Turkish Forum

Tag: Flotilla crisis

  • The secret flotilla negotiations between Turkey and Israel

    The secret flotilla negotiations between Turkey and Israel

    Claire Berlinski, one of the best observers and reporters out of Turkey, has a must-read article on what happened during the negotiations between Israel and Turkey over the Palmer report on the flotilla:

    The Turkish journalist Kadri Gürsel published an interesting piece the other day inMillyet about the failure of the negotiations between Turkey and Israel to normalize relations in the wake of the Mavi Marmara fiasco. Kadri Gürsel is a journalist whose work and opinions I take seriously; here, for example, he’s written a thoughtful piece in Turkish Policy Quarterly that will help you locate him in the spectrum of Turkish political opinion.

    Gürsel first places the blame for the failure of the negotiations on the Turkish foreign ministry’s incompetence (he uses the more tactful phrase “lack of experience,” but the Turkish foreign ministry is hardly inexperienced, so I assume we’re to read between the lines). He then moves to what has become something of a standard narrative in Turkey and elsewhere: that the deal was “95 percent completed,” but fell through only because of Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman’s intransigence:

    But the deal was never “100 percent complete” because in Israel, the obstacle, the extreme of the extreme Lieberman was not overcome. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could not persuade Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman for an apology and compensation. And the Turkey-Israel secret negotiations that started after the U.N. Investigation Panel was formed in August 2010, collapsed in June following the days when the draft agreement was prepared.

    Matters in this “duplex channel” were held tight. The Israeli member of the U.N. Investigation Committee, Joseph Ciechanover and Ambassador Özdem Sanberk, who represented Turkey on the panel, were also negotiating through the duplex channel. The head of the panel Geoffrey Palmer and his deputy Alvaro Uribe, even if they were aware of that secret negotiations were conducted between the two countries, they did not know that Ciechanover and Sanberk were the participants. The “duplex channel” held meetings in Geneva, Bucharest and Rome.

    Despite all, this draft agreement could be the operational basis for a new normalization process between Turkey and Israel. Of course, if it is possible to persuade Lieberman in the light of new situations in the Middle East.

    I asked an Israeli official who was close to these negotiations–and who has thus far never provided me with information that has proved unreliable–for comment. This is what he said:

    I’ve seen the “draft deal” and the formula for apology includes indeed the English word “apologize”, though the phrase “operational mistakes that caused life losses and injuries to Turkish people” was preceded by an “if.” (I can’t remember the exact wording, but it went something like: Israel apologizes if there were any operational mistakes etc … ) This was the mutually agreed formula, and by using the conditional mode, it was possible for us to apologize without admitting that we actually did something wrong, which of course we believe we didn’t.

    It is also correct that we agreed to pay compensations (through a bi-national fund, not directly), though the Turks did not specify at that point how much they thought would be reasonable. We thought the details and the sum could be worked out later on, based on mutual trust that would arise from the approval of the package deal.

    Turkey, however, did not guarantee that “Turkish citizens and their legal representatives would not take legal action against Israel.” It agreed to promise not to prosecute Israelis, but explained it could commit itself on behalf of private citizens in Turkey or abroad. This made some Israelis suspicious: what would happen if we endorsed the deal, and then had to face suits by members of the Turkish public, maybe even with covert assistance by the government? What guarantee did we have that the “deal” would actually end all claims and enable Israel and Turkey to reconcile and restart their relationship? This suspicion grew stronger in light of Turkey’s insistence that the text should state that Israeli soldiers killed activists “intentionally.” Why insist on this admission of guilt if not to enable legal action? As Gürsel himself says, this text which the Israeli government was supposed to approve was not completely agreed upon by Turkey, because they still wanted to include the intentionality wording. Even if the Israeli government had approved the draft, it would have left us with Turkish disavowal and discontent.

    Another condition set forth by the Turks, and agreed to by Israel, was shelving the Palmer Report. Strange that Gürsel should say nothing of this, since he starts his discussion with the meaning of the Report to Turkey. The Turks were very keen on making the report disappear …

    Finally, when it all came down to a discussion in the Israeli Cabinet, it wasn’t just Lieberman who was reluctant to approve the whole package deal. Others, too, did not exactly trust Erdoğan, and raised doubts as to his real intentions: what would we get in return for the (indirect) apology, the compensations and the shelving of the report? Restoring ties with Ankara and an “end of conflict.” But what if, after all was said and done, Erdoğan would claim that not all of his conditions were met? That Israel did not fulfill the requirements? All of a sudden, he speaks about lifting the siege on Gaza as a condition – but it was never mentioned in the negotiations nor in the draft! How easily it could have served as a pretext not to restore ties. And as for taking legal action against Israelis, well … With the intentionality clause still open, and with Turkey’s non-commitment to stop private suits, and with the Palmer Report scrapped, where would it all lead us? Certainly not to an end of conflict, but rather to a further deterioration, with us in an inferior position.

