Tag: Iraq

  • Popular anger boils over in Iraq

    Popular anger boils over in Iraq

    Further protests in Algeria, Tunisia and Yemen

    iraq map

    The eruption of the Egyptian revolution, in the wake of the Tunisian events, is inspiring populations across the Middle East and North Africa.

    Protest over social conditions spread to Iraq this week, as demonstrations broke out in numerous cities. Meanwhile, a mass rally has been scheduled in Algiers for Saturday. In Tunisia itself, the population continues to simmer, with the same autocratic power structures still in place despite the flight of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Jordan, Yemen and Morocco are also witnessing protests.

    The Iraqi population is beginning to openly register its opposition to the wretched conditions that have been created by eight years of US and allied occupation, as well as bitter sectarian conflict.

    Last weekend, protesters stormed government buildings and a police station in Hamza, an impoverished and heavily Shiite community in southern Iraq, to protest shortages of power, food and jobs, as well as political corruption. Security officials allegedly opened fire on the demonstrators, killing one and wounding four others.

    The National, from the United Arab Emirates, cited the comment of Abu Ali, who reportedly helped organize the protest: “There will be a revolution of the hungry and the jobless in Iraq, just as there was in Egypt,” he said. “It was a march by the unemployed, by those who have lost hope and who see [Prime Minister] Nouri al Maliki and the new government becoming another dictatorship.”

    On February 10, protests of varying sizes took place in Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Karbala, Diwaniyah, Kut, Ramadi, Samawah and Amara. In Baghdad’s Sadr City, demonstrators took to the streets to protest the lack of public services, unemployment and government corruption. Public sector employees joined residents in the protest. A group of employees from the Ministry of Industry denounced the decision to cut their pay by 20 percent.

    In Karbala, residents also demanded an improvement in municipal services and an investigation into the local government. One protest sign read, “We have nothing. We need everything. Solution: Set ourselves on fire”—a reference to the suicide of a young man that ignited the Tunisian upheaval. In Najaf, farmers demanded greater assistance from the government and the resignation of the head of the local government. Demonstrators in Basra explained that changes in food ration policy had left families unable to buy enough food as prices for basics have nearly doubled in recent months.

    One of the largest protests Thursday brought some 3,000 lawyers onto the streets of a Sunni Muslim neighborhood in western Baghdad. They called for an end to judicial corruption and prisoner abuse in Iraq’s prisons. The Canadian Press cited the comment of Kadhim al-Zubaidi, spokesman for Iraq’s lawyers’ union in Baghdad: “This is in solidarity with the Iraqi people.… We want the government to sack the corrupt judges.” He added, “We also demand that the interior and defence ministries allow us to enter the [recently exposed] secret prisons…. We want to get information about these prisons.”

    In Karbala, the head of the local lawyers’ guild mocked the pittance the government was giving out monthly in place of rations that included cooking oil, rice, flour and sugar. “We reject this amount of money,” said Rabia al-Masaudi, adding, according to Agence France-Presse (AFP), “that MPs were getting paid $11,000 per month, while many of the six million families nationwide who depend on government rations were receiving $12 a month in place of their full supplies.”

    On Friday, further protests were held across Iraq. One of the Baghdad protests marched to the Green Zone, where government buildings and embassies are located, calling for an improvement in basic services. According to Reuters, placards carried various messages, including “Where are your electoral promises, food rations and basic services?” and “Tahrir Square Two,” a reference to the events in Cairo.

    In Baghdad’s impoverished Bab-al-Sham district last Sunday, one protester, an engineer, told the media, “It is a tragedy. Even during the Middle Ages, people were not living in this situation.” Reuters notes, “Almost eight years after the U.S.-led invasion, Iraq’s infrastructure remains severely damaged. The country suffers a chronic water shortage, electricity supply is intermittent and sewage collects in the streets.”

    In Algeria, the security apparatus is preparing for a large demonstration, perhaps in the tens of thousands, planned for February 12 by the National Coordination for Change and Democracy (CNCD)—a grouping of human-rights, unions, and official “opposition” parties tolerated by the regime of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika.

