Tag: Turkey-Israel

  • Post-apology, are Israel and Turkey allies again, or uneasy frenemies?

    Post-apology, are Israel and Turkey allies again, or uneasy frenemies?

    ADNAN KHAN

    Post-apology, are Israel and Turkey allies again, or uneasy frenemies?

    ADNAN KHAN

    The Globe and Mail

    obama-erdoganIf you believe the hype, Turkey and Israel are friends again. It’s been a long time coming. Four years ago, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Turkish Prime Minster Recep Tayyip Erdogan walked off the stage during a debate with Israeli President Shimon Peres, accusing the moderator of not giving him enough time to respond to Mr. Peres’ comments on Israel’s military campaign in Gaza.

    The incident came to be known in Turkey as the 12-Minute Affair, referring to the time Mr. Erdogan was given to speak compared to the 25 minutes allotted to Mr. Peres. Turks began using the phrase proudly, if somewhat lightheartedly, at dinner parties and bars, raising their hands in the air during heated discussions with friends, shouting: “Twelve minutes! Twelve Minutes!”

    A little more than a year later, in May 2010, Turkish-Israeli relations took a more ominous turn after a deadly raid by Israeli commandos on a Turkish cargo ship hired by the Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), carrying supplies to civilians in Gaza, in defiance of Israel’s blockade. Eight Turks and an American citizen were killed in the pre-dawn chaos, prompting Turkey to expel Israel’s ambassador. Relations dipped to dangerous levels after Israel refused to apologize for the incident and pay compensation to the families of those killed, reaching their nadir when Turkey changed its designation of Israeli warplanes from ‘friendlies’ to ‘hostile.’ The apology finally came in late March this year following a visit to Israel by U.S. President Barack Obama. In Turkey, it was seen as another victory. Mr. Erdogan had triumphed again over the Goliath of the Middle East, raising his street cred among both Turks and Arabs.

    In terms of U.S. strategic interests, the apology was critical. As Islamists cash in on the political windfall following the collapse of authoritarian governments throughout the Middle East, it’s Turkey that offers the kind of moderation and leadership the American administration needs.

    But it’s a risky gamble. Turkey is nowhere near the human rights norms expected of it if it intends to reach international standards. A recent report by the Paris-based Reporters Without Borders dubbed Turkey “the world’s biggest prison for journalists.” The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been accused of using intimidation to silence critics and push forward an agenda many feel undermines Turkey’s secular system.

    For Israel, these are worrying developments. Its apology falls into the rubric of necessity more than any genuine sense of remorse. In fact, Israeli and Turkish interests have never been as far apart as they are today, the victims of geopolitical realities neither could have anticipated.

    But it is Turkey that has played the game expertly. The AKP occupies a novel category in conservative politics. It is perhaps the world’s only Muslim political party with a proven track record of successfully operating in a globalized democratic environment. It has shown a remarkable ability to read the key issues of its time, both domestically and geopolitically. In many ways, despite its increasing authoritarianism, it operates as a mature political party, catering to its key domestic constituencies – namely religious conservatives and the business community – while managing to preserve its international image as the pivot point between East and West.

    Take Syria: In a recent interview with Turkish journalists, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu admitted his government has “concerns” over extremist groups gaining ground in the Syrian revolution but insisted that worrying about those groups now undermines the more urgent need – namely, to bring an end to the conflict.

    The Israelis view events in Syria through a very different lens. Islamic extremism tops the agenda and as jihadists gain ground in Syria, Israel faces the prospect of another hardline Islamist government on its doorstep.

    The Turkish approach is more subtle. On the one hand, it condemns groups like the Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda-linked militants considered the most dangerous rebel group operating in Syria. On the other, it quietly supports groups like the Ahrar al-Sham, a Salafi-inspired Islamist faction that has made deep in-roads into Syrian society through its vast network of humanitarian relief operations.

    The IHH, considered an arm of the AKP, has developed a strong working relationship with the Ahrar al-Sham. Most of the aid it delivers to Syria is channeled through them.

    It’s hard to believe the AKP leadership is not aware of how the IHH operates. But the sensitivity of the issue, both inside Turkey where allegations of an Islamist conspiracy abound, and internationally where helping Islamist factions in Syria is tantamount to helping terrorists, poses serious problems for Ankara.

