Turkish Forum

Tag: kemalism

  • The Paradox of Religion In Erdogan’s Turkey

    The Paradox of Religion In Erdogan’s Turkey

    Turkey's Prime Minister and leader of ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) Recep Tayyip Erdogan (C), accompanied by his wife, Emine, (front 2nd R), greets his supporters as he enters the hall during his party congress in Ankara, Sept. 30, 2012. (photo by REUTERS/Adem Altan/Pool ) Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/religion-turkey-akp-islamists-zaman-gulen-dagi.html#ixzz2NsQO1Dt0
    Turkey’s Prime Minister and leader of ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) Recep Tayyip Erdogan (C), accompanied by his wife, Emine, (front 2nd R), greets his supporters as he enters the hall during his party congress in Ankara, Sept. 30, 2012. (photo by REUTERS/Adem Altan/Pool )

    By: Tulin Daloglu for Al-Monitor Turkey Pulse

    In a country where there seems to be a mosque on almost every corner, it sounds overblown to claim that pious Muslims are oppressed in Turkey. But since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power over a decade ago, it has been the party line to accuse Kemalist ideology as being Islamophobic and responsible for oppressing and discriminating against practicing Muslims in state, business, and personal affairs.

    About This Article

    Summary :

    Ihsan Dagi of Zaman asks whether conservatives are moving to the center; the answer is just that power is changing hands in Turkey, but not in a democratic way, writes Tulin Daloglu.

    Author: Tulin Daloglu
    Posted on : March 17 2013

    For the AKP, it was the “state” that had an active policy against freedom of religion in Turkey for followers of Sunni Islam.

    Writing at the daily Zaman, the flagship media organ of Turkey’s influential religious movement of Fethullah Gulen’s on Tuesday, March 12, Ihsan Dagi, made a crucial observation: “The most important element of state and society relationship to me is this,” he pointed out. “Many interpret the shift of the conservatives to the center as a natural outcome of democratization. Indeed, it’s true. … But what’s important is the relationship of those conservatives who moved to the center with the ‘state.’

    “Are they encouraging the state to become civilized, or are they becoming the state? What I believe is that … this movement of the conservatives works to the advantage of the state in this power equilibrium between the state and the society.”

    He concludes with this question: “To me, what determines the level of democracy in a country is the number of people who are dependent on the state. Who are those people, and how many are they today who need the state to survive? The secret answer to this question presents the level of democracy in our country.”

    Thinking logically, if there were fewer people dependent on the state today, Dagi would probably not bother to open such a question to debate. There certainly is a problem in today’s Turkey, where people cannot get things done if they are not in good standing with the authorities. For three consecutive terms, Erdogan governments have been exceptionally adept in placing their own like-minded people to all sorts of state institutions. And because people see that they can get things done by getting close to the power, they rally even more when the prime minister escalates his tone and stature in doing business with the state.

    By the same token, the persistent repetition of the slogan that there is no “alternative” to the ruling party does not help the opposition, which consistently plays defense in explaining that they’re also capable of governing the country. This general picture creates a new segment of isolated, and silenced people — rather than closing the gap between practicing and non-practicing Muslims in the Turkish society.

    Many businessmen, who are now outside the loop of the Islamist circles, in talking to Al-Monitor, complain about loss of jobs and wealth because they can’t compete with those inner circles. The ruling party has created its own elites. The Turkish media have not reported much about corruption in the past decade, but the rumors in this country are so persistent that it’s a real issue. Some whisperers claim that no one dares to talk about it — as it’s not possible to stand against the Erdogan government’s robust power, money, and fame triangle. And everyone is feeling a bit scared of coming under the wrong attention and paying a price with their wealth — so many seem to be staying silent out of fear as they have a responsibility to take care of their families.

    The parliamentary commission investigating the illegal wiretappings stated on Thursday, March 14, that the gendarmerie had wiretapped 470,000 people’s telephone communications in the past 11 years. This massive number excludes the wiretappings of the security and intelligence agencies. In 2009, then-Justice Minister Mehmet Ali Sahin said that the security units — still excluding the National Intelligence Service — had wiretapped 70,000 phone lines. The government has refused to provide the new numbers since then. The point is that the public is convinced that those who are wiretapping in these state institutions are all followers of the Fethullah Gulen movement. The public verdict is that they’re everywhere, from the Justice ministry to security agencies. Yet there is now a growing perception that Prime Minister Erdogan has fallen out with this movement — and that not only the Islamist camp is divided (and therefore in a contest of byzantine games), but there are also other camps who are using illegal wiretapping to access privileged information to use to their benefit.

    Politicians like to exploit weaknesses and play up those mistakes of the previous governments to mobilize the constituents to their side. Yet the Erdogan government’s provocative and arrogant politicking of mixing religion and state affairs misses the natural flow of the maturity of the society. It’s been wrong all along to frame the old Turkey as anti-Islam, and cherry-pick examples that are impossible to justify. Why, then, keep looking at the half of the glass that is empty?

    Such politicking does not pave the way for creating a harmonious society that honors and respects differences and values individualism. While no one knows exactly as to how many Turks today are dependent on the state to survive, or who feel obliged to have good relations with authorities for their survival, one thing is clear: At each election cycle, it is not the opposition parties but the AKP which distributes aid to people — and that includes not only food supplies, but even refrigerators and a small amount of investment gold. And there are many who feel grateful for those distributions, and cast their vote accordingly.

    They are certainly not to be blamed for doing that, because they are mostly low-income families. The point is though, the more that this kind of politicking continues, and the more that they follow the trend, the further they will move away from the hope of standing on their own feet, incapable of making their own choices. This is the recipe for reshaping Turkish society in the form of an ummah — a religious community, where individualism is no longer honored. If Turkey continues on this path, many soon will most likely start craving for the days of the old Turkey, where there was more freedom of religion and speech despite all odds — and there was no pressure to act in an expected norm to fit to the trending elites.

