Tag: Energy

  • Iran owes BOTAS $750 million

    Iran owes BOTAS $750 million

    ANKARA, Turkey, Feb. 27 (UPI) — Iran must pay Turkey $750 million stemming from a case won by Turkish state-owned pipeline operator BOTAS in international court.

    BOTAS won its case before the International Chamber of Commerce Commission on Arbitration on Feb. 17. The arbitration court found Iran must pay $750 million for refusing Turkish demands to lower gas prices under provisions requested in a 2003 contract, Turkish daily Today’s Zaman reports Friday, citing anonymous sources.

    The ruling said Iran is obligated to compensate Turkey for the losses from the higher gas prices since the initial 2003 request.

    Turkey had requested a lower price because of lower-than-expected gas volumes, disruptions in transports and low-quality product.

    Turkish officials said the ruling, however, will not impact the relationship between the two countries in the energy sector.

    The details of the court decision had not yet been released to the public.

    https://www.upi.com/Energy_Resources/2009/02/27/Iran_owes_BOTAS_750_million/UPI-64261235752184/

  • Turkey and Russia Developing a New Economic and Strategic Partnership

    Turkey and Russia Developing a New Economic and Strategic Partnership

    Turkey and Russia Developing a New Economic and Strategic Partnership

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 31
    February 17, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkish president Abdullah Gul paid a four-day visit to the Russian Federation from February 12 to 15, marking the flourishing multidimensional relations between the two countries. Gul met with Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and other officials and also traveled to Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, where he discussed joint investments. Gul was accompanied by Kursad Tuzmen, the state minister responsible for foreign trade, and Minister of Energy Hilmi Guler, as well as a large delegation of Turkish businessmen. Foreign Minister Ali Babacan joined the delegation for part of the trip.

    The Russian side elevated Gul’s trip from the previously announced status of an “official visit” to a “state visit,” the highest level of state protocol, indicating the value Moscow attaches to Turkey. Gul and Medvedev signed a joint declaration announcing their commitment to deepening mutual friendship and multi-dimensional cooperation. The declaration mirrors a previous “Joint Declaration on the Intensification of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership,” signed during a landmark visit by then-President Putin in 2004 (Today’s Zaman, February 14).

    Indeed, Turkish-Russian economic ties have flourished over the past decade, with trade volume reaching $32 billion in 2008, making Russia Turkey’s number one partner. Given this background, bilateral economic ties were quite naturally a major item on Gul’s agenda and both leaders expressed their satisfaction with the growing commerce between their countries.

    Cooperation in energy is the major area of mutual economic activity. Turkey’s gas and oil imports from Russia account for most of the trade volume. Russian press reports indicate that the two sides are interested in improving cooperation in energy transportation lines carrying Russian gas to European markets through Turkey (www.cnnturk.com, February 14).

    Moreover, Russia is playing a major part in Turkey’s attempts to diversify its energy sources. Cooperation in nuclear energy is particularly important in light of Turkey’s plans to introduce nuclear power. A Russian-led consortium won the tender for the construction of Turkey’s first nuclear plant; but since the price the consortium offered for electricity was above world prices, the future of the project, which is awaiting parliamentary approval, remains unclear (EDM, January 26). Prior to Gul’s visit to Moscow, the Russian consortium submitted a revised offer, reducing the price by 30 percent (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, February 14). If this revision is found legal under the tender rules, the positive mood during Gul’s trip may indicate the Turkish government is ready to finally give the go-ahead for the project.

    The Russian market also plays a major role for Turkish overseas investments and exports. Russia is one of the main customers for Turkish construction firms and a major destination for Turkish exports. Similarly, millions of Russian tourists bring significant revenues to Turkey every year.

    Nonetheless, a huge trade imbalance in Russia’s favor due to Turkey’s heavy dependence on Russian gas and oil continues to be a major concern for the Turkish side. Despite commitments to fix the trade imbalance made during Putin’s 2004 visit, the gap is still there. It remains to be seen whether this trip will produce concrete results on that count, but so far the only news is that the two sides may start to use the Turkish lira and the Russian ruble in foreign trade, which might increase Turkish exports to Russia (Hurriyet, February 15).

    Other economic issues causing problems in Turkish-Russian commercial relations were also addressed. Ankara is particularly disturbed by difficulties encountered by Turkish goods at the Russian border. In response to Gul’s request for help on that issue, Medvedev reiterated the Russian position that strict inspection rules on trucks were being applied to all countries and Turkey was not specifically discriminated against. Nonetheless, he suggested the establishment of a joint technical delegation to examine the issue (Anadolu Ajansi, February 13). The parties had already agreed in September to simplify customs procedures and the new delegation might contribute to those efforts.