    This is the reason why quite a few ministers refused to endorse the draft. The Turkish anger at the leak of the Palmer Report, and Davutoğlu’s hot-headed reaction and statements, only seemed to confirm our worst doubts: they were never in earnest to begin with.

  • Turkey: Navy Will Escort Gaza Flotillas

    Turkey: Navy Will Escort Gaza Flotillas

    By REUTERS

    erdoganTurkey said Thursday that it would escort aid ships to Gaza and would not allow a repetition of last year’s Israeli raid that killed nine Turks. “Turkish warships, in the first place, are authorized to protect our ships that carry humanitarian aid to Gaza,” Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, left, said in an interview on Al Jazeera television. “From now on, we will not let these ships be attacked by Israel, as happened with the Freedom Flotilla.” He also said that Turkey had taken steps to stop Israel from unilaterally exploiting natural resources in the Mediterranean. An Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman, Yigal Palmor, said, “This is a statement well worth not commenting on.”

    www.nytimes.com, September 8, 2011

  • Turkish-Israeli Relations Deteriorate Further

    Turkish-Israeli Relations Deteriorate Further

    Turkish-Israeli Relations Deteriorate Further

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 130

    July 7, 2010

    By Saban Kardas

    Turkish-Israeli relations continue to worsen, despite attempts to heal the divisions caused by the flotilla crisis. Ankara has asked Tel Aviv to issue an official apology for the killing of its citizens, pay compensation to the victims’ families, accept an independent international probe into the incident, return the confiscated ships and end its blockade on the Gaza strip. Although Turkey threatened to sever ties if Israel fails to deliver, how far Ankara might go with its “punitive” actions has been a matter of controversy (EDM, June 7).

    Thus far, the steps Israel has taken are far from meeting Turkish expectations, as acknowledged by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Burak Ozugergin (Anadolu Ajansi, June 30). For instance, Israel defied a UN-proposal to form an international commission and instead launched its own internal inquiry. The Israeli panel had only limited powers to examine “whether Israel’s Gaza blockade and the flotilla’s interception conformed with international law and also investigate the actions taken by the convoy’s organizers and participants.” Although the panel’s mandate was expanded slightly by the Israeli cabinet, Turkey continues to dismiss it (www.worldbulletin.net, July 4).

    There has been no progress on compensation for the killings. Similarly, Israel has not taken any steps to return the three ships it confiscated during the raid. Although Tel Aviv announced some measures to ease the Gaza blockade, humanitarian aid is not flowing into the area freely. Therefore, the Turkish government has continued its criticism of Israel on various domestic and international platforms. During the G20 summit in Toronto, Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, labeled Israeli actions as state terrorism and vowed to pursue this issue until Israel changed its attitude on Turkey’s conditions (Anadolu Ajansi, June 28). Again, during his state of the union address, Erdogan continued with the same level of criticism against Israel (Anadolu Ajansi, July 1).

    Nonetheless, a secret meeting between Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, and Israeli Industry and Trade Minister, Ben-Eliezer, in Brussels altered the terms of the discussion (www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 1). Although the meeting was allegedly “secret,” the manner in which it entered the press demonstrated that both sides did not want it to remain secret. They probably sought to send signals that they were willing and able to discuss ways of overcoming the stalemate, despite the confrontational public rhetoric adopted by their leaders.

    While government sources from both countries confirmed the meeting, it had significant reverberations on each side. In Israel, the meeting caused a major debate, as it turned out that Ben-Eliezer was acting in consultation with Prime Minister, Benyamin Netanyahu, and Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, while Israel’s hard-line Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, was not informed.

    The Turkish opposition also capitalized on this story, presenting it as an indication of the government’s “insincere” foreign policy. Opposition parties argued that while the government was lambasting Israel publicly for domestic political reasons, it continued dialogue with Israel behind closed doors. Responding to such criticism, Davutoglu ruled out any “inconsistency” in the government’s foreign policy and defended the meeting. He argued that, the meeting was requested by the Israeli side and he used that opportunity to state Ankara’s demands directly to Israeli officials (www.cnnturk.com, July 1).

