATO’s command, and have it cover the entire territory of NATO members. Regarding the use of Turkish territory as a possible site for the system, the Turkish side apparently maintained its reservations (Dogan, October 14; Cihan, October 16).

    Speaking to reporters upon his return to Turkey, Gonul, however, did not rule out Turkey’s participation. Gonul rejected labeling Turkey’s stance as simply putting up objections, noting that the two sides were negotiating, which will continue until the Lisbon summit. Interestingly, Gates also denied speculation that the US was pressuring Turkey and said they were simply continuing negotiations with an ally. Gonul preferred to highlight the potential benefits of the missile shield for Turkey’s own security. Referring to some smaller scale defense systems Turkey is undertaking, Gonul maintained that if a future NATO missile shield also covers Turkey, it might help the country save huge costs (Zaman, October 16, October 17).

    Gonul apparently sees some opportunity for Turkey to participate in the missile shield project, since most of the costs would be borne by the United States. Turkey has considered missile defense systems since the 1990’s, but has failed to build an operational system, given its inability to shoulder the enormous costs of such a project and its limited technological know-how. One Turkish defense expert, Mustafa Kibaroglu, stressed that Turkey might opt to benefit from this project by seeking to gain a say in the decision making processes of the system and sharing technological expertise (Hurriyet Daily News, October 20).

    During his trip to the US where he attended the 29th annual American-Turkish Council (ATC) conference in Washington, Gonul, accompanied by Turkish government officials and diplomats, continued the talks on the issue with their American counterparts. “Contrary to some press reports, we are not pressuring Turkey to make a contribution. But we do look to Turkey to support NATO’s adoption at the Lisbon summit of a territorial missile defense capability,” Gates said, underscoring the ongoing difficulties in bridging the differences of opinion (Today’s Zaman, October 20).

    Unlike Davutoglu, who has been the architect of Turkey’s controversial Iran policy, Gonul might be less concerned about Turkey’s Iran portfolio and more sympathetic to the idea of benefiting from the missile shield project. Nonetheless, Ankara’s reservations over the ramifications of the project for its relations with its neighbors still run deep. Davutoglu has emphasized on many occasions that Turkey does not perceive any threats from the Middle East, and recently added that regional countries do not pose a threat to NATO, either (www.cnnturk.com, October 20).

    Turkey might increasingly find itself between a rock and a hard place. Irrespective of whether NATO designates any targets, Iran, whom the US has already dubbed as a “rogue state,” might nonetheless perceive the missile shield as a threat. Turkey, thus, will find it hard to explain its support for the missile shield to its Middle Eastern neighbors, especially as it pursues a “zero problems with neighbors” policy and forges deeper regional integration in the Middle East. In contrast, given the deep-running problems currently bedeviling US-Turkish relations, caused by the row over the Iranian nuclear issue and Turkey’s disputes with Israel, Turkey might not afford to be the deal-breaker at NATO. Ankara already sparked the ire of the US and other NATO members, when it contemplated vetoing Rasmussen’s election last year (EDM, April 6, 2009).

    Nonetheless, it may still be too early to determine the conditions under which Turkey could give its consent. Indeed, Turkey might prefer to continue “negotiations” on this issue until the Lisbon summit, and perhaps beyond.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-maintains-reservations-about-us-missile-defense/