Turkish Forum

Tag: Gulen

  • Erdogan resists US calls for Iran sanctions

    Erdogan resists US calls for Iran sanctions

    Erdogan15

    By DESMOND BUTLER, Associated Press Writer Desmond Butler, Associated Press Writer – 1 hr 43 mins ago

    WASHINGTON – President Barack Obama has failed to persuade the prime minister of Turkey of the need for sanctions against Iran.

    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (REH’-jehp TY’-ihp UR’-doh-wahn) stressed at a press conference following his White House meeting, that persuading Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions should be left to diplomacy.

    He said that he expressed Turkey’s willingness to mediate negotiations between Iran and the West. But he also criticized current sanctions against Iran as being ineffective because of loopholes for Western goods to reach the Iranian market.

    The Obama administration may seek new sanctions against Iran in the United Nations Security Council, where Turkey currently votes as a non-permanent member.

    THIS IS A BREAKING NEWS UPDATE. Check back soon for further information. AP’s earlier story is below.

    WASHINGTON (AP) — Seeking more help in the war in Afghanistan, President Barack Obama praised Turkey for its “outstanding” contributions there.

    Speaking in the Oval Office after a private meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Obama said Turkey’s commitments have helped bring stability to Afghanistan. Turkey took over the rotating command of the NATO peacekeeping operation in Kabul last month and doubled its number of troops to around 1,750. However, it has resisted repeated U.S. requests to send its troops on combat operations.

    Last week, Obama ordered 30,000 more U.S. troops be sent to Afghanistan. The administration expects its allies to provide up to 10,000 reinforcements.

    Obama also expressed his condolences for a recent terrorist attack in Turkey, and said the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to defeat terrorism “regardless of where it occurs.”

    At least five Turkish soldiers were killed and several others wounded in an ambush Monday in central Turkey. Authorities have not identified the attackers but Kurdish and leftist militants are active in the area.

    Monday’s meeting between the two leaders comes at a time of rising Turkish influence in the Middle East and Central Europe. Before leaving for Washington, Erdogan said Turkey has already contributed the “necessary number” of troops in Afghanistan, and that Turkish military and police will train their Afghan counterparts and press ahead with health, education and infrastructure projects there.

    Turkey’s participation in the Afghan mission carries enormous symbolic importance because it is the only Muslim country working with U.S. troops to beat back the resurgent Taliban and deny al-Qaida a sanctuary.

    More broadly, however, the United States would like Turkey to use its sway as a regional power and Muslim majority ally to help solve some of America’s trickiest foreign policy problems. But the two sides disagree on many of the important issues.

    Turkey has sought to become a mediator for the United States with Iran and Arab countries, but it is unclear whether the Obama administration is eager for Ankara to play that role. The two sides disagree on sanctions against Iran and the Obama administration is uneasy about recent Turkish disputes with Israel.

    Greater friction is looming as the Obama administration intensifies pressure on Iran to end its nuclear ambitions. A U.S. push for sanctions at the U.N. Security Council, where Turkey currently sits as a nonpermanent member, will force Ankara to choose between a NATO ally and an important neighbor.

    The two allies also will need to navigate the perennial issue of an annual U.S. statement on the World War I-era massacre of up to 1.5. million Armenians by Ottoman Turks. Breaking a campaign pledge, Obama has refrained from referring to the killings as genocide, a term widely viewed by genocide scholars as an accurate description.

    The Obama administration has said it is wary that the sensitive issue could upset talks that could lead to reconciliation and a reopening of the border between Armenia and Turkey. It remains unclear how the administration will handle the issue in the future, especially if talks between Turkey and Armenia falter.

    Tensions have eased over cooperation in Northern Iraq. Turkish complaints about a lack of U.S. help in rooting out Kurdish militants launching attacks on Turkey from Iraq loomed over Erdogan’s White House visit with former President George W. Bush in 2007.

    Since then Turkey has boosted trade in the region and improved ties with members of the Kurdish minorities living on both sides of its border with Iraq.

  • When Islamist foreign policies hurt Muslims

    When Islamist foreign policies hurt Muslims

    Turkey’s government and leader bash the West for transgressions while absolving anti-Western regimes of their sins. This hurts ordinary Muslims from Darfur to Chechnya to Iran.

