Tag: Kurds

Can Turkey seize the ‘Kurdish card’ for itself?

By Soner Cagaptay, Special to CNN

Editor’s note: Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. His publications include the forthcoming book ‘Turkey Rising: The 21st Century’s First Muslim Power.’ The views expressed are his own.

Turkey’s Syria policy now seems to have one goal: take down the al-Assad regime. With this in mind, Ankara has become actively involved in the Syrian uprising, supporting the opposition and allegedly allowing weapons to flow into Syria to help oust Bashar al-Assad. But not everyone vying for power in post-al-Assad Syria has welcomed Turkey’s helping hand.

Enter the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Ankara’s archenemy for decades. The PKK and its Syrian franchise, the Party for Democratic Unity (PYD), which holds sway over the Syrian Kurds, have recently secured parts of northern Syria adjacent to Turkey. This suggests that when the al-Assad regime falls, Turkey will be confronted with PKK and PYD-run enclaves across from its border with Syria.

As hostile as the PKK has been towards Ankara, though, the PKK cannot afford to carry this menacing anti-Turkish attitude into Syria. After al-Assad is gone, the Syrian Kurds represented in the PYD will discover that they are fated to become woefully dependent on Ankara for survival, much like the Iraqi Kurds were after the end of the Saddam regime in Iraq.

Simple geography dictates this. The PYD holds sway among the Syrian Kurds in the northwestern part of that country. These Kurdish-dominated areas are non-contiguous enclaves, surrounded by Arab majority areas with Turkey to the north. One emerging battle in Syria is conflict between Arabs and Kurds. When that struggle fully unfolds, the Kurds in northwestern Syria will have no friend but Turkey to rely on as leverage against that country’s majority Arabs. This will present the PKK in Syria with a stark choice: fight both Turkey and the Arabs on all four sides and perish, or rely on Turkey to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the country’s Arab majority. Survival will require the second path, and as surreal as it sounds now, the PKK’s Syrian branch will acquiesce to Turkish power.

More from GPS: Why U.S. should rethink Syria Kurds policy

This corresponds to a seismic shift in Turkey’s Kurdish policy. Until recently, Ankara had seen the “Kurdish card” in the region as a threat to its core interests. Now, this appears to be changing. Ankara has reportedly built intimate commercial and political ties with the Iraqi Kurds. Now, Ankara wants something similar with the Syrian Kurds. If the PKK in Syria is deft enough to curry favor with Ankara, Ankara will return the favor.

The Turkish Kurds are the last piece of the puzzle. If recently announced peace talks between the Ankara government and jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan succeed, Turkey may be able to turn the “Kurdish card” to its favor.

If the peace talks go as planned, PKK members will lay down their weapons. In return, Turkey would issue a blanket amnesty to the group’s core membership currently located at the Kandil enclave in northern Iraq, and possibly grant some cultural rights to its Kurdish population. And Ocalan, who has been in solitary confinement in an island jail, will see an end to his isolation.

Still, the Syrian Kurds in the PKK’s Kandil enclave in mountainous northern Iraq could spoil this process. Many among the PKK’s membership, especially those from Turkey, will listen to Ocalan. But some hardline leaders could refuse to buy into what they might perceive as a personal deal to set himself free.

All this means that while the PKK in Syria will moderate its behavior towards Turkey because it has to, the Syrian Kurds in the PKK will likely maintain a hardline stance against Ankara.

Turkey may be able to preempt such a scenario by showing the Kurds in Syria a degree of friendship that exceeds even the outreach it has shown to the Iraqi Kurds. Such a strategy might help placate the animosity of the Syrian Kurds in Kandil towards Ankara, though it will not fix the problem.

For now, it appears that while the PKK in Syria will not bite Turkey, Syrian Kurds in the Kandil enclave will remain the biggest hurdle to Turkey being able to claim the Kurdish card for itself.

Post by: CNN’s Jason Miks

via Can Turkey seize the ‘Kurdish card’ for itself? – Global Public Square – CNN.com Blogs.

February 7, 2013
How Turkey Can Make Peace With the Kurds

How Turkey Can Make Peace With the Kurds

By ALIZA MARCUS

THE assassination of three Kurdish activists in Paris last week has raised fears that the true target was peace talks between Turkey and the rebel Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or the P.K.K. But the so-called peace process was already in shambles before the killings, which have not been solved.

Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, claims that he wants a deal to end nearly 30 years of war between the state and the P.K.K. rebels. But he has yet to take the decisive action needed for a credible peace process. Until he understands that the Kurdish problem in Turkey is about politics and identity, and not just about getting the guerrillas to withdraw from Turkey and give up their weapons, there will be no hope for peace.

The head of Turkish intelligence, Hakan Fidan, has recently been holding talks with the imprisoned P.K.K. leader, Abdullah Ocalan. Turkey’s intelligence services have had discussions with Mr. Ocalan since he was captured in February 1999, but to no avail.

The problem is that Mr. Ocalan may not be the right partner to negotiate with. He is held in extreme isolation on an island prison, with all communication vetted by his jailers. He received a television in his cell for the first time just a few days ago. Visits must be approved, and rarely are. This means that Mr. Ocalan has limited knowledge of developments in the Kurdish region of Turkey. And while he remains the head of the P.K.K., he has no practical control over the rebels’ day-to-day operations.

Even if he were in control, the highly authoritarian Mr. Ocalan is not necessarily the man to ensure democracy for Turkey’s Kurds. During the nearly two decades he was based in Syria, Mr. Ocalan consolidated power by killing or isolating challengers.

A viable peace deal must answer Kurdish demands for human rights in a manner that protects the views of all Kurds, not just those of Mr. Ocalan and the P.K.K. And the best way to do this is through the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party, known as the B.D.P., which won seats in Turkey’s parliament in 2011 and can genuinely claim to represent Kurdish aspirations.

Mr. Erdogan needs to recognize that the way to peace is through politics. Instead of engaging solely with Mr. Ocalan, as if the P.K.K. rebellion were purely a security problem, he must craft a political process that addresses Kurds’ grievances about cultural rights and autonomy, giving the rebels a reason to lay down their weapons.

To end the conflict, which has killed more than 40,000 people and hampered Turkey’s ability to exert its clout in the Middle East, Turkey needs to do three things.

First, Mr. Erdogan must unequivocally commit to a negotiated process that includes compromises by both sides. While Turkey’s territorial integrity should not be up for debate, everything else should be. Mr. Erdogan has generally been dismissive of Kurdish grievances. In a recent interview, he said there was no need to instruct Kurdish students in their native tongue, because they can already study the language as an elective. Instead of belittling Kurds’ cultural demands, he should demonstrate good faith by pushing through stalled constitutional and legal reforms, including changes to constitutional provisions that restrict the use of the Kurdish language in schools, punish criticism of the Turkish state and define citizenship through the prism of Turkish identity.

Second, Mr. Erdogan needs to understand that disarming the P.K.K. won’t come at the beginning of the peace process, but at the end. He can, and should, ask for a cease-fire agreement, but it cannot be a one-sided call for Kurdish surrender. To silence the P.K.K.’s guns while talks are under way, Turkey will also have to suspend its military operations against rebels in the southeast and in northern Iraq.

Third, Turkey shouldn’t limit itself to negotiating with an imprisoned authoritarian figurehead; it should also negotiate with the B.D.P. Unlike the P.K.K., the B.D.P. has legal recognition. But it also has legitimacy among Kurds due to its close ties to the P.K.K.; its members share the P.K.K.’s political goals of Kurdish autonomy and recognize Mr. Ocalan as a leader of the Kurds. This is what makes the B.D.P. a serious negotiating partner; the party can be an effective conduit for P.K.K. demands and help devise a viable democratic reform package in Parliament.

more :

Aliza Marcus is the author of “Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence.”

via How Turkey Can Make Peace With the Kurds – NYTimes.com.

January 17, 2013
Kurdish Leader: Turkey Will Impede Kurdish Aspirations in post-Assad Syria

By ADIB ABDULMAJID

image Turkish troops deployed along the Turkish-Syrian border, Oct. 2012. Photo: AFP.

AMSTERDAM, Netherlands – Turkey opposes greater political power for Syrian Kurds and will impede Kurdish aspirations in a democratic Syria that emerges after the fall of President Bashar al-Assad, the head of the Kurdish Progressive Party in Syria (PPKS) said.

