Tag: GAME THEORY

Brzezinski on WikiLeaks: VERY POINTED

“very pointed” .. [and] .. “clearly calculated in terms of its potential impact on disrupting the American-Turkish relationship.”

ANALYSIS AIR DATE: Nov. 29, 2010

How Will New WikiLeaks Revelations Affect Diplomatic Candor?

Gentlemen, it’s good to have you both with us.

So, Secretary Clinton said today she is confident that this will not have long-lasting — do permanent damage to U.S. relations with other countries.

Stephen Hadley, do you agree with her? Is she right about that?

STEPHEN HADLEY, former adviser, U.S. National Security: In one sense, yes. I think, in the short run, it’s going to have some very deleterious effects.One is, you know, confidential communications between our government and other governments are important in terms of making policy. And if we cannot keep the secret and the confidences of other governments, they will be reluctant to share their innermost thoughts with us.

It also is corrupting because our people in diplomatic posts overseas want to be able to give their candid assessments about people with whom they’re dealing in their countries up to U.S. leadership. It’s important to inform the president, secretary of state. They will now be reluctant to be as candid in the reporting cables, for fear that it will become public and harm their relationship with a country.

So, it’s very corrupting of the process of confidence on which our diplomacy depends, both internally and with other governments.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Dr. Brzezinski, what do you think the fallout is going to be?

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, former adviser, U.S. National Security: Well, you know, the best assessment I can give is to cite a phrase which used to be used very often in Vienna when it was the capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

And when some crisis would take place, it would be said, it’s catastrophic, but not serious. And this is the way I look at. I think Steve has put his finger on it by saying that some things will pass. Of course, some things will endure.

But I think the most serious issues are not those which are getting the headlines right now. Who cares if Berlusconi is described as a clown. Most Italians agree with that. Who cares if Putin is described as an alpha dog? He probably is flattered by it.

The real issue is, who is feeding Wikipedia on this issue — Wiki — Wiki — WikiLeaks on this issue? They’re getting a lot of information which seems trivial, inconsequential, but some of it seems surprisingly pointed.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Well, what are you referring to?

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Well, for example, there are references to a report by our officials that some Chinese leaders favor a reunified Korea under South Korea.

This is clearly designed to embarrass the Chinese and our relationship with them. The very pointed references to Arab leaders could have as their objective undermining their political credibility at home, because this kind of public identification of their hostility towards Iran could actually play against them at home.

JUDY WOODRUFF: And I want to ask you about that, because the impression is — and I want to turn to Steve Hadley on this as well — Saudi Arabia has not been public about its view, as — and we heard the quote from King Abdullah, that the U.S. should go after or Israel should go after Iran and its nuclear weapons program.

So, what — what effect could this have now that that’s out there that it’s confirmed?

STEPHEN HADLEY: Well, actually, I don’t think that’s new.

And a lot of people have been saying, without going into details and without going into these sort of sensational quotes, that the Arab states are very concerned about Iran, very concerned about the impact of a nuclear Iran.People have been saying that’s one of the odd things about how Israel and the Arab states actually have common cause about their concern about Iran.

So, I think the fact that there is concern is not new. But, unfortunately, the way it is expressed, with these, you know, very headline-grabbing phrases, that’s what’s unfortunate and that’s what’s embarrassing. And that’s what may make people a little bit less candid in their communications in the future.

JUDY WOODRUFF: And what is it — what are you worried about with regard to the knowledge that…

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: It’s not a question of worry. It’s, rather, a question of whether WikiLeaks are being manipulated by interested parties that want to either complicate our relationship with other governments or want to undermine some governments, because some of these items that are being emphasized and have surfaced are very pointed.

And I wonder whether, in fact, there aren’t some operations internationally, intelligence services, that are feeding stuff to WikiLeaks, because it is a unique opportunity to embarrass us, to embarrass our position, but also to undermine our relations with particular governments.

For example, leaving aside the personal gossip about Sarkozy or Berlusconi or Putin, the business about the Turks is clearly calculated in terms of its potential impact on disrupting the American-Turkish relationship.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Just criticizing the people around…

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: And the top leaders, Erdogan and Davutoglu and so forth, are using some really, really, very sharp language.

JUDY WOODRUFF: But this is 250 — it’s a quarter-of-a-million documents.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Precisely.

JUDY WOODRUFF: How easy would it be to seed this to make sure that it was slanted a certain way?

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Seeding — seeding it is very easy.

I have no doubt that WikiLeaks is getting a lot of the stuff from sort of relatively unimportant sources, like the one that perhaps is identified on the air. But it may be getting stuff at the same time from interested intelligence parties who want to manipulate the process and achieve certain very specific objectives.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Do you have that concern?