    By Soner Cagaptay

    December 7, 2009

    What is an Islamist foreign policy, exactly? Is it identifying with Muslims and their suffering, or is it identifying with anti-Western regimes even at the cost of Muslims’ best interests? Turkey’s foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, government demonstrates that far from protecting Muslims and their interests, it is the promotion of a la carte morals — bashing the West and supporting anti-Western regimes, even when the latter hurts Muslims.

    AKP leader and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is scheduled to meet today with President Obama in Washington. This is a chance for Obama, who visited Ankara in April in a charm offensive to win Turkish hearts, to have a discussion with Erdogan about Turkey’s ill-conceived foreign policy, which is bad for the West and for Muslims.

    Since coming to power in 2002, the AKP has dramatically changed Turkey’s foreign policy. The party has let Ankara’s ties with pro-Western Azerbaijan, Georgia and Israel deteriorate and has started to ignore Europe. Meanwhile, the AKP has built ties with anti-Western states such as Sudan while making friends with Ankara’s erstwhile adversaries, including Russia, Iran and Syria, and positioning itself as Hamas’ patron.

    It wasn’t always this way. After casting its lot with the United States in 1946, Ankara collaborated with the West against the communist Soviet Union, Baathist Syria and Islamist Iran. When communism ended, Ankara worked to spread Western values, including free markets and democracy, in the former Soviet Union, becoming close with pro-Western Azerbaijan and Georgia. Turkey also developed a close relationship with Israel, based on shared values and security interests.

    The AKP has now turned Turkish foreign policy on its head — bashing the West for transgressions and absolving anti-Western regimes of their sins.

    A comparison of the AKP’s Israel and Sudan policies helps define Turkey’s Islamist foreign policy. Since coming to power, the AKP has not only built a close political and economic relationship with Khartoum but also defended Sudanese leader Omar Hassan Bashir’s atrocities in Darfur.

    Last month, Erdogan said: “I know that Bashir is not committing genocide in Darfur, because Bashir is a Muslim and a Muslim can never commit genocide.” What? The International Criminal Court indicted Bashir and has called for his arrest for war crimes in the Darfur conflict, in which 300,000 Sudanese — mostly Muslims — have died.

    The AKP’s Sudan policy stands in stark contrast to its Israel policy. At a World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland, in January, Erdogan chided Israeli President Shimon Peres, Jews and Israelis about the Gaza war, for “knowing well how to kill people.” Erdogan then walked off the panel. Days later, he hosted the Sudanese vice president in Ankara.

    This is an ideological view of the world, guided not by religion but by a distorted premise that Islamist and anti-Western regimes are always right even when they are criminal, such as when they are killing Muslims. And in this view, Western states and non-Muslims are always wrong, even when they act in self-defense against Islamist regimes.

    Such an a la carte morality in foreign policy is also apparent in the AKP’s approach to Russia. Russian violence in Chechnya continues, yet the AKP seems not to be bothered by the Chechen Muslims’ suffering. Despite Russia’s northern Caucasus policies, the rapport between Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Erdogan and commercial ties have cemented Turkish-Russian ties. Russia has become Turkey’s No. 1 trading partner, replacing Germany.

    The ties between Ankara and Moscow come at a cost to the West and its allies. During Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, the AKP did not stand with Tbilisi, sacrificing traditional Turkish support for Georgia in favor of commercial relations with Russia. The party is also working with Russia in building South Stream, a pipeline that undermines the Nabucco pipeline that would have connected Azerbaijan to the West, abandoning both Azerbaijan and Europe.

    Another example of this harmful foreign policy is the government’s stance on Iran’s nuclearization, a crucial issue for the West. In October, Erdogan defended Iran’s nuclear program, saying that the problem in the Middle East is Israel’s nuclear capacity rather than Iran’s program. Earlier that month, he called Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad his friend and dismissed the leaders of France and Germany.

    Far from helping the West, the AKP’s foreign policy is challenging its regional interests, and this is also bad for Muslims. When Iranian demonstrators took to the streets in June to contest the election outcome, the AKP rushed to the defense of Ahmadinejad’s regime, congratulating him on his “electoral success” while pro-Ahmadinejad forces were beating peaceful protesters.

    Instead of supporting Western values, the AKP and its Islamist foreign policy undermine such values and the West, which in turn hurts ordinary Muslims from Darfur to Chechnya to Iran.