    In short, to answer Dagi’s well-posed question, Turkey is not getting democratized. It’s just that the power is changing hands, and a religious dogma is slowly but gradually planting its seeds for the new Turkey.

    Tulin Daloglu is a columnist for Al-Monitor’s Turkey Pulse. She has written extensively for various Turkish and American publications, including The New York Times, International Herald Tribune, The Middle East Times, Foreign Policy, The Daily Star (Lebanon) and the SAIS Turkey Analyst Report.

    Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/religion-turkey-akp-islamists-zaman-gulen-dagi.html#ixzz2NsPy2Z10

  • Turkey: Is Atatürk Dead? Erdogan Islamism Replaces Kemalism

    Turkey: Is Atatürk Dead? Erdogan Islamism Replaces Kemalism

    Turks continue to idolize their staunchly secularist founding father. But democratic reforms have all but obliterated his Westward-looking vision.

    The photograph shows a pair of men in dusty work clothes, saluting proudly as they stand at attention inside a gutted reinforced-concrete building. The caption, in Turkish, tells us that the picture was taken Nov. 10. Every year on that date, the entire country—schools, government offices, hospitals, even traffic—comes to a halt at 9:05 a.m., the exact minute of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s death in 1938. The photo went viral on the Internet this year, desperately offered via Twitter and Facebook as proof that even though an Islamist government has ruled the country for the past decade, modern Turkey’s fiercely rationalist founder remains a source of inspiration to the masses.

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    Once eager to join Europe, Ankara is now turning its gaze eastward instead. (George Georgiou / Panos)

    The question is how much longer Mustafa Kemal can remain on that pedestal. To the people of his country, Atatürk—the sobriquet means “father of the Turks”—has been both a national hero and an ideology, bolstered by decades of indoctrination in the schools and by his ubiquitous image in the form of busts, portraits, statues, figurines, T-shirts, currency, key chains, and even iPhone cases. A reformist Ottoman Army general, he led an independence struggle against the invading Greek, French, and Italian armies after the First World War, culminating in the establishment of a modern republic in 1923.

     

    Under Mustafa Kemal’s leadership, the young republic made a clean break from its Ottoman past nearly nine decades ago, ditching the caliphate for a secular regime and turning away from the empire’s former Arab territories in favor of an anti-clerical, pro-Western vision that became known as Kemalism. He pushed for women’s suffrage, decreed the alphabet’s conversion from Arabic to Latin overnight, established parliamentary government, declared war on Islamic zealotry long before jihadism became a global concern, even banned the Ottoman fez in favor of European-style hats. Turkish schoolbooks today summarize the changes he imposed as “the Atatürk revolutions.”

    Nevertheless, Mustafa Kemal’s staunchly secularist legacy is now being challenged by a new Turkish strongman, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Free at last to espouse and promote his conservative Muslim faith publicly, the prime minister embodies the political aspirations of millions of Turks who have been alienated from the military-backed secular establishment for generations: the rural folk, the urban poor, conservative Muslim clerics, and the rising religiously conservative business classes. While studiously avoiding direct confrontation with Atatürk’s Westernized ideals, Erdogan and other pro-Islamist leaders of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) have inaugurated an era of deep political transformation.

    With the party’s encouragement, many Turks have come to regard Kemalism as an outmoded ideology unsuited to the needs of present-day Turkey’s dynamic society. “I don’t know if Atatürk himself is dead,” says liberal academic and commentator Mehmet Altan. “But Kemalism will eventually die, as Turkey democratizes.” Altan has argued for years against the Kemalist doctrine, calling instead for the creation of a “second republic” that would be less centralized, more inclusive of Kurds and Islamists, and less rigid in its secular and nationalist policies.

    That’s what’s already happening as the Erdogan government dismantles the Kemalist establishment. The military, once the country’s most powerful political force and the self-proclaimed guardian of secularism, has been relegated to the barracks and publicly reprimanded for the series of coups that have stunted democracy’s growth since Atatürk’s death. Religious conservatism is on the rise, and Ankara has turned its attention away from the country’s longstanding bid for European Union membership, seeking instead a more prominent role in the Middle East and the former Ottoman lands. Vestiges of the old Kemalist order—the headscarf ban on university campuses, restrictions on use of the Kurdish language, Soviet-style commemorations held in stadiums on national days—have nearly disappeared.

    And yet liberal democrats like Altan are not happy. Many feel that Erdogan’s government has lost its reformist drive, becoming authoritarian and single-mindedly Islamic instead. Intellectuals who once supported Erdogan against the military now complain about his efforts to control the media, his intolerance for dissent, and his halfhearted concessions to Kurdish demands. “Politics in Turkey has always been a struggle between the barracks and the mosque,” says Altan. “Because we never had a proper capitalist class, the Army represented the bourgeoisie, and the mosque represented the underprivileged. With AKP, we thought a democracy would emerge out of the mosque. But instead what we got was simply the revenge of the mosque.”

    A year ago Altan finally became one of the many journalists who have lost their jobs for criticizing Erdogan. It’s the same penalty commentators used to incur for finding fault with Atatürk. Altan grieves for the fading of Turkey’s European dreams. Bringing European standards to Turkey’s democracy was the only possible solution for the conflict between the secularists and the Islamists, he says. “But the EU reforms have stopped, and the government’s Islamic reflexes are more obvious now, making the division even sharper.”

    The Kemalists appear to have lost their 90-year political battle. Hundreds of military personnel and hard-core secularists are currently in jail for alleged roles in various coup investigations. In last year’s general elections, the country’s top secular opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP)—founded by Atatürk himself—drew only 26 percent of the vote, versus 50 percent for the AKP. And although “insulting Atatürk” remains a crime under the Turkish penal code, prosecutors seldom if ever bother to file such charges these days.