    The government has officially banned the march and will reportedly deploy some 30,000 police to block the protest. An opposition spokesman, Said Sadi, told the media that the regime had ringed the capital in an effort to prevent people from participating. “Trains have been stopped and other public transport will be as well,” he said.

    The AFP reported: “Large quantities of teargas grenades had been imported, he [Sadi] added. Anti-riot vehicles were seen parked not far from the square where the rally is scheduled to begin on Saturday, and police in uniform patrolled surrounding streets.”

    Protests took place in a number of Algerian towns on February 8. In the city of Annaba, 600 kilometers east of Algiers, a hundred unemployed young men protested outside the city’s prefecture and in the streets. In an especially desperate act, in the nearby town of Sidi Ammar, seven jobless men inflicted knife wounds on themselves and threatened a mass suicide outside the town hall.

    An Algerian newspaper reports that in the same area, the residents of the village of Raffour also took to the streets. In the last few weeks, around 20 people have attempted to set themselves on fire. Three have died from their injuries.

    In Tunisia, where the self-immolation of 26-year-old Mohammed Bouazizi in mid-December helped set off mass protests, a woman set herself on fire Thursday in front of government offices in Monastir, the birthplace of longtime Tunisian dictator Habib Bourguiba. The woman, from Sfax, the second largest city in Tunisia, took the action because of difficulties in obtaining medicine for her husband, afflicted with cancer. She remains in “serious condition” with third-degree burns.

    Demonstrations were held in numerous Tunisian cities this week demanding the resignation of officials associated with the Ben Ali regime. In Kasserine, 250 kilometers southwest of Tunis, hundreds of people blocked a main road to call attention to their social problems. In Gafsa also, protesters Tuesday demanded that the new governor step down.

    In Yemen, two marches were held Friday in the capital of San’a and in the port city of Aden in solidarity with the Egyptian revolution. Hundreds of young protesters assembled in the afternoon in Aden. According to the Wall Street Journal, “Eyewitnesses said police and protesters scuffled, and about a dozen protesters were arrested. A security official in Aden said the police took action to ensure safety in the city.”

    University students in San’a also staged a protest, closing down main roads for about three hours on Friday. They ended their demonstration near the Egyptian embassy. The protest expressed support for the Egyptian people, but also called on US-backed dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh to resign. Protesters denounced the ill treatment and torture of detainees in the secret police headquarters.

    In southern Yemen, several thousand people demonstrated Friday in support of secession, and demanded Saleh’s ouster as well. Army tanks, reports Reuters, “rolled into Zinjibar, the capital of Abyan, where suspected Al Qaeda militants have been active and over a thousand protesters gathered on Friday. Hundreds of men sat outside a former South Yemen leader’s home, wearing white shrouds to symbolise their readiness to fight to the death.

    “ ’Ali, Ali, catch up with Ben Ali,’ they shouted, implying that Saleh should follow former Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali to exile in Saudi Arabia.”

    In Amman, Jordan, two protests took place, one—organized by left organizations—demanding the resignation of the new prime minister, Marouf al-Bakhit, and the second in support of the struggle to topple Mubarak. At the latter, organized by Islamists, Hamzeh Mansour, secretary general of the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, told the crowd, “Arab rulers should listen to the voice of their peoples and stop betting on the United States.”

    The Jordanian Farmers Union organized a protest Friday, tossing crates of tomatoes onto the Karak-Aqaba highway to protest dropping prices.

    In the Moroccan capital of Rabat on Friday, more than 1,000 protesters rallied to demand public sector jobs. An organizer of the protest told the media that at a meeting January 24, the government had asked for a truce because of the unrest in the region. The truce ended February 10, the government’s deadline for recruiting 4,500 highly qualified graduates. The unemployment rate for university graduates stands at around 18 percent.

    According to the communication minister, Khalid Naciri, at least 21 protests daily are being held in Morocco, a nation beset by social inequality and government corruption.

