Tag: European Parliament

Reply to Baroness Shreela Flather

Re: your question and proposal to the House of Lords -16.06.2011
House of Lords
London SW1 OPW

01/07/2011

Dear Baroness Shreela Flather,

The Ataturk Society of the UK has been astonished and dismayed to learn about
your question and proposal regarding a possible timetable for the British
Government to recognize the so called Armenian Genocide at the House of Lords on
the 16th of June 2011. Whilst we appreciate your “right” to ask questions as a
member of the House of Lords (not as an elected representative), we would like
to bring the following facts to your attention regarding this matter.

First of all can we remind you that there is no legal justification for such a
recognition unlike the Holocaust or Bosnian massacres.

As a historical event, it is a fact that Suzanne and Gregoire Krikorian took
their case to the European Court of Justice in 2003 in reference to the so called
Armenian genocide, and demanded moral and material compensation. However, they
lost this court case on the 17th December 2003 and were ordered to pay the court
expenses of 30,000 Euro for unfounded charges.

This issue began with the passing of an ill conceived resolution C-190 of the
European Parliament on 20th July 1987 that Turkey cannot become a member of EEC unless she recognizes the so called Armenian Genocide!

Twelve years later, in 1999, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit was
negotiating with the EEC regarding Turkish candidacy and when the discussions
were strained, the Turkish P.M. was invited to Helsinki talks. The Helsinki
European Council decision was to officially invite Turkey into the E.U. Since
than Turkey has been a candidate member and has many agreements with the EU,
going back to 1963 Ankara Association Agreement).

This invitation obviously did not go the way the Armenian Diaspora wanted and
they opened a court case against:

*    the European Parliament
*    the European Union Association Council
*    the European Commission

at the European Court of Justice, with reference to the European Parliament’s
resolution no. C-190, demanding that Turkey acknowledges so called Armenian
Genocide before being offered membership status, otherwise EU’s contractual
status would be impaired and therefore insisting on “Responsibility from the
European Union outside of it’s commitments and without any judicial
justification”.

We would like to remind you that this court case was rejected by the First
Division of the European Court of Justice on December 17, 2003 under decision
number T-346/03, confirming that there is no legally accepted justification for
so called ‘Armenian genocide’.

Still unsatisfied the Armenian Diaspora applied to the “Court of Appeals” for
the repeal of the referred decision. This application was heard by the Fourth
Division of the European Court of Justice at the session dated 17.04.2004. It
was rejected again under the clause No. C-18/04 and the Armenians were charged
to pay the court expenses of 30,000 Euros.

Dear Baroness Flather, we would like to ask you to reconsider your question to
the House of Lords in the light of the evidence presented above and before
taking a stance against the decisions of the European Court of Justice which is
an authorised Court set up to deal with these kind of cases and is officially
recognized by the UK Parliament.

Turkish people have a right to request that you re-address the House of Lords
regarding your question and put right the inaccuracies or injustices done to the
Turkish Nation. We consider your action as biased and prejudiced, and also
lacking in informed knowledge and the right facts of the matter.

Yours sincerely,
Betula Nelson
Foreign Media Coordinator
Ataturk Society UK
London

Extracts from the European Court of Justice decision number T-346/03;
Clause 25.
Secondly, as regards the requirement that the applicants must have suffered
actual and certain damage, the applicants clearly confined themselves in their
application to relying in general terms on non-material damage caused to the
Armenian community, without giving the least indication as to the nature or
extent of the damage which they consider they had suffered individually.
Therefore the applicants have supplied no information that would enable the
Court to find that the applicants in fact suffered actual and certain damage
themselves (see, to that effect, Case T-99/98 Hameico Stuttgart and Others v
Council and Commission [2003] ECR II-2195, paragraphs 68 and 69).

Clause 21.
As regards the alleged breach of fundamental rights (see paragraph 10 above), it
is sufficient to note that the applicants merely claim that such a breach took
place, without explaining how that follows from the conduct of the defendant
institutions complained of in this case.

—

Original reply in Turkish here by Refik Mor

July 8, 2011

European Parliament to call for new constitution in Turkey

The European Parliament is expected to reiterate its call on Turkey to adopt a new constitution to better protect human rights and freedoms in a draft resolution due to be discussed at its Committee on Foreign Affairs this week.

The draft resolution penned by the European Parliament’s rapporteur on Turkey, Ria-Oomen Ruijten, welcomes the adoption of constitutional amendments in a referendum on Sept. 12 but underlines “the pressing need for an overall constitutional reform transforming Turkey into a full-fledged pluralistic democracy, with the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms at its core.”