    And yet somehow the old man himself is still going strong. “How many leaders are there around the world whose name, 74 years after his death, is still being tattooed on people’s bodies?” demanded Yilmaz Özdil when I asked him if Atatürk is dead. A diehard Kemalist, Özdil writes for Turkey’s top newspaper, Hürriyet, and is by all accounts the country’s most popular columnist. Just look around, he says. He’s not speaking only of the skin-art parlors that honor Nov. 10 by offering free renditions of Atatürk’s signature. People decorate their baby strollers and cars with stickers bearing the founder’s picture, and audiences seem insatiable for books and films about his life.

    The wave of Atatürk mania has a distinct undertone of defiance—a response to the frustrations of secular urbanites these days. “Saying you love Atatürk is code for saying you are afraid of a religious state,” says Altan. Tens of thousands of middle-class Turks joined a demonstration against the AKP government this past Oct. 29, the country’s Republic Day. Elderly women and students carried pictures of Atatürk and chanted in unison: “We are the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal!” While Erdogan watched a military parade at a stadium in Ankara, the protesters were being tear-gassed not far away. Finally breaking through police barricades, they marched to Atatürk’s mausoleum.

    Less than two weeks later, an estimated 400,000 Turks made pilgrimages to the secularist shrine. But Erdogan was far away, on a visit to Brunei. When critics in Parliament and the media accused him of avoiding the ceremonies, the prime minister brandished photos of the Turkish government–sponsored renovation of Kemal’s father’s old home in the Balkans and declared that the AKP’s economic-development policies have done more to ensure Atatürk’s legacy than the independence hero’s own party ever achieved.

    Regardless of the dwindling ranks who call themselves secular or Kemalist, surveys say Atatürk himself remains popular across the political spectrum. In one recent poll, 82.3 percent of respondents said they want “Atatürk principles and revolutions” included in the new constitution that is currently being drafted. “Whatever they say, his revolution has succeeded,” says Özdil. “Efforts to reverse it are creating a healthier interest in Atatürk.”

    In fact, it’s hard for Turks of any political affiliation to truly despise the republic’s founder. He was known as a lady’s man who loved to dance and drink, and yet his life had a melancholic quality. The 2008 film Mustafa upset many Kemalists with its rare but candid glimpse of the great leader’s private loneliness. The film portrayed him as subsisting on a daily diet of 3 packs of cigarettes, 15 cups of Turkish coffee, and 1 bottle of raki. A leading brand of the powerful Turkish liquor features an Atatürk look-alike on the label wearing a tux and visibly enjoying a glass. Secularists take pride in the image; in an age of religious conservatism and prohibitive taxation on alcohol, even drinking has become an act of political defiance.

    Turkey has an Atatürk for everyone. In contrast to the secularists’ idea of him, Islamists prefer to ignore his drinking and anti-religiosity, emphasizing instead his leadership on the battlefield against invading Western armies. Leftists picture him as an anti-imperialist with an anti-capitalist streak, while the country’s religious-minority Alevis consider him their defender against domination by hard-line Sunnis. Even the often-oppressed Kurds find good things to say about him. Over the past decade, imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan is said to have spent many hours musing to his lawyers about Kemalism, often concluding that much like Öcalan himself, Atatürk was misunderstood and isolated.

    And yet for all Atatürk’s enduring popularity, his vision is unlikely to survive the political climate change that is sweeping Turkey and the entire Middle East. The country has too many old internecine scores to settle—mass killings of Kurds in 1938, oppression of religious conservatives through most of modern Turkish history, massive human-rights violations following each of Turkey’s four military coups—all committed in the name of preserving Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s republic.

    A decade ahead of the republic’s centennial, Erdogan is floating what he calls the “2023 vision.” He envisions a complete overhaul of the state, scrapping the country’s parliamentary system and replacing it with an American-style tripartite government. And by all accounts, he intends to oversee the transformation personally. If he gets that wish, he will have remained in power for 20 years—five years longer than the father of the Turks himself. Turks can only ask themselves: what would Atatürk say?

    http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/12/16/turkey-is-ataturk-dead-erdogan-islamism-replaces-kemalism.html

  • Kemalism is dead, but not Ataturk

    Kemalism is dead, but not Ataturk

    Kemalism is dead, but not Ataturk

    Editor’s Note: Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a GPS contributor. You can find all his blog posts here. The views expressed in this article are solely those of Soner Cagaptay.

    By Soner Cagaptay – Special to CNN

    Turkish leader Kemal Ataturk (1881 - 1938).
    Turkish leader Kemal Ataturk (1881 – 1938).

    Has Turkey’s twentieth century experience with Kemalism – a Europe-oriented top-down Westernization model – come to an end?

    To a large extent: Yes.

    Symbolically speaking, nothing could portend the coming end of Kemalism better than the recent public exoneration of Iskilipli Atif Hoca, a rare resistance figure to Kemalism in the early twentieth century. However, even if Kemalism might be withering away, ironically its founder Ataturk and his way of doing business seem to be alive in Turkey.

    But first the story of Iskilipli Atif Hoca: In November 1925, Ataturk carried out perhaps the most symbolic of his reforms, banning all Turkish males from wearing the Ottoman fez in order to cement his country’s commitment to European ideals. Ataturk wanted make Turks European head to toe and the abolition of the fez embodied this effort.

    Most Turks acquiesced to Ataturk’s reforms, not just to the “hat reform” but also to deeper ones such as the “alphabet reform,” which changed the Turks’ script from an Arab alphabet-based one to its current Latin-based form, further connecting the Turks to European culture.

    Ataturk was able to achieve these reforms with minor resistance thanks to the weight of his persona. After all, Ataturk – who had just liberated Turkey from a massive Allied occupation – was considered nothing short of a father to all Turks.