    WSWS

  • Telafer: The Massacre of Turkmens

    Telafer: The Massacre of Turkmens

    Telafer: the massacre of Turkmens

    Telafer Turkmens massacre

    The destruction of the Iraqi Turkmen city of AMIRLI


    Turkmen City Of Amirli Destruction

    Telafer: Massacre of Turkmens

    Massacre of Turkmens

    Telafer Northern Iraq – US soldiers killed the parents of these children

    US soldiers Killed Turkmens family

    Via Merry Hanim

  • Admiral Mullen Discusses Critical Military Engagement in Turkey

    Admiral Mullen Discusses Critical Military Engagement in Turkey

    Admiral Mullen Discusses Critical Military Engagement in Turkey

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 160

    September 8, 2010

    By Saban Kardas

    Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Turkey last week. Although the official purpose of Mullen’s visit was to congratulate his Turkish counterpart General Isik Kosaner, recently appointed as the Chief of the General Staff, this introductory visit had no fixed agenda. Mullen had a chance to gauge Turkey’s position on many of US policies in the surrounding regions. In his meetings with Turkish military and civilian leaders, Mullen exchanged opinions on US withdrawal from Iraq, the Iranian nuclear issue and the international military presence in Afghanistan, as well as reiterating US support for Turkey on various issues such as its struggle against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and sales of military equipment for the Turkish armed forces (Hurriyet, Cumhuriyet, Radikal, September 5).

    On the issue of Iran, Mullen downplayed recent disagreements, arguing that both Turkey and the US share the common objective of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. However, as Ankara’s earlier diplomacy on the Iranian nuclear standoff attested, such blanket mutual understanding was not enough to eliminate major differences of opinion over how best to deal with Iran (EDM, June 1). Ankara’s objections to a tougher US position and insistence on a diplomatic solution culminated in Turkey’s vote against a US-brokered UN Security Council resolution authorizing a new round of sanctions in June. Coupled with other crises, such as the problems encountered in Turkish-Israeli relations, this development further strained bilateral relations, prompting many US politicians and interest groups to question the strategic partnership with Turkey. In this tense environment, in August the Republicans blocked President Barack Obama’s nominee for the next Ambassador to Turkey, Frank Ricciardione. The vacant post highlighted how tenuous Obama’s Turkey policy remained, as well as the impact of Ankara’s recent policies on US domestic politics.

    While for Washington a combination of diplomatic efforts and punitive sanctions is needed to deal with Iran, Ankara still believes that constructive diplomacy must be prioritized. Earlier in August, Mullen had raised tensions in the region, following his statement that military options against Iran remain on the table, which invited a harsh reaction from Iran, placing Turkey in a difficult diplomatic position (AFP, August 3).

    In this context, Mullen adopted a rather balanced tone in Ankara and said that he had no plan to question Turkey over the Security Council vote and emphasized that he welcomed Turkish leaders’ statements that they would comply with UN sanctions against Iran. Nonetheless, this last point underscored continued differences over Iran. The Turkish government has reiterated on many occasions that it would implement only sanctions authorized by the UN, not the stricter set of measures being introduced by the US and the European countries.

    Mullen also referred to ongoing discussions within NATO pertaining to the formation of a missile defense system against Iran, which will be part of the agenda of the upcoming NATO summit in November. Turkey is one of the possible locations for radars and interceptors. However, the Turkish position on this issue remains unclear, and it is unlikely to welcome such a proposal considering Ankara’s sensitivity to Tehran’s concerns.

    Turkey’s contribution to the international military effort in Afghanistan was also discussed. Praising Turkey’s critical role in ensuring Afghanistan’s security through its provision of troops and training to Afghan security personnel, Mullen requested that Turkey maintains its military contribution after its command over international troops in Kabul and the surrounding area expires in October. Turkey has contributed to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since its inception immediately after the US invasion of the country in 2001, and has assumed the command of ISAF on many occasions. Although the US has pressured Turkey to increase its troop levels, Ankara has refused to do so, on the grounds that non-military means should be used to address the root causes of the conflict. Washington has come to acknowledge Ankara’s concerns on this issue, but wants to ensure that Turkey maintains at least its current level of commitment to ISAF.

    An additional area discussed during the bilateral talks was Turkey’s specific role in US withdrawal plans from Iraq. Ever since the Obama administration announced its withdrawal plans, there has been speculation that Turkey would serve as one of the exit routes for US troops and military equipment (EDM, March 9, 2009). Denying such reports, Mullen stressed that he was not in Ankara to negotiate the terms of the US military exit from Iraq through Turkey. Since the transfer of military units will require authorization from the Turkish parliament, it is unlikely that Washington will seriously consider this option. Indeed, a recent statement from the Turkish foreign ministry also ruled out such an option, though welcoming the possibility of moving non-combat elements through the country. If an agreement is reached, Turkey would be ready to create a safe zone for the transfer of technical equipment (Sabah, September 3).