The resolution praises progress made in reforming the judiciary and on military-civilian democracy, urging “the parliament to become active in ensuring parliamentary oversight of security forces, including full oversight of the defense budget.”

In other areas, however, the document says difficulties persist, citing laws that continue to limit freedom of expression, deterioration of freedom of the press and a growing self-censorship in the Turkish media, and restrictions of Internet sites.

The draft resolution on Turkey will first be discussed at the Committee on Foreign Affairs on Thursday. A second debate at the same committee will take place in February and the document will be brought to the European Parliament in March, when it will be debated and voted on.

The constitutional changes pushed by the government include measures to further curb powers of the military and reform the judiciary. The EU, which Turkey aspires to join, has welcomed the amendments and called for more efforts for further changes. It is not clear, however, if any further reform can be carried out in a near future, given the upcoming parliamentary elections that are likely to take place in June.

The resolution expressed concern about “lack of readiness of government and opposition to work towards consensus on key reforms” and urges the government to strengthen “political plurality in State institutions by involving the opposition into responsibility for the modernization and democratization of the State and society” while also calling upon all opposition forces to constructively engage in the reform process.

It also regrets that the constitutional changes did not include any amendment on closure of political parties and urges the government to bring Turkish laws into line with EU standards. It calls for new reforms to reduce the election threshold which currently stands at 10 percent, and laments that no effort has been made to limit the immunity of parliamentarians for corruption-related offenses.

According to the document, the government also should do more to advance its Kurdish initiative, to prevent honor killings and to address problems of Alevis and non-Muslim communities, “notably concerning their ability to obtain legal personality, to open and operate houses of worship, train clergy and to solve property problems not tackled by the Law on Foundations.”

On terrorism, the resolution “strongly condemns the continuing terrorist violence by the PKK and other terrorist groups in Turkish soil” and says Turkey should intensify its cooperation with the EU.

On the ongoing Ergenekon investigation, which looks into a clandestine organization accused of plotting to incite a coup against the democratically elected government, the document says this and other investigations into coup plans “have to prove the strength and the proper and transparent functioning of Turkish democratic institutions” and expresses concern about “the excessively long pre-trial detention periods and stresses the need for effective judicial guarantees for all suspects.”

European Parliament deplores vote against Iran sanctions

The European Parliament resolution also notes Turkey’s increasingly active foreign policy — praising Turkish efforts in Afghanistan, the Balkans and calling for a Turkish role in efforts to foster dialogue in the Middle East — and calls on both the EU and the Turkish government to coordinate their foreign policy objectives.

Reflecting disagreements between Ankara Turkey and the West over how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, the document urges the Turkish government “to fully support efforts of the international community to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and deplores Turkey’s vote against the relevant UNSC resolution,” referring to Turkey’s vote in May against the imposition of new sanctions on Iran. Ankara says sanctions are counterproductive and calls for a negotiated settlement to an international dispute over Tehran’s nuclear program.

It also criticizes Turkey for its refusal to open its ports and airports to traffic from Greek Cyprus, regrets that NATO-EU cooperation is blocked by NATO member Turkey, and urges Ankara to withdraw a 1995 decision to declare any unilateral Greek move to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean as a “casus belli,” or a reason to declare war.

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION to wind up the debate on statements by the Council and the Commission pursuant to Rule 110(2) of the Rules of Procedure on Turkey’s 2010 progress report Ria Oomen-Ruijten, on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

European Parliament draft resolution on Turkey’s progress report 2010

The European Parliament,

–having regard to the Turkey 2010 Progress Report of the Commission (SEC(2010)1327),

–having regard to its previous resolutions of 27 September 2006 on Turkey’s progress towards accession , of 24 October 2007 on EU-Turkey relations , of 21 May 2008 on Turkey’s 2007 progress report , of 12 March 2009 on Turkey’s 2008 progress report , and of 10 February 2010 on Turkey’s 2009 progress report ,

–having regard to the Negotiating Framework for Turkey of 3 October 2005,

–having regard to Council Decision 2008/157/EC of 18 February 2008 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey (“the Accession Partnership”), as well as to the previous Council decisions on the Accession Partnership of 2001, 2003 and 2006,

–having regard to Rule 110 (2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.whereas accession negotiations with Turkey were opened on 3 October 2005 after approval by the Council of the Negotiating Framework, and whereas the opening of those negotiations is the starting point for a long-lasting and open-ended process,