    However, subsequent exchanges between Turkish and Israeli sources showed that the parties were far from overcoming differences. In defiance of Turkey’s account of the secret meeting, Netanyahu argued that no compensation was discussed and the panel formed by Israel would satisfy the demands of the international community. Although expressing regret for the loss of life, Netanyahu ruled out any apology and compensation (www.cnnturk.com, July 3).

    This statement prompted Davutoglu to issue further harsh remarks directed at Israel in an interview with Hurriyet, which appeared as an ultimatum: “Israelis have three options: they will either apologize or acknowledge an international impartial inquiry and its conclusion. Otherwise, our diplomatic ties will be cut off” (Hurriyet Daily News, July 4). Davutoglu also indicated that Turkey could not wait indefinitely and would continue to take measures to isolate Israel, which might include extending a flight ban on Israeli military aircraft over Turkish airspace to civilian flights as well.

    In response, Israeli sources again rebuffed Turkey’s demands for an apology. Liberman and Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Yigal Palmor, slammed Ankara’s harsh rhetoric. “When you want an apology, you do not use threats or ultimatums… Everything leads us to believe that Turkey has another agenda in mind,” Lieberman maintained (AFP, July 5; Today’s Zaman, July 6).

    Turkish-Israeli tensions have been an important issue affecting the course of Turkish-US relations, which also experienced recent turbulence. Since the Davutoglu-Ben-Eliezer talks took place after Erdogan’s meeting with the US President, Barack Obama, at the G20 summit, some speculated that Washington was behind this development. Moreover, Obama arguably sought to convince Erdogan to drop his demand for an international investigation into the flotilla incident (www.cnnturk.com, July 4). Davutoglu has rejected the suggestion that the meeting was held due to American pressure.

    Although it might be difficult to confirm what role US diplomatic sources played in the latest meeting, US efforts to mend ties between Turkey and Israel are no secret. Since the parties started bickering immediately after the revelation of the “secret” meeting, it might indicate that they were encouraged by Obama to meet. Indeed, Turkish-Israeli ties were one of the items on the Erdogan-Obama meeting, where Erdogan extended his gratitude to Obama for his constructive role in the flotilla crisis (Anadolu Ajansi, June 28).

    However, it seems Obama has been less successful in dampening the tension between the two allies in the Middle East and in convincing Erdogan to drop his critical rhetoric towards Israel. The row over the secret meeting, obviously seeking to bridge differences, demonstrated the depth of the Turkish-Israeli rift. As a final straw, it was announced that Turkey will not attend a US-Israeli-Turkish joint naval search-and-rescue exercise, scheduled in the Eastern Mediterranean next month. Dubbed “Reliant Mermaid,” the drill has been held regularly over the past decade (www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 5).

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-israeli-relations-deteriorate-further/

  • Economic and Defense Ties Between Turkey and Israel in Crisis

    Economic and Defense Ties Between Turkey and Israel in Crisis

    Economic and Defense Ties Between Turkey and Israel in Crisis

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 109

    June 7, 2010

    By: Saban Kardas

    In the wake of the flotilla crisis between Israel and Turkey, attention is shifting to the question of what this development might mean for their bilateral relationship. Angered by the Israeli army’s treatment of Turkish citizens seeking to break Israel’s blockage of Gaza, which resulted in nine deaths and various injuries, the Turkish public has expressed deep outrage. While demonstrations throughout the country called for punitive retaliatory actions, the Deputy Prime Minister, Bulent Arinc, set the limits of Turkey’s response. “No one should expect us to declare war against Israel,” said Arinc (Anadolu Ajansi, May 31).

    Granted, Turkish leaders unanimously used harsh language, accusing Israel of state terrorism and vowing that they would hold Tel Aviv accountable for its actions. However, representatives of opposition parties and many NGO’s found the government’s response insufficient, demanding concrete measures rather than “political rhetoric” (www.ntvmsnbc.com, May 31).

    Amidst these discussions, the Turkish parliament held an extraordinary session to adopt a declaration condemning Israel. The debates in parliament reflect the depth of feeling in the country against Israel, which exerts pressure on the government. Reportedly, the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) expressed reservations over a clause in the draft declaration that stated: “Parliament expects the Turkish government to reconsider economic and military ties with Israel and take the necessary effective measures.” Only after the AKP bowed to growing pressure from opposition parties could parliament adopt the declaration (www.haberturk.com, June 2).