    The visit by Mullen underscores the extent to which US-Turkish relations are characterized by military-strategic issues, and how the United States needs Turkey’s cooperation at best and at the very least its acquiescence for the successful execution of its military engagements in the regions surrounding Turkey. Therefore, Turkey is a key part of discussions on major US military campaigns, which serves as a constraint on Washington and prevents it from severing ties with this critical ally over its independent policies. Turkey, in contrast, relies on US assistance and the transfer of military technology, which curbs any tendency on its part to pursue unilateral policies. Aware of this mutual interdependence in military-security affairs, civilian and military bureaucrats from both sides have intensified their efforts to maintain the pace of cooperation. Recently, Turkish foreign ministry officials visited Washington to reiterate Ankara’s determination to maintain strategic ties with the US. This message will perhaps be repeated during the visit to the US later this month by Turkish President, Abdullah Gul, and Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, as part of the UN General Assembly.

    https://jamestown.org/program/admiral-mullen-discusses-critical-military-engagement-in-turkey/

  • Blair postpones book party at Tate Modern

    Blair postpones book party at Tate Modern

    (Reuters) – Former premier Tony Blair has postponed a party at the Tate Modern art gallery celebrating the launch of his autobiography because of threats from protesters, his office said on Wednesday.

    Anti-war demonstrators had planned to disrupt the reception on Wednesday evening and a group of celebrated artists including Tracey Emin and Vivienne Westwood had called on the gallery to cancel the “disgraceful” event.

    Blair has also been forced to cancel a signing session for “A Journey” at a bookstore in central London.

    “It has been postponed for the same reason as the book signing,” a spokesman for Blair said.

    “We don’t want to put our guests through the unpleasant consequences of the actions of demonstrators.”

    At the weekend, protestors hurled eggs and shoes at the former prime minister during a promotional event in Dublin.

    Blair, prime minister for Labour between 1997 and 2007, led Britain into wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In particular, the occupation of Iraq by Western coalition forces was widely opposed and contributed to a dive in Blair’s popularity.

    Emin, Westwood and musician Brian Eno, were among figures from the arts world who wrote a letter to the Guardian newspaper on Wednesday to voice their concern about the Tate Modern event.

    “It is disgraceful that the Tate is being used for this purpose,” they said.

    (Reporting by Matt Falloon; Editing by Steve Addison)

    The Reuters

  • Iraq, Syria, Turkey to have water meeting

    Iraq, Syria, Turkey to have water meeting

    24 August 2009


    BAGHDAD: Iraq, Syria and turkey have agreed to meet in Ankara on Sept. 3, 2009, to discuss mutual water situation especially at the Euphrates River, the Iraqi Water Resources Ministry said Monday.

    “The Iraqi water resources minister met the Syrian irrigation minister and the Turkish energy minister in Damascus,” said a release issued by the Iraqi Ministry and received by Aswat al-Iraq news agency.

    “The three sides agreed to hold a meeting on Sept. 3, 2009 to discuss mutual water relations,” it said.

    Zawya

  • Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    Over 300,001 readers
    My Mission: God has uniquely designed me to seek, write, and speak the truth as I see it. Preservation of one’s wealth while providing needful income is my primary goal in these unsettled times. I have given the ability to evaluate study, and interpret world and national events and their influence on future of the financial markets. This gift allows me to meet the needs of individual and institution clients. I evaluate situations first on a fundamental basis then try to confirm on a technical basis. In the past it has been fairly successful.