“Turkey is quite concerned with the Kurdish situation in post-Assad Syria, and the Turkish government wants to make sure that Syrian Kurds will not benefit from any transitional phase in the country,” Abdulhamid Darwish told Alkurdiya News on Monday.

He said that Ankara would use “its influence on the opposition in general and on its ally, the Muslim Brotherhood, in particular” to clamp down on Kurdish aspirations.

According to Darwish, Syria’s new opposition coalition was founded under European and American sponsorship in order to guarantee the future of Syrian minorities.

“However, the coalition cannot get rid of the influence of some regional powers, especially Turkey, which is obsessed with a chauvinistic mentality and works hard to impede any possible liberty for the persecuted minorities in Syria, especially the Kurds,” he said.

Darwish added that Syria’s new opposition coalition is a modified body of the Syrian National Council (SNC), adding that the position of the Kurdish Supreme Committee (KSC) in Syria inside the coalition will be similar to the Kurdish National Council’s attitude toward the SNC.

Darwish argued that the opposition coalition cannot be regarded as a ruling party, so the Kurds do not count on it to achieve Kurdish rights.

“The only thing we expect from the coalition is to explicitly recognize our demands as ‘legitimate,” and declare a clear position on the Kurdish issue in Syria,” he said.

Many Kurdish activists blame Kurdish political forces for failing to take the lead in the Syrian civil war.

Siyamend Ahmad, a Kurdish activist in the city of Qamishli, told Rudaw that the KSC wants to blame its inability to respond to the needs of the Kurdish people to a potential intervention of countries like Turkey in the situation in Syria.

Unfortunately, some Kurdish political parties claim that Turkey prevents them from taking any steps forward to achieve what they actually couldn’t achieve,” Ahmad argued.

He added that Turkey is absolutely supporting the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria for some agenda, “but that doesn’t mean to claim that Turkey is behind the suffering of our people in the entire Kurdish region in Syria.”

Ciwan Issa, member of the Union of Kurdish Coordination Committees, said that different Kurdish forces should unify in order to gain a greater voice inside the opposition coalition.

“Only then will we stop blaming outside forces like Turkey, and face challenges without fear.”

via Rudaw.net – English – Kurdish Leader: Turkey Will Impede Kurdish Aspirations in post-Assad Syria.

January 6, 2013
The Balkanization of Iran

Iran has always presented a thorn in the eye of Western policy makers since the Pahlavi dynasty and its resurgent nationalism. Being strategically located in a position that affords it to patrol and play a significant part in monitoring and controlling the flux of forty percent of the world’s oil flows, the foreign policies of superpower governments teetered between soliciting Iranian support and stability through backing and the focused undermining of Iranian regional power. Throughout modern history, we have seen both policy aims carried out with effect. The crux of the issue is Iran’s power to blockade the Strait of Hormuz and its military capability to do so. Looming over this immediate outcome is Iran’s power as a multiethnic nation state with vast oil, mineral, and gas resources. Its large coastline with the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea also affords it power that it is able to project within the spheres of the Gulf States, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. One of the aims of Iran’s nuclear program is to solidify its hold on regional power and prevent any foreign intrigue from upsetting this influence.

This is why the response to Iran’s nuclear program won’t just be surgical strikes. In the short term, a surgical strike or any other military action aimed at destabilizing Iran and setting back its atomic aims will do exactly that, but it will not curb Iran’s two main resources- human capital in the form of knowledge and raw material wealth. This is where separatism comes into play. The majority of Iran’s oil and gas resources are located in the Khuzestan and Hormozgan provinces, home to many ethnic Arabs. Another large chunk of oil and gas is located near and within the Caspian Sea; areas inhabited by ethnic Azeris. Any policy of providing a mortal blow to Iran will factor in ethnic tensions and the creation of new nation-states from the mammoth corpse of what used to be known as Iran. The establishment of a Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was one of the efforts put into separatism, and while unsuccessful, it demonstrated that with enough foreign funding and support, an independent republic carved out of one of Iran’s minority-held provinces is feasible and beneficial for multiple parties. A resourceless Iran poses no threat to Arab states, the increasing regional power of Azerbaijan, nor the struggling states of Pakistan and Afghanistan. And without such resources, Iran doesn’t stand a chance at mobilizing its human capital in nation-strengthening efforts that could potentially pose a threat.

