Tag: Kurdistan Regional Government

  • Turkey Is Drawn into Iraqi Affairs

    Turkey Is Drawn into Iraqi Affairs

    Turkey Is Drawn into Iraqi Affairs

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 84
    May 3, 2012
    By: Saban Kardas
    The developments in Iraqi domestic politics, coupled with their regional implications, continue to drag Turkey deeper into Middle Eastern affairs, while its involvement in the Syrian conflict already occupies a large part of Ankara’s foreign policy agenda. The ongoing power struggle between Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his opponents on the one hand, and the complicated relationship between the central government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq on the other have taken an interesting turn, creating reverberations for Turkey’s regional policies.

    In the wake of the withdrawal of US forces, Maliki has moved to consolidate his power, threatening to undermine the delicate balance between various sectarian and ethnic groups. Maliki, who assumed his current post following a 2010 power sharing agreement, has failed to work toward national reconciliation. On the contrary, in this already fractured country, he has even undermined the governing coalition and also put Iraq on a collision course. His campaign against Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, who took refuge in Northern Iraq fearing for his life, crystallized the power struggle. The dispute grew into an impasse, with the increasingly harsher tone of the parties, engulfing Turkey (EDM, January 18). After spending some time in Kurdistan, Hashemi visited Saudi Arabia and Doha and later came to Turkey, effectively beginning his days in “exile.” Calling openly for Ankara’s support, Hashimi also furthered its involvement in his country’s affairs (Anadolu Ajansi, April 10).

    A parallel process concerned Iraqi Kurds. The KRG’s relationship to Baghdad is complicated over the status of the disputed city of Kirkuk and the conflict over revenues from the exploration of natural resources in the North. In the ongoing standoff, the leader of KRG, Masoud Barzani, supports Hashimi and has used the leverage he gained to further bolster his position in Iraqi domestic politics. Last month, Barzani suggested he could hold a referendum to redefine ties to Baghdad. In a move that further accentuated this trend, during his trip to the US earlier this month, Barzani urged Washington to reconsider its backing of Maliki. Then, Barzani visited Turkey to meet with Hashimi and Turkish leaders (Anadolu Ajansi, April 20).

    Barzani’s visit also underscored the degree to which Turkey has readjusted its regional policies. After years of confrontation with the KRG, Turkey already moved to normalize its relations with the Northern Iraqi Kurdish leadership to solicit their backing for Ankara’s fight against the PKK. In the wake of the latest developments, Ankara has further moved toward Iraqi Kurds to cope with the challenges in Iraqi domestic politics.

    In the region, too, Turkey faces a similar fluid environment. With the unfolding of the Syrian uprising, Ankara’s partnerships in the region have gone through a new reshuffling. Faced with Tehran’s support for the Syrian regime and its backing of Iraq’s Maliki, Turkey’s coordination of its policies with the Syrian opposition, Iraqi opposition and the Gulf countries raise interesting questions about the patterns of Ankara’s alignment.

    These realignments lead some to suggest that Turkey has been drawn into sectarian groupings but the Turkish government rejects those claims. Ankara justified its support for the Syrian opposition on the principles of human rights and democracy, rather than any sectarian affiliation. In Iraq, Turkey again refrained from framing its support for the Sunni leader Hashimi in sectarian terms and instead underlined the divisive nature of Maliki’s policies.

    However, such statements from Turkish officials have far from convinced the Iraqi leadership. Maliki, already critical of Turkey’s policy on Syria, reacted harshly to recent developments and, in a press release, accused Turkey of interfering in Iraqi internal affairs and acting in a hostile manner (Milliyet, April 21). Reflecting the new regional realignment, Maliki then paid a two-day visit to Tehran on April 22-23, where he met with key Iranian leaders. In his first visit after his reelection, Maliki expressed solidarity with the Iranian leadership and vowed to work in tandem on regional issues (www.presstv.ir, April 23).

    Both Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan and Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave a very strong reaction to Maliki’s remarks. On his way back from Doha, where he discussed Middle East issues with his regional counterparts, Erdogan called Maliki insincere and maintained that his oppressive policies threatened to divide Iraq. Suggesting that Maliki himself might have a sectarian agenda, Erdogan insisted that Ankara was in communication with all Iraqi groups including Shiite leaders (Sabah, April 22). The MFA’s statement also referred to Maliki’s attempts to monopolize power and exclude others as the basis of the current crisis in Iraq (www.mfa.gov.tr, April 21). Both countries summoned each other’s diplomats posted to the respective capitals over the developments.

