Tag: foreign policy

  • Kazakhstan and Nazarbayev in the	Light of the Developments in Crimea

    Kazakhstan and Nazarbayev in the Light of the Developments in Crimea

    The Western actors were almost shocked with the annexation of Crimea to Russia through Putin’s play chess tactics. The latest events that are going on in some cities of Ukraine next to Russia could also be seen as a part of this game. Russian supporters already got the controls of some cities of Ukraine and put the Russian flags on some public buildings. At this stage it could be expected that only Russia which “swallowed” Crimea could solve the conflict. It is possible that the choice of cooperation with Putin may be put on the agenda in order not to let Ukraine to divide and more blood to be shed.
    Generally the poblems come to the political agenda and become a part of political studies only after they occured. However there is capability of foreseeing and taking precautions or agenda setting behind grand strategies. That’s why the strategy that is implemented by Nazarbayev in Northern KazakhstAlaeddin Yalçınkayaan which has similiar characteristics with Crimea is one of the greatest in this field.
    The milestone in the disintegration process of the USSR had astonished Russian nationsalists very much. Furthermore socialists outside the USSR had wanted that “dramatic dream” to come to end as soon as possible. When there was a coup d’etat attempt in Moscow on 19 June 1991, because Gorbachev had violated the main principles of socialism, one of the prominent scholars of Turkey wrote in his column that “the real communism will come from then, and nobody should wait Soviet Union to be disintegrated. However only two days were enough this attempt to be declared as failure.
    After the failed coup the republics declared their independences. At that time Ukraine’s (to which Crimea was given as a present in 1954) declaration of independence in 1991 was not a serious problem for Russia. In fact, the three Slavic republics namely Russia, Belarussia and Ukraine were the co-founders of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) before Almatı Declaration. Even though Russian strategists had various worries about the future.
    At the phase of the deconstruction of Berlin Wall and the disintegration of Warsaw Pact, instabilities in the republics started to be seen and in 1990 they declared their sovereignty one after one. It was a great step towards independence which was reached in 1991.
    A Russian physicist Alexandre Soljenitsyne, in one of his article written on 18 September 1990, wrote that eastern and northern parts of Kazakhstan where Russians were in majority were in fact part of Russia, therefore if the USSR disintegrates this region should be returned to Russian Federation. The reason of this physicist who had to live in camps in Kazakhstan because of his activities against communist regime was very interesting: This region is historically part of Russia, due to the maps which were drawn by “unconscious” communist leaders it is seen within the boundaries of Kazakhstan. In fact the Russian population in the region was the people who were migrated there in Tsarist era especially in 1950s as a result of the “Project of Virgin Lands” for the Russification of the land and therefore historically there were no evidence that the region was a “Russian land”. Those claims of Soljenitsyne were also taken up by some of the institutions and politicians and got their place in the agenda. In those regions Russian population were almost 80% of the whole population and the weight of Russians in Kazakhstan’s politics, economy and technology was very big. Even in military and at decision makers’ levels in the country the effects of Russians very decisive. After all, due to various problems, especially the economic ones Russia faced, Moscow had to recognize the independences and existing boundaries of the republics and establish new forms of cooperation like CIS without taking into consideration the above mentioned discussions.
    Nazarbayev who is still the President of Kazakhstan, by taking into consideration the future dangers, gave priority to confidence and coperation based policies in its relation with Russia. The charter (Almatı Declaration) of the CIS which was also the product of those worries and precautions was signed in the capital city of Kazakstan in those days as a diplomatic masterpiece of Nazarbayev. Nazarbayev moved the capital city of his country from Almatı to Akmola that is situated in Northern Kazakhstan in 1994. He changed the name of the capital city as Astana in 1998. He encouraged the settlement of youngsters in the city which had a population of 10.000 at the beginning. Throughout the 1990s, as in many other republics, a great deal of Russians in Kazakhstan also found a way to migrate to Russia. During that period Nazarbayev administration pursued relations with Russia in cooperation and confidence. He performed a very successful “soft power” policy that could be tought at political science lectures.
    If the Ukraine leaders took the example of Kazakhstan policy that made Kazakhstan to keep the region where Russian population is in majority under their control and to keep apart from the aggressive policies of Russia to which it shares 6.477 km borders, there was no need to have all these not-yet completed bloody events and happenings in Ukraine. The main misfortune of Ukraine here is its being a neighbour of EU and its trust to western organizations. This misfortune as for many other countries could be defined as becoming a toy for the great powers in strategically important areas, not to be able to put forward one’s own real position and policies.
    We should also specify that the Kazakhstan’s move to get the issue of possible allegations of Russian in Russian populated areas in Kazakhstan from the agenda, was not a great loss for Russia. On the contrary, Russia and Russians benefitted from that process. If, for example, the conflicts reached to the point of “hot conflict”, even if Russia that was strong once upon a time won, just because of the reciprocal revenge feelings, both sides would loose like in Ukraine. The developments funded by Soros did not bring peace and ease to that country. One should not also depend on KGB supported ones.