B.whereas Turkey has committed itself to reforms, good neighbourly relations and progressive alignment with the EU, and whereas these efforts should be viewed as an opportunity for Turkey itself to modernise,

C.whereas full compliance with all Copenhagen criteria and EU integration capacity, in accordance with the conclusions of December 2006 European Council meeting, remain the basis for accession to the EU, which is a community based on shared values,

D.whereas the Commission concluded that in 2010 Turkey has continued its political reform process, but that lack of dialogue and spirit of compromise between the main political parties has a negative impact on the relations between key political institutions and slows down work on political reforms,

E.whereas Turkey has still not implemented, for the fifth consecutive year, the provisions stemming from the EC-Turkey Association Agreement and the Additional Protocol thereto,

1.Commends Turkish citizens and civil society for their support for further democratisation of Turkey and their commitment to an open and pluralistic society;

2.Is concerned about the ongoing confrontation between the political parties and the lack of readiness of government and opposition to work towards consensus on key reforms; urges the government to enhance political plurality in State institutions by involving the opposition into responsibility for the modernisation and democratisation of the State and society; calls upon all opposition forces to constructively engage in the reform process;

3.Points to the crucial role of a system of checks and balances in the governance of a modern democratic State, which must be based on the principle of separation of powers and balance between the executive, the legislative and the judiciary, on respect of human rights and freedoms, and in particular the media freedom, and on a political culture truly reflecting the plurality of a democratic society;

4.Underlines the role of the Turkish Grand National Assembly as the institution which should crucially contribute to the strengthening of a system of checks and balances, and support, actively and constructively, on the basis of a cross-party commitment, the modernisation reforms, whilst ensuring the democratic scrutiny of government’s policies;

5.Welcomes the adoption of constitutional amendments and urges their proper implementation, fully respecting the ECHR standards; underlines however the pressing need for an overall constitutional reform transforming Turkey into a fully-fledged pluralistic democracy, with the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms at its core; welcomes the declared readiness of the government as well as of the opposition to undertake such a reform, and calls upon the government to ensure that all political parties and civil society are closely involved in the whole constitutional process;

6.Welcomes a number of the government’s symbolic and goodwill gestures in the areas of religious freedoms, protection of minorities and cultural rights; insists however that systematic improvements are needed; in particular encourages the government to provide the democratic opening with a new impetus, and calls upon the opposition to constructively support and engage in this process;

Fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria

7.Is concerned about the deterioration of freedom of the press and the growing self-censorship within the Turkish media; underlines that independent press is crucial for a democratic society, and points in this context to the essential role of the judiciary to protect and enhance the freedom of the press, thereby guaranteeing the public space for a free debate and contributing to a proper functioning of the system of checks and balances; recalls the need for a new media law to be adopted, addressing, inter-alia, the issues of independence, ownership and administrative control;

8.Regrets that a number of laws continue to limit freedom of expression; reiterates its previous calls to the government to finalise the review on the legal framework on freedom of expression and to bring it, without delay, in line with the ECHR and the ECtHR case law; regrets the repeatedly disproportionate closure of websites and asks the government to prepare amendments to the internet law (No. 5651) in order to make sure that it does not any more limit freedom of expression and restrict the right of citizens to access information;

9.Appreciates the progress made in reforming the judiciary and reiterates its view that judicial independence and impartiality are one of the keys to the functioning of a pluralistic democratic society; asks the government to implement the constitutional amendments adopted in this area in full respect with the separation of powers between the executive and judiciary branches, and in line with European standards;

10.Welcomes that the adopted constitutional amendments finally provide the basis for the establishment of an ombudsman institution and urges the government to prepare and the parliament to adopt the relevant law, allowing for an appointment based on a democratic procedure which would bring into this new office a broadly respected personality;

11.Commends the progress made on civil-military relations, and urges the parliament to become active in ensuring parliamentary oversight of security forces, including full oversight of the defence budget;

12.Underlines that investigations of cases of alleged coup plans such as ERGENEKON have to prove the strength and the proper and transparent functioning of Turkish democratic institutions; is concerned about the excessively long pre-trial detention periods and stresses the need for effective judicial guarantees for all suspects;

13.Regrets that the recent reform of the constitution did not include amendments on the closure of political parties, and urges the government to bring the relevant legislation in line with European standards, pointing in particular to the relevant opinion of the Venice Commission;

14.Reiterates its calls from its previous resolutions for the electoral system to be reformed by reducing the threshold of 10%, thereby strengthening party pluralism and better reflecting the plurality of Turkish society; asks the government to tackle this issue as a priority in order to apply the reform ahead of 2011 parliamentary elections; encourages political parties to reinforce internal party democracy and to strengthen the accountability of elected members vis-à-vis their constituencies;