    To Turkey’s credit, concerns over Maliki’s course are indeed shared by a larger number of Iraqi actors, including Shiite groups. Increasingly, the inability of Maliki to build up coalitions with other groups and the weakening of the ties between Baghdad and the provinces, most notably Northern Iraq, are criticized by major Iraqi actors. Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr also visited Northern Iraq for the first time, in an effort to establish bridges between the parties (Anadolu Ajansi, April 26).

    For years, Turkey has worked to ensure a smooth political transition in Iraq. Ankara’s policy was based on the understanding that if national reconciliation cannot be achieved, it could deepen the fragmentation and pave the way for an independent Kurdish state, not to mention other damaging repercussions for regional peace. It was for this reason that Ankara supported the Maliki-led government, although its initial preferences after the Iraqi elections had been different. With the ongoing political crisis and tensions in the region, Turkey has increasingly found itself on the same page as the KRG.

    For his part, Barzani apparently hopes to deepen his cooperation with Turkey to further consolidate his position in Iraq. This development inevitably raises speculations as to whether the Iraqi Kurds might press for independence or a greater degree of autonomy from Baghdad, which, ironically, will put Turkey in a difficult position. Given Ankara’s own concerns about an independent Kurdish state and the Kurds’ claims over Kirkuk, Turkey’s support for Barzani will be conditional and it will hardly be the midwife to an independent Kurdistan.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-is-drawn-into-iraqi-affairs/
  • Kurdish Question Dominates Turkish Politics

    Kurdish Question Dominates Turkish Politics

    By: Saban Kardas

    Kurdish unrest in Turkey.
    Kurdish unrest in Turkey.

    Having received unequivocal backing from voters in the constitutional referendum, the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) has moved to address Turkey’s structural problems, most notably the Kurdish question, through a combination of domestic measures, as well as regional and international diplomacy.

    The resolution of the Kurdish issue has been one of the main targets of the AKP government. The AKP first sought to address this issue through domestic political reforms in the early 2000’s, also benefiting from the relative calm prevailing in southeastern Anatolia, thanks to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) suspending its operations. However, granting greater cultural rights to the Kurds as part of Turkey’s EU accession process or devising socio-economic policies proved to be ineffective. The threat posed by the PKK’s separatist terrorism lingered, as the organization managed to maintain its manpower in safe havens in Northern Iraq.

    The PKK’s resumption of its campaign of violence in the second half the decade caught Ankara by surprise, triggering a heated debate. Faced with the PKK’s deadly attacks against Turkish military outposts from its bases in Northern Iraq, the AKP bowed to pressure and considered seriously pursuing stronger military measures to tackle this problem. Coordinating its policies with the US and the Northern Iraqi Kurdish authorities, the Turkish army undertook incursions into Northern Iraq in pursuit of PKK militants in the winter of 2007-2008. Greater security cooperation and intelligence sharing between Turkey, the US and Iraq, or the enhanced military operations inside Turkey could put an end to the PKK’s terrorist attacks.

    Meanwhile, the AKP government launched an ambitious “Kurdish opening” in 2009, yet failed to garner popular and political support for the measure. The government’s mishandling of the opening, coupled with the PKK’s and pro-Kurdish parties’ uncooperative attitude turned the entire Kurdish initiative into a near fiasco (Terrorism Monitor, February 19). The government could change the terms of the debate only through its smart moves to table the constitutional amendment package in the first part of 2010, arguing that the Kurdish issue could also be addressed as part of a broader “democratization agenda” (EDM, May 5).

    PKK violence, however, continued throughout the spring and summer, which exposed the failure of the Turkish security apparatus in fighting against the PKK formations inside and outside Turkey (Terrorism Monitor, July 8). The escalation of the conflict could be avoided only through the PKK’s declaration of a unilateral ceasefire prior to the referendum, which was partly facilitated by some civil society organizations. Following the referendum, the PKK sent signals that it would resume its campaign, unless Turkish security forces halted their operations by a self-declared deadline of September 20. A deadly mine explosion killing nine civilians on September 16 reignited the debate on terrorism (www.haber7.com, September 16). Though the PKK denied its involvement in the attack, it was a stark reminder that the PKK remained a potent force that could deal a serious blow to Turkey’s security. The PKK decided to extend the “non-action” period until this week as a goodwill gesture (Radikal, September 20).

