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Tag: Iraq

  • U.S. general wants to move troops to northern Iraq

    U.S. general wants to move troops to northern Iraq

    By ADAM ASHTON

    McClatchy Newspapers

    BAGHDAD — The top U.S. general in Iraq wants to place more American soldiers along the fault line between Iraqi Kurds and Arabs, two groups who have appeared on the verge of civil war at times over the past year.

    Gen. Ray Odierno has discussed his proposal with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, two leaders who have been at odds for the past year over how to determine which group should govern the oil-rich city of Kirkuk and the Ninevah plains near Mosul.

    A spokesman for Multi-National Force Iraq said Monday that Odierno is proposing a temporary deployment that would not affect the planned withdrawal of American forces by Dec. 31, 2011.

    The intent is to partner American soldiers with Kurdish-controlled peshmerga and Iraqi forces who answer to al-Maliki’s government in Baghdad “to prevent the disputed areas from being used as a seam.”

    “If approved, this change in security posture would be a temporary measure to improve confidence in the security situation and pressure terrorist networks,” said the spokesman, who asked not to be identified as a matter of policy.

    Resolving the dispute between Kurds and Arabs over Kirkuk and the Ninevah plains is one of the top remaining priorities for Americans in Iraq. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited the country last month and urged al-Maliki and Barzani to settle the matter before U.S. forces leave.

    Al-Maliki’s Cabinet, meanwhile, has submitted a proposal that would give Iraqi voters a chance in January to hasten the withdrawal of American forces from their country by as much as a year, sending all remaining U.S. soldiers home by the end of 2010 instead of 2011.

    The plan, en route to Iraq’s parliament, would set a national referendum on Jan. 16, giving voters a say on the security agreement that defines the pace of the drawdown.

    That vote would take place on the same date that Iraqis choose their next parliament, their first national vote since 2005.

    It’s not clear whether parliament will support the date, but it’s likely that Iraqis – exhausted by more than six years of war and occupation – would elect to send Americans home earlier if they had an opportunity to vote on it.

    The pact took effect Jan. 1. Its key date so far was June 30, when American soldiers were required to leave their bases in cities and towns. Al-Maliki designated the date “National Sovereignty Day,” and it was celebrated with parties in the street.

    That success could persuade Iraqis to support the withdrawal agreement, said Abdul Karim al-Samarrai, a prominent lawmaker from the Iraqi Islamic Party.

    “The people now have a better idea about what the agreement holds for them, especially as they have seen the actual withdrawal of American troops from their cities. Maybe they have more faith in it,” he said.

    About 131,000 American soldiers remain in Iraq. That number is expected to decline to 50,000 by next August.

    The security agreement, drafted last fall between the Bush administration and al-Maliki’s government, says either side must give the other a year’s notice before changing the pact, meaning that the U.S. would have at least that much time to exit Iraq if voters reject the agreement.

    Al-Maliki agreed to put the agreement to a vote to appease critics in parliament who insisted that all Iraqis have their say. The referendum was supposed to take place at the end of July.

    The Ministry of Planning also announced a delay in another election-related issue Monday. It’s postponing a planned census because of fears that the results would stir violence in the northern provinces that are the focus of Odierno’s new security proposal.

    The Kurdistan Regional Government wants to annex both areas. The census was supposed to be a step toward votes on whether the territories would join the semiautonomous Kurdish region or continue to be controlled by Baghdad.

    Barzani’s government controls three provinces and views both Kirkuk and the Ninevah plains as essential parts of the Kurdish homeland.

    Kurds grew especially sensitive to threats against the territories late last year when the central government deployed an army division near Kirkuk, an ethnically mixed province believed to have roughly equal populations of Kurds, Arabs and Turkomen.

    Meanwhile, the Ninevah plains outside Mosul have seen some of the most violent attacks on civilians in recent weeks. More than 20 Yazidis, a religious minority, were killed Thursday. A village outside Mosul was leveled by two truck bombs Aug. 10, which killed more than 30.

    (Ashton reports for The Modesto (Calif.) Bee. McClatchy Newspapers special correspondent Sahar Issa contributed to this report.)

  • Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    Turkey, U.S.: Strengthening Ties as Ankara Rises
    March 19, 2009 | 1837 GMT ADEM ALTAN/AFP/Getty ImagesTurkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoganSummary
    U.S. President Barack Obama will visit Turkey on April 6-7 and meet with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The United States and Turkey have many areas of mutual interest, including Iraq, Middle Eastern diplomatic efforts, Iran and Central Asia. Obama’s visit indicates that his administration recognizes Turkey’s growing prominence, and it gives the United States a chance to coordinate policy with a rising power.

    Analysis
    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan confirmed late March 18 that U.S. President Barack Obama will be visiting Turkey on April 6-7. In an interview with Turkish news channel Kanal 7, Erdogan said he had invited Obama to attend a meeting of the Alliance of Civilizations initiative in Istanbul on April 7, but “did not expect” Obama to arrive a day early for an official state visit to Ankara. “Combining the two occasions is very meaningful for us,” he added. Obama’s trip to Turkey will follow a visit to London for the G-20 summit on the global financial crisis, a NATO summit in Strasbourg, France, and a trip to Prague to meet with EU leaders.

    Obama’s decision to visit Turkey this early in the game highlights his administration’s recognition of Turkey’s growing prominence in the region. The Turks have woken up after 90 years of post-Ottoman hibernation and are in the process of rediscovering a sphere of influence extending far beyond the Anatolian Peninsula. The Americans, on the other hand, are in the process of drawing down their presence in the Middle East in order to free up U.S. military capabilities to address pressing needs in Afghanistan. With the Turks stepping forward and the Americans stepping back, there are a number of issues of common interest that Obama and Erdogan will need to discuss.

    The first order of business is Iraq. The United States is putting its exit strategy into motion and is looking to Turkey to serve as an exit route for U.S. troops and equipment from Iraq. The Turks would not have a problem with granting the United States such access, but they also want to make sure that U.S. withdrawal plans will not interfere with Turkey’s intentions of keeping Iraqi Kurdistan in check. With key Kurdish leader and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani retiring soon and Kurdish demands over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk intensifying, the Turks want to make clear to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq that Ankara promptly will shut down any attempts to expand Kurdish autonomy. Turkey will not hesitate to use the issue of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters hiding out in northern Ir aq as a pretext for future military incursions should the need arise to pressure the KRG in a more forceful way, but such tactics could run into complications if the United States intends to withdraw the bulk of its forces through northern Iraq. Therefore, the decision on where to base U.S. troops during the withdrawal process will be a political one, and one that will have to address Turkish concerns over the Kurds. Washington likely will see this as a reasonable price to pay, as it has other problems to handle.

    Related Special Topic Page
    Turkey’s Re-Emergence
    Beyond Iraq, the United States is looking to Turkey as the Muslim regional heavyweight to take the lead in handling some of the knottier issues in the Middle East. The Israeli-Syrian peace talks that went public in 2008 were a Turkish initiative. These negotiations are now in limbo, with the Israelis still working to form a new government, but the Turks are looking to revive them in the near future. Turkey, Israel, the United States and the Arab states all share an interest in bringing Syria into a Western alliance structure, with the aim of depriving Iran of its leverage in the Levant. However, the Syrians are setting an equally high price for their cooperation: Syrian domination over Lebanon. These negotiations are packed with potential deal breakers, but Turkey intends to take on the challenge in the interest of securing its southern flank.

    Iran is another critical area where the United States and Turkey see eye to eye. The fall of Saddam Hussein and the rise of the Shia in Iraq have given Iran a platform for projecting influence in the Arab world. But the Turks far outpace the Iranians in a geopolitical contest and will be instrumental in keeping Iranian expansionist goals in check. Erdogan’s outburst over Israel’s Gaza offensive was just one of many ways Turkey has been working to assert its regional leadership, build up its credibility among Sunnis in the Arab world and override Iranian attempts to reach beyond its borders. At the same time, the Turks carry weight with the Iranians, who view Turkey as a fellow great empire of the past and non-Arab partner in the Middle East. Washington may not necessarily need the Turks to mediate in its rocky negotiations with Iran, but it will rely heavily on Turkish clout in the region to help put the Iranians in their place.