STEPHEN HADLEY: Obviously, it would always be a concern.

The — what we know or what has been said publicly is it looks like a data dump through a pretty junior-level person. So, in terms of that material, it looks like a data dump. Generally, in Washington, I have had the rule that, if there are two explanations, one is conspiracy and one is incompetence, you ought to go with incompetence. You will be right 90 percent of the time.

(LAUGHTER)

But you can’t rule out what Dr. Brzezinski talked about. And if not in the past, in terms of how we got here, it would be interesting — and now, having heard this, I suspect there will be some intelligence services thinking about maybe we could seed in these data dumps something that would be useful. You can’t rule it out.

But it has the appearance at this point of a core dump. For some reason, people get a thrill out of leaking classified documents. It’s never — you know, it’s — whether it’s a sense of self-importance.

But I think it’s more likely, in terms of the volume, that that’s what’s at work. But you can’t rule out, particularly going forward, the kind of thing Dr. Brzezinski is talking about.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: But, Steve, the other foreign intelligence services don’t have to wait for me to make that suggestion.

(LAUGHTER)

I think they can think of it themselves, particularly after the first instance.

JUDY WOODRUFF: What effect do you think this will have, though, on the willingness of foreign — whether it’s leaders, diplomats — to talk candidly with Americans about their views? Is this going to affect that?

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Well, I haven’t seen anything in it that really affects serious issues that would be constrained in direct talks.

It’s the more sensational impacting items that can have a political significance that I find that more significant. Beyond that, of course, there is a second problem which I think is serious in this otherwise, in my view, non-catastrophic situation. Namely, it’s an absolute scandal that this now is happening again.

You know, the head of the Bureau of the Budget has issued an instruction to all the heads of departments to the effect that they must safeguard classified information, and any failure is unacceptable. It will not be tolerated.

Well, this is the second instance. I would like to know what the administration has done since the first to make the second one less likely.

JUDY WOODRUFF: But a lot of these documents have been in the hands — haven’t they been in the hands of WikiLeaks for some time…

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: We don’t know that for a fact.

JUDY WOODRUFF: … because of — because of this private who is in jail and accused, Army private?

STEPHEN HADLEY: We don’t know it. And what Dr. Brzezinski is talking about, I think, also shows one of the dilemmas in all of this, is one of the things you like to do is to get information that would be useful to people in the field out to the field. And that means fairly widespread distribution.

After things like this, there is an effort, usually a reaction, understandable, to narrow down the distribution. And that could have the effect of denying information to people who could use it in their jobs day to day.

So, just exactly — this is the challenge. How do you try to limit the risk of this kind of activity in going — in a way going forward, while still making this information available to those who can use it, particularly in the field in their day-to-day activities?

JUDY WOODRUFF: And what about asking diplomats, in essence, to spy? I mean, we have learned now that Secretary Clinton and, before her, Secretary Rice were asking diplomats to collect confidential information, credit cards and so forth, on foreign diplomats.

You’re smiling.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Well, yes, because, look, diplomats are supposed to be reporting. They’re not supposed to shut their eyes and close their ears.

JUDY WOODRUFF: But doesn’t that blur the line?

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Well, not really. I mean, they’re not asked to do anything that is really a violation of the laws.

But if they can obtain some information regarding key individuals, I see nothing wrong with it, provided it doesn’t become a major task or a significant assignment.

JUDY WOODRUFF: And — but, on balance, you’re not worried that this changes the level of candor in diplomatic communities?

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Do you think foreigners are not doing that?

(LAUGHTER)

STEPHEN HADLEY: No, I’m worried about the heads of state having their communications compromised and how willing they are going to be talk candidly going forward.

Quite frankly, there’s a difference between getting information from diplomats.Of course, that’s what you want — that’s what you have diplomats out there for, is to get you all kinds of information. And you want to know the background of the people you’re dealing with.

That’s different than stealing secrets. That’s what your intelligence services do.I don’t think there’s a line here that’s been crossed.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Stephen Hadley, Zbigniew Brzezinski, thank you both.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Thank you.

STEPHEN HADLEY: Thank you.

, Nov. 29, 2010

December 10, 2010
WikiLeaks: More Israeli Game Theory Warfare?

by Jeff Gates

The United States is the real victim of WikiLeaks. It’s an action aimed at discrediting them.
— Franco Frattini, Foreign Minister of Italy

The impact of the WikiLeaks release of diplomatic cables fits the behavior profile of those well versed in game theory warfare.

When Israeli mathematician, Robert J. Aumann, received the 2005 Nobel Prize in economic science for his work on game theory, he conceded, “the entire school of thought that we have developed here in Israel” has turned “Israel into the leading authority in this field.”