    Moreover, the success of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in boycotting the referendum in the Kurdish-speaking provinces reiterated once again that the ethnic Kurdish movement still enjoys substantial support in the region and continues to harbor ambitious demands for greater political rights. Indeed, the BDP representatives even went as far as demanding democratic autonomy (EDM, September 20).

    Faced with this double-edged challenge, the AKP now seeks to address this issue through complex diplomatic traffic. There have been numerous visits undertaken by cabinet members and security bureaucrats. Turkish Interior Minister, Besir Atalay, was in Arbil over the weekend, where Kurdistan Regional Government sources expressed their support for Turkey’s fight against terrorism and the peaceful resolution to the problem (www.trt.net.tr, September 27). He is expected to soon meet his Syrian and Iraqi counterparts. The Head of the Turkish Intelligence Agency, Hakan Fidan, visited Washington last week, and might visit northern Iraq soon. On September 28, a US delegation led by Lloyd James Austin, commanding general of the American forces in Iraq, visited Turkey to discuss the joint efforts (Yeni Safak, September 29).

    These contacts are undertaken within the framework of a joint “action plan” agreed in April to combat the PKK, as a result of the trilateral security mechanism between Turkey, the US and Iraq (IHA, April 11). Through closer cooperation with the US and the Iraqi Kurds, the action plan would have helped Turkey to take stronger military measures to eliminate the threat posed by the PKK, which to date has proved ineffective.

    Although the recent initiatives also seek to address the security aspects of PKK terrorism, security cooperation through the trilateral mechanism might be secondary to the AKP government’s policy of exploring a non-military solution to the problem in a new political setting. The goal of the contacts is to somehow convince the PKK to extend its unilateral ceasefire, halt its operations inside Turkey, and turn its non-action into a permanent truce (Hurriyet Daily News, September 27). Once the guns fall silent, the government hopes to find a suitable environment within which it can address the Kurdish problem through domestic political reforms.

    The crux of the issue is what will happen to the thousands of PKK militants. In this process, the PKK will possibly withdraw its forces from Turkey into Northern Iraq. In the most optimistic scenario, PKK militants might voluntarily turn themselves in and reintegrate themselves into civilian life, if the AKP’s democratic solution succeeds. Since this is highly unlikely, Turkey expects the Iraqi Kurds and the US to take steps towards the disarmament of these PKK militants and eventually end the PKK’s military presence.

    However, given the uncertainty over the future of Iraq and the US military presence in the region, it might be unrealistic to expect either the US or the Iraqi Kurds to demilitarize the PKK. Turkey will still need to maintain its operational capability to carry out operations inside Iraq, as reflected by the government’s decision to table a motion for the extension of the Turkish army’s mandate to do so. It seems that there is no easy choice between the use of force and diplomacy.

    https://jamestown.org/program/kurdish-question-dominates-turkish-politics/

  • The Kurdistan Regional Government Launches Oil Exports through Turkey

    The Kurdistan Regional Government Launches Oil Exports through Turkey

    The Kurdistan Regional Government Launches Oil Exports through Turkey

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 105
    June 2, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has started to export its oil to European markets, under partnerships with Turkish and other international energy companies. Following a new consensus on the distribution of revenues between the central administration in Baghdad and the KRG, oil from the Tawke and Taq Taq fields will be transported via the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan in the Mediterranean.

    A crucial aspect of the project has been the entry of international companies into the flourishing regional economy. The KRG has tried to attract foreign investment as a means to generate wealth and consolidate its authority within northern Iraq. Having successfully attracted foreign capital, the KRG signed independent contracts for the development of the oil fields, which caused a dispute with the central Iraqi government. In May, KRG officials announced that they received Baghdad’s approval to export oil through Iraqi pipelines (www.krg.org, May 10). Although it allowed these exports, “the central government still refuses to recognize the production-sharing agreements Kurdish authorities have signed with oil firms.” This situation created uncertainty regarding the payment of foreign investors’ revenues, but the statements from KRG officials indicate that this will not become a major issue (Today’s Zaman, June 2).