    But the AKP has read the writing on the wall. It seems inevitable that Islamists will dominate Middle Eastern politics for the foreseeable future. As authoritarian regimes collapse, it’s these groups, with their networks of social organizations, that have offered their citizens a social agenda and capitalized on elections. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood swept to power on the back of a reputation for humanitarianism, developed over years of working among Egypt’s poor and disenfranchised. The secularists, who launched the Egyptian revolution, could not compete on the political stage. Young, and largely online, they were ill-equipped to address the ground realities facing everyday Egyptians.

    Through its leveraging of these Islamist parties, Turkey has developed into a dominant force in the Middle East. The gambit in Syria follows this same logic: the Ahrar al-Sham is developing into the most influential group in Syria. Barring a wider civil war after the Assad regime collapses, it is posed to dominate the future of Syrian politics. And Turkey is its friend.

    Obviously, the Israelis would not approve. Their nightmare scenario is a future Syria dominated by Islamists who reject Israel’s right to exist, or worse still a sectarian civil war that turns Syria into an Arab Afghanistan where al-Qaeda flourishes, right on Israel’s doorstep. It is a near-sighted vision, however, that fails to take into account the broader realities of the Arab Spring, and runs counter to the interests of Turkey.

    But for the sake of appearance Turkey and Israel must appear to be friends again, as paper thin as that friendship actually is. It is a game, and Turkey is winning.

    Adnan Khan is a writer and photographer who lives in Istanbul and Islamabad.

  • Despite Israel’s apology, Turkey not normalizing ties

    Despite Israel’s apology, Turkey not normalizing ties

    Despite Israel’s apology, Turkey not normalizing ties

    NATO planned to invite foreign ministers from Mediterranean countries, including Israel and six Arab states, but Turkey nixes Israeli participation • Erdoğan: Turkey will not send an envoy to Tel Aviv before Israel lifts its naval blockade on the Gaza Strip.

    Eli Leon and Israel Hayom Staff

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    NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. | Photo credit: AP

    Despite the Israeli apology for the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, Turkey said it objects to meeting Israeli diplomats at the upcoming Mediterranean Dialogue group, in which Israel was supposed to have participated for the first time since 2008.

    In addition, Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said on Saturday that Turkey will not send an envoy to Israel as part of a recent move for normalization of ties before Israel lifts its naval blockade on the Gaza Strip.

    Erdoğan reiterated Turkey’s stance on the issue and said Israel should lift the blockade before full restoration of diplomatic ties, Turkish newspaper Sunday Zaman reported.

    According to the Turkish daily Hurriyet, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the 12th and current secretary-general of NATO, planned to invite the foreign ministers from Mediterranean countries, including from Israel and six Arab states, but Turkey has objected, arguing that “it wasn’t the right time” for such a meeting.

    “The general-secretary was planning to invite the foreign ministers of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries on the sidelines of the NATO foreign ministers meeting scheduled for April 23 but Turkey objected to the idea,” a Western diplomatic source told Hürriyet on the condition of anonymity.

    A Turkish official told Hurriyet that “at this stage, such a meeting would not be useful.”

    According to the newspaper, the official also said that Egypt and Tunisia, two members of the Mediterranean Dialogue, did not want to hold such meeting at this stage either.

    NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue was initiated in 1994 by the North Atlantic Council. It currently involves seven non-NATO countries in the Mediterranean region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

    According to Hurriyet, Turkey has been having a tough time normalizing relations with Israel since the relatives of slain Turkish activists still appear defiant about continuing their lawsuits against senior Israeli officials, with one even declaring that he would hand his compensation money from Israel to Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The dropping of legal cases against Israeli officials was one of the core conditions that Israel demanded from Turkey as part of the apology deal.

    via Israel Hayom | Despite Israel’s apology, Turkey not normalizing ties.

  • What does an Israel-Turkey Awakening Mean for Mediterranean Gas?

    What does an Israel-Turkey Awakening Mean for Mediterranean Gas?

    After nearly three years of tension, Israel’s olive branch to Turkey in late March was welcome news to most of the Eastern Mediterranean, not to mention Washington. With Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu offering an apology for Israeli actions against a Turkish aid flotilla in 2010, it seemed possible we might see some cohesion on the region’s roster of current challenges. Announcing a full resumption of diplomatic ties, the two governments opened the door to an assortment of possible joint efforts, including how to deal with a beleaguered Syria and a new Egypt. However, what stood out for many was what it all would mean for the region’s energy options.