    Some Turks, however, objected to his reforms.

    Enter Atif Hoca, a cleric in the small central Anatolian town of Iskilip, who refused to adhere to Ataturk’s “hat reform.” Atif Hoca defended his use of the fez, couching his objections in Islam. He rallied to protest against the reforms and began publishing essays in local papers. He was executed in February 1926, becoming a rare icon of resistance to Kemalism.

    Recently though, Atif Hoca’s legacy has been reversed in the public eye. In February 2012, the government decided to name a public hospital in Iskilip – Atif Hoca’s hometown – after him. This dedication carries remarkable symbolic significance, as it is tantamount to honoring one of the best known anti-Kemalists to date, as well as signaling Turkey’s move to a post-Kemalist era.

    Kemalism appears to have lost its influence, not just symbolically but also politically. In the past decade, Turkey has undergone a complete transformation. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has won three consecutive elections since 2002, with increasing majorities. The AKP, representing a brand of Islam-based social conservatism, has since replaced Turkey’s former Kemalist ideology and secular elites. Turkey seems to be moving to a post-Kemalist era.

    Though, this is not to suggest that Ataturk is out, too. On the contrary, Ataturk shapes the Turkish mindset in the post-Kemalist Turkey. The legacy of Turkey’s liberator is too powerful to resist even if Turkey is seemingly “moving on” from his ideology.

    Perhaps the most powerful aspect of Ataturk’s legacy is that he wanted to restore Turkey’s great power status. To this end, Ataturk envisaged stripping Turkey of its Ottoman legacy and instilling in it a set of European standards and beliefs so that Turkey could successfully compete against its historic European rivals. In other words, Turkey could become more powerful than Europe only by becoming entirely European itself.

    Turkey’s new elites have a different view of how to make the country powerful, not by abandoning the country’s Ottoman past or secularizing its religious values, but by embracing them. Though, the ultimate goal remains the same: Become powerful enough to compete against the Europeans. Even if the post-Kemalist Turkey is not going to emulate Europe, it will still treat it as a measuring stick.

    A second aspect of Ataturk’s legacy that remains alive in post-Kemalist Turkey is top-down social engineering. In the same way that Ataturk wanted to shape modern Turkey in his own image, his successors will now want to do the same, imposing their own worldview on Turkish society.

    In this regard, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a case-in-point. Like Ataturk, Erdogan seems willing to use the weight of his personality to remake Turkish society to match his worldview. Erdogan has already ruled Turkey longer than any other democratically-elected prime minister, and he might replace Ataturk as the country’s longest-reigning leader if he is elected as the president of Turkey in 2014. Like Ataturk, Erdogan seems willing to use his personal charisma to remake Turkish society to match his vision.

    Ataturk often said “he wanted to raise contemporary European generations” among Turks. Recently, Erdogan said “he would like to raise religious generations” among the Turks. Kemalism may be dead, but Ataturk’s way of doing business appears to be alive and kicking in Turkey.

    The views expressed in this article are solely those of Soner Cagaptay.

    via Kemalism is dead, but not Ataturk – Global Public Square – CNN.com Blogs.

  • An Independent Turkey Sets Its Own Tone in a Troubled World

    An Independent Turkey Sets Its Own Tone in a Troubled World

    by Dan Lieberman / December 17th, 2011

    The global community has become more interested in stepping across the bridge between Europe and Asia; eager to traverse the divide between the Western community and reconstituted Arab world. Previously regarded as only a geographical bridge between continents, the nation of Turkey now serves as a political, strategic and economic bridge. Its location, Muslim identity, independent policies, and continued economic growth at a time when the United States and Europe Union nations continue in economic crisis, provoke the inquisitive. Turkey is being watched, examined and scrutinized for its actions and policies.

    After Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Istanbul mayor from 1994 to 1998, established the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the year 2001 and subsequently won a victory in the 2002 election, a new Turkey successfully emerged from a severe economic crisis and its runaway inflation. Since becoming Prime Minister in 2003, Erdogan has diverged from the post-Ottoman laicism (secular), authoritative, and nationalist philosophy of the Turkish Republic’s founder, Kemal Ataturk, and steered Turkey in a direction more consistent with western democratic philosophy.

    What enables this nation to operate independently and grow in a dependent and declining western world? Can it sustain its growth? Can it reject Kemalism without military interference? These are only three of many questions concerning Turkey’s foreign, economic and social policies, all of which contain contradictions, doubts, and problems. Problems? Turkey excels in problems. There is the Kurdish problem, Cyprus problem, Islamic influence problem, writing a new Constitution problem, relations with adjacent nations problem, entry to the European Union problem and of course, problems with Israel and the United States

    A trip through Turkey, sponsored by the Washington based Rumi Forum, an interfaith and peace organization, featured meetings with parliamentarians, journalists, academics and businessmen, and provided insight into Turkey’s (1) ability to confront its problems, (2) strength to continue an independent path, and (3) role as a model for the Arab nations that are struggling from a revolutionary spring into a bright and peaceful future. Istanbul revealed the ‘think tanks that define the present.” Ankara provided the parliamentarians that shape the future. In Sanliurfa and Gaziantep, one learns of an ancient past and gains insight into Turkey’s nationwide progress and the role of its Kurdish community.

    A discussion of Turkey starts with its youth.

    A modern country

    New airports, new super highways, massive construction of modern buildings in expanding cities that now contain 75% of the population with a median age of 28.5 years, highlight the growing Turkey.

    A western oriented nation reflects a Mediterranean appearance. Buildings, offices, restaurants, hotels and institutions use warm colors; brown, beige, orange, together with neutral white, black and lilac; colors associated with steadfastness, simplicity, friendliness, and dependability. The warm colors made large rooms look cozier, while the orange proved mentally stimulating as well as sociable.

    A subjective appraisal notes a nation of hard working purposeful and dedicated people, well organized and progressive. Turkey reflects vision and mission. Youthful representatives satisfied the vision.

    Faik Tunay, at 30 years, is the youngest parliamentarian for the The Republican People’s Party (CHP). The CHP is the oldest political party of Turkey and is currently the main opposition in the Grand National Assembly. Best described as a modern social-democratic party, it is faithful to the principles of Kemal Ataturk, the Party’s founder.

    The deputy for Istanbul, member of the Foreign Affairs committee, speaks five languages, and has been invited by the Eisenhower Institute to visit America, In addition to being an elected member of the Grand National Assembly, he is involved in several family businesses and some of his own – construction, agriculture, advertising. His ambition – although born as a White Turk, a member of a privileged class, he wants to leave as a Black Turk, as a member of the masses.

    The youngest member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly is only 27 years old, one of three members under 32 years of age. Bilal Macit represents an Istanbul district for the AKP, but insists he represents the state and not the civil authority, does not represent youth nor will limit his activities to youth policies. He has traveled widely, matured in a global world and learned to think independently. Cognizant that his Party’s leader changed politics, Parliamentarian Macit won’t allow his independent attitude to harm the Party. Surprisingly, he offered the opinion that youth does not represent the Arab revolutionary movements, suggesting the movements are more complex and widely distributed. The youthful parliamentarian attributes some of his success to his previous association with the Young Civilians, a movement he helped to found.

    Young Civilians

    Fatih Demirci, who graduated with a manufacturing system engineering degree and is now an Istanbul entrepreneur, is another 27 year-old founder of the Young Civilians and still an active member. At a dinner meeting, he explained the operations of the organization whose name indicates its thrust — contrasts to Kemal Ataturk’s Young Turks who led the 1908 revolution and the Young Officers who won Turkey’s independence.

    Organization? The Young Civilians have no formal organization. Corresponding by Facebook, Twitter and other social networks, they gather compatriots at demonstrations. Their symbol is the sneaker, a sharp difference from the military boot that shaped the nation. Similar to America’s flower children of the 1960′s with a dash of France’s 1968 rebel Cohen-Bendit’s “Ask for the impossible,” the Young Civilians “demand the possible but perfect.”

    They grimace at any military or nationalist demonstrations, such as the May 19 Youth and Sports Day national holiday. On that day, in 2003, the group organized its first gathering at Parliament to protest the style of the festivities and become known. They became well known, even internationally, with coverage by the New York Times. Reducing military appearance in social and political life, gaining equal rights for all forty-two ethnicities, and no-holds barred allowance for religious and national expressions dominate their thinking. Removing visa requirements and opening the border between Armenia and Turkey would please them.

    Will the Young Civilians (who are growing older) be only a humorous irritant to Turkey’s elite or will it become a serious movement that contributes to all Turks embracing one another with equal expression, regardless of religion or ethnicity? Does the answer lie with the flowering of the flower children of the American 60′s, who became more conservative as they moved on in years?

    The Young Civilians might already be superfluous. The Kemalism they want defeated and the military coup they fear are quickly being subdued with no appearance of immediate revival.

    Kemalism

    After Kemal Ataturk died in 1938, almost any government that threatened the principal tenets, the six arrows of Kemalism, triggered a military coup.
    Republicanism–a broadly based republican system.
    Nationalism–a distinctly Turkish identity
    Populism–a more classless society
    Revolutionism–wholesale, rather than gradual, change
    Laicism-cancellation of the power of religion in the state, and
    Statism–state-led development of the economy and society

    were inviolate until the AKP gained power.

    Prime Minister Erdogan’s instant and bold challenge in 2003 to the tenets of Kemalism did not provoke a military coup. Nevertheless, the military and allied Kemalists have been accused of preparing a conspiratorial response in 2007 that was uncovered in 2009.

    Why did Erdogan proceed so boldly and why was it difficult for the military to instantly respond to the AKP’s removal of several of the six arrows of Kemalism from its quiver? AKP parliamentarian Bilal Macit explained; “Before 2002, the military exercised control of most facets of society except for the economic system. Their political and social control promoted economic stagnation and decline.” Erdogan’s deft handling of the economy apparently impressed much of the military to favor his administration.

    Markar Esayan, editor of the independent Taraf newspaper, suggested that the Prime Minister correctly gauged a change in society and recognized he had wide support. The year 2002 is now a milestone in Turkish history – the year the military was no longer the principal authority.

    Mesut Ulker, a former army colonel, presently a strategist for a think tank and a well-known television personality, added a simple comment: ‘The army has rapidly changed.”

    Professor Dr. Yasin Aktay, Director of the Institute of Strategic Thinking, summarized the situation in a strategic context: “The shift of the population to urban areas created an expanding middle class with new social demands. The population requested an allocation of resources, a new identity and a new constitution. The ideological state (Kemalism) with its stress on Turkic identity and secularism created problems.”

    Yusuf Acar, Zaman newspaper journalist and world news editor for magazine Aksiyon, echoed the decline of Kemalism and military domination. “Power has shifted to president office #1, Parliament as #2, and then the military. Nevertheless, the state still comes before the citizen.”

    A journalist for Zaman, which has become one of Turkey’s principal newspapers, with a circulation of about one million, might be prejudiced in its observations. Yusuf Acar admits Zaman is often accused of being a government supporter and receiving assistance. However, except for sharing a state run television station and agency with the government, he denies the state has any involvement with the newspaper.

    Ozcan Yeniceri, previously a university professor, and presently a parliamentarian for MHP (The Nationalist Movement Party) speaks passionately and in great length on all topics. By gaining 53 seats in the 2011 general elections, his Party remained the third largest parliamentary group. Previously characterized as an ultra-nationalist party, which has recommended martial law in Kurdish territory, the MHP has tempered its extremist views.

    In Ozcan Yeniceri’s opinion, nationalism has ontological meaning, a striving for security, and struggle for independence. It unites the country against invading forces. He considers his Party is less nationalistic than that of President Obama and would not resort to the killing of leaders that Obama has done. (Evidently referring to the assassination of Osama bin Laden and NATO attempts on Moammar Gadaffi’s life.) “Liberal criticisms about the establishment of the Republic are wrong in the claim that Ataturk did not introduce democracy. Ataturk was a pragmatic and not actually a Kemalist. He understood the times and adapted. Turkey’s divisions have been between left and right with left defined as communist and right defined as capitalist. Now there is a rapid change in democracy in all areas with an increase in human rights.”

    Kemal Ataturk’s framed portraits still adorn the walls of public sector rooms and halls. Gigantic banners and posters of his image are noticeable. Prime Minister Erdogan has wisely retained the reverence to Turkey’s George Washington but abruptly replaced Ataturk’s nationalist and statist policies with an agenda more compatible with the global system and more in harmony with democratic dictates.

    Nevertheless, the AKP, despite its widespread support, still has severe antagonists. The charge of an ongoing coup against the government has resulted in mass arrests of well known public figures, has divided the National Assembly and disturbed leaders from several sectors of society. In mid-November 2011, after several judicial reviews and hearings, a 264-page indictment accuses 143 suspects, 66 of them in pre-trial detention, with an attempt to overthrow the government.

    The indictments have provoked a question: Is Erdogan using tactics similar to those of the military forces, exaggerating threats to squash opposition? Will the trial of civilians and officers associated with Operation Sledgehammer destabilize the stable nation?

    Operation Sledgehammer

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan insists that nobody has been jailed in Turkey because of their profession as a journalist; only due to their membership in an illegal organization. Others are skeptical.

    Markar Esayan and his independent Taraf newspaper received credit and fame for exposing the proposed 2007 coup, which had as objectives: undermine the stability of the AKP and create chaos. Esayan would not expose those who presented his newspaper with the documents, but insisted they were authentic and with signatures of known generals. He said plans had been made to bomb two major mosques in Istanbul, assault a military museum by people disguised as fundamentalists, and increase tension with Greece by instigating dogfights between the fighter planes of the two countries over the Aegean Sea. The allegations included shooting down a Turkish plane and blaming it on Greece. Subsequently, he said, prosecutors found supporting documents at military headquarters.

    Faik Tunay senses that the revelations spurred citizens to support Erdogan and harmed opposition Parties. Although he believes the alleged coup plotters should be punished, he senses some plotters, especially journalists, have been accused only because of personal association with alleged plotters — guilt by association.

    Zaman’s Yusuf Acar said that the “society did not accept reports of military intervention,” but after “armaments in a military home were found to match some terrorist activities, belief became widespread. Changes became apparent when the Prime Minister chaired the Military Council and the General Chief of Staff no longer stood at his side.”

    Professor Dr. Yasin Altai claimed that the military often created problems to justify its existence. He has been spied upon and a file prepared on him. Now the civil can try the military.

    All top generals, one of whom died, resigned. Some interpreted the resignations as an attempt to create anarchy, others as a protest to the arrests.

    What seems to many as an obvious and serious plot against the government, which must be dealt with in a legal manner, is viewed by others as a bumbling proposal by a few who drew others in with arguments and not with definite alliances. All words and no action. So where is the plot?

    The decline of Kemal Ataturk’s political course and weakening of the military dictates a new direction. Can that direction continue without a new constitution? What constitution? The subject is being vigorously debated.

    The Constitution

    A commission, composed of representatives from the three major Parties and a pro-Kurdish group, has been appointed to prepare a Draft Constitution. One limiting factor: each article must be approved unanimously, an impossible task. Without a new constitution, Kemalism cannot be entirely decomposed. Without a new Constitution, it is doubtful Turkey can gain admittance to the European Union.

    The Young Civilians want a total change and absolutely new constitution. Bilal Macit noted that it is difficult to change the first three articles of the constitution; secular, socialist, modern. Article 4 of the present Constitution declares the immovability of the founding principles of the Republic defined in the first three Articles and bans any proposals for their modification. Regardless, Macit claims that no division exists between secularists and Islamists. Both want a pluralist society.

    If the Constitution is modified, will it contain some references to Sharia Law? The Kemalists and western world have one question in common: To what extent is the AKP an Islamic Party?

    The Islamic Party

    A consensus rejects the AKP as an Islamist party. Nothing in its agendas, in its cabinet, and in its operations suggests a relation with an Islamic movement.

    Nasuhi Güngör, columnist for the Star newspaper, said that the AKP “no longer represents Islamic identity,” and he should know. He admits that the Star, which has a moderate circulation of 130K daily, is owned by businessmen aligned with the government and, although critical at times, still close to the AKP. “Many AKP members practice Islam and believe that forward movement requires affiliation with Islam. However, they don’t go beyond believing that the Islamic religion can play a satisfactory role in society and wanting its adherents to be able to practice the religion in accord with their own rules.” One clue, Güngör noted, is that the AKP has not brought the wearing of the scarf issue to the table, perceiving it as human rights rather than religious issue. If the AKP raised the issue then it would be marked as an Islamic Party.

    Although Turkey might not be considered an Islamic run nation, will its identification with the Islamic religion serve as a model for the newly liberated Arab nations?

    Turkey as role model

    The world expects the Turks to guide the Arab revolutions in the same direction as Erdagon’s movement. Consensus does not adhere to that theme and has Turkey envisioning itself only as another European a nation. Rather than being a role model, Turkey wants absolute friendship with Arab neighbors, a lack of which distracted the Ottoman Empire and impeded progress of the Kemalist programs.