    Some problems may arise, however, when U.S.-Turkish talks venture beyond the Middle East and enter areas where the Turkish and Russian spheres of influence overlap. Turkey’s influence extends into Central Asia and deep into the Caucasus, where the Turks have a strong foothold in Azerbaijan and ties to Georgia, and are in the process of patching things up with the Armenians. As the land bridge between Europe and Asia, Turkey is also the key non-Russian energy transit hub for the European market, and through its control of the Bosporus, it is the gatekeeper to the Black Sea. In each of these areas, the Turks bump into the Russians, another resurgent power that is on a tight timetable for extracting key concessions from the United States on a range of issues that revolve around Russia’s core imperative of protecting its former Soviet periphery from Western meddling.

    The U.S. administration and the Kremlin have been involved in intense negotiations over these demands. Washington is still sorting out which concessions it can make in return for Russian cooperation in allowing the United States access to Central Asia for supply routes to Afghanistan, and in applying pressure on Iran. As part of these negotiations, Obama will be meeting with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev at the G-20 summit and later in the summer in Moscow. Though it is still unclear just how much the United States is willing to give the Russians at this juncture — and how flexible the Turks will be in challenging Russia — Washington wants to make sure its allies, like Turkey, are on the same page.

    But as STRATFOR has discussed in depth, Russia and Turkey now have more reason to cooperate than collide, and recent diplomatic traffic between Moscow and Ankara certainly reflects this reality. In areas where the United States will want to apply pressure on Russia, such as on energy security for the Europeans, the Turks likely will resist rocking the boat with Moscow. The last thing Turkey wants at this point is to give Russia a reason to politicize its trade relationship with Ankara, cause trouble for the Turks in the Caucasus or meddle in Turkey’s Middle Eastern backyard. In short, there are real limits to what the United States can expect from Turkey in its strategy against Russia.

    Obama and Erdogan evidently will have plenty to talk about when they meet in Ankara. Though the United States and Turkey have much to sort out regarding Iraq, Syria, Iran and Russia, this visit will give Obama the stage to formally recognize Turkey’s regional prowess and demonstrate a U.S. understanding of Turkey’s growing independence. Washington can see that the Turks are already brimming with confidence in conducting their regional affairs, and can expect some bumps down the road when interests collide. But the sooner the Americans can start coordinating policy with a resurgent power like Turkey, the better equipped Washington will be for conducting negotiations in other parts of the globe.

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  • Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    Geopolitical Diary: The Turkish and Iranian Balance of Power
    February 27, 2009Turkish President Abdullah Gul announced on Thursday that he will make a one-day trip to Iran on March 10 to attend the Economic Cooperation Organization summit. While the summit aims to improve economic and commercial relations among the member states, the leaders will also discuss bilateral relations and regional issues. Of the two items on Gul’s agenda, his bilateral meetings with the Iranians hold far more interest for STRATFOR than anything that the summit will generate.

    Both Turkey and Iran are on the rise. Until relatively recent times, both have been contained by various forces, most notably Iraq and the Soviet Union. Between the end of the Cold War and American defeat of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, however, many restrictions on the power of both states evaporated. Both Turkey and Iran are looking for wider roles in their region. Both have grand imperial pasts. Both have ambitions. And both are somewhat oddballs in the world of geopolitics.

    Most nations are oriented around a piece of flat, core territory where the nationality was not just born, but has entrenched itself. For France, Germany and Poland, that core is their respective portions of the Northern European Plain. The core territory of the United States is the coastal Atlantic strip east of the Appalachians. Argentina is centered on the bountiful flatlands around Buenos Aires. The defining territory of China comprises the fertile regions between the Yellow and Yangtze rivers.