    alaeddin.yalcinkaya@marmara.edu.tr

  • What Went Wrong? Turkey’s Foreign Policy and the Reality of the Middle East

    What Went Wrong? Turkey’s Foreign Policy and the Reality of the Middle East

    by Birol Baskan, Contributor

    DOHA–The AKP found the 2000s a very convenient decade in which to increase its influence in the Middle East. But this situation changed with the start of the Arab spring process. Turkey must carry out the tough analysis needed and decide on how to allocate its resources and invest accordingly.

    When the Justice and Development Party took office in November 2007, it found that circumstances in the Middle East region were particularly suitable for a more active foreign policy.

    Firstly Turkey’s problems with PKK terrorism were on the point of ending. Even though they sometimes went beyond the limits of what is acceptable in legal and humanitarian grounds, , the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and the policy and security services had struck the PKK hard throughout the 1990s and almost finished off the organisation. Furthermore the capture and rendition to Turkey of Abdullah Öcalan was the most fatal blow delivered to the PKK and after the organisation began to disintegrate. To put it another way, the improval in relations with Israel eliminated the most important reason causing relations to be bad with the Arab World and Iran and a new page was now started in relations with them.

    There was an serious vacuum of leadership in the Arab world. States like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, and Libya were inward-looking and the leaders of these countries had lost all their credibility.

    This overall picture was made even worse by an abhorrent event: the 11th September attacks. The US responded first by attacking Afghanistan and then with the occupation of Iraq. The occupation brought down one of the strongholds among the Sunni regimes of the Middle East. It was possible to discern long beforehand thatthe Shi’ites would be dominant element in the new Iraq. Indeed, King Abdullah of Jordan warned the world against the rise of the Shi’a crescent at the end of 2004.

    In Iraq, the USA made things even better for Iran and then shortly afterwards added both Iran and Syria to its list of targets. The religious regime in Iran then launched its programme to develop nuclear weapons, going for dear life. This move altered the balance of power in the Middle East in favour of Iran and the Shi’ites and further alarmed the Sunni Arab regimes of the Gulf who were in any case in a state of alert already.

    As they struggled against the international attempt under the leadership of the USA to isolate them, Iran and Syria began to see Turkey as an important ally but the Arab regimes of the Gulf also did the same, regarding Turkey as an ally against the growing Shi’ite Crescent in the Middle East.

    Turkey becomes a rising star

    These circumstances made Turkey into rising star and its popularity soared in parts of the Middle East, first when the Turkish Grand National Assembly voted by a whisker in March 2003 against the resolution to take part in the invasion of Iraq. This was followed by the popularity of Turkish TV series and then by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s criticisms of Israel. A time came when the prime minister of Turkey was indisputably the most popular leader in the Arab World.

    Erdoğan and his ministers worked with almost unbelievable energy to take advantage for Turkey of this highly favourable set of circumstances. The exports of Turkish firms to the Middle East and the number of Arab and Iranian tourist rose sharply during this period. Visa requirements were lifted for a lot of countries or the visa systems eased. For the first time in the history of the Gulf Cooperation Council, an agreement was signed proclaiming Turkey to be a ‘strategic partner. In addition to that diplomatic mechanisms were established making it possible to have a regular exchange of views with different groups of countries in the region.

    Leaving aside the support they gave to Iran’s nuclear programme, which may be considered an exception, Erdoğan and Davutoğlu did what was necessary and they did not bind Turkey to any of the sides now appearing with increasing frequency in the region.

    While these developments were going on in foreign policy, the PKK began to regroup. By 2005, the organisation had resumed its terrorist attacks, even if in somewhat simple form, with landmines. The AKP governments made mistakes in the fight against terrorism and so this process could not be halted. The PKK re-formed and was now strengthened.

    Though Davutoğlu and his disciples initially did not greet the Arab Spring with great enthusiasm, the Middle Eastern scene was now about to change in a way which was very much in favour of Turkey. Until then Erdoğan and Davutoğlu had been able both to win the hearts of the Arab peoples and to go around arm in arm with the authoritarian Arab leaders. Until that time they had not been forced to

    The Arab spring now compelled Turkey to make its preference. The manoeuvres of the AKP leaders, Davutoğlu first and foremost, for a year and a half were based on trying to avoid making a final choice. Eyes which followed developments in Egypt and Libya closely, were closed when it came to those in Bahrain and Yemen. Thus Turkey took sides neither with Iran nor the Arab Gulf states. Syria was a much more complex problem. While declaring that it supported neither Iran nor the Gulf Arabs, Turkey was patient for months with al-Assad, advising him to activate reforms. By comparison, in Egypt Erdoğan had told Hosny Mubarek to resign before the first week of protests was over.

    Today Turkey has been forced by events to make the choice that it was reluctant to do. In the first it has chosen the people in the countries where the Arab uprisings took place and for the choice between the Sunni Arab world and Iran, it has chosen the former.

    The future of Syria will determine the cost to Turkey of the Arab spring. It is not difficult to grasp that if a vacuum of authority is created in Syria, comparable to that in northern Iraq in the 1990s, the PKK will discover near areas for it operations.

    Turkey’s power: deterrent but not punitive

    If one takes an optimistic view of what has happened, one might say that Turkey has been able to see the limitations on its real power without having been involved in a dangerous adventure. The moral is that while Turkey’s military power is sufficient to be a deterrent, it does not possess punitive military power in the way that the USA or Israel do. Turkey undoubtedly possesses an army which is more disciplined and stronger than those of the Arab countries, but this army is not strong enough to be the instrument of an active foreign policy in Clausewitz’s sense.

    Turkey has more than enough accumulated experience for one to feel doubtful about whether enough reliable analysis and information flowed through to Ankara from its Embassies and consulates in the Arab world, let alone high quality intelligence. We can leave Saudi Arabia to one side. Turkey does not even have the material resources of Qatar in influencing foreign policy, even though Qatar is a much smaller country. Turkey does not have even one TV channel, followed not in seven continents but just in the Arab world that can compete with Al Arabiya, Al Jazeera or CNN. The impact of Turkish TV soap operas and firms is felt in the Middle East, but its presence in education and intellectual activity is at a level of virtual non-existence.

    Perhaps what is most disappointing is that Turkey is a country which is in a position to request things from the Arab world, and not a political actor from whom things are being demanded. For example it is pursuing an active foreign policy aimed at getting Arab countries to open their markets to Turkey and to make investments in this—as prime minister Erdoğan has stated many times.

    From now on, Turkey has to come up with much higher quality analysis of its capacity and make investments to steadily eliminate its deficiencies. At International Strategic Research Center (USAK) Osman Bahadır Dınçer and Mustafa Kutlay have produced an important report on this topic. Unless Turkey can eliminated the structural weaknesses identified in this report and others like it, it would appear to be almost completely impossible for it to have a policy which will influence the outcome in the Middle East.

    Perhaps the biggest mistake of Davutoğlu and his team was to adopt a slogan about a stronger Turkey. This mantra of a very strong Turkey created excessive expectations both in the Arab world and in Turkey. In the event, Turkey could not match these expectations.

    To conclude, the situation is summarised very neatly by an Arabic cartoon which I came across on the social media. In the cartoon, Erdogan is saying “I will not permit Syria to shoot down a second Turkish aircraft.”

    *Birol Baskan is Assistant Professor at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar.

  • Turkey: Modern Assertiveness in a Globalized World

    Turkey: Modern Assertiveness in a Globalized World

    Ari Katz

    Turkey is a predominantly Sunni Muslim, ethnically Turkish country with a Kurdish minority. Its role in several ongoing geopolitical sagas, its increasingly public Islamic conservatism, and its newly assertive nature has positioned Turkey squarely on the international stage.

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    Historical Background

    After a brutal war for independence from Western WWI victors, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk led a group of military officers who successfully instituted secular and western reforms, including the restriction of Islam in the public sphere. Heralded as exemplary, “Kemalism” drove Turkey’s destiny to become a successful, liberal and modern power.

    Following World War II, Turkey moved forward as a largely secular, constitutional parliamentary republic that became increasingly allied and integrated with the Western geopolitical framework.

    Coups and the subsequent splintered political landscape led to the ascendancy of the socially conservative, fiscally liberal Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by the current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The AKP, elected in 2002, has presided over fiscal growth, a push to join the European Union (EU), and an institutional social conservatism.

    Domestic Politics

    Turkey has leaned more conservative in recent years, but maintains a relatively stable political atmosphere with healthy civic participation. The success of the reigning AKP, with Erdogan at the helm, has sparked fears of a developing Islamist shift. Although this conservatism appeals to elements of the Turkish population, for others, it runs counter to ostensibly important secular norms and curbs on Islam in the public sphere. Whether this Islamist characterization is true, Erdogan rejects the label to avoid the associated stigma from both external and internal actors.

    Aside from the AKP, two other major political parties are acting in Turkey: the center-left leaning Republican People’s Party and the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party. The former espouses a populist, secular ideology in the tradition of Ataturk, while the latter has a nationalist Pan-Turkic agenda.

    A third organization, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), is a militant, leftist revolutionary organization that claims to represent the interests of the ethnic Kurdish population in Turkey. The PKK is banned in Turkey and has been designated as a terrorist group, but it continues a sporadic armed insurrection against the Turkish government in its quest for increased Kurdish minority rights and the eventual establishment of a separate Kurdish state.

    Foreign Politics and Geopolitical Significance

    Turkey has become an increasingly strong, assertive regional power that has shown some foreign policy independence from the US strategic framework, while still remaining a key American/NATO ally in the Region. In this respect, Turkish military power is burgeoning on the heels of an evolving modernization program, and its participation in the US F-35 Stealth Fighter Program could dramatically alter power dynamics with its neighbors.

    Turkey is also experiencing a recent surge in soft-power. Its recent rebukes and strained dealings with Israel over the Palestinian issue have earned it admiration across the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA). Synergizing with this, Turkey also propagates a populist image by claiming support for popular uprisings in the Arab world. The flagship aspect of this policy has been the public criticism of Syrian President Bashar al Assad and limited logistical support of the Syrian rebels in the current uprising.

    With regards to Tehran, historically closer ties have given way to recent tension both over Ankara’s negative disposition towards Iran’s ally in Damascus, and its participation in the NATO antiballistic missile system. This cooperation with the NATO program is a manifestation of Turkey’s increasing desire – seen also in its bid to join the EU – for increased integration with the West, especially Europe. Far from assured, however, this quest for EU membership is challenged by European fears of an ostensible Turkish Islamic resurgence under Erdogan along with an indecisiveness stemming from recent internal EU political and economic upheaval.

    A burgeoning power at the crossroads of the West and Asia and the nexus of many critical international issues, Turkey will continue to play a key role in regional and global politics. It is a critical broker among internal MENA actors and ultimately between the West and the East.

    via Turkey: Modern Assertiveness in a Globalized World | Fair Observer°.

  • Brussels tells Turkey to “coordinate” foreign policy with EU

    Brussels tells Turkey to “coordinate” foreign policy with EU

    Brussels – Turkey must coordinate its foreign policy with the European Union if it wants to join the bloc, the EU signaled Tuesday, with the release of its annual report on the country’s progress towards membership.

    The warning came after Turkey’s increasingly assertive stance took it to defy the EU and the United States in June, by voting against stronger United Nations sanctions on Iran after it eschewed international talks on its nuclear programme.

    “Turkey’s foreign policy has become more active in its wider neighbourhood. This is an asset for the European Union, provided it is developed as a complement to Turkey’s (EU) accession process an in coordination with the EU,” the European Commission’s report said.