    Star Daily journalist Güngör, who is the newspaper’s expert on the Middle East, believes the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has close similarities to the incipient AKP, but has never governed and is 30 years behind the AKP operations. He declared that if any of the Islamic parties gain control in the Arab nations, and they have already in Tunisia and Morocco (whose Islamic Party is also named Justice and Development), that country will make a big mistake.

    His views on Hamas and Hezbollah are sanguine. Both, he claims, are maneuvered by Iran and are too militaristic. Nevertheless, he recommends that Turkey continue its relationship with Hamas.

    Zero problems with neighbors

    As others have said: “Turkey’s pursuit of zero problems with neighbors has morphed into zero neighbors without problems.”

    All commentators agreed that Turkey has failed in this pursuit. Turkey has problems with neighbors and this is partly due to its own initiatives and independent policies. PM Erdogan’s commendable moral imperative, which identifies friendship with moral agendas rather than with what one nation can do for the other, creates misperceptions and misconceptions.

    Misperception of the moral imperative solicits charges of arbitrary judgment of others and intention to establish a neo-Ottoman agenda. Erdogan has a misconception that these policies can succeed in a world of mistrust and self-interest.

    Trespassing on Iraq sovereignty by engaging in military attacks on Kurds in Northern Iraq, requesting the resignation of Syria’s President Bashar Assad, demanding Israel apologize for the killing of Turkish citizens during an attempt to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza, installing NATO missile radar detection equipment to deter Iran, and refusing to pay compensation to Bulgaria for Ottoman eviction of Bulgarians in eastern Thrace, are only a few examples of Turkey’s conflicts with neighbors.

    MHP Parliamentarian Özcan Yeniceri described the policy. “Turkey previously consulted the Pentagon for regulating its relations with Iran, Russia and others. After the fall of the Soviet Union, everything changed, and this allowed Turkey to reach potential. Still, its relations with the U.S. hindered relations with neighboring nations.”

    And a host of other problems: resolution of the Kurdish question, entry into the European Union, and engagement with Israel and its principal supporter.

    The Kurdish

    Strategists outside of Turkey consider the Kurdish insurgency as Turkey’s number one problem. Despite continuous attacks by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), punishing government counterattacks, and arrests of suspected PKK associates, correspondents considered the Kurdish question to be a declining problem. They noted that the Kurdish population is no longer demanding separation, feel more Turkic and sense the government is addressing their grievances. Turkey’s minority of 20 million does not maintain a unique Kurdish language and many dialects are prevalent. As for the Kurds being an organized ethnicity with direct relations in several nations, the Turkish Kurds don’t directly relate to the Kurdish populations in the other nations of Syria, Iraq and Iran. Kurdish irredentism is irrelevant to Turkey’s Kurds.

    No longer considered to be a military problem, the Kurdish situation is defined as a civil and human rights problem. Former army colonel Mesut Ulker expressed the opinion succinctly: “It is a civic problem that will be resolved in 2-3 years.”

    MHP Parliamentarian Ozcan Yeniceri presented a more rigorous analysis: “One third of the population has Kurdish relatives, intermarriage between ethnicities is high, and Kurds are well integrated. The Kurdish independence problem appeared after the fall of the Soviet Union, when new states formed. Nationalist Kurds asked: ‘Why not a Kurd state?’

    “The PKK thought that after reforms, the government would become weak, eventually collapse and the country would divide into several divisions. Demands for democracy and freedom are not essential for the Kurds. They are only a Trojan horse. Nevertheless, the government should acknowledge rightful claims, and the conditions of the Kurds are showing improvement. Demand for a separate Kurdish language to be used in all facets of everyday public life comes from the PKK movement. In response the government has granted a Kurdish language television station, which broadcasts cultural programs.” Dunya TV has a satellite channel, and a footprint that reaches to Kurdish speaking peoples in all adjacent countries.

    Ozcan Yemceri believes in equal rights for all ethnicities and private courses for Kurds, in their own language, which the government now allows. He closed with a wry remark: “America might face similar problems with its own minorities,” evidently referring to the multicultural and multilingual aspirations of Hispanic groups.

    Apparently, the Turks believe that as their democracy develops it will encompass all minorities and diminish ethnic demands for separation. Developments in the Balkans, Iraq and Spain have not substantiated that belief.

    European Union

    As a member of the European Customs Union, Turkey has common tariffs in trade with EU nations. Petitioning the European Union for complete admission has faltered. Now, observers note that due to the contrast between Turkey’s growth and strength and a weakening Europe, it might no longer be favorable to Turkey to become a EU member.

    Parliamentarian Bilal Macit agreed: “It is not important.”

    Dr. Burak Erdenir, Deputy Undersecretary at Ministry for EU affairs, disagreed.
    Three reasons for his intransigence:
    (1) As a member of the Customs Union, Turkey is part of the decision taking but not part of the decision making.
    (2) The European Union has been incorrect in its behavior towards Turkey and that behavior must be corrected.
    (3) The EU process is supported by all political Parties

    Dr. Erdenir spoke frankly. “EU refusal to grant admission to Turkey is entirely due to prejudice. To achieve candidate status, 35 articles must be approved. Seventeen are constantly blocked. Although Bulgaria and Romania have been given admission, Turkey is refused. The EU believes Turkey is too big, too poor, and too Muslim. The Austrians in particular have a mindset that that equates today’s Turkey with that of the Ottoman Empire 18th century attack on Vienna.

    “However, things have changed. Turkey has the sixth largest economy in Europe, 159 universities, and the most stable economy. The EU has lost credibility and behaves dishonestly.”