    Soner Cagaptay, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, is the author of “Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk?”

    Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times
  • FETULLAH GULEN SCHOOL NETWORK

    FETULLAH GULEN SCHOOL NETWORK

    Recent (Nov. 30) article on the dealings of Gulen network with U.S. public schools.

    Charter school controversy prompts audit of state board

    Education » Charter school’s alleged ties to Muslim preacher give rise to audit of school governance

    By Kirsten Stewart

    The Salt Lake Tribune

    Updated: 11/30/2009 11:53:49 PM MST
    fetullah
    Questions about a charter school’s supposed ties to Turkish Muslim preacher Fethullah Gülen have prompted legislative auditors to more broadly scrutinize charter school governance in Utah.

    The legislative probe comes after the State Charter School Board issued preliminary results from its own investigation, clearing Beehive Science & Technology Academy of allegations that it exists to advance and promote Islamic beliefs but flagging the school for poor fiscal management.

    The board has given the Holladay school until Dec. 31 to remedy a $337,000 deficit or face closure. Last week, to help shave costs, Beehive principal Frank Erdogan resigned.

    But it’s the Charter School Board’s financial oversight that’s the focus of this new legislative probe, “particularly a state loan fund that charter schools are able to access,” said Auditor General John Schaff, who declined to divulge further details.

    Rep. Jim Dunnigan, R-Taylorsville, said he called for the audit after learning from a constituent about Beehive’s “unusual financial dealings.”

    Founded and financially supported by a group of Turkish-American scholars, Beehive advertises itself as a public charter school offering seventh through 12th graders a foundation in math and science.

    Earlier this year, a former teacher and parent pointed to questionable financial transactions and hiring practices as proof of the school’s covert ties to Fethullah Gülen, a preacher and educator living in Pennsylvania and founder of the Gülen movement, an international network of schools, universities, banks, TV networks and newspapers.

    Some see Gülen as the modern, nonviolent face of Islam. In Turkey, however, the private nature of his “civic society” has aroused suspicion. Gülen was forced to leave Turkey in 1998 on charges he was working to overthrow the secular government.

    Charter schools are tuition-free, tax-funded public schools, which means they must be non-sectarian.

    And while the Charter School Board found no proof of Beehive funneling state dollars to the Gülen movement, tax filings show the school has been propped up with interest-bearing loans from Turkish American heads of charter schools outside Utah. Two loans also came from executives at the non-profit Accord Institute in Tustin, Calif., which contracts with Beehive on curriculum design and teacher evaluations.

    Beehive apparently also tapped a revolving, low-interest loan fund administered by the State Office of Education to pay for $184,000 in building upgrades. Schools must apply for the money, but the Charter School Board has no control over it, according to board chairman Brian Allen, who says he welcomes legislative scrutiny if it means improving charter schools.

    “I think they’re watching how we handle Beehive to see if there are other tools we need to have in our toolbox to help us do our job better,” Allen said.

    The board has asked Beehive to document the terms of its private loans. In addition, the school must devise a plan for paring expenses.

    Original projections for 2009 showed the school $33,000 in the red. But outstanding loans coupled with high rent payments have opened a $337,000 hole in the school’s $2 million budget, according to documents obtained by The Salt Lake Tribune through an open records request.

    The school has renegotiated its lease and laid off several staffers. Erdogan, the school’s principal, was among those who voluntarily resigned.

    For the time being, academic dean Omer Odabasoglu will serve as acting principal, said Erdogan, who believes Beehive will survive its temporary budget woes.

    kstewart@sltrib.com

  • Patrik Bartholomeos, Let’s Turn the Hatred Door into Friendship Door

    Patrik Bartholomeos, Let’s Turn the Hatred Door into Friendship Door

    Sibel Keskin [sibelkeskin@yahoo.com]

    In the recent years, the Fener Greek Patriarchate has been trying to make its name known and gain sympathy with dialogue attempts and peaceful statements in many fields. On the contrary, despite all the efforts, it is known that the Patriarchate is a church which follows its customs as strictly as to reject any negotiation and criticism on issues which are directly related with it.

    Even Patriarch Patrik Bartholomeos, who conveys Turkey that he is a loyal citizen and pays attention to create an image as such, is not able to eliminate certain practices which are regarded as evil attitudes in the public opinion.