15.Regrets that no progress has been made in limiting the immunities of members of parliament concerning corruption-related offences, while at the same time there is concern about the adequate protection of expression of non-violent opinions in the parliament; calls therefore upon the government and the parliament to agree on an appropriate reform of the system of parliamentary immunities;

16.Takes note of Turkey’s current chairmanship of Council of Europe Committee of Ministers and encourages Turkey to reflect its commitment to the values of the Council of Europe by signing and ratifying the Framework Convention for the protection of national minorities and by ratifying all additional protocols to the ECHR;

17.Is disappointed that the ratification of the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against torture has been pending since 2005 and urges the parliament to ratify it without any further delay;

18.Supports the ongoing dialogue of the government with religious communities, including the Alevis and the Christian communities, is however disappointed that no progress has been made with regard to the legal framework for the functioning of these communities, notably concerning their ability to obtain legal personality, to open and operate houses of worship, train clergy and to solve property problems not tackled by the Law on Foundations;

19.Calls therefore upon the government to systematically address these issues without any further delay by amending legislation and by ensuring its proper implementation at all levels of government, including the municipalities; points in this context also to the recommendations adopted by the Venice Commission in spring 2010 concerning the legal personality of religious communities and the ecclesiastical title “Ecumenical” of the Orthodox Patriarchate; reiterates its expectation that the government’s announcements concerning the re-opening of the Halki Greek Orthodox seminary are soon followed by concrete steps;

20.Strongly condemns the continuing terrorist violence by the PKK and other terrorist groups on Turkish soil; encourages Turkey to intensify its cooperation with the EU, notably its counter-terrorism coordinator and Europol, as well as with the EU Member States in the fight against terrorism;

21.Calls upon the government to revitalise its efforts in the framework of the democratic opening to comprehensively address the Kurdish issue, notably by ensuring a consistent interpretation of laws allowing for use of the Kurdish language in political and public life and in education, by amending anti-terror legislation in order to avoid abuse or extensive interpretation, by addressing efficiently the problems of persons displaced from their home regions as a consequence of, inter alia, the long conflict, and by improving further the socio-economic situation in the south-east;

22.Welcomes the strengthening of the legal framework guaranteeing women’s rights and gender equality through the constitutional package; urges the government, and the business and civil society, to take comprehensive measures tackling the poverty of women, increasing women’s social inclusion and participation in the labour market, such as actively supporting the access of girls to secondary education or providing child care facilities; furthermore, encourages the introduction of a system of reserved quotas in order to ensure a meaningful presence of women at all levels in business, the public sector and government; calls in particular upon the political parties to use the opportunity of the upcoming elections to strengthen women’s active engagement in politics;

23.Deeply deplores the increase in honour killings, and urges the government to step up its preventive efforts at all levels, in particular by obliging municipalities to provide sufficient shelters for women in danger, by effectively monitoring full compliance with this obligation, and by putting in place a system of follow-up assistance for women leaving the shelters; urges the judiciary to ensure that violence against women is consistently and consequently punished;

24.Believes that Turkey should pass legislation introducing civil or social service as an alternative to military service, based on free choice; asks the government to ensure full compliance with the ECtHR judgement Ülke vs. Turkey;

Enhancing social cohesion and prosperity

25.Commends the resilience of the Turkish economy vis-à-vis the global economic crisis; stresses that this economic revival is a unique opportunity to increase labour force participation and employment rates, which are still very low, barely reaching 50% only, and to set in motion a process of progressive social inclusion; points to the shared responsibility of the government and social partners, and encourages them to intensify cooperation in order to strengthen the anchors of a socially oriented market economy;

26.Notes the interdependence of the EU and the Turkish economies and points to its potential for enhancing prosperity in both, the EU and Turkey, as Turkey’s integration into the EU market advances;

27.Takes note of the improvements introduced by the constitutional amendments in the area of social dialogue, insists however that also here the key lies in proper implementation into the legal framework, which still needs to be brought in line with ILO standards; encourages all parties of the Economic and Social Council to strengthen their engagement and cooperation to advance this goal;

28.Reiterates the need to strengthen cohesion among Turkish regions and between rural and urban areas; points in this context to the particular role of education and to the need to tackle persisting large regional disparities as far as quality of education and enrolment rates are concerned;