    Israel and America

    Commentators condemned Israel for its policies towards the Palestinians and criticized the United States for its support of Israel and for its other Middle East policies. From observations, Israel has little support in Turkey, regardless of Party affiliation.

    CHP Parliamentarian Faik Tunay included discussions of U.S. foreign policy as one factor in his Party’s quarrelsome manner. Despite Erdogan’s angry attitude towards Israel, which he supports, he claims the U.S. supports the AKP. His validation – Due to the AKP government, demonstrations against U.S. involvement in Iraq were limited.

    MHP Parliamentarian Özcan Yeniceri established Israel and its support by the United States as the prime foreign policy issues. “The American image is deteriorating internationally and includes instability within NATO, in which the US has played a key role. The direction of its fight with Radical Islam and Al Qaeda will soon include all Islam. The U.S. shouldn’t be a military empire, but should base policies on values. U.S. mentors have become the Evangelists and Samuel P. Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations.

    The U.S. interfered in Iraq and now tries to restrict Iran in its developments. Unlike Iran, the U.S. has the nuclear weapon and has used it, signs of hypocrisy and loss of credibility. The same can apply to Israel. If the U.S. changed its policy in regard to Israel, the region will change drastically. The effort would be a game changer.”

    Two industrialists, who manufacture food containers for export to European nations, posed a simple question: ‘Why can’t Israel be satisfied with its nation to the Green Line? Why is it constantly expanding?”

    Economy

    Officials from TUSKON, the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists Worldwide, which has offices in major cities worldwide, highlighted Turkey’s economic progress. Since the AKP achieved governance, GDP and exports have tripled, while the inflation rate has fallen from 30 percent to 7.5 percent. Unemployment, which had been 14 percent in 2010, has dropped to 9.5 percent. A GDP of 735 billion dollars places Turkey 17th in the world and 7th in Europe, excluding the Russian federation. An export driven economy has increased exports to 135 billion dollars.

    All the statistics are moving in proper directions, and although the inflation rate, interest rate (6%) and unemployment are high by western standards, they are acceptable by Turkish standards. Actually, the real interest rate (interest rate minus inflation) is negative, a deflationary anomaly that was not explained, and could hinder investment. Another major concern is the monotonically increasing negative trade balance, which was 42 billion dollars (2010).

    If a fall in the European economy intensifies the negative trade balance, negative real interest rate, and relatively high unemployment rate, Turkey’s growth could come to a screeching halt. The vigorous economy has fragile elements.

    Conclusion

    Few, if any world leaders, have received as much admiration from the domestic and international public as has Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. His open manner, sincerity and moral challenges contrast with the covert, duplicitous and self subscribing attitudes of most world leaders. If his policies are out of step with most nations, they might prove that in the present global environment an independent course is a route to success.

    • Europe’s and America’s economies falter. Turkey continues with rapid growth.
    • Nations split apart from nationalism. Turkey enhances national identities.
    • Western nations sanction Iran. Turkey increases trade with the Islamic state.
    • Military control increases in most nations. Military control is constrained in Turkey.
    • China and other fast growing nations pursue statist polices. Turkey eschews statism.

    As in most nations, continued governing by the AKP depends upon the continued success of its economic policies. With Europe being the primary source for Turkey’s exports, a forecasted faltering of the European Market could drastically affect Turkey. Or will it? Is it possible that Erdogan’s pragmatism will lead Turkey to realign allegiances and markets and shift them to Iran and Russia, trading finished products for energy supplies? Turkey seems to be in the driver’s seat.

    But not entirely. The AKP needs prosperity to advance democracy, which will enhance civil and human rights and prevent the electorate from considering Kemalism as an antidote for Turkey’s problems.

    Kemalism will soon be proved as either past history or a spoke in the cycles of history. As the wheel turns, will Kemal Ataturk’s visions and policies return and challenge another Turkish Republic? The verdict is still not rendered.

    Dan Lieberman is Editor of Alternative Insight, a monthly web based newsletter. He is a writer of many published articles on the Middle East. He can be reached at: [email protected]. Read other articles by Dan.

  • Kemalism still has an important role to play in Turkey

    Kemalism still has an important role to play in Turkey

    ataturk3

    Financial Times’dan bir okuyucu mektubunu bilginize sunuyorum……

    Pulat Tacar

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    Kemalism still has an important role to play in Turkey

    Published: February 9 2011 00:12 | Last updated: February 9 2011 00:12

    From Prof Emeritus Feroz Ahmad.

    Sir, I read with interest Andrew Duff’s article “EU and Turkey avoid last ditch Cypriot talks” (FT.com, January 20). Much of the article was informative; but Mr Duff showed a lack of understanding about Turkey today when he talked of “Turkey’s exaggerated adherence to its state ideology of Kemalism”.

    Mustafa Kemal never created a state ideology because he argued that ideologies become fossilised. He didn’t simply labour “to modernise Turkey along western lines”, he launched a determined struggle against the patriarchal society the new republic inherited from the Ottomans. In that society knowledge was based on myth and belief, truth was religious, government was dynastic and social relations were vertical, while social stratification was based on family, clan or sect.

    The Kemalists introduced rational knowledge, truth based on science, a party-led government, social relations that were horizontal, and a society based on class.

    Turkey is only 87 years old and therefore young by the standards of “old Europe”. The reforms of the 1920s and 1930s have still to be protected from attempts to restore patriarchal values, especially the rights gained by women. There is also the question of education and scientific thought; for example, in recent years the idea of evolution has been challenged by creationists in schools and institutions of science.

    Mr Duff does not seem to understand what is happening in Turkey today and that is why Kemalists are alarmed.

    Feroz Ahmad,

    Professor Emeritus of History,

    University of Massachusetts,

    Boston, MA, US

    Copyright The Financial Times Limited

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    The development of secularism in Turkey

    By Niyazi Berkes, Feroz Ahmad