Tag: Hungary

  • RESEARCH DOCUMENT /// Hungary 1956 : Reviving the Debate over US (In)action during the Revolution

    RESEARCH DOCUMENT /// Hungary 1956 : Reviving the Debate over US (In)action during the Revolution

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    The toppled head of Joseph Stalin sits on Rákóczi út in Budapest on October 23, 1956. (Photo: Róbert Hofbauer, Fortepan, from Wikimedia Commons)

    Hungary 1956 : Reviving the Debate over US (In)action during the Revolution

    Eisenhower’s Caution Broadly Justified, Declassified Defense Department Study Finds

    But Swifter, More Imaginative Response Might Have Brought Different Results

    U.S. Officials Weighed but Rejected Many Options Including Tactical Nukes

    Posted May 10, 2017
    National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 591
    Edited by Dr. Ronald D. Landa
    Introduced by Malcolm Byrne
    For more information: nsarchiv, 202.994.7000

    Washington D.C., May 10, 2017 – The United States’ cautious response to the unexpectedly powerful popular uprising in Hungary in 1956 grew out of the Eisenhower administration’s policy of “keeping the pot boiling” in Eastern Europe without having it “boil over” into a possible nuclear conflict, according to an unpublished Defense Department historical study posted for the first time by the National Security Archive at The George Washington University.

    Eisenhower and his top aides, including Secretary of State John Foster Dulles – often seen as one of the most aggressive Cold Warriors – opted for the long view of encouraging a gradual erosion of Soviet domination of the socialist camp.

    The study, by Dr. Ronald D. Landa, is a follow-on to another recently posted here entitled, “Almost Successful Recipe: The United States and East European Unrest prior to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.” Readers are encouraged to examine both documents together since they contain complementary information.

    Defending Eisenhower’s reticence to take stiffer action, including covertly assisting the Hungarian rebels or threatening to use tactical nuclear weapons on supply routes into Hungary, the study notes his concerns about inadvertently touching off a nuclear war with the USSR. At the same time, the author points out that Eisenhower “let the matter slide” by early in the crisis rejecting a recommendation that he convene a special meeting of the National Security Council to consider possible responses, which “undercut the urgency for action.”

    This study differs markedly from a number of Hungarian, American, and other historical accounts that take a harsher view of U.S. policy, accusing it of cynicism, hypocrisy, and plain obliviousness about the nature of the crisis. For one thing, it suggests that the U.N. decision to send an emergency force to the Middle East during the Suez crisis, more than the administration’s rhetoric about loosening Moscow’s ties with the East European satellites or hopes of liberation fostered by Radio Free Europe, was chiefly responsible for any expectations of Western military assistance that Hungarians had.

    Today’s posting is the third and final in a series Landa completed for the Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense during 2011 and early 2012. The National Security Archive thanks him for donating these materials.

    READ THE DOCUMENT

    Document 1

    2012-02-00

    The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A Fresh Look at the U.S. Response (Draft, February 2012)

    Draft study by Dr. Ronald D. Landa, prepared for the Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

  • European countries provide most of PKK’s weapons

    European countries provide most of PKK’s weapons

    Intelligence sources indicate that the biggest arms suppliers of the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) are allies of Turkey that are also members of NATO. Recently drafted General Staff reports say that many mines planted by the PKK were obtained from Italy and Spain.

    Turkey is ready to start a new round of diplomatic initiatives to stop countries that supply the PKK with arms. Turkey has undertaken similar initiatives in previous years.

    Over the past few months, the PKK has relied on arms from Mediterranean countries, intelligence reports indicate. The roadside bomb that exploded in Halkalı on Tuesday was of Portuguese origin, intelligence sources said, adding this country to the list of countries that supply arms to the terrorist organization. That attack was carried out by the PKK’s urban offshoot, the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK).

    The most crucial question is how the PKK is able to bring these arms supplies it obtains from Mediterranean countries to northern Iraq. US journalist Seymour Hersh claimed in 2007 that this was done via Israel.

    The General Staff has seized PKK arms and ammunition originating from 31 different countries. However, NATO-member countries have been the biggest suppliers. Most of the arms and ammunition seized are of Russian, Italian, Spanish, German and Chinese origin.

    In 2007 Turkey questioned the countries where the arms used by the PKK — particularly the heavy artillery the terrorist group uses — are mostly manufactured on how the PKK could have obtained these weapons. These diplomatic attempts must have produced some sort of a result, as all PKK weaponry seized in the past three years have had their serial numbers erased. The military has noticed that the PKK now generally erases serial numbers, especially on explosives. However, most of the time the origins of the ammunition can still be traced. Turkey is concentrating on finding the sources of not the lighter arms but of heavy artillery such as heavy machine guns, rocket launchers, mines and hand grenades.

    According to data from the General Staff, the Kalashnikovs used by PKK terrorists are from Russia and China. The rocket launchers, mines, hand grenades and heavy machine guns so far seized from the organization appear to have been manufactured in Italy, Germany, England, Spain, Portugal, Czech Republic and Hungary.

    The organization uses a third country to bring the weapons to northern Iraq and then into Turkey. What disturbs Turkey most is that the mines that have killed more than 100 Turks recently were all obtained from Italy.

    Another issue is that the PKK, which had been rather sloppy in using remote-controlled mines until 2008, has become more of an expert at such attacks. Terrorism experts say the PKK has been given special training, with many suspecting Mossad agents. In 2009, Interior Minister Beşir Atalay claimed that some Mossad agents had gone to northern Iraq and given training on remote-controlled explosives.

    According to documents from the General Staff, 72 percent of the Kalashnikovs used by the PKK are from Russia, 15 percent from China and the rest from Hungary and Bulgaria.

    In 2007, it was reported that more than 170,000 weapons donated by the US to the Iraqi army had ended up in the PKK’s hands. The US Defense Department started an investigation after Turkey’s discovery of this fact.

    Turkey is making a point to not publicly announce how it suspects these weapons are being brought into northern Iraq. Pulitzer-winning journalist Hersh, in an interview with the Takvim daily earlier this month, said Israel helped the PKK base in the Kandil Mountains bring in arms and supplies on helicopters.

    He said that Israel gives extensive support to the PKK and the related Iranian organization Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), especially in terms of arms supplies. He also said that Mossad operatives are active in the area, noting that Jewish Kurds who left northern Iraq 50 years ago returned to the region after the 2003 US occupation. He argued that most of these people are cooperating with the PKK and the purpose of these developments will become clear to all in the near future.

    Although this interview has attracted the attention of Turkish security units, there is a visible effort to avoid making any official statements at this point. Turkey recently made a decision to start diplomatically lobbying countries that supply arms to the PKK. If these countries fail to cut the support they provide for the PKK, then they will be warned openly in the international arena.

    24 June 2010, Thursday
    ERCAN YAVUZ ANKARA

    www.todayszaman.com, Jun 26, 2010

  • South Stream Gets a Boost

    South Stream Gets a Boost

    Business Week
    May 18, 2009
    Gas Pipelines: South Stream Gets a Boost
    Key countries sign on to Russia’s South Stream project, giving it an edge over the rival Nabucco pipeline proposal in a race with geopolitical repercussions
    By Jason Bush

    On May 15, Russia signed deals with Italy, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, bringing the South Stream project, a major new gas pipeline to Europe, one step closer to reality.

    At a meeting in Sochi, attended by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, Russia’s Gazprom (GAZP.RTS) and Italy’s ENI (ENI.MI) agreed to double the planned pipeline’s capacity to 63 billion cubic meters. In addition to ENI, Gazprom signed memoranda of understanding with Greek natural gas transmission company DESFA, Serbia’s Srbijagas, and Bulgarian Energy Holding.

    The participating countries also signed documents needed to start work on the 2,000km (1,243-mile) pipeline. With completion planned by 2015, South Stream eventually will pump natural gas from southern Russia under the Black Sea, bringing it via Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, and Greece to terminals in western Austria and southern Italy.

    The agreement represents a significant diplomatic coup for Russia in a great geopolitical race that will help determine the source of Europe’s energy supplies for decades to come. That race has been visibly gaining pace over recent weeks. Backers of a rival pipeline to southern Europe are now vying to put together the necessary political support. “It’s very much down to the wire now,” says Chris Weafer, chief strategist at UralSib (USBN.RTS), a Moscow bank. “There’s definitely a race on to get all the signatures in place.”

    Concerns About a Stranglehold

    It’s no coincidence that the agreements on South Stream come just days after a key summit in Prague designed to give political impetus to Nabucco, a proposed rival pipeline through Turkey that is backed by the European Commission and the U.S. In the eyes of the EU and the U.S., the key advantage of Nabucco is that it would bypass Russia, diminishing Europe’s already heavy dependence on Russian gas. Imports from Russia presently account for around 40% of gas imports and 25% of gas consumption in Europe. Concerns about Russia’s stranglehold on Europe’s energy have only intensified recently, following this January’s damaging price spat between Russia and Ukraine, which briefly saw Russia’s gas supplies to Europe suspended.