    Location of the Eastern Mediterranean (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

    After years of fruitless exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean, Israel hit upon billions in potential revenue and energy independence in 2009 with the discovery of one of the largest offshore finds in a decade. Since then, the country has rushed to exploit the reserves with the help of foreign partners, including Texas’s Noble Energy, in hopes of bringing in an estimated $80 billion over the coming years. However, while Israeli gas efforts officially started flowing during the final days of March, the challenge of just how to transport the product to worthwhile markets like Europe remains a challenge. Sure they’d explored alterative options, including a Cyrus-Greece line or LNG plants. But with Turkey eager to get involved in a gas bonanza they’d previously only watched from the sidelines and with the economic stability to back up their plans, Israel’s surest best now seems to rest in Ankara.

    So, with Israel and Turkey now willing to talk and plan for the future, where does this leave poor Cyprus? Always willing to play the cautiously neutral middleman as its neighbors laid claims to the region’s newfound gas fortunes, the partial island nation is finding itself newly isolated in the push to cash in on the region’s gas riches.

    This could not come at a worse time for Cyprus. Over the last few weeks, the country’s fiscal situation has gone from bad to worse as a push for a financial bailout package ended with a series of missteps that dashed any remaining confidence in the country’s economy. In addition to nearly destroying the country’s bloated banking system, the experience left them in a weaker position when it comes to developing their offshore claims.

    Cypriot leaders, including newly elected Prime Minister Nicos Anastasiades have insisted that gas revenues be left alone when it comes to dealing with the country’s current crisis. In order to avoid selling off the country’s future wealth in a panic to ensure a quick bailout or loans, gas revenue would be kept separate and not be considered until production efforts really started bringing in revenue, which they expect as early as 2018 or 2019. Even during recent negotiations to secure funding to fend off a collapse of their banking system and restructure a Russian loan, Cyprus balked at the idea of exchanging support for exploration and production rights to their offshore claims.

    However, as the dust has now settled and the reality of the country’s path towards economic recovery has become a little more clear – long and difficult – the ability to hold off on potential gas revenue has become much more difficult. Even with financial support pledged from Europe and the IMF, Cyprus may likely soon have to appeal for further support to stay afloat. Keeping gas off the table during those discussions may soon become impossible.

    In a more immediate, logistical sense, Cyprus’s role in exporting gas out of the region and to Europe has become a lot more difficult in terms of being able to pay to play. With an economy in tatters and investor confidence in the dumps, its unclear just how the country’s leaders plan to support their own energy infrastructure development, much less taking part in regional efforts linking the Eastern Mediterranean with more eager markets. Israel may have floated early partnerships when offshore gas first became a reality, but given Nicosia’s current financial standing,

    Here, it appears is where Turkey enters the picture. While Cyprus will be struggling to find ways to meet even basic spending needs, Turkey has shifted billions towards infrastructure projects in recent years.

    For now, Cyprus has pledged to push on with or without regional partnerships they explored over the last year. Also working with Noble Energy, Cyprus lays claim to an estimated 60 trillion cubic feet of offshore gas reserves, which they hope will start flowing within the next few years. While they intend to move on alone if they have to, moving the gas out of Cyprus may prove challenging or at the very least, very expensive. Early proposals include building a pipeline to Cyprus where Liquefied Natural Gas plants could process the reserves for transport to the rest of Europe, though such an effort would cost an estimated $13.3 billion. For a country that just barely nailed down a bailout package worth about as much, this is not an easy task.

    via What does an Israel-Turkey Awakening Mean for Mediterranean Gas? – Forbes.

  • Are Israel and Turkey friends again?

    Are Israel and Turkey friends again?

    Turkey will not alter its hawkish stance, yet Israel needs Turkey as a strategic partner. But not at any price.

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    Billboards put up in Ankara to thank Erdogan for getting Israel to apologize for Marmara incident. Photo: REUTERS/Umit Bektas

    For many years, the relationship between Israel and Turkey has been extremely good. The close cooperation between the countries has been reflected in diplomatic relations, tourism, military cooperation and security, including joint military maneuvers and extensive defense trade.