    The Fener Greek Patriarchate demands lots from Turkey, and does not refrain from taking its problems to the courts and even complaining to other countries and the ECHR.  However, it stubbornly rejects the proposals to open the “Hatred Door” which has been cited both by the official channels and the non-governmental organizations since the foundation of the Republic and has caused serious suspicion and unrest in the public opinion.

    This strict attitude leads to a widespread approval by the public opinion of the view that the “Patriarchate is a seedbed of trouble and betrayal that has been involved in any kind of activity against Turkey including the Morean rebellion in 1821, the War of Independence, the Lausanne Treaty and the Paris Accord of 1947”.

    The “Hatred Door” which creates serious unrest in the Turkish public opinion has been closed since 1821. In the years between 1820-1821, Greeks massacred thousands of Turks in the Morea; as a result of the investigations, it was found out that the mentioned massacre against the Turks in the Morea was organized by the then Fener Greek Patriarch Gregorius, and the Patriarchate was acting as a “command-control center”. After plans and documents related to the Morean rebellion and the massacre were found in the Patriarchate, Gregorius was tried and executed in front of the main door of the church for having “betrayed his country”.

    The then Patriarchate administration decided “to keep the door closed until the revenge of Gregorius was taken, a Turkish statesman was hung at the same place, and Istanbul was taken over by Greece”. The main door is still closed and the door for the servants is used for entrance. The Hatred Door which has been closed for 188 years cannot avoid causing such a description that “the Patriarchate is the Trojan horse of Greece”.

    Thus, it would be regarded as “an indication of goodwill and sincerity” if the Fener Greek Patriarchate, which nowadays keeps making lists of demands to Turkey, opens and turns the “Hatred Door” into “Friendship Door”.

    Sibel Keskin

    sibelkeskin@yahoo.com

  • california: fetullah gulen conference

    california: fetullah gulen conference

    • Headlines

    Keynote by Reza Aslan

    The opening reception features a keynote from an acclaimed author,…

    Monday, 30 November 2009

    Press Release

    LOS ANGELES, Dec. 1 – Pacifica Institute – The Gulen Movement,…

    Tuesday, 11 August 2009

    Invitation

    Invitation to a conference on “East and West Encounters: The…

    Friday, 29 May 2009

    RSVP

    Thanks to our sponsors, conference registration is free of charge….

    Saturday, 18 April 2009

    East and West encounters: The Gülen Movement

    Office of Religious Life at the University of Southern California, Department of Theological Studies at the Loyola Marymount University, International Education Center, Santa Monica College, Department of Religious Studies at the Humboldt State University, Department of Religious Studies at Whittier College and Pacifica Institute are sponsoring a conference on the general theme of an encounter between “East” and “West” in the case of the Gülen Movement and the movement’s contributions to education, interfaith and intercultural dialogue, tolerance, and world peace.

    Objective
    To explore the appeal, meaning, and impact of Fethullah Gülen and the Gülen movement as exemplifying approaches to education, dialogue, and peace that transcend and mediate traditional distinctions between “East” and West”.

    Important Dates

    July 15, 2009 – Abstract submission deadline

    September 20, 2009 – Article submission deadline

    November 1, 2009 – Revised article submission deadline

    December 1, 2009 – Registration deadline

  • Why Obama Will Praise Erdogan

    Why Obama Will Praise Erdogan

    The Good Rapprochement: Why Obama Will Praise Erdogan
    Soner Cagaptay
    Hurriyet Daily News
    November 25, 2009

    What will U.S. President Barack Obama and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan discuss when they meet in the White House on Dec. 7? There is going to be some give and take on a variety of issues, including Iran. But both leaders will agree on Iraq.

    Ever since coming to power in 2002, the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, government in Ankara has come under fire for pursuing rapprochement with the wrong international partners. The AKP has faced criticism for warming up to Sudan and Iran, whose authoritarian and anti-Western regimes contrast with Turkey’s political system. Yet, another rapprochement the AKP has pursued deserves praise: The party has painstakingly built ties between Ankara and Baghdad, and improved relations with the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government, or KRG. Mr. Erdogan should expect praise from President Obama for holding Iraq’s and the KRG’s hands, and for helping the Iraqis emerge from the trauma of the war and rebuild. What is more, in a region wrought by win-lose thinking, the improvements in Turkish-Iraqi ties nurtured by the AKP serve as a sign that at least part of the Middle East is open to win-win politics.