    Those fears help explain the recent burst of activity surrounding Nabucco, a project that has been under discussion since 2002. In addition to the Prague summit, the EU has also been busy courting Turkey, a key transit country, which is expected to sign an agreement in June paving the way for Turkey to host the pipeline. Previously, there had been concerns that Turkey would try to use the pipeline as a bargaining chip in EU accession negotiations.

    But despite the recent progress on Nabucco, it all still looks to many analysts like a case of too little, too late. “I believe Nabucco still looks very problematic,” says Jonathan Stern, director of gas research at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. “It might work, or it might not, but I don’t think it’s going to work quickly.” He argues that the pipeline probably won’t be viable until around 2020­much later than the 2014 starting date currently being advanced.

    It doesn’t help that Russia, eager to safeguard its dominant position as Europe’s energy supplier, is already one step ahead of the game. The agreements reached in Sochi underscore Russia’s success in winning over key customers and transit countries for South Stream­a project that contradicts the EU’s stated policy of diversifying Europe’s energy supplies.

    Where to Get the Gas

    Even without the competition from South Stream, major question marks continue to hang over the whole economic viability of the Nabucco project. One key problem is financing: So far the EU has only committed a small fraction of the €7.9 billion ($10.6 billion) needed to build the pipeline. An even more basic question is where the gas for Nabucco (ultimately targeted at 31 billion cubic meters per annum) will come from.

    The original idea behind the pipeline was to ship gas from the Caspian region and Central Asia, with gas-rich countries such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan supplying the fuel. The snag is that of these four countries, only Azerbaijan signed up to the Prague agreement backing the project.

    The other three Central Asian countries, under diplomatic pressure from Russia, pointedly declined to do so. In any case, no one has figured out how Central Asian gas could be linked up with Nabucco. A pipeline under the Caspian is impossible until all the bordering states resolve a long-running dispute over the sea’s legal status, giving Russia an effective veto.

    Analysts therefore believe the only way Nabucco can be viable is if Iran can now be talked into supplying gas for the project­a scenario that the U.S. previously fought. And despite recent overtures from U.S. President Barack Obama to improve relations with Iran, it’s still far too soon to talk of any diplomatic thaw.

    Meanwhile, the Russians are making progress with South Stream, which currently appears to be the more economically viable of the two. In sharp contrast to Nabucco, the Russians have no shortage of gas that could potentially be transported to Europe via the pipe, and the Russians also seem committed to financing the project. “It’s expensive, controversial, and hard to implement,” says Valery Nesterov, oil and gas analyst at Russian investment bank Troika Dialog. “But at least it has investment guarantees, and a resource base, to be secured by Gazprom. Though not without problems, the financial guarantees and resource base are still more realistic than those secured by Nabucco.”

    Snail vs. Tortoise

    It’s far too early, though, to declare victory for the Russians. The South Stream project also faces many daunting obstacles. Indeed, the great pipeline race might be said to resemble a marathon contest between a snail and a tortoise. “At this stage, it’s not clear where the gas is going to come from for either route,” says UralSib’s Weafer.

    Although Russia has huge gas reserves that could potentially be shipped Europe’s way, most of those reserves are still sitting deep under the Arctic tundra, in the remote Yamal region of Northern Siberia. The cost of bringing them to market is gargantuan­around $250 billion, according to estimates by Royal Dutch Shell (RDSA). The current global recession has only increased the uncertainty about future gas demand, making Gazprom even more reluctant to invest. Russia and the EU have so far failed to hammer out legal agreements that would regulate joint ventures between Gazprom and Western partners. “It’s a real mess,” says Weafer.

    Then there’s the tremendous cost of the South Stream pipeline itself. Officially estimated at between €19 billion and €24 billion ($25.6 billion to $32.4 billion), it’s around three times as expensive as the alternative Nabucco route. Those costs could now be especially problematic, at a time when the global financial crisis is depressing gas prices and Gazprom’s profits. “Gazprom is facing financial difficulties in the years to come,” says Nesterov, “and the cost of the project is tremendous.”

    So despite South Stream’s diplomatic head start, the outcome of the great pipeline race is still far from certain. And neither pipeline is likely to provide any quick solution to Europe’s mounting long-term energy needs.

    Bush is BusinessWeek’s Moscow bureau chief.