ISTANBUL (CIHAN)- Despite recurring numbers that display decreasing levels of conservatism in Turkey, a TESEV/KONDA survey has shown an increasing ratio of people who self-describe as Islamists. In an effort to understand why the number of Islamists is surpassing even the traditionally dominant self-identified conservatives, Sunday’s Zaman talked to experts on the subject. It turns out that as Turkey becomes a more open society, people are expressing and labeling themselves more freely, as well as associating Islamism with religiosity independent from a political context.
In the results of a TESEV/KONDA survey released in September 2012, when respondents asked how they would define themselves, 18.9 percent chose the label “Islamist” while 15.6 percent chose “conservative.” In October 2012, the Open Society Foundation-Turkey even found that conservatism was in decline in Turkey, with a drop from 16.6 percent to 10 percent from 2006 to 2012. On the other hand, MetroPOLL, another polling company, measured self-identified Islamists at 9.6 percent in Turkey and “religious conservatives” at 6.4 percent, in a survey conducted in the second half of 2012. How do we explain a rise in the number of Islamists in a slowly but steadily liberalizing and apparently less conservative society?
According to TESEV’s Etyen Mahçupyan, if most people in Turkey were asked without any restrictions how they would define themselves, they would label themselves “Muslim.” In the absence of a religious identity, however, they prefer the political identity that the term Islamist represents. Mahçupyan argues that people who have a more democratic political outlook likely choose to call themselves Islamist rather than conservative as the latter suggests a less democratic outlook. Why then do they not choose to call themselves simply “democrat”? “Because they wonder whether it would jeopardize their religiosity, asking themselves, ‘Are we going to perceive religion democratically, too?’” says Mahçupyan, adding that in Turkey it is not yet fully comprehended that one could be democratic and religious at the same time.
“Being a democrat has always been perceived as a proper form of secularism,” adds Mahçupyan, in a novel statement. All in all, Mahçupyan separates cultural and political conservatism. “Conservative has a negative connotation in the political arena but a positive one in the cultural sphere,” Mahçupyan explained, while emphasizing the necessity of distinguishing between cultural and political senses. Apparently, some Muslims want to “give the message that they are not politically conservative by calling themselves Islamists,” Mahçupyan claims.
However, according to some, it is not as complex as it seems. For Dr. Yalçin Akdogan, an Ankara deputy of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and a close advisor to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, “The man on the street does not even know what Islamism corresponds to, but perceives it as a general religiosity.” According to Akdogan, what is happening is an increasing visibility of religious people in society. “In the past, it was the cleaning lady who wore a headscarf; now the newscaster on TV wears one,” says Akdogan, claiming that “some who believe their turf is restricted are uncomfortable with the AK Party’s policy to handle the problems of all segments in society, including the conservatives.” Although he emphasizes that the AK Party is now a mass party that receives the support of people from all walks of life, Akdogan adds, “In an unprecedented way, the conservative political identity is now undertaking the transformation of Turkey.” Indeed, he labels the 2000s as the years that conservatism ruled. Yet Akdogan downplayed polls and said Islamism is an issue of great significance that begs further analysis.
By a similar token, Professor Özer Sencar, the head of the MetroPOLL research company, says that people perceive the term Islamist to mean “staunchly religious,” and not necessarily in political terms. “There are even CHP [Republican People’s Party] voters who define themselves as Islamist because they do not perceive it as a political identity,” remarks Sencar, directing attention to the impact of normalization in society. “Those who might not have labeled themselves Islamist under previous conditions tend to do so now, with the idea that the government and leaders in power are one of them,” says Sencar.
The academic and Zaman columnist Ihsan Dagi also emphasizes the “normalizing” conditions in Turkey. While disagreeing that the number of Islamists is on the rise, Dagi believes that what is happening is “the emergence of conditions in which Islamists can freely express themselves.” In other words, Islamism, which used to have stigma attached to it, is becoming normalized in society. According to Dagi, “Islamists who were excluded from society now see themselves in power in AK Party governments.” Referring to the gains that Islamists have received from their inclusion into the resources provided by the state, Dagi argues that “Islamists are now the ones who allocate the resources,” which as a result has contributed to their self-confidence.
External developments as well have added to the growing reputation of Islamism. For Dagi, “The coming into power of Islamists in the post-Arab Spring period who did not hide their identity also contributed to the public display of Islamism in Turkey.” In other words, for many in Turkey, Islamism has become a part of the mainstream discourse.
Dr. Berat Özipek has studied conservatism in Turkey and looks at public opinion polls with a suspicious attitude due to doubts over their scientific accuracy. The scholar says that those who call themselves Islamists are the ones who change the most in this region of the world. “Now a more democratic Islamism exists that does not reduce Islam into a political project,” Özipek claims, unlike Mahçupyan believing that “many people could be Islamist and democratic at the same time.” According to Özipek, Islamists in Turkey exist in a wide array, from pro-liberal democrats to anti-capitalist Muslims.
To what extent do the prime minister’s remarks influence the numbers in the polls? Or is it vice versa? According to Mahçupyan, there is no doubt that society is influenced by Erdogan and that people use more timid answers when disagreeing with the prime minister. However, he disagrees with the claim that the AK Party is straying back to its roots (the Islamist Milli Görüs [National View] movement), and rather sees the conservative statements of the prime minister as a political tactic.
Dagi also sees the prime minister as highly influential on the public, pointing to his recent Islamist rhetoric and increasing references to religion which have excited Islamists in the party. According to Dagi, today one-third of the AK Party constituency describe themselves as Islamist, a number that had not exceeded 10 percent in previous years. On the other hand, for Özipek, it is only acceptable for the AK Party as a conservative party to use such rhetoric when it comes to issues like abortion, promoting bigger families and the construction of mosques. Özipek sees the situation as legitimate for the AK Party in a democracy as long as it does not change public policies in an “illiberal direction.”
Although Islamism is in an unprecedented rise according to the polls, it could be argued that people do not necessarily perceive it as a political identity, but a way to define their lifestyle. (Cihan/Sunday’s Zaman) CIHAN
