Tag: Turkey-Israel

  • Turkey and Israel: A ‘what next?’ mindset

    Turkey and Israel: A ‘what next?’ mindset

    Turkey and Israel: A ‘what next?’ mindset

    By CAN KASAPOGLU

    At this point, the critical question is how to turn the forthcoming strategic dialogue into strategic cooperation.

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    Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan. Photo: REUTERS/Stringer
    Following the early signs of rapprochement between Turkey and Israel, analysts on both sides focused on why and how this was happening.

    Meanwhile, many columnists voiced their opinions about who should take credit for this critical development; some praised the Turkish foreign policy that succeeded in making Israel apologize, others praised Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu for his strategic wisdom, and of course US President Barack Obama for his excellent mediation skills. There were even academics who discussed whether the Israeli government did or did not exactly apologize. Although these issues might be very attractive to read about in foreign policy columns, they don’t make much sense at all in the “Hobbesian real world of the Middle East” which is “nasty and brutish” indeed.

    Instead of all endless “why, how, and what happened exactly” debates, this paper prefers to focus on the vital question of “what to do next, and how to accomplish it.”

    From Détente to strategic dialogue: Following “the apology and the positive response,” now we have a détente in Turkish- Israeli relations that offers a cautious optimism for the future. The first and foremost requirement should be turning this détente into a strategic dialogue.

    Having political figures from both countries photographed shaking hands would just be a PR effort. Instead, we, the Turks and the Israelis, right away need our experts to talk openly about Syrian chemical and biological agents’ locations, Assad’s ballistic missiles’ combat-readiness, and trajectory of the Syrian civil war. Likewise, a rise in tourist exchange would be nice in order to overcome mutual distrust in people-to-people relations. However, more urgently, we need our think-tanks setting forums for brain-storming about Iran’s military trends and nuclear program.

    In sum, we need a comprehensive strategic dialogue to compensate for the times days of deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations. As the author of this op-ed has stated, when the crisis between the two nations culminated in the flotilla incident, “Bouazizi was still alive in Tunisia, Ankara and Damascus were holding joint cabinet meetings, and Iranian officials hadn’t threatened Turkey due to NATO assets on Turkish soil.” In other words, while we were having problems in our marriage, the neighborhood was only as dangerous as usual; but now everywhere is on fire and we have really serious issues to handle.

    From strategic dialogue to cooperation Upon a comprehensive strategic dialogue on key issues of Turkish and Israeli national security agendas, decision-makers of both sides would need to develop a robust cooperation to confront the drastically worsening landscape of regional threat.

    As PM Netanyahu pointed out immediately after he initiated the US-brokered rapprochement, the most critical strategic priority would be Syria’s prolonged civil war. Within this context, Turkey and Israel have to get ready to secure the Baathist tyranny’s chemical and allegedly biological weapons arsenal along with other strategic weapons systems in case of an uncontrolled regime collapse. Furthermore, we also need to carefully watch for any mass transfer of game-changing weapon systems in asymmetric conflicts, such as man portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and antitank guided missiles (ATGM) into the hands of non-state groups that might target Turkey or Israel. In a moment of irrational shock, Assad or members of the elite surrounding him might attempt to ignite a regional war by provoking Turkish or Israeli administrations. In this case, the two nations need to be prepared to act in coordination, to nip the threat in the bud.

    At this point, the critical question is how to turn the forthcoming strategic dialogue into strategic cooperation. While everyone recalls the strategic partnership in the 1990s between Turkey and Israel, during the years of deterioration of their relationship the author of this op-ed has tried to point out the presence of another cooperation model in Turkish- Israeli relations, namely, the peripheral pact signed in 1958. This model was narrowly-designed to cover specifically determined military-political affairs, and was handled within a limited community of top decision makers. Although the current rapprochement is an overt development, we should also take the two countries’ domestic political constraints into consideration. Israel has just formed a new government with the participation of right-wing and centrist figures that excluded the ultra- Orthodox. On Turkey’s end, municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections will take place only in two-a-half years, although constitution debates are ongoing. Moreover, both Israel’s apology and Turkey’s positive response are “security-oriented” to a large extent, and the two states will have to deal with very critical threats.

    Who would say no to some extra benefits Although the US-brokered restoration is taking place out of national security urgencies on both sides, Turkish- Israeli relations have always had the potential to produce momentous results. The first prospective development might be a come-back in military ties. As the relations normalize, frozen military deals can be gradually revived. In that sense, Turkey’s ongoing efforts in promoting missile defense capabilities, drone warfare and armor modernization would be attractive to the Israeli defense industry. Moreover, the two countries can restart naval and air force drills and Turkey might drop its veto on NATO-Israeli cooperation, as things get better. More importantly, effective energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean would a bright idea, especially when the Greek Cypriots are swamped with their banking crisis and corrupt governance; Turkey and Israel can work on an alternative energy corridor that would be much more beneficial.

    In the long run, if everything goes even better than expected, the special relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan, and Israel’s close defense and intelligence cooperation with Baku can be enhanced to prompt a trilateral partnership to counterbalance the Iranians’ aggressive agenda.

    In sum, the most important bilateral ties of the Middle East, relations between the only two democracies of this dangerous region, might be on the eve of a major restoration. The crucial track would be driving this prospect into a strategic dialogue, and then an effective cooperation. However, at this point we should keep an eye on Palestinian affairs and Lebanon, where anyone who is uncomfortable with Turkish-Israeli partnership might try to provoke an Israeli military action, and thereby, a Turkish diplomatic reaction. If Turkish and Israeli officials want to keep their rapprochement safe, they should remember that on one hand there are the likes of Obama, who is happy with how things are going so far. Nevertheless there are some others who are already starting to go mad to see the Turks and the Israelis acting in coordination in Syria.

    The writer, who holds a Ph.D. from the Turkish War College, served as a post-doctoral fellow for the BESA Center at Bar-Ilan University. He is currently a research fellow at the Istanbul based Turkish think-tank EDAM.

  • Turkey riding on the back of the tiger

    Turkey riding on the back of the tiger

    By Pinhas Inbari

    erdogan2013Geopolitical forces in the Middle East demand the return of cooperation and amicable relations between Turkey and Israel. The two former allies face similar challenges like the growing threat of terrorist Iran, with its dangerous nuclear ambitions, and the possibility that Syria becomes a launching pad for Sunni al-Qaeda affiliated terror groups in the Middle East and Europe.

    Recently, encouraging reports in the media indicated that Israel would supply military technology to Turkey to fulfill old contracts that remained in limbo due to the tensions between the two countries. In addition, it has been reported that Haifa’s seaport would become the new gate for Turkish trade with Jordan, which used to run through Syria before the embattled country blocked all Turkish ground convoys. However, despite these encouraging signs, no breakthrough has been achieved via the U.S. mediated efforts to melt down the freezing relations between the countries in place since the Mavi Marmara episode. Last week, Prime Minister Erdoğan compared Zionism with fascism and characterized the Israeli national movement as a crime.

    Islamist Turkey has clearly chosen the neo-Ottoman ethos over state interests. This not only complicates its relations with the Jewish state but also intensifies friction with Iran – its Islamic rival. The decision to privilege inter-Islamic quarrels and preserve its Islamist ideology has caused Turkey to endorse the al-Qaeda affiliated Nusra group so as to turn it into a tool against the declining Syrian regime and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

    In order to understand the carnivorous nature of the Nusra group, one has to review its origins. The group began as a violent Jordanian gang that operated in Iraq under the command of the notorious Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Its nucleus in Syria is not composed of native Syrians but of al-Qaeda operatives from across the region helmed by a Jordanian contingent.

    In its Turkish incarnation, the Nusra group has de facto become the military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Its headquarters are located in Istanbul, commanded by a veteran Syrian Muslim Brotherhood soldier Faruq Taifur. However, Turkey should find little solace in the fact that Nusra is headed by a Muslim Brotherhood rather than an al-Qaeda operative on its soil. It is likely that al-Qaeda is already eyeing Turkey for possible terrorist operations regardless of Taifur’s affiliation.

    With the Nusra forces fighting Hezbollah in both Syria and Lebanon, Turkey finds itself in the midst of a proxy war with Iran. A quick glance at the regional map tells us that the parties are struggling over control of Kurdish Syria and Alawistan. To date, the Nusra forces have refrained from attacking the Alawites so as to avoid unifying the Kurds with the Alawites, who have so far stayed loyal to President Assad and the regime in Tehran. The unification might create a ‘Shiite Crescent’ spread over Iran, Iraqi Kurdistan, Syrian Kurdistan and Alawistan, and Tripoli, touching upon the areas controlled by Hezbollah.

    Turkey and Iran are engaged in a regional race to establish and control this crescent. While Turkey is negotiating a deal with the captive Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan and his Syrian allies in the Democratic Union Party (PYD), Iran is busily supporting the other side and may use Hezbollah to stage terrorist operations on Turkish soil.

    Turkey would do well to preserve its glorious Muslim cultural heritage. In order to do so, it must abandon the Muslim Brotherhood’s ethos and disengage from the Middle Eastern morass by normalizing relations with Israel and thereby identifying itself once more with the West.

    via World Jewish Congress – WJC ANALYSIS – Turkey riding on the back of the tiger.

  • Israeli Initiative with Turkey Fails

    Israeli Initiative with Turkey Fails

    The head of Israel’s National Security Council met a Turkish official in an attempt to restore ties, but to no avail.

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    Mavi Marmara

    A recent Israeli attempt to restore the strained relations with Turkey failed, according to a report on Channel 2 News on Saturday night.

    According to the report, the head of Israel’s National Security Council, Yaakov Amidror, recently met in Rome with the Director-General of the Foreign Ministry in Ankara.

    The meeting was held at the initiative of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s Office and was also attended by Joseph Ciechanover, formerly the Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. However, the meeting failed and no agreements were reached.

    Israel’s relationship with Turkey broke down completely after the 2010 incident on the Mavi Marmara ship.

    The vessel, owned by the Turkish IHH group, was one of six sent to illegally breach Israel’s maritime blockade of Gaza as a “humanitarian flotilla” but was found to be carrying nothing.

    When the vessels ignored repeated Israeli navy requests to redirect their boats to Ashdod port, IDF commandos boarded each vessel to force them to port, where the humanitarian aid they were allegedly carrying could be off-loaded and carried to Gaza through the land crossings with Israel.

    In the case of the Mavi Marmara, however, the Israeli soldiers – armed only with pistols and paint-ball training guns — were brutally attacked by the “activists” as they boarded, with several critically injured. The commandos who followed them shot and killed their attackers, leaving nine dead.

    Turkish leaders have demanded an apology from Israel over the incident, but Israeli leaders have refused, saying Israel had acted in self-defense.

    Former Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman emphasized in the past that Israel is ready to solve any outstanding disputes with Turkey, but it will not apologize to Ankara for the raid on the Mavi Marmara.

    Turkey has several times rejected offers by Israel to improve relations. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erodgan has chosen to deepen the conflict by continuously verbally attacking Israel.

    Earlier this month, Erdogan accused Israel of waging “state terrorism”, condemning an alleged Israeli air strike in Syria as an unacceptable violation of international law.

    Tags: Mavi Marmara ,Yaakov Amidror ,Israel-Turkey relations

    via Israeli Initiative with Turkey Fails – Middle East – News – Israel National News.

  • ‘Turkey Marmara trial a cynical political process

    ‘Turkey Marmara trial a cynical political process

    ‘ By YONAH JEREMY BOB02/20/2013 03:09

    Trial of 4 former IDF commanders charged with the deaths of nine Turks aboard the Mavi Marmara set to restart.

    Turkish cruise ship Mavi Marmara, carrying pro-Palestinian activists and humanitarian aid to Gaza, leaves from Sarayburnu port in Istanbul

    Mavi Marmara Photo: Stringer Turkey / Reuters

    Two days away from the restart of Turkey’s trial on Thursday in absentia of top Israeli military commanders regarding the May 2010 Marvi Marmara flotilla incident, The Jerusalem Post recently spoke to a top government legal official who said that the entire process is “political, not really judicial. It looks judicial, but it’s really not.”

    The first set of hearings for the trial of four former Israeli military commanders, charged with the deaths of nine Turks aboard the Mavi Marmara, started in November 2012, but recessed after a few days.

    Related:

    ‘Common sense must reign in Mavi Marmara case’

    ‘Families of Marmara flotilla victims sue Israel’

    The commanders charged are former chief of staff Lt.-Gen. (res.) Gabi Ashkenazi, former OC Navy V.-Adm. (res.) Eliezer Marom, former OC Military Intelligence Maj.-Gen. (res.) Amos Yadlin and former Air Force Intelligence chief Brig.-Gen. (res.) Avishai Levy.

    The 144-page indictment in the case seeks more than 18,000 years of life sentences in a trial expecting around 490 witnesses.

    Speaking on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue, the official asked, “What does Turkey want with this? Maybe they’re waiting to [see] what the next government looks like.”