The candor of this Israeli-American offered a rare insight into an enclave long known for waging war from the shadows. Israel’s most notable success to date was “fixing” the intelligence that induced the U.S. to invade Iraq in pursuit of a geopolitical agenda long sought by Tel Aviv.

When waging intelligence wars, timing is often the critical factor for game-theory war planners. The outcome of the WikiLeaks release suggests a psy-ops directed at the U.S.

Why now? Tel Aviv was feeling pressure to end its six-decade occupation of Palestine. With this release, its foot-dragging on the peace process was displaced with talk of an attack on Iran.

While the U.S. bore the brunt of the damage, the target was global public opinion. To maintain the plausibility of The Clash of Civilizations, a focus must be maintained on Iran as a credible Evil Doer.

With fast-emerging transparency, Israel and pro-Israelis have been identified as the source of the intelligence that took coalition forces to war in Iraq. Thus the need to shift attention off Tel Aviv.

WikiLeaks may yet succeed in that mission.

Foreseeable Futures

Game theory war planning aims to create outcomes that are predictable — within an acceptable range of probabilities. That’s why Israeli war planners focus on gaining traction for a plausible narrative and then advancing that storyline step by gradual step.

For the Zionist state to succeed with its expansionist agenda, Iran must remain at center stage as an essential villain in a geopolitical morality play pitting the West against Islamo Fascists.

To displace facts with false beliefs — as with belief in the intelligence that induced the invasion of Iraq — momentum must be maintained for the storyline. Lose the plot (The Clash) and peace might break out. And those deceived may identify the deceiver.

Thus the timing of this latest WikiLeaks release. Its goal: to have us believe that it is not Tel Aviv but Washington that is the forefront of geopolitical duplicity and a source of Evil Doing.

Intelligence wars rely on mathematical models to anticipate the response of those targeted. With game theory algorithms, reactions become foreseeable — within an acceptable range of probabilities.

Control enough of the variables and outcomes become a mathematical inevitability.

The WikiLeaks Motive

Was the reaction to this latest WikiLeaks foreseeable? With exquisite timing, the U.S. was discredited with an array of revelations that called into question U.S. motives and put in jeopardy U.S. relations worldwide.

As the Italian Foreign Minister summarized: “The news released by WikiLeaks will change diplomatic relations between countries.”

The hard-earned trust of the Pakistanis disappeared overnight. Attempts to engage Iran were set back. The overall effect advanced The Clash storyline. If Washington could so badly misread North Korean intentions, then why is the U.S. to be trusted when it comes to a nuclear Iran?

This Wiki-catalyzed storyline pushed Israel off the front page in favor of Iran.

Even U.S. detainees at Guantanamo are again at issue, reigniting that shameful spectacle as a provocation for extremism and terror. U.S. diplomats will now be suspected of spying and lying. What nation can now trust Americans to maintain confidences?

In short, the risks increased for everyone.

Except Israel.

Should Israel launch an attack on Iran, Tel Aviv can cite WikiLeaks as its rationale. Though an attack would be calamitous from a human, economic and financial perspective, even that foreseeable outcome would be dwarfed by the enduring hatred that would ensue.

That too is foreseeable — from a game theory perspective of those marketing The Clash.

The effect of the U.S. invasion of Iraq was predictable. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia foresaw it, noting simply that the U.S. invasion would “give Iraq to Iran as a gift on a golden platter.”

With the elimination of Sunni leader Saddam Hussein, the numerically dominant Shiites of Iraq were drawn into the political orbit of the Shiite-dominant Iran.

Game theorists focus their manipulation of affairs on their control of key variables. Then events take on a life all their own. The impact of this discrediting release was wide-ranging and fully foreseeable.

A Mossad case officer explained Israel’s success at waging war by way of deception: “Once the orchestra starts to play, we just hum along.”

These, after all, are the leading authorities in the field.

Jeff Gates is author of Guilt By Association, Democracy at Risk, and The Ownership Solution. Read other articles by Jeff, or visit Jeff’s website.

, December 1st, 2010

December 5, 2010
WIKILEAKS AND ESPIONAGE – ISRAELI STYLE
JEFF GATES : WIKILEAKS AND ESPIONAGE – ISRAELI STYLE

To whom should this release be attributed? Who benefitted?

WikiLeaks Disinformation Campaign

The U.S. is under attack by an enemy within. Skilled at game theory warfare, this foe targets the most sensitive realm of U.S. national security: its relations with other nations.