    A large part of Gul’s visit concerned the development of political ties between the two countries. Both leaders repeated the position that, as the two major powers in the area, cooperation between Russia and Turkey was essential to regional peace and stability. Noting he had held fruitful and sincere contacts with his Russian counterparts, Gul said “Russia and Turkey are neighboring countries that are developing their relations on the basis of mutual confidence. I hope this visit will in turn give a new character to our relations” (Hurriyet Daily News, February 13).

    For their part, the Russians praised Turkey’s diplomatic initiatives in the region. Medvedev particularly emphasized his satisfaction with Turkey’s actions during the Russian-Georgian war last summer and Turkey’s subsequent proposal for the establishment of a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP). Medvedev said the August crisis had demonstrated not only the need for coordination among regional countries to address local challenges, but also their ability to deal with such problems on their own without the involvement of outside powers (www.cnnturk.com, February 13).

    Medvedev was clearly referring to the exclusion of the United States from attempts to solve regional problems. Indeed, the ease with which Turkey went ahead with the CSCP, bypassing Washington and not seeking transatlantic consensus on Russia, prompted international and Turkish observers to question Turkey’s place in the West (EDM, September 2). Since then, attention has been focused on Turkey’s determination to follow an independent foreign policy.

    Economic dependence on Russia, however, reduces Ankara’s autonomy and options with regard to Russia in diplomatic affairs. During the Russia-Georgia war, this asymmetric dependence forced Turkey to follow an acquiescent policy toward Moscow. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan acknowledged that dependence on Russia had tied Turkey’s hands (EDM, August 27; Milliyet, September 2).

    This dependence apparently did not bother Turkey very much. Following Gul’s visit, some have even described Turkish-Russian relations as a “strategic partnership,” a label traditionally used for Turkish-American relations. It remains to be seen how long Ankara can maintain a balancing act between the two major powers when controversial issues such as Russian plans for building a missile shield come onto the agenda.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-and-russia-developing-a-new-economic-and-strategic-partnership/

  • Is the Russian-Led Consortium Trying to Overcharge Turkey for Its First Nuclear Power Plant?

    Is the Russian-Led Consortium Trying to Overcharge Turkey for Its First Nuclear Power Plant?

    Is the Russian-Led Consortium Trying to Overcharge Turkey for Its First Nuclear Power Plant?

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 16
    January 26, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey is continuing to debate the construction of its first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, Mersin. After the tender was launched in March 2008, 13 foreign and local companies purchased documents. All but one, however, failed to submit an offer, because they did not have sufficient time to prepare the necessary documentation. The government did not respond to their call for extending the September 2008 deadline; and only one consortium, a joint venture of Russia’s state-run Atomstroyexport, Inter RAO, and the private Turkish company Park Teknik submitted a bid (EDM, October 10).

    Although many within the energy sector called for the cancellation of the tender, the AKP government went ahead with the plans. The sole bidder submitted its offer to the Turkish government; and, upon technical evaluation, the Turkish Atomic Energy Agency (TAEK) concluded in December that the proposal met the necessary criteria.

    On January 19 the Energy Ministry opened the sealed letter with the offer, which also included the price. This was the third and final stage of the tender process. Energy Minister Hilmi Guler announced that the consortium had offered a price of 21.16 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh) for the electricity it would sell to Turkey. In the coming days, the state-run Turkish Electricity Trading and Contracting Company (TETAS) will evaluate the proposal and present a report to the cabinet for final approval (Dogan Haber Ajansi, January 19).

    Under the bid, the consortium would build “four units of the Russian VVER-1200 pressurized water reactors that generate 1,200 megawatts of electricity each.” The plant would produce around 4,800 megawatts of electricity per year. Since the Turkish government must commit itself to buying electricity from the company for 15 years, it would be paying $86.3 billion for 415.5 billion kWh during that period (Hurriyet Daily News, January 20).

    Turkey is considering the construction of nuclear plants as a source of clean and cheap energy and as a means for reducing energy dependency. By 2020 it seeks to produce 8 percent of its electricity from nuclear plants and increase that amount to 20 percent by 2030 (www.ntvmsnbc.com, January 20).

    The price of electricity is a crucial factor. Earlier, Turkish officials had said that they expected the consortium to make a reasonable offer. Some observers had predicted a price offer in the vicinity of 12 to 15 cents. Many observers found the price excessive, arguing that 21.16 cents per kWh was above market prices. Experts and representatives from the energy sector noted concerns about a price that was almost four times higher than the current rates in the Turkish market, which varied from 4 cents to 14 cents. Some described it as the world’s most expensive electricity generated at a nuclear plant, arguing that the world average was around 10 to 15 cents per kWh. Others noted that Turkey had cancelled another tender for the construction of a coal-fired power plant, because even the anticipated 14.