    The government to date has boycotted the proceedings, referring to the trial as a “kangaroo court.” But Israel has faced biased audiences before and has found ways to indirectly present its point of view, such as when former Israeli government officials presented what would have been many of Israel’s arguments to the UN’s Goldstone Commission that investigated the 2008-2009 Gaza War, even though the government itself boycotted the hearings.

    Asked if any similar behind the scenes efforts were under way, the official demurred, saying “this is nothing like Goldstone. The case is not against a state, it’s against four individuals,” implying that it was not even clear what kind of standing Israel as a country would have had to appear before the Turkish court.

    The official said that the decision not to attempt even behind the scenes presenting of Israel’s position was made in light of an estimation that “I don’t think the Turkish judge will go against the Turkish government’s” agenda of harming Israel’s image – “there is no chance,” he said.

    He also said, “I don’t think any legal arguments could impact the process, because it is not a judicial process at all. The trial is being used for cynical political processes.”

    What objective factors brought the official to these conclusions? The official said the court was completely ignoring the neutral and authoritative UN-sponsored Palmer Report on the incident, which held that Israel’s blockade was legal under international law and that to the extent that there were Israeli violations of the law of armed conflict in the altercations on the vessel, their severity was mitigated by the context of the Israel Navy sailors being under attack.

    The “judge can look at the Palmer Report which is not like the actions discussed in the trial,” the official said.

    He said unlike the Turkish trial, the Palmer Report makes no mention of “murder” allegations, at most describing certain actions as “mistakes” and problematic “planning issues in the context of self-defense.”

    The official said that Israel was not afraid of defending itself in cases in countries where it believed it had a shot at a fair trial and that to date “no universal jurisdiction case has gotten past the first round of procedures” to go to trial.

    Ties between Jerusalem and what was once its only Muslim ally crumbled after the incident, in which some of the sailors who tried to commandeer the ship were wounded in clashes with those on board that left nine of the passengers dead.

    Turkish media reports and various Twitter accounts of the case in November indicated that the witnesses included statements from the families of the nine dead passengers and people from other ships in the protest flotilla as well as surviving activists from the Mavi Marmara.

    Ahmed Dogan – the father of 19- year-old Furkan Dogan, the youngest of the dead passengers – said he saw evidence showing that his son had been “shot in the face,” according to the reports.

    Mary Ann Wright, a 65-year-old former US Army colonel who was aboard the nearby Challenger 1 ship, testified about the scale of the military force involved in stopping the flotilla as well as the sailors’ conduct vis-a-vis the firing of paintballs and tossing of stun grenades.

    According to the reports, Wright said she believed that such a force could only have been meant to attack.

    The reports could not be confirmed and no Israeli officials are present at the trial to make objections or cross-examine the witnesses.

    via ‘Turkey Marmara trial a cynical p… JPost – Diplomacy & Politics.

  • Israel supplying advanced weaponry to Turkey

    Military deal, the fulfillment of an order that was halted after the Mavi Marmara incident, is first of its kind since 2010By MICHAL SHMULOVICH February 18, 2013, 5:56 pm 8

    A Turkish F-16. (photo credit: CC BY Ronnie Macdonald, Flickr)RELATED TOPICS

    Israel is providing advanced electronic warfare systems for aircraft to Turkey, a fulfillment of an earlier order that was put on hold in the wake of the infamous Mavi Marmara incident in 2010. It is the first instance of a military equipment exchange between Jerusalem and Ankara since then.

    Turkey’s Today’s Zaman reported the sale, which will significantly beef up Ankara’s intelligence capabilities, and the aircraft upgrade was confirmed by senior Israeli sources Monday. A source said the deal was approved due to US pressure and Israel’s desire to restore its damaged relationship with Turkey, amid escalating tension between Ankara and Tehran over the Syrian conflict, according to the Hebrew daily Haaretz.

    The Syrian civil war has posed additional security challenges for Turkey. In October 2012, five Turkish civilians were killed by Syrian fire, sparking fears that Ankara would be dragged into the regional conflict. Turkey vowed to respond harshly, and it deployed extra jets to its border with Syria in the weeks after the incident.

    Turkish soldiers patrol a military station at the border crossing with Syria in Akçakale, across from the Syrian rebel-controlled town of Tel Abyad in October. (photo credit: AP)

    The electronic systems are to be integrated into the Turkish Air Force’s Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) military aircraft that were purchased from the US in the early 2000s. The system enables the planes to protect themselves from electronic attacks that target its controls during flight, Today’s Zaman reported.