    Behind the scenes, there has also been cooperation in the intelligence field. However, Operation Cast Lead brought about a dramatic change.

    Immediately thereafter, relations began to deteriorate as a result of initiatives carried out by Turkey’s leadership, supposedly in response to Israeli violence against Palestinians. In reality, however, it was only an excuse Turkey used to cover up its aspiration to become an influential player in the Muslim world.

    Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan gradually began taking more and more extreme positions and speaking out strongly against Israeli policy. The peak came when the Mavi Marmara flotilla attempted to enter Israeli waters and the IDF used force to stop it. Turkey recalled its ambassador, diplomatic ties were cut off and joint military training was canceled. There was a total disconnect between the countries.

    Erdogan needed to cut ties with Israel, and to weaken Turkey’s secular military, so that he could strengthen his position in the eyes of his Muslim constituents. He was also interested in positioning Turkey as a regional leader. To do so, Turkey had to constantly become more radical to keep up with Iran and Syria. Turkey’s demand that Israel apologize for the Marmara incident, and Israel’s refusal to do so, was the excuse Erdogan used to become even more extreme.

    There are a number of ramifications to the cutting off of security cooperation between Turkey and Israel.

    The defense industry took the hardest hit. Israeli exports to Turkey, including potential orders which were canceled as a result of the crisis, reached hundreds of millions of dollars. And the commercial relationship Israel had with Turkey was not limited to defense. Commercial, nonmilitary cooperation was also seriously hit. Numerous projects, including upgrading Turkish tanks in Israel, were canceled. Sensitive technological systems that had previously been sold to Turkey were exported in much smaller quantities. Large Israeli companies such as Elbit Systems, ELTA Systems, Elbit Systems Electro-optics – Elop and Israel Aerospace Industries were hit the hardest.

    The IDF’s operational readiness was also affected.

    Throughout the years, the IDF had benefitted from joint sea, land and air exercises with the Turkish military. In addition, they jointly planned operations that were carried out in distant locations, strengthened cooperation with NATO countries and practiced scenarios that could only be carried out with Turkish assistance.

    The rupture led to an end to joint maneuvers for which the IDF had no suitable alternative.

    The third area that was affected was intelligence.

    Valuable security information regarding technology and intelligence had been transferred between the two countries over the years. This trade of information was the basis for the trust that had been forged. To a large extent, this was a prerequisite for Israel to achieve its goals. As relations with Turkey deteriorated, however, the fear that sensitive security information might find its way to hostile or even enemy countries grew. Security agreements were canceled and the alienation intensified.

    Non-military commercial and legal interests were also hit. Following the cut in relations, there was a steep fall in the number of Israeli tourists who visited Turkey. Numerous lawsuits were submitted in Turkey against Israeli individuals and senior officers, which limited their movement outside Israel.

    In recent months, there has been a change in the Turkish leadership. Erdogan realized that if Turkey wishes to be considered a regional power bridging East and West, and to remain on good terms with the US, then it would need to be more moderate.

    At the same time, Syria, Turkey’s neighbor to the south, is falling into chaos, which could put Turkey in danger. Therefore, Erdogan has softened his tone and the atmosphere has become more relaxed. Turkey’s goals have not changed, and it is still maneuvering in an effort to gain status and power in the regional Arab leadership.

    However, its need to remain close to the US and Europe requires that it watch its step.

    The Turks received the apology they asked for, and the ambassadors will probably be reinstated. Smiles may replace the angry faces, and defense cooperation might even return to some extent. But the trend has not really changed. Turkey must continue to walk on the thin line between its desire to lead the predominately Muslim Middle East, and its need to please the West and retain its image as a moderate country.

    We in Israel are sitting right on that thin line. Apologies like the one Netanyahu gave Erdogan are apparently necessary to keep the thin line from breaking. But the future holds many more difficulties in the relationship between the two countries. Turkey will not alter its hawkish stance, yet Israel needs Turkey as a strategic partner. But not at any price.

    The writer is a former brigadier-general who served as a division head in the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency). The original article appeared in Hebrew in Sof Hashavua.

    Translated by Hannah Hochner.

    via Are Israel and Turkey friends again? | JPost | Israel News.

  • Turkey-Israel: the new Great Game

    There is a new Great Game afoot and it is taking place beneath the sea floor of the eastern Mediterranean.

    Turkey and Israel’s tentative reconciliation is a process so fraught that US Secretary of State John Kerry appeared in Istanbul at the weekend to chivvy the two sides towards restoring full diplomatic ties. But if the steps he set out can be taken — agreeing compensation for nine Turks killed by Israeli forces in 2010, avoiding inflammatory talk, exchange of ambassadors — then a whole series of changes could be unleashed from Damascus to Brussels.

    In particular, there is the question of a pipeline that could ferry newly discovered Israeli natural gas to energy-hungry Turkey — a move that would knit the two US allies closer together, despite enduring suspicions.

    “It is possible that cooperation in energy between Turkey and Israel could follow an anticipated rapprochement,” said Taner Yilidz, Turkey’s energy minister, on Monday.

    Turkish officials caution that bilateral talks on such cooperation can only really get going after ambassadors are exchanged — but add that business contacts on the topic are already burgeoning.

    Ozgur Altug at BGC partners in Istanbul contends that rapprochement means that “relatively weak Israel-Turkey economic relations will pick up again”. He observes that although Turkish exports to Israel have risen over the last decade (falling back slightly in 2012) to their current level of $2.5bn, they have declined as a proportion of Ankara’s total exports (of which they now account for about 1.5 per cent rather than more than 2 per cent previously).

    While noting that the two countries have relatively tiny levels of direct investment in each other, he highlights the potential for tourism. Israelis represented more than 2 per cent of tourists coming to Turkey in the early 2000s, a level that fell to just 0.3 per cent as of the end of last year.

    But the biggest economic issue is probably gas. Altug calculates that Turkey could save $1bn a year in energy costs if it entered into a gas joint venture with Israel, a figure that could dramatically escalate if other initiatives, such as a possible Turkish energy deal with Northern Iraq, were factored in. Because of such developments, he reckons that Turkey’s current account deficit, the country’s economic Achilles heel, which reached 10 per cent of GDP in 2011 and was still above 6 per cent in 2012, could be kept below 5 per cent from 2016.

    Such an economically significant relationship would have other consequences as well. Though diplomats from both sides warn the Israeli-Turkish relationship is unlikely soon to return to 1990s-era warmth, cooperation on Syria, which both sides hope will avoid becoming a failed state and which Israel wants to keep out of the control of the Muslim Brotherhood, is a distinct possibility.

    Turkish-Israeli energy cooperation could also have an impact on Cyprus, which has gas finds of its own that are adjoining but smaller than Israel’s discoveries. If Cyprus finds itself bereft of Israeli cooperation it may lack economies of scale to proceed with a multi-billion dollar LNG plant or a pipeline to Greece.

    Although Turkey, which invaded the island in 1974, has no diplomatic relations with the internationally recognised Cypriot government, Yildiz pointedly remarked on Monday that if energy cooperation with Israel went ahead Turkey might “also like to see Greek Cyprus involved”.

    If, somehow, Turkey and Cyprus managed to establish a relationship, this in turn would unblock one of Ankara’s biggest problems with the EU, since not a single negotiating chapter of Turkey’s membership talks can be closed as long as a standoff continues in which Ankara bans Cypriot vessels from its ports.

    The stakes are high, therefore, in the Turkey-Israeli reconciliation. But two questions hang over the whole scenario of mutual economic benefit, closer cooperation in a region in chaos and a roadblock removed from the highway to Brussels.

    First, can the Turkey-Israeli rapprochement prosper without a change of Israeli policy on the Palestinians, whose cause is a rallying cry for prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan? And second, do Erdogan and Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, see the healing of their own frayed ties in strategic terms, or simply as a tactical measure, taken in part just to keep the Americans quiet and not worth investing much more political capital in?

    The future of the region — and the geopolitical map of the Eastern Mediterranean — depends on the answers.

    via Turkey-Israel: the new Great Game | beyondbrics.

  • Israel, Turkey (and Beyond) Live Coverage: A New Israeli-Turkish Relationship?

    Israel, Turkey (and Beyond) Live Coverage: A New Israeli-Turkish Relationship?

    1425 GMT: Palestine. Thousands of mourners have turned out for the funerals of three Palestinians, including two teenagers killed by Israeli army gunfire in Tulkarm.