The policy does, however, pose some risks. For one, a Kurdistan carved out of Iran will destabilize and effectively plunge Turkey into ethnic war. Already, an autonomous Kurdish republic is in effect in the state of Iraq, and has also gone into effect in Syria. The next steps are Iran and Turkey- Iran being the weaker and more unstable holder of Kurd-inhabited territories. A war with Iran will provide the instability and resource sapping necessary for the formation of an autonomous Kurdistan in western Iran. The trouble starts when the Kurds of Turkey begin to demand their own autonomy. Perhaps it is a worthwhile deal for Turkish inclusion into Europe, and for the promotion of stability in a region haunted by war and sectarianism. What remains to be seen is whether the Kurds, given autonomy in Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Turkey, will opt to secede and form a resource-rich nation-state. However, it seems the Kurdistan dilemma is an inevitability; preventing 45 million people from forming a nation-state is an uphill battle for all parties involved.

Any formation of an Arab state from Southwestern Iran would serve the goal of limiting Iran’s coastline in the Gulf and resource wealth. It would be eagerly supported by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Kingdoms, and with enough repression from Iran, will evoke international support. This will effectively cripple Iran as a nation and plunge it into Afghanistan-grade poverty within several generations. The question of Azerbaijan remains. While separatists and pan-Turkists declare that Iranian Azeris suffer discrimination, facts on the ground hold otherwise. Azeris serve high positions in Iranian society and politics, and enjoy lifestyles similar to ethnic Persians. Furthermore, the historical link of the land of Azerbaijan (northern and southern) is part and parcel of Iranian history. The Land of Fire was the hub of Zoroastrianism and Persian culture for eons. It is unclear whether separatism will take hold as a popular sentiment in Iranian Azerbaijan. It is greatly dependent on how well the Republic of Azerbaijan in the north does in the coming years, as it fosters greater relations with the United States and Europe. If standard of living and economic mobility in the country rise simultaneously as quality of life, political and social repression, and economic rot plague Iran, the desire to join their brothers in the north will increase.

And why would international players be apprehensive about this option in the long run? The momentary instability that will rise from carving new states out of Iranian territory is a tradeoff that pales in comparison the the benefits of stronger trading partners in the area, the goodwill of neighboring countries, and the loss of the threat to oil flow in the Gulf and the Caucasus. An Iran without Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, and Khuzestan will be an immobile and poverty-stricken land. The secession of barren Baluchistan will also rob Iran of its rich mineral resources. The goal is to ensure Iran will never pose a threat to international interests in the Middle East- without the resources and strategic advantages it holds, it will never be able to pose such a threat again. Minority groups may be apprehensive- they may hold the belief that they have greater opportunities as Iranians in socioeconomic mobility, yet a concerted support and funding effort from the international community can dissolve such apprehension at the prospect of separation.

Iran is “The Land of the Aryans” much as Yugoslavia was the land of the Slavs. It does not have a consistent national identity that rests on three pillars- language, ethnicity, and religion. Thus far, religion is the tie that binds many Iranians, and to an extent, language. This is why Iran is adamant on excluding Azeri and Kurdish as national tongues, as such moves may dissolve Iranian national unity. A state without a national identity resting on the aforementioned pillars provides a tempting opportunity for more powerful players to play the ethnic tension card. In this sense, whatever Iranian government in power must learn to adeptly play at identity politics and mitigate the forces of separatism and ethnic division. Thus far, all of Iran’s governments have done poorly in mitigating these differences, often resulting in crises and near-losses for the nation state of Iran. As Iran’s tension with the international community grows, a dismembered Land of the Aryans continues to become a very real possibility in our lifetime.

Source: iranian.com

December 24, 2012
Kurdish prisoners in Turkey end hunger strike

Hundreds of Kurdish prisoners have ended a 68-day hunger strike after an appeal from jailed former leader Abdullah Ocalan. The prisoners were demanding more rights for the Kurdish population in Turkey and better jail conditions for Ocalan.