    EU enlargement commissioner Stefan Fule tried to play down the message when talking to the press, stressing how he and EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton had “very constructive and substantive” contacts with Turkish officials.

    “We are not referring to just one concrete example. This remark … makes a point that the closer cooperation between the EU and Turkey is an important thing (that) adds value to our accession negotiations,” he told reporters.

    Those talks started in 2005, but are progressing at a snail’s pace because of Turkey’s involvement in the Cyprus question – divided between ethnic Turks and ethnic Greek communities – and because of wider EU hostility to the integration of a large, Muslim country into the bloc.

    “Negotiations advanced, albeit rather slowly,” the EU commission acknowledged, in reference to the past 12 months. It said Turkey made advances against corruption and took “an important step in the right direction” by adopting a constitutional reform in September.

    However, the commission lamented that the referendum-approved changes were not consensual. Secular opposition parties opposed them, arguing that reforms gave the ruling moderate Islamic party of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan too much control over the judiciary.

    “A new civilian constitution would provide a solid basis for a further strengthening of democracy,” the EU executive noted.

    Erdogan’s government was also told to do more on press freedom, freedom of expression and religion, women’s and trade union rights, as well as on integrating the Kurdish minority.

    The report also reiterated that “it is urgent” for Turkey to open up its ports and airports to vessels and planes from the Greek-governed part of Cyprus, as stipulated by a free-trade agreement covering all EU members.

    Turkish authorities refuse to concede the point until reunification talks succeed between Greek Cypriots – the only side which is recognized as an EU member – and Turkish Cypriots.

    Because of this, the EU decided in 2006 to freeze talks on eight of the 35 chapters that make up the accession process. The commission proposed that, in the absence of progress, the provision should be maintained, but not extended to cover even more chapters.

    Cyprus and France have informally frozen a number of other dossiers, leaving EU and Turkish negotiators with only a handful of chapters where negotiations can actually be opened and bringing closer the spectre of a complete standstill in the process.

    via Brussels tells Turkey to “coordinate” foreign policy with EU | Afro News 24.

  • Internet has changed foreign policy for ever, says Gordon Brown

    Internet has changed foreign policy for ever, says Gordon Brown

    In exclusive interview with the Guardian, prime minister says web era ‘more tumultuous than any previous economic or social revolution’

    Katharine Viner

    Gordon Brown says foreign policy 'can no longer be the province of just a few elites'. Photograph: Virginia Mayo/AP
    Gordon Brown says foreign policy 'can no longer be the province of just a few elites'. Photograph: Virginia Mayo/AP

    Foreign policy can never be the same again — and it’s all because of the internet,  Gordon Brown said in an exclusive interview with the Guardian.

    Referring to the so-called Twitter revolution in Iran, the prime minister said technological advances and the democratisation of information mean “foreign policy can no longer be the province of just a few elites”.

    “You cannot have Rwanda again,” he said. “This week’s events in Iran are a reminder of the way that people are using new technology to come together in new ways to make their views known.”

    He described the internet era as “more tumultuous than any previous economic or social revolution”. “For centuries, individuals have been learning how to live with their next-door neighbours,” he added.

    “Now, uniquely, we’re having to learn to live with people who we don’t know.

    “People have now got the ability to speak to each other across continents, to join with each other in communities that are not based simply on territory, streets, but networks; and you’ve got the possibility of people building alliances right across the world.”

    This, he said, has huge implications. “That flow of information means that foreign policy can never be the same again.

    “You cannot have Rwanda again because information would come out far more quickly about what is actually going on and the public opinion would grow to the point where action would need to be taken.

    “Foreign policy can no longer be the province of just a few elites.”

    During a frank and personal interview in Guardian Weekend magazine, published tomorrow, he also discussed the return to favour of the business secretary, Peter Mandelson.

    Brown said that there was now a “common purpose” between the two of them, and that the Labour party – famously resistant to Lord Mandelson’s charms, had finally come round to him.

    “People are coming to appreciate his talents in a way the Labour party didn’t before … I think there’s a great affection for him now,” he added.

    Source: www.guardian.co.uk, 19 June 2009