    Contact John Mauldin

    Print Version

    Volume 5 – Special Edition
    August 20, 2009

    Iraq Endgame
    By George Friedman

    As many of have heard, I had the pleasure of partaking in a weekend of fishing and intellectual jousting with some of today’s most brilliant minds. We spoke of war, politics, and of course, the economy. Their interconnection seems somehow much clearer sitting on a Maine lake fishing for bass. This week I offer you an article that’s key to understanding the U.S. role in Iraq. Futurologist and fellow aspiring fisherman George Friedman at STRATFOR lays out piece by piece U.S. options in the region. If your interests have anything to do with global energy markets — and whose don’t? — it’s enormously important that you grasp the relationships between various sectors in and around Iraq, and the possibilities moving forward.
    Staying aware of geopolitical imperatives around the globe is crucial to any comprehensive investment portfolio. I encourage you to check out STRATFOR’s Web site for whatever informs your investment area. Plus, my readers get a special membership rate.
    John Mauldin, Editor
    Outside the Box

    Iraq Endgame

    August 18, 2009
    By George Friedman
    Related Special Topic Pages
    Iraq, Turkey and the Kurdish Position
    Iraq, Iran and the Shia
    Turkey’s Re-Emergence
    U.S. Military Involvement in Iraq
    Iraq’s Oil
    Though the Iraq war is certainly not over, it has reached a crossroads. During the course of the war, about 40 countries sent troops to fight in what was called “Multi-National Force-Iraq.” As of this summer, only one foreign country’s fighting forces remain in Iraq — those of the United States. A name change in January 2010 will reflect the new reality, when the term “Multi-National Force-Iraq” will be changed to “United States Forces-Iraq.” If there is an endgame in Iraq, we are now in it.
    The plan that U.S. President Barack Obama inherited from former President George W. Bush called for coalition forces to help create a viable Iraqi national military and security force that would maintain the Baghdad government’s authority and Iraq’s territorial cohesion and integrity. In the meantime, the major factions in Iraq would devise a regime in which all factions would participate and be satisfied that their factional interests were protected. While this was going on, the United States would systematically reduce its presence in Iraq until around the summer of 2010, when the last U.S. forces would leave.
    Two provisos qualified this plan. The first was that the plan depended on the reality on the ground for its timeline. The second was the possibility that some residual force would remain in Iraq to guarantee the agreements made between factions, until they matured and solidified into a self-sustaining regime. Aside from minor tinkering with the timeline, the Obama administration — guided by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, whom Bush appointed and Obama retained — has followed the Bush plan faithfully.
    The moment of truth for the U.S. plan is now approaching. The United States still has substantial forces in Iraq. There is a coalition government in Baghdad dominated by Shia (a reasonable situation, since the Shia comprise the largest segment of the population of Iraq). Iraqi security forces are far from world-class, and will continue to struggle in asserting themselves in Iraq. As we move into the endgame, internal and external forces are re-examining power-sharing deals, with some trying to disrupt the entire process.
    There are two foci for this disruption. The first concerns the Arab-Kurdish struggle over Kirkuk. The second concerns threats to Iran’s national security.
    The Kurdish Question
    Fighting continues in the Kirkuk region, where the Arabs and Kurds have a major issue to battle over: oil. The Kirkuk region is one of two major oil-producing regions in Iraq (the other is in the Shiite-dominated south). Whoever controls Kirkuk is in a position to extract a substantial amount of wealth from the surrounding region’s oil development. There are historical ethnic issues in play here, but the real issue is money. Iraqi central government laws on energy development remain unclear, precisely because there is no practical agreement on the degree to which the central government will control — and benefit — from oil development as opposed to the Kurdish Regional Government. Both Kurdish and Arab factions thus continue to jockey for control of the key city of Kirkuk.
    Arab, particularly Sunni Arab, retention of control over Kirkuk opens the door for an expansion of Sunni Arab power into Iraqi Kurdistan. By contrast, Kurdish control of Kirkuk shuts down the Sunni threat to Iraqi Kurdish autonomy and cuts Sunni access to oil revenues from any route other than the Shiite-controlled central government. If the Sunnis get shut out of Kirkuk, they are on the road to marginalization by their bitter enemies — the Kurds and the Shia. Thus, from the Sunni point of view, the battle for Kirkuk is the battle for the Sunni place at the Iraqi table.