    ERDOGAN NETANYAHU --- USED 04-04-13On Tuesday, Maysara Abu Hamdeya, a 64-year-old prisoner serving a life term in an Israeli jail, died from cancer.

    Palestinian officials accused Israel of delaying treatment for Hamdeya and gave him full military honours at the funeral in Hebron, where masked gunmen fired into the air as his body arrived at a mosque.

    Amer Nassar, 17, and Naji Belbisi, 18, were killed in the wave of disturbances that followed the announcement of Hamdeya’s death.

    1045 GMT: Egypt. Writing for the Associated Press, Maggie Michael and Sarah El Deeb describe the bloody clashes last month outside Muslim Brotherhood headquarters in Cairo:

    The riot on March 22 revealed a new readiness of some in the anti-Brotherhood opposition to turn to violence, insisting they have no choice but to fight back against a group they accuse of using violence against them for months. The fight featured an unusual vengefulness. Young protesters were seen at one point pelting a Brotherhood member with firebombs and setting him aflame. Others chased anyone with a conservative Muslim beard, while Islamists set up checkpoints searching for protesters. Each side dragged opponents into mosques and beat them.

    Since the fight, Islamists enraged by what they saw as aggression against their headquarters have for the past week hiked up calls for wider action against opponents — and the media in particular — accusing them of trying to overthrow Islamist President Mohammed Morsi.

    1025 GMT: Egypt. Minister of Planning Ashraf al-Araby has said the Government expects to reach a final agreement with the International Monetary Fund on a $4.8 billion loan within two weeks.

    An IMF delegation resumed negotiations with Egypt on Wednesday. Agreement has been held up for months by political and economic tensions, with President Morsi introducing but quickly withdrawing required tax increases and cut in subsidies last autumn.

    Foreign reserves are at $13.4 billion, covering less than three months of imports.

    0735 GMT: Palestine. US and Palestinian officials say that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas will suspend “all unilateral measures” at the United Nations to give US Secretary of State John Kerry time to pursue a new round of Israeli-Palestinian talks.

    A source said the Fatah Central Committee, led by Abbas, passed a resolution for the suspensions on Tuesday.

    “For a limited and specified period of time a new opportunity will be given to international efforts under way to break the deadlock in the peace process,” the resolution read. It went on to say, “In the event Israel thwarts such efforts, we will again turn to international organizations.”

    In November, the UN General Assembly recognised Palestine as an Observer State, angering the Israelis and leading to a cut-off of tax revenues from Israel to the PA. West Jerusalem warned the PA, which controls the West Bank, not to pursue accession to UN agencies and bodies such as the International Criminal Court.

    Sources gave the timeframe of the suspension of the Palestinian Authority’s efforts to secure member-state status in various UN agencies as around eight weeks starting on 22 March, when President Obama concluded his visit to the region, with a possible four-week extension.

    Abbas is due to meet Kerry on Sunday.

    0710 GMT: Palestine. Two Palestinian teenagers have been shot and killed by Israeli forces in the West Bank city of Tulkarm amid clashes.

    One teenager was confirmed dead on Wednesday while the body of a second youth was found on Thursday.

    The Israeli military said its troops opened fire on Palestinians who threw firebombs at a guard post.

    0650 GMT: Israel and Turkey. We start this morning with an analysis by Shoshank Joshi and Aaron Stein of the recent “reconciliation” between West Jerusalem and Turkey, marked by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s apology over the killing of nine Turkish citizens by Israeli commandoes during an attack on a Gaza-bound “Freedom Flotilla” in May 2010.

    On EA, we have emphasised the place of Syria in this reconcilation, with the US and others seeking to get Turkey and Israel on the same side over support for the insurgency. In the final third of the article Joshi and Stein add other dimensions:

    1. The potential of exports of Israeli natural gas to Turkey, downplayed by the authors;

    2. “What the apology could do is restart Turkey and Israel’s defense relationship”, with supply of Israeli drones, specialized equipment for Turkey’s U.S.-made Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft , and other technology and weapons;

    3. “An upgrade in intelligence cooperation in Syria”;

    4. “The apology may shake up Turkey’s diplomacy in the Palestinian territories….Turkey may even feel well placed to broker reconciliation between the two factions [of Hamas and Fatah].”

    via EA WorldView – Home – Israel, Turkey (and Beyond) Live Coverage: A New Israeli-Turkish Relationship?.