    Such flatness is critical to the development of a nation because the lack of internal geographic barriers allows the dominant culture to assimilate or eliminate groups that would dilute or challenge its power. Additionally, plains regions tend to boast river systems that allow thriving agricultural, transportation and trade opportunities that mountainous regions lack. Very few states count mountains as their core simply because mountains are difficult to pacify. It is very easy for dissident or minority groups to root themselves in such regions, and the writ of the state is often weak. Consequently, most mountainous states are defined not by success but by failure. Lebanon, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Laos come to mind.

    Turkey and Iran are different. Their core lands are mountainous regions — the Anatolian Peninsula for Asia Minor and the Zagros Mountains of Persia. Even though the Turks are not original descendants of their their Anatolian power base, they were able to secure their central lands when they swept in as conquerors a millennium ago and have since destroyed or assimilated most of the natives. The Persians ruled through a dizzyingly complex system of interconnected elites that succeeded in instilling a common Persian culture that extended somewhat beyond mere ethnicity, all while keeping the base of power in the Persians’ hands.

    But that is where the similarities end. As these two states both return to prominence, it is almost inevitable that Turkey that will fare better than Iran, simply because the Turks enjoy the advantage of geography. Anatolia is a plateau surrounded by water on three sides and enjoys the blessing of the Golden Horn, which transforms the well-positioned city of Istanbul into one of the world’s best — and certainly most strategically located — ports. Turkey straddles Europe and Asia, the Balkans and the Islamic world, the former Soviet Union and the Mediterranean Basin. The result is a culture not only incredibly aware of international events, but one steeped in trade whether via its land connections or —by virtue of being a peninsula — maritime trade. Unsurprisingly, for a good chunk of the past 2,000 years, Anatolia — whether under the Greeks, the Romans, the Byzantines or most recently under the Turks themselves — has been at or nea r the center of human development.

    By comparison, Iran got shortchanged. Although Iran has water on two sides, it has a minimal maritime tradition. Its plateau is a salt desert. The Caspian Sea is landlocked and boasts no major population centers aside from Baku — the capital of another country with a hostile ethnic group. The Persian Gulf coast of Iran is not only lightly populated, but it is easy for powers on the gulf’s southern coast to block Iranian water access to the wider world. While Anatolia has a number of regions that are well watered — even though it does not have many rivers — Persia is predominately an arid region.

    The Turks also enjoy demographic advantages. Only one-fifth of Turkey’s population is non-Turkish, while roughly half of Iran is non-Persian. Iran requires a large army simply to maintain rule at home, while Turkey has the relative freedom to expend resources on power projection tools such as an air force and navy. The difference shines through in their respective economies as well. Despite having nearly identical populations in terms of size, Iran’s economy is only two-fifths the size of Turkey’s. Even in the battle of ideologies, Turkey retains the advantage. The Arab majority in the region prefer Turkey — a fellow Sunni power — to take the lead in managing regional affairs, whereas Shiite Persian Iran is the historical rival of the Arab world.

    Iran may be junior to Turkey in a geopolitical contest, but Iran is still a power that Turkey has to take into consideration. In a major historical reversal, the Iranians have regained influence over Iraq with the rise of a Shia-dominated government that they had lost to the Turks in the mid-1550s, bringing the two powers closer into contact. When two expansionary powers interact closely — as Turkey and Iran are now — they can be either driven to conflict or come to an understanding regarding their respective spheres of influence. In the present day, there are probably more causes for cooperation than conflict between Ankara and Tehran. Iran’s westward expansion gives Turkey and Iran good reasons to cooperate in order to contain Iraq’s Kurdish population in the north. Moreover, Turkey’s bid to become a major energy transit state would improve significantly through a better relationship with Iran.

    Given this dynamic, Gul’s upcoming trip to Iran is likely to be the first of many. The Turks and the Persians have much to sort out on the bilateral level as each seeks to expand their geopolitical influence.

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  • Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    United States: Treasury Calls Anti-Iranian Kurdish Group A Terrorist Organization
    February 4, 2009The U.S. Treasury has labeled the anti-Iranian Kurdish group Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) a terrorist organization and will freeze any assets the PJAK has under U.S. jurisdiction, Reuters reported Feb. 4. PJAK is a front for the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has been fighting against Turkey’s government for 25 years. PJAK members fight