    Turkey further complicates the situation in Iraq. Currently embedded in constitutional and political thinking in Iraq is the idea that the Kurds would not be independent, but could enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Couple autonomy with the financial benefits of heavy oil development and the Kurdish autonomous region of Iraq becomes a powerful entity. Add to that the peshmerga, the Kurdish independent military forces that have had U.S. patronage since the 1990s, and an autonomous Kurdistan becomes a substantial regional force. And this is not something Turkey wants to see.
    The broader Kurdish region is divided among four countries, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. The Kurds have a substantial presence in southeastern Turkey, where Ankara is engaged in a low-intensity war with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), members of which have taken refuge in northern Iraq. Turkey’s current government has adopted a much more nuanced approach in dealing with the Kurdish question. This has involved coupling the traditional military threats with guarantees of political and economic security to the Iraqi Kurds as long as the Iraqi Kurdish leadership abides by Turkish demands not to press the Kirkuk issue.
    Still, whatever the constitutional and political arrangements between Iraqi Kurds and Iraq’s central government, or between Iraqi Kurds and the Turkish government, the Iraqi Kurds have a nationalist imperative. The Turkish expectation is that over the long haul, a wealthy and powerful Iraqi Kurdish autonomous region could slip out of Baghdad’s control and become a center of Kurdish nationalism. Put another way, no matter what the Iraqi Kurds say now about cooperating with Turkey regarding the PKK, over the long run, they still have an interest in underwriting a broader Kurdish nationalism that will strike directly at Turkish national interests.
    The degree to which Sunni activity in northern Iraq is coordinated with Turkish intelligence is unknown to us. The Sunnis are quite capable of waging this battle on their own. But the Turks are not disinterested bystanders, and already support local Turkmen in the Kirkuk region to counter the Iraqi Kurds. The Turks want to see Kurdish economic power and military power limited, and as such they are inherently in favor of the Shiite-dominated Baghdad government. The stronger Baghdad is, the weaker the Kurds will be.
    Baghdad understands something critical: While the Kurds may be a significant fighting force in Iraq, they can’t possibly stand up to the Turkish army. More broadly, Iraq as a whole can’t stand up to the Turkish army. We are entering a period in which a significant strategic threat to Turkey from Iraq could potentially mean Turkish countermeasures. Iraqi memories of Turkish domination during the Ottoman Empire are not pleasant. Therefore, Iraq will be very careful not to cross any redline with the Turks.
    This places the United States in a difficult position. Washington has supported the Kurds in Iraq ever since Operation Desert Storm. Through the last decade of the Saddam regime, U.S. special operations forces helped create a de facto autonomous region in Kurdistan. Washington and the Kurds have a long and bumpy history, now complicated by substantial private U.S. investment in Iraqi Kurdistan for the development of oil resources. Iraqi Kurdish and U.S. interests are strongly intertwined, and Washington would rather not see Iraqi Kurdistan swallowed up by arrangements in Baghdad that undermine current U.S. interests and past U.S. promises.
    On the other hand, the U.S. relationship with Turkey is one of Washington’s most important. Whether the question at hand is Iran, the Caucasus, the Balkans, Central Asia, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Afghanistan, Russia or Iraq, the Turks have a role. Given the status of U.S. power in the region, alienating Turkey is not an option. And the United States must remember that for Turkey, Kurdish power in Iraq and Turkey’s desired role in developing Iraqi oil are issues of fundamental national importance.
    Now left alone to play out this endgame, the United States must figure out a way to finesse the Kurdish issue. In one sense, it doesn’t matter. Turkey has the power ultimately to redefine whatever institutional relationships the United States leaves behind in Iraq. But for Turkey, the sooner Washington hands over this responsibility, the better. The longer the Turks wait, the stronger the Kurds might become and the more destabilizing their actions could be to Turkey. Best of all, if Turkey can assert its influence now, which it has already begun to do, it doesn’t have to be branded as the villain.
    All Turkey needs to do is make sure that the United States doesn’t intervene decisively against the Iraqi Sunnis in the battle over Kirkuk in honor of Washington’s commitment to the Kurds.
    In any case, the United States doesn’t want to intervene against Iraq’s Sunnis again. In protecting Sunni Arab interests, the Americans have already been sidestepping any measures to organize a census and follow through with a constitutional mandate to hold a referendum in Kirkuk. For the United States, a strong Sunni community is the necessary counterweight to the Iraqi Shia since, over the long haul, it is not clear how a Shiite-dominated government will relate to Iran.