    In 2002, Boeing won a $200 million contract to supply Turkey with the four AWACS aircraft — and a $25 million contract to integrate electronic warning systems into the four planes was then won by ELTA, a subsidiary of Israel Aerospace Industries. Boeing supplied the planes to Turkey three years ago. Israel’s fulfillment of the order, however, was halted after it delivered two of the electronic systems in 2011, in the wake of the Mavi Marmara incident.

    News about the weapons deal comes less than three months after media reports surfaced that Ankara and Jerusalem were engaging in secret back-channel reconciliation talks despite heightened tensions over Operation Pillar of Defense. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu confirmed that the two countries were trying to find ways to end their diplomatic impasse.

    Relations between former close allies Turkey and Israel soured after nine pro-Palestinian activists — eight Turks and a Turkish-American — were killed by Israeli troops aboard the Mavi Marmara vessel, which was part of an international flotilla trying to break the Gaza blockade, on May 31, 2010. Israeli naval commandos commandeered the vessel and were attacked by activists.

    Turkey has demanded a formal apology, compensation for victims and the families of the dead, and for the Gaza blockade to be lifted.

    Israel has resisted Turkish demands to apologize for the raid on the ship and to compensate those killed as a precondition for normalizing relations. Israel — stressing that its solders were attacked with clubs and poles by violent thugs aboard the vessel, and insisting that its blockade against Gaza, which is run by the terror group Hamas, is legal — has said it “regrets” the loss of life, rather than issuing a full apology, and has offered to pay into what it called a “humanitarian fund” through which casualties and relatives could be compensated.

    Turkey disputes Israeli assertions that its soldiers acted in self-defense. The commando operation sparked worldwide condemnation and led to an easing of Israel’s blockade on the the Gaza Strip. A UN report on the Mavi Marmara incident released in 2011 concluded that Israel had used unreasonable force in stopping the ship, but that the blockade on Gaza was legal.

    via Israel supplying advanced weaponry to Turkey | The Times of Israel.

  • Prospects for Israel/Turkey Relations

    Prospects for Israel/Turkey Relations

    Contrary to what common interests might otherwise suggest, the upheaval in Syria has not altered the Turkish government’s view of Israel. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s recent assertion that Israel was operating like a “terrorist state” when it bombed targets outside Damascus last month indicates that Turkey is not seeking to incorporate Israel into its Syria strategy. Although Israel might wish otherwise, there is little reason to believe that Turkey will change its tune regarding bilateral relations in the near term, but there is prospect that relations may thaw in the longer term.

    Erdogan stated that Turkey would only renew ties with Israel under three conditions — that Israel issue an official apology for the Mavi Marmara (Palestinian flotilla) incident in May 2010, provide financial compensation to the victims’ families, and lift the blockade on Gaza. It is highly unlikely that the Israeli government would meet the first two conditions; if it were inclined to do so, it would have already done so, and no Israeli government would support lifting the blockade on Gaza as long as it remains under Hamas’ administrative authority.

    By linking a restoration of ties with Israel to a condition that Turkey knows Israel will not meet, one must conclude that Ankara is not inclined to mend fences with Israel and prefers an antagonistic relationship. Indeed, this is consistent with Erdogan’s ongoing ambition to be a hero to the Arab ‘man in the street,’ as well as the foreign policy objectives of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

    Since the AKP’s rise in 2002, Ankara’s foreign policy decisions have become increasingly under the control of elected civilian leaders committed to catering to public opinion. While Erdogan’s opponents have criticized his administration’s handling of certain aspects of foreign affairs — especially vis-à-vis Syria — he has faced virtually no condemnation for severing ties with Israel. It seems only Turkish businesses active with Israel are concerned about the deterioration of bilateral relations. Given that bilateral trade has actually increased since diplomatic relations deteriorated, there is no reason for Erdogan to expect a backlash from the domestic business community. Moreover, Turkey’s conservative Islamists — the APK’s core constituency — are supportive of their government’s current policies vis-à-vis Israel. As Erdogan eyes continued rule, his position on Israel only shores up his base.

    Turkey’s stance on Israel must also be analyzed within the context of Ankara’s pursuit of greater autonomy from Washington, and its interest in capitalizing on Turkey’s strategic depth throughout the Arab world. While remaining a U.S. ally under AKP rule, on numerous occasions Ankara has refused to march to Washington’s drum, opting instead for a more independent foreign policy, which has provided greater returns over the past last decade. Turkey has largely and successfully filled a vacuum created by America’s declining influence on the Arab Street.