29.Urges the government to fully consider the sustainability and environmental consequences of its plans on new water and energy infrastructure pursued under the South-East Anatolia project (GAP) which risk to destroy the environment and the unique landscape of many regions; in particular stresses the need to ensure that the draft law on nature protection and biodiversity is amended so as to fully respect European standards, and to clearly allocate the responsibility for nature protection within the executive;

Building good neighbourly relations

30.Calls on the Turkish Government to actively support the ongoing negotiations, to contribute in concrete terms to the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue and to facilitate a suitable climate for negotiations by immediately starting to withdraw its forces from Cyprus; strongly urges the two communities in Cyprus to work intensively as asked for by the SG of the UN to capitalise on the progress already made in the negotiations in order to reach a sustainable solution, in line with the relevant UNSC resolutions and the principles on which the EU is founded, to the benefit of the Cypriot citizens, the EU and Turkey;

31.Encourages Turkey to intensify its support for the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, in particular by facilitating its access to military zones in the north;

32.Urges Turkey to ratify the protocols with Armenia, to open the border with this neighbour, and to use its regional weight as one of the key powers in the Caucasus to enhance confidence building measures and to contribute to the solution of the frozen conflict around Nagorno Karabach;

33.Takes note of the intensified efforts between Turkey and Greece for improvement of their bilateral relations; regrets however that the casus belli declared by the Turkish Grand National Assembly towards Greece has still not been withdrawn;

34.Appreciates the deepening of relations between Turkey and Iraq, including its Kurdish regional government, and points in particular to Turkey’s contribution to the stabilisation of Iraq;

Advancing EU-Turkey cooperation

35.Deplores the fact that the Additional Protocol to the EC Turkey Association Agreement has still not been implemented by Turkey, which continues to affect the process of negotiations; calls on the government to fully implement it;

36.Takes note of the progress achieved by Turkey on the energy chapter and urges the Council once again to open negotiations on this chapter without any further delay; calls on the Turkish government to step up its efforts in negotiations on joining the Energy Community Treaty; welcomes the ratification of the Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement;

37.Welcomes the substantial progress that has been made towards finalising negotiations on an EU-Turkey readmission agreement, and calls upon the Turkish government to ensure that, until this agreement enters into force, existing bilateral agreements are fully implemented; underlines the importance of intensification of the cooperation between EU and Turkey on migration management and border controls, also given the large percentage of illegal immigrants entering the EU territory via Turkey; is of the view that once the readmission agreement enters into force, the Commission will prepare negotiations on a visa facilitation agreement, easing in particular the entry conditions of businesspeople and students travelling to the EU;

38.Takes note of Turkey’s increasingly active foreign policy, aimed at strengthening its role as regional player; urges the HR/VP to take this dimension in full consideration and engage with Turkey for the coordination of objectives and the proper valorisation of EU interests; calls upon the Turkish government to step up its foreign policy coordination with the EU;

39.Urges the Turkish government to fully support efforts of the international community to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and deplores Turkey’s vote against the relevant UNSC resolution; is of the view that Turkey could contribute to the democratisation and the strengthening of human rights in Iran, whilst coordinating its efforts with the EU;

40.Believes that Turkey should play an important role in fostering dialogue in the Middle East Peace process, and calls upon Turkey to resume its constructive mediation and in particular to contribute to the strengthening of the Palestinian Authority;

41.Appreciates Turkey’s constructive engagement supporting the efforts of the transatlantic partners in Afghanistan and in the Balkans; regrets however that NATO-EU strategic cooperation beyond the “Berlin Plus” arrangements is blocked by Turkish objections;

42.Calls on the Turkish Government to sign and submit for ratification the Statute of the International Criminal Court, thus further increasing Turkey’s contribution to, and engagement in, the global multilateral system;

43.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, the President of the European Court of Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Government and Parliament of the Republic of Turkey.

December 8, 2010

Greeks of Istanbul Celebration Held at European Parliament

A celebration dedicated to the Greeks of Istanbul will take place next Wednesday at the European Parliament. The initiative was organized by Marilena Koppa of Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima and George Koumoutsakos of Nea Dimokratia; both members of the European Parliament. Professors N. Alevizatos, G. Ktistakis and M. Athanasiadou, P. Markaris, writers and several representatives of Unions of Constantinopolitans are invited to speak at the event.

The event coincides with the presentation of the plan of Turkey’s progress report, carried out by Ria Oomen. Oomen is a member of the European Parliament and this marks the 5th anniversary of the start of Turkey’s EU negotiations. Every year a little bit of progress is achieved, yet the problem concerning minorities’ rights has not be resolved; the Copenhagen Agreement can not be established yet.

via Greeks of Istanbul Celebration Held at European Parliament | Greek Reporter Europe.