    The Shiite Question
    The Shiite-dominated government led by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is no puppet of Iran, but at the same time, it is not Iran’s enemy. As matters develop in Iraq, Iran remains the ultimate guarantor of Shiite interests. And Iranian support might not flow directly to the current Iraqi government, but to al-Maliki’s opponents within the Shiite community who have closer ties to Tehran. It is not clear whether Iranian militant networks in Iraq have been broken, or are simply lying low. But it is clear that Iran still has levers in place with which it could destabilize the Shiite community or rivals of the Iraqi Shia if it so desired.
    Therefore, the United States has a vested interest in building up the Iraqi Sunni community before it leaves. And from an economic point of view, that means giving the Sunnis access to oil revenue as well as a guarantee of control over that revenue after the United States leaves.
    With the tempo of attacks picking up as U.S. forces draw down, Iraq’s Sunni community is evidently not satisfied with the current security and political arrangements in Iraq. Attacks are on the upswing in the northern areas — where remnants of al Qaeda in Iraq continue to operate in Mosul — as well as in central Iraq in and around Baghdad. The foreign jihadists in Iraq hope such attacks will trigger a massive response from the Shiite community, thus plunging Iraq back into civil war. But the foreign jihadists would not be able to operate without some level of support from the local Sunni community. This broader community wants to make sure that the Shia and Americans don’t forget what the Sunnis are capable of should their political, economic and security interests fall by the wayside as the Americans withdraw.
    Neither the Iraqi Sunnis nor the Kurds really want the Americans to leave. Neither trust that the intentions or guarantees of the Shiite-dominated government. Iraq lacks a tradition of respect for government institutions and agreements; a piece of paper is just that. Instead, the Sunnis and Kurds see the United States as the only force that can guarantee their interests. Ironically, the United States is now seen as the only real honest broker in Iraq.
    But the United States is an honest broker with severe conflicts of interest. Satisfying both Sunni and Kurdish interests is possible only under three conditions. The first is that Washington exercise a substantial degree of control over the Shiite administration of the country — and particularly over energy laws — for a long period of time. The second is that the United States give significant guarantees to Turkey that the Kurds will not extend their nationalist campaign to Turkey, even if they are permitted to extend it to Iran in a bid to destabilize the Iranian regime. The third is that success in the first two conditions not force Iran into a position where it sees its own national security at risk, and so responds by destabilizing Baghdad — and with it, the entire foundation of the national settlement in Iraq negotiated by the United States.
    The American strategy in this matter has been primarily tactical. Wanting to leave, it has promised everyone everything. That is not a bad strategy in the short run, but at a certain point, everyone adds up the promises and realizes that they can’t all be kept, either because they are contradictory or because there is no force to guarantee them. Boiled down, this leaves the United States with two strategic options.
    First, the United States can leave a residual force of about 20,000 troops in Iraq to guarantee Sunni and Kurdish interests, to protect Turkish interests, etc. The price of pursuing this option is that it leaves Iran facing a nightmare scenario: e.g., the potential re-emergence of a powerful Iraq and the recurrence down the road of the age-old conflict between Persia and Mesopotamia — with the added possibility of a division of American troops supporting their foes. This would pose an existential threat to Iran, forcing Tehran to use covert means to destabilize Iraq that would take advantage of a minimal, widely dispersed U.S. force vulnerable to local violence.
    Second, the United States could withdraw and allow Iraq to become a cockpit for competition among neighboring countries: Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria — and ultimately major regional powers like Russia. While chaos in Iraq is not inherently inconsistent with U.S. interests, it is highly unpredictable, meaning the United States could be pulled back into Iraq at the least opportune time and place.
    The first option is attractive, but its major weakness is the uncertainty created by Iran. With Iran in the picture, a residual force is as much a hostage as a guarantor of Sunni and Kurdish interests. With Iran out of the picture, the residual U.S. force could be smaller and would be more secure. Eliminate the Iran problem completely, and the picture for all players becomes safer and more secure. But eliminating Iran from the equation is not an option — Iran most assuredly gets a vote in this endgame.

    John F. Mauldin
    [email protected]

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