    Whereas the U.S. position on Israel/Palestine is widely resented throughout the Arab world, Ankara is advancing a position far more reflective of public opinion throughout the region. Erdogan’s calls for Israel to disband its nuclear arsenal, lift the blockade on Gaza and recognize a sovereign Palestinian state have been well received throughout the Arab world. Due largely to this, Erdogan is arguably the most popular leader in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). With the world’s 17th largest economy and a deep historical connection to the inhabitants of the former Ottoman Empire, Turkey is well poised to expand its soft-power influence throughout MENA. More likely than not, the benefits of maintaining the poor bilateral relations with Israel will continue to outweigh the benefits of restoring ties.

    Given the ‘Islamic winter’ that is developing as an outcome of the Arab Awakening, and its growing isolation, Israel would clearly welcome improved ties with Turkey. Israel’s isolation is evident beyond its immediate borders, as was noted by many of Israel’s traditional European allies voting in favor of non-member observer state status for Palestine at the UN last year and the entire Non-Aligned Movement voting unanimously in favor of Iran’s right to pursue nuclear energy in Tehran last August.

    As Turkey and Iran compete for expanded soft-power influence and control over energy corridors in the Middle East and Central Asia, Syria has become a focal point of their rivalry, however Ankara and Tehran’s mutual interests will likely prevent any conflicts of interests from creating a hostile bilateral relationship. That said, Turkey and Israel’s shared interest in reducing Iran influence’s in Syria is not a strong enough commonality to unite Turkey and Israel. Turkey would not want the replacement of President Assad and/or Iran’s weakened strategic posture vis-à-vis Syria to result either in diminished bilateral business interests in Iran, or stronger Israeli influence in the region.

    While Turkey’s relationship with the Free Syrian Army indicates Ankara’s commitment to toppling the Ba’athist regime in Syria, Israel would view Assad’s ouster with much hesitation, despite its ambition to weaken the so-called “resistance axis” of Iran/Syria/Hezbollah. While no friend of Israel, the Assad regime has in the past stated its willingness to make peace with Israel, and a de facto peace has existed since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, when the Assad regime regulated militant groups in Syria and afforded the Israelis with four decades of peace along their border. Israel recognizes that Salafi jihadists resent Assad’s willingness to hold peace talks with Israel and regulate factions that seek to confront the Jewish state. The rise of groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra in a post-Assad Syria would constitute grave security dilemmas for Israel.

    The high level of animosity between Ankara and Jerusalem undermines prospects for any short-term reconciliation, and the evolving Arab Awakening does not appear to be a force likely to alter Turkey’s calculus — at least in its present form. As Washington is preoccupied with more pressing issues — such as winding down the Afghan war, Iran’s nuclear program, and the Syria conflict — facilitating a rapprochement between Turkey and Israel is not a high priority for the Obama Administration. Likewise, Turkey’s decision-makers are more likely to continue devoting their energy toward Syria and securing Turkey’s long-term commercial interests. Israel can be expected to maintain its focus on its growing security dilemmas along its borders, and its standoff with Iran over Tehran’s alleged nuclear ambitions, so restoring the health of bilateral relations is not a priority for either state.

    That said, recent reports indicate that Turkey’s leaders intend to maintain a line of communication with Israel. During Operation Pillar of Defense in November last year, Turkey’s head of intelligence met with Mossad’s head in Cairo, and a senior Israeli envoy in Switzerland. It seems both governments realize what is at stake, and that neither can afford a complete cessation of communication. As the Arab Awakening continues to reveal unexpected and unwelcome surprises, and as Iran continues to barrel toward a full nuclear weapon capability, Ankara and Jerusalem are more likely than not to acknowledge that they have more to lose than to gain as a result of the continuation of a chilly relationship. Even though Mr. Erdogan clearly wishes to prolong his credibility with the ‘Arab Street’ as long as possible, with the stakes so high, and with Turkey wishing at the same time to maintain its ‘street cred’ with the West, the two states should eventually find a way to reach some common ground.

    Daniel Wagner is CEO of Country Risk Solutions, a cross-border risk management consulting firm, and author of the book “Managing Country Risk”. Giorgio Cafiero is a research analyst with CRS.