December 8, 2010
DEAD HEADS by Cem Ryan

DEAD HEADS: Headscarves, Turbans…Shrouds for the Living

It’s now all the chi-chi fashion rage! The prurient fashion designing male politicians of both sides are again trying to determine what Turkish women should wear on their heads. And where, and when, too. The secular left offers the Iranian model with a dash of hair showing. The so-called pious, ruling party, convicted by the Turkish constitutional court of being the center of the anti-secular movement in the nation, argues in the craven words of democracy and freedom. Whether

Üsküdar, Istanbul, November 2003

it’s abaya, chador, burqa, nigab, turban, hijab, it’s all part of a women’s democratic fashion choice. And the prime minister himself has proclaimed the covering of women as a “political symbol.” In fact, it’s a symbol of stupidity and backwardness. It’s a political dialogue, at the expense of the dignity of Turkish women, intended to put them and keep them in a “living” kefen (burial shroud). It is a lifelong headlock—social, political, intellectual, physiological, and psychological—a death grip until they meet their literal end in the grave.

“Be sure of it!” challenged the jealous Othello, for he must be certain of his wife’s infidelity. “Give me the ocular proof,” he demanded of the treacherous Iago, taking him by the throat. And in this manner Desdemona would be condemned by her own version of a headscarf, her handkerchief, the ocular proof of her infidelity. Except it was false, planted evidence. But she was a woman so she died anyway.

The headscarf issue that so besets and divides Turkey is also “ocular proof.” But of what? National piety, that’s what. It had allowed America to call Turkey a “moderate Islamic nation.” It satisfied the American need for symbolic gestures, like the upright purple fingers of Iraqi voters signified democratic progress. For without such signs how could America, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and their fellow Americans be sure of Turkey’s democratic moderate Islamic piety? And if you’re wondering how a backward-thinking political party like the AKP came to be the ruling party of the country of Atatürk, it’s because of AKP’s complete collaboration with America’s disastrous Middle East policy. And sadly, while President Obama earlier indicated differently, he too de facto continues the nonsensical Bush administration’s policy of Turkish moderate Islam. And the ruling party, the AKP, loves all of it, particularly the headscarf part. The prime minister also encourages women to open themselves to the idea of having at least three children. Ah such loving political concern by the prime minister for the most delicate areas of femininity.

It should come as no surprise to even a casual reader of the Koran that the Turkish headscarf issue has nothing to do with Islam. It is a tradition that was made-in-America, not Mecca, and certainly not in Turkey. The genuine tradition of wearing a headscarf arose from women field workers in rural areas for protection from extreme weather conditions. In other words, the headscarf came about from a physical necessity that had nothing to do with religion. This has been appropriated, more correctly, stolen, by religious-mongering politicians and converted into a bogus religious duty. In fact, it is an imperative that arises from imperialism and enslavement.

The historian Eric Hobsbawn explains this phenomenon in his book, The Invention of Tradition. (1) One example is especially relevant to today’s Turkey. Do you think that the Scottish kilt and its fabric-coded clans were part of some long cultural tradition in Scotland? Wrong! It was invented by the ruling power, England, to divide tribes into definable groups, thus to better control them. In like manner was the political turban invented by America for Turkish consumption by gullible women at the hands of scheming male politicians. Turkish women, wise up! It’s always the same old story with you! Don’t allow yourselves to be led by ignoramuses, no matter what political party they pretend to represent!

Consider this. Without the headscarf Turkish women look, for the most part, much the same as any western women. Don’t bother what’s in the head of Turkish women. For Turkish politicians, it’s what’s on it that counts. In their eyes, women are merely objects, with particular prurient focus on their hair. The admonition for women to cover their heads is made by men not by the Koran.

The American woman presented as some sort of authority by the Turkish Daily News article entitled “American seeking a democratic Turkey” (Feb. 2, 2008) said that, for her, the headscarf symbolizes that “I am a Muslim woman.” Covering is “mandatory” and an “obligation,” she said. This is nonsense. She was either misreading or not reading the Koran. Indeed, she was manufacturing her own tradition. One may wear whatever they want on their heads, whether a baseball cap or a lampshade. And one may justify doing so or not. But the justification for Turkish women to wear headscarves resides not in the Koran, but in their blind, thoughtless subservience to political men. One may make up one’s own rules about anything but there is no such rule in the Koran. “There must be some wisdom to it,” she insisted, demonstrating blind faith and little else. How sad a limitation for this woman who professes to be a “seeker.”