    A joint venture between the Turkish company Genel Enerji, a subsidiary of the Cukurova group, and the Canadian-Swiss Addax Petroleum will run the operations in the Taq Taq field in Erbil. Their joint investments are valued at over $350 million. The Norwegian DNO operates the Tawke field in Dohuk, where the Genel Elektrik also holds a 25 percent stake (Hurriyet Daily News, June 2). The investors designate Taq Taq as “a potentially world class oil field” (www.addaxpetroleum.com). KRG sources also claim that the oil from this region is high quality and expect the new production to “improve on the overall quality of the present Kirkuk oil mix.” Oil from the Tawke field will be directly transferred to the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik through an auxiliary pipeline. As a temporary measure, the crude from the Taq Taq will first be transported by road to the existing local pipeline networks – and from there it will connect to the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik export pipeline (www.krg.org, May 8).

    Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Company (SOMO) will market the exported oil from both fields and the revenues will be deposited in the federal account. Under the Taq Taq deal, Baghdad will receive 88 percent of the revenues, 17 percent of which will go to the KRG. Foreign investors will receive a 12 percent share. The Tawke deal reportedly has similar stipulations (www.krg.org, May 8; www.alarabiya.net, June 1).

    Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, KRG President Masoud Barzani, KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, as well as other dignitaries from the KRG and representatives of the investors participated in a ceremony held in Erbil to celebrate the export deal. Talabani described this development as a “historic step” and contended that it signified how the Iraqis can work together for the prosperity of the country. In a move to allay concerns over the legality of the contracts, Talabani said “these contracts are legal, constitutional and legitimate and they are in the interests of the Iraqi people” (www.alarabiya.net, June 1).

    Earlier, one KRG representative, Halid Salih, also emphasized that they were acting within the boundaries set by the Iraqi constitution. He noted that they entered into agreements with foreign companies according to the constitution, which granted greater autonomy to regional governments to explore oil following its revisions in 2005 (Cihan Haber Ajansi, June 1).

    Echoing similar sentiments, Nechirvan Barzani described this project as a gift of the KRG to the Iraqi people. He emphasized the KRG’s respect for the central administration, but stressed how hard they worked to secure a fair share of the region’s revenues. Barzani explained that:

        “Fortunately, we possess abundant natural resources … We must use these resources … for the benefit of all the people of Iraq… We signed contracts with international oil companies in order to bring capital, technology, know-how and experience to our region and to the entire country… We are proud to contribute to Iraq’s increased production and revenues. In reality, revenue-sharing will bind us together more than any political slogan” (www.krg.org, June 1).

    Oil exports will begin at an initial rate of around 100,000 barrels per day. 60,000 barrels will be pumped from the Tawke field, while the remaining 40,000 of the light crude will come from the Taq Taq field. Havrami said the crude exports from both fields are expected to reach 250,000 barrels per day within one year, 450,000 barrels per day by the end of 2010 and 1 million barrels per day by 2013. According to current price estimates, within four years, the annual revenues from exports might reach $20 billion (www.tempo24.com.tr, June 2).

    This agreement highlights the prospect for mutually beneficial economic cooperation, if internal political disagreements are set aside. Since the country urgently needs revenues to recover from the effects of a devastating war, the wealth brought by the oil exports might offer further incentives for political reconciliation, and help heal the feud between the KRG and the central administration. Nonetheless, it remains unclear how other political actors within the Iraqi political scene will react. Other than President Talabani, himself a Kurd, non-Kurdish members of the Shiite Arab dominated Iraqi central government did not attend the ceremony, which might indicate some enduring disagreement. Similarly, Iraq’s Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani also reportedly questioned the legality of the KRG’s deal.

    In any case, such joint projects have the potential to boost not only ties between the KRG and the central administration, but also Ankara’s relations with both the KRG and Baghdad. Economic collaboration serves as a major driving force to sustain the existing security cooperation partnership within the region (EDM, April 13).

    https://jamestown.org/program/the-kurdistan-regional-government-launches-oil-exports-through-turkey/