    Overall, the Turkish government has stressed that it would prefer to explore instruments provided by international law and diplomacy to force Israel to compensate victims for its actions. So far, Israel has proven reluctant to accept an independent international inquiry into the flotilla incident and it is unclear if it will agree to pay reparations for the material and human losses suffered by Turkish citizens. Inevitably, Turkish-Israeli relations might come down to coercive instruments short of force. Therefore, it is necessary to ponder the following questions: what instruments can Turkey bring to bear on Israel, and how effective will they be in terms of achieving Turkey’s stated objective of punishing Israel? What price will Turkey pay if it continues on this confrontational path?

    The economic and military relationship might suffer from the nationalist urge to punish Israel. As regards economic ties, the public has called for boycotting Israeli products. However, experts point out that even if the crisis results in the limitation of the bilateral trade volume, it will not have a major impact either on Turkey or Israel. In 2009, Turkey’s imports from Israel were $1.1 billion, while Turkish exports to Israel were $1.5 billion. Since this trade volume accounts for only 1 percent of Turkey’s foreign trade, its economy will not suffer from any escalation of the crisis. Experts further note that despite similar calls to limit economic activity with Israel following the Gaza crisis in January 2009, Turkish-Israeli trade continued unabated. Nonetheless, analysts observed that since the 2009 crisis, Turkish businessmen doing business in Israel have faced bureaucratic obstacles and those problems are likely to accelerate (Referans, June 2). Turkish Finance Minister, Mehmet Simsek, also expressed similar opinions, arguing that given the limited trade volume, economic measures against Israel will not undermine Turkey’s economic recovery efforts (Anadolu Ajansi, June 3). Nonetheless, major Turkish firms scheduled to invest in Israel announced that they might freeze their investment or downgrade their operations to support the government’s policies (Milliyet, June 1).

    Since severing Turkish-Israeli economic ties will hurt neither Israel nor Turkey to a considerable extent, Ankara is evaluating energy cooperation. Although Energy Minister, Taner Yildiz, said it was too early to talk about sanctions in the energy sector early on in the crisis (Star, June 2), he later supported nationalist arguments, saying “we are not considering any projects with Israel, until things return to normal” (www.haberturk.com, June 3). Yildiz emphasized that major energy and infrastructure projects with Israel will be suspended. He was obviously referring to the plans for the construction of multiple pipelines to transport oil, gas and water from Turkey to Israel, commonly termed Med-stream. These are, however, multinational projects that also involve other countries including Russia, Azerbaijan and India (EDM, November 25, 2008; August 7, 2009), and it remains to be seen how they will react to Turkey’s plans to politicize these projects.

    Escalation of tensions may have considerable repercussions in military affairs. Israel has been a major supplier to the Turkish army, especially in sophisticated weapons systems. Moreover, Israel has, in the past, undertaken various multi-billion-dollar contracts to modernize Turkey’s aging military hardware. Turkish Defense Minister, Vecdi Gonul, highlighted that although no new large-scale projects with Israeli defense companies were being considered, the ongoing programs, worth hundreds of millions of dollars, would continue (Hurriyet Daily News, June 3). Attending a TV show, a representative from the AKP argued that all agreements with Israel, including defense cooperation, would be cancelled (www.ntvmsnbc.com, June 6). It is, however, too early to tell if Turkey will indeed take this route.

    Even if military cooperation continues, relations will fall short of earlier levels, which had led observers to describe Turkish-Israeli ties as a “strategic partnership.” The new era might harm both sides to a significant degree. Previously, in addition to reaping the gains of lucrative Turkish defense contracts, Israel had also benefited from military-defense cooperation with Turkey in strategic terms. Various agreements signed in the 1990’s enabled Israel to conduct joint military exercises and develop defense cooperation with Turkey, which expanded its strategic depth vis-à-vis Syria and Iran. Following the 2009 crisis, Turkey limited Israeli access to its airspace, and have now announced cancellation of further exercises with Israel. Overall, Israel might suffer from the loss of such a valuable “ally,” not to mention its possible alienation in the Middle East due to the deterioration of diplomatic relations with Turkey. Ankara, also might have to pay a price, as Israel is reportedly reluctant to transfer to Turkey advanced strategic weapons systems which are considered essential for the country’s security needs, especially those required in the fight against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

    https://jamestown.org/program/economic-and-defense-ties-between-turkey-and-israel-in-crisis/