The Koran, a precisely worded text, contains no language requiring women to cover their heads. None whatsoever! It renders specific procedures about many things. For washing: “hands as far as the elbow… feet to the ankles.” In the desert? No water? Use “clean sand” (5.5). For apostates who preach against God: “have their hands and feet cut off on alternate sides” (5:31). Regarding food: don’t eat “strangled animals” (5.3) and “kill no game while on pilgrimage” (5:95). Of course, it does admonish all people as “children of Adam” to cover their shameful parts, but this is mythological derivative material from the Bible and the fall of man (7:25). And for all its enormous specificity, it never mentions women’s hair. There is much information in this fact.

In reality, the Koran is protective of women. Women should “draw their veils close round them” so they will not be molested (33:57)—by men of course, the same kind of men who now seek to enslave Turkish women. They should “cover their bosoms,” not display “their adornments except such as normally revealed” and not “stamp their feet when walking” (24:30). But there is nothing therein about wearing a headscarf in order to be a “Muslim woman.” This is a manmade myth, a sham, that is also dangerously stigmatizing of those women who don’t cover. Are they any less Islamic? And why should women bear the full signifying burden anyway? The answer is simple. First, because of the Turkish government’s complicity with America’s political project in the Middle East. Second, because men, particularly pious political men, said so in order to keep women in a subservient role. What a bad, sick joke on women! What a bad, sick joke that women play on themselves!

Of course, women can wear anything they choose. But they should know why they do so. And if they choose to wear a headscarf, they do so, not for Allah or Jahweh or Jesus or Mary or Mohammed, and certainly not for the Koran. They do so for politicians. And that’s just stupid. They should take great care not to end up like Desdemona, torn apart by the jealous, deceitful hands of their own personal and political Othellos.

Cem Ryan, Istanbul

(1) Hobsbawm, Eric. The Invention of Tradition.Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992. (2) Turkish Daily News. American seeking a democratic Turkey. 2 February 2008.

October 14, 2010
DARKNESS MADE VISIBLE BY THE TURKISH ZOLA

DARKNESS MADE VISIBLE BY THE TURKISH ZOLA

A dungeon horrible, on all sides round,
As one great furnace flamed; yet from those flames
No light; but rather darkness visible
Served only to discover sights of woe,
Regions of sorrow, doleful shades, where peace
And rest can never dwell, hope never comes
That comes to all, but torture without end
Still urges, and a fiery deluge, fed
With ever-burning sulphur unconsumed.
John Milton
Paradise Lost

When Emile Zola published his historic letter, J’Accuse, addressed to the President of France, in L’Aurore newspaper on 13 January 1898, he was rich and famous. But that did not stop his mighty anger. Outraged by the travesty of justice that resulted in the false arrest, conviction, and imprisonment of Alfred Dreyfus, a loyal Jewish army officer, he appealed to the president and the nation for reason and justice to prevail.

Dreyfus was convicted by falsified evidence and forged documents, and was a scapegoat for the thoroughly corrupt French Army general staff. He had been imprisoned at a hell hole called Devil’s Island for three years when Zola wrote his letter. (1)

Zola did so for two reasons. First, to draw the public’s attention to the shameful miscarriage of justice. Second, to provoke his own arrest for libel so that new evidence could be introduced that would prove Dreyfus innocent. He succeeded on both counts. Dreyfus was cleared in 1899 and fully exonerated and reinstated in the French Army in 1906. Zola died under suspicious circumstances on 29 September 1902, “a moment in the history of human conscience,” as eulogized by Anatole France. (2)

On 29 September 2010, 108 years to the day after Zola’s death, the ongoing disaster called Turkey received yet another Pinochet-style shock in its struggle to retain its secularity. Hanefi Avcı, the head of the police department in the city of Eskişehir, was arrested for writing a best seller. His book laid bare the widely suspected fact that Turkey’s highest government institution’s—police, army, and judicial system—had been infiltrated and indeed subverted by a religious cemaat, the Fethullah Gülen movement. (3) Since Avcı himself was once an eager activist for Gülen’s cemaat, the book has a certain whiff of authenticity.

And yesterday, Avcı was arrested. The reason? The usual nonsense of the Ergenekon prosecutor. It seems that suddenly the previously highly esteemed police chief has connections with a terrorist organization. Was the terror organization the Gülen movement? Ha, ha, ha, no not quite. The Gülenista government of Turkey, also known as the AKP, paid no attention to the compelling information in Avcı’s book about their sugar daddy, Gülen. It decided on some other “terror group,” some socialist or maybe, horror of horrors, some communist operation. Another Alice-in-Wonderland group, cobbled together with false documents and bogus telephone conversations, using the latest listening and stealth technology provided by…guess who?