Members of a pro-Kurdish party stand behind a banner reading “They are dying” as they start on November 17, 2012 a two-day hunger strike in support of the several hundreds Kurdish inmates who have been on hunger strike for 67 days in Ankara. (AFP Photo / Adem Altan)

Ocalan was sentenced to death in 1999, but the term was commuted to life imprisonment following the abolition of the death penalty in Turkey in 2002. Most of the prisoners on strike are serving time for alleged links to the PKK, and are deemed terrorists by Turkey and its Western allies.

Turkey’s government has tried to reconcile with members of the Kurdish minority, which makes up nearly 30 percent of the country’s population. However, activists who seek autonomy in the mostly Kurdish southeast say state concessions have not gone far enough.

Ocalan is serving his sentence in solitary confinement on an island near Istanbul.

On Saturday, his brother Mehmet said Ocalan told him that the hunger strike had “achieved its goal.”

Doctors recently warned that many of the strikers were in imminent danger of starving to death. However, authorities have not indicated that the conditions of Ocalan’s detention will be changed.

via Kurdish prisoners in Turkey end hunger strike (PHOTOS) — RT.

November 19, 2012
New Statistics Reveal the Size of Turkey’s Kurdish Population

The most populated cities of Turkey are Istanbul, Konya, Urfa, Diyarbakir and Izmir, consecutively. Photo: AFP.

DIYARBAKIR, Turkey – The Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) recently published the birth records of Kurdish citizens in Turkey.

According to these records, there are 22,691,824 Kurds in Turkey, mostly born in Kurdish cities in the southeast of the country. Therefore, out of Turkey’s 74.7 million citizens, more than 30 percent are Kurds. These records only include people who have been registered at official government institutions.

After the founding of the Turkish Republic, the first census was carried out in 1927. According to that census, the Turkish population was 13,464,564. At that time, Serhat was the most populous Kurdish city with 38,000 residents. The second most populous city was Dilok.

Official census records show that the Kurdish population in 1927 was 2,323,359. This number increased to 3,850,723 in 1950, to 5,147,680 in 1960 and to 10,505,672 in 1990.

According to TurkStat, the number of Kurds in Kurdish cities of Turkey in 2000 was 12,751,808; in 2012, this number increased to 14,733,894.

There are 8,902 Kurdish villages, 108 towns and 275 districts, according to TurkStat.

In the 2000 census, only residents of Kurdish cities were taken into account. From 1990 to 1997, under the pretext of security measures, around 4,000 Kurdish villages were evacuated and destroyed. The villagers left for other Turkish towns, and thus were not taken into account in this census.

Rohat Alakom, a researcher and writer, said that there are 102 Kurdish villages in Ankara, 75 in Konya, 44 in Kirsehir, 17 in Aksaray, 41 in Yozgat-Tokat-Amasya, 23 in Kaysari and 26 in Cankiri and Kizilirmak. There are around 313 Kurdish villages in central Anatolia.

Additionally, a large number of Anatolian Kurds have fled to European countries. There are no official records of the number of the Kurds in central Anatolia, but it is estimated to be no less than 1 million people.

Kurdish researcher and historian Jalili Jalil has presented an important document related to the Gozanogullari that shows a 1888 message from Suleyman Beg, a Gozanogullari member, directed to the Russian ambassador in which he presented himself as a Kurd.

TurkStat also published the number of the migrants. The largest number of migrants appears to be those who left Mardin for Izmir. There are also many Adana migrants in Urfa, and Arzrum migrants in Bursa.

The real number of Kurds cannot be determined with these statistics, but can give an idea of the actual figures.

Not all those who were born in Kurdish cities are Kurds. There are many other ethnicities who live in Kurdish regions but have been counted as Kurds due to their place of birth.

But, taking 22.7 million as the number of Kurds and adding the 1 million who live in central Anatolia and other regions, then subtracting the number of citizens of other ethnicities who live in the Kurdish regions, leads to an acceptable figure of around 20 million.

Turkstat has published the census records of 81 provinces of Turkey. They include the place of birth and the number of the citizens.

The most populated cities of Turkey are Istanbul, Konya, Urfa, Diyarbakir and Izmir, consecutively. The least populated cities are Yalova, Bayburt and Bilecik. The least populated Kurdish cities are Kilis and Jolemerg.

via Rudaw in English….The Happening: Latest News and Multimedia about Kurdistan, Iraq and the World – New Statistics Reveal the Size of Turkey’s Kurdish Population.

September 21, 2012