The online publication of a quarter-million documents chronicling diplomatic exchanges is notable both for what’s omitted and what’s included. To determine whether this latest release was a form of espionage, analysts need only examine how this treasure trove of trivia was peppered with documents certain to damage U.S. relations.

To identify its origins, analysts must answer a key question:

Cui Bono? To whose benefit?

One clue: the release of degrading and insulting language about Turkish leaders soon after they insisted in late October that the U.S. no longer share Turkish intelligence with Tel Aviv.

That request from a valued ally marks a critical step in isolating Israel by requiring that the U.S. shut down Israeli operations inside its 16 intelligence agencies, the White House and the Intelligence Committees in both the House and Senate. Tel Aviv was not pleased.

Turks remain outraged at the lack of accountability for the execution-style killing by Israel Defense Forces of nine Turkish citizens aboard a humanitarian ship that was boarded in international waters while sailing to Gaza with provisions to relieve an Israeli siege.
```
Was this release a tit-for-tat, Tel Aviv style? Is WikiLeaks
the visible face of an Israeli disinformation campaign? Whose
interests were served by disrupting U.S.-Turkish relations?
```
Intent is Determinative

A leak on this scale is only a leak if it is a random data dump. If items were purposely included or excluded based on their intended effect, it’s an intelligence operation. Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski points out how this release is “seeded” with information that is “surprisingly pointed.”

Take for example the cables indicating that Chinese leaders are inclined to cooperate with the U.S. in reunifying North and South Korea under the leadership of the south. That information was guaranteed to embarrass China’s leaders, damage U.S. relations with Beijing and make reunification more difficult.
```
From a game theory perspective, that damaging result was fully
foreseeable. With the U.S. economy teetering on a meltdown, the
creation of a rift with America’s largest trading partner was
also an assault on the economic strength required for the U.S.
to sustain a viable defense.
```
```
Similarly, the pointed references to Arab leaders were destined
to weaken their political credibility at home while complicating
relations abroad. By exposing Arab displeasure with Iran, this
operation also sharpened the divide between Sunni and Shiite
Muslims, a source of ongoing tensions and a key barrier to
forming a viable government in Iraq.
```
The effect was certain to complicate U.S. disengagement and raise America’s costs in both blood and treasure.

The cables involving Saudi leaders were released soon after Washington agreed to allow Riyadh to purchase $60 billion in U.S. aircraft and armaments over a multi-year period. Tel Aviv was not pleased.

By targeting the credibility of both Saudi Arabia and the U.S., this operation targeted the two nations pressing hardest for an end to Israel’s occupation of Palestine.

Transparency is the Biggest Threat

Has Tel Aviv panicked? After more than six decades of nonstop provocations while routinely portraying itself as the perennial victim, has Israel’s storyline lost traction?

Zionism faces an existential threat though not from Iran or those Tel Aviv portrays as “Islamo-fascists.” The threat lurks in the fast-emerging transparency that confirms pro-Israelis as the source of the intelligence that took the U.S. to war on false premises.

A critical mass of disinformation persuaded the U.S. to wage war in pursuit of an agenda long sought by Zionist extremists.

Steve Rosen, a former employee of the Israel lobby, has promised to testify on the lobby’s routine receipt of classified U.S. intelligence. Is this massive release of classified materials meant to make the lobby’s intelligence-gathering operation appear routine?

What’s included in the WikiLeaks release is pointed. What’s excluded is even more so: the lack of facts chronicling the role that Israel has long played in undermining U.S. interests.

Israel has escaped accountability for more than six decades. Was the WikiLeaks release “seeded” to discredit the U.S. at this time-critical juncture? The evidence suggests that what we see is not a data dump but a disinformation operation.

Last week, Israeli resistance to a peace plan was front-page news. This week the news is all about war with Iran. The Jerusalem Post immediately crowed that WikiLeaks “vindicated Israel” by citing Arab leaders’ concerns about Iran.
```
These latest releases even enabled Tel Aviv to suggest that if
U.S. intelligence was flawed on a nuclear-armed North Korea,
how can anyone trust America to contain a nuclear Iran?
```
To whom should this release be attributed? Who benefitted?

Jeff Gates is author of Guilt By Association – How Deception and Self-Deceit Took America to War.

2010 Copyright – Jeff Gates

Comments

Danton says:
December 2, 2010 at 12:22 pm

The following quote is from today’s (Dec. 2) online Haaretz:
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange on Wednesday defended his disclosure of classified U.S. documents by singling out Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as an example of a world leader who believes the publications will aid global diplomacy.

What stronger indication does one need of the Israeli origins of WikiLeaks?

[…]

http://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/12/02/jeff-gates-wikileaks-and-espionage-–-israeli-style/, December 2, 2010
December 5, 2010