Avcı refused to file a petition suggested by his lawyer to demand release from prison pending presentation of formal charges. Like Zola, he wants to experience the whole disgusting mess called Turkish justice. He also refuses to speak to any judicial or prosecutorial officials that he suspects of being members of the Gülen cemaat. But Avcı says that he will talk, at his trial. Like Emile Zola, may he sing long and loud.

Hanefi Avcı, KORKMA!

Cem Ryan
Istanbul

NOTES:
1. An excellent summary of the Zola/Dreyfus affair by University of Georgia law professor Donald Wilkes can be found at:
For those interested in a dramatic representation of this incident see the stunning classic film (1937) The Life of Emile Zola:

2. “Il fut un moment de la conscience humaine.” Anatole France, 5 October 1902.

3. Gülen lives in Saylorsburg, Pennsylvania. It is well and widely known that his activities are aided, abetted, and otherwise supported by the United States government, in particular by the CIA. The latter’s officials were signatories to Gülen’s permanent residency application (“green card”), which he was granted in 2008. For more detailed information see ISLAM, SECULARISM, AND THE BATTLE FOR TURKEY’S FUTURE at:

October 1, 2010
One day Turkey will run the EU

28 September 2010 Die Presse Vienna

Hassan Bleibel, Al Mustaqbal (Beirut)

Turkey isn’t even a member yet, but deputy prime minister Ali Babacan is already demanding a leading role in Europe for his country. All you have to do is look at Turkey’s economic and demographic growth to see it’s likely to get what it wants, says Die Presse

Wolfgang Böhm

“When Turkey becomes a member of the EU, it is not going to be in a secondary position, that’s one of the reasons why countries like Germany and France are quite nervous about our membership,” Turkish vice-premier Ali Babacan declared at a World Leadership Forum in New York during the recent UN plenary session.

And Turkey’s claim to a leading role in the EU is based on hard facts. With economic growth set to hit 7% this year, near-inexhaustible human resources, and mounting clout as a hub of international oil and gas pipelines, Turkey has recently moved into the European fast lane.

At present, Turkey is the 17th biggest economy in the world. Experts predict that in 20 years it will make the top ten, outstripping countries like Spain and Italy. According to forecasts by the IIASA (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis) and the Vienna Institute of Demography, the Turkish population will be around 85.5 million by then – surpassing Germany, now the most populous nation in the EU.

If Turkey were to be admitted into the EU despite resistance from countries like Austria, Germany and France, it would dominate policy in the EU institutions. Even as things are today, Turkey would be the second biggest political force in the European Parliament and on an equal footing with the heavyweights on the EU Council.

Although the EU power structure will have to be gradually adjusted under the rules of the Lisbon Treaty, not much would change for Turkey. By dint of its rapid demographic growth, Ankara’s influence would actually increase, since the number of seats in Parliament and the new representation ratios in the Council will essentially be based on population size.

Given its size, Turkey could not only push EU decisions through with ease, it would also be able to block those that are not to its liking. The Lisbon Treaty provides that as of 2014, countries whose combined populations exceed 35% of the EU population may constitute a blocking minority. That means Ankara could join forces with, say, London, Madrid and Warsaw to thwart any step backed by Paris and Berlin – which would jam the prevailing German-French axis.

What would change politically in the event of Turkish accession? With Turkey on board, European diplomats say, EU foreign and security policy would be even more heavily US-geared. In matters of commerce, Ankara would probably favour free trade more than the EU members do now. Ankara would, in all likelihood, get behind efforts to cooperate more closely on internal security – even while downplaying certain civil rights such as the protection of private data.

Babacan argued in New York that letting Turkey in would boost the EU’s standing on the world scene. “The weight of the European economy in the world has shrunk and will continue to shrink. And only with enlargement will the EU be able to protect its power and influence.”

An opinion seconded by Gerhard Schröder in Die Welt’s online edition. “Without Turkey the EU will sink into mediocrity,” writes the Social Democrat ex-chancellor, pointing to the rapid pace of growth there: this year alone the Turkish economy will grow four times as much as the French and twice as much as the German economy. Schröder expects Turkey to be the fourth or fifth biggest European economy in 20 years. Then there will be no ignoring it.

Translated from the German by Eric Rosencrantz

September 30, 2010