    The most symbolic sign of Turkish-Iraqi rapprochement is the opening of two Turkish diplomatic missions in Iraq, respectively in Basra and Arbil. A Turkish consulate was opened in Basra recently, and another mission is scheduled to be opened in Arbil soon.

    These two missions serve as a sign that Turkish-Iraqi and Turkish-KRG ties have come around. Only two years ago, I was getting calls from frantic journalists asking whether the Turkish military was going to invade Iraq. Today, it is Turkish diplomats and businessmen who are doing the invading.

    One reason driving this change has been the shift in Iraqi Kurds’ evaluation of their strategic environment. Between 2003 and 2006, when a majority of Sunni Arabs and Shiite Arabs fought against the United States, the Iraqi Kurds were a significant ally for Washington in Iraq. This equation earned the Kurds American backing in Baghdad. In due course, the Kurds achieved many gains, such as recognition of the KRG as a federal entity.

    That situation, however, changed after 2006. First, the United States co-opted the Sunni Arabs through the Awakening Councils. Then, Washington made peace with the Shiite Arabs. The new relationship with both Arab groups allowed the United States to zoom out from Baghdad and see the big picture in Iraq. Washington realized that if the Iraqi state is to function, its modus operandi must continue to satisfy the Arabs, who constitute the vast majority of Iraq’s population.

    Hence, the United States started to back the Arabs over the Kurds on several crucial issues. In February 2007, Washington pressured the Kurds until they agreed to a hydrocarbon law favorable to the Iraqi Arabs and the central government. The United States dealt a second blow to the Kurds on the Kirkuk issue. Washington pressured the Kurds to drop their insistence on carrying out a referendum in Kirkuk by the constitutionally mandated deadline of Dec. 31, 2007. The referendum would have annexed oil-rich Kirkuk to the KRG, fulfilling a Kurdish dream.

    These U.S. actions convinced the Kurds, perhaps somewhat prematurely, that America had abandoned them in favor of the Iraqi Arabs. This rationale forced the Iraqi Kurds, already fearful of Iran’s influence in Iraq, to turn to their remaining neighbor: Turkey.

    The KRG’s turn towards Ankara brought the Iraqi Kurds into closer cooperation with Turkey against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK. In the 1990s, the Iraqi Kurds helped Ankara against the PKK when Turkey helped them. At this time, Ankara provided the Iraqi Kurds with access to U.S. military protection against Saddam. After Saddam was removed in 2003, the Iraqi Kurds shortsightedly concluded that they did not need Turkey anymore. This calculus precipitated four years of KRG foot dragging on the PKK issue. That ended in 2007. Within the background of their new security environment, the Iraqi Kurds decided that they still needed Turkey and that they were better served by building a long-term relationship with Ankara.

    Enter the AKP. The party utilized this strategic opening, building ties with Iraqi Kurds. At the same time, the AKP was smart enough to also cultivate good ties with non-Kurdish Iraqi factions. In due course, Turkey emerged as an honest broker inside Iraq, enjoying good ties with Kurds and Arabs, Sunnis and Shiites alike.

    Subsequently, the KRG and Turkey have built strong ties, extending from Iraqi Kurdish commercial contracts awarded to Turkish companies, to likely pipeline and energy deals between Turkey and the KRG, to close contact between Turkish and KRG intelligence officials. Meanwhile, Turkey has become a force to reckon with inside Iraq, from Arbil in the north to Basra in the south.

    Turkey’s rapprochement with Iraq and the KRG has been quite smart. Iraq is more stable today thanks to Turkey. Ankara enjoys unprecedented political and economic power inside Iraq, and moreover, it has managed to align the Iraqi Kurds along its policy of countering the PKK.

    Furthermore, the AKP’s rapprochement with Iraq has earned it brownie points with the Obama administration. Since the administration wants to wrap up the Iraq war while ensuring the nation’s future stability, Turkey’s constructive involvement in Iraq has made Ankara an asset for President Obama ahead of Erdogan’s Dec. 7 Washington visit. The Turkish-Iraqi-KRG rapprochement is indeed a win-win case. That is rare indeed in the Middle East, and this is one reason why Erdogan should expect some praise from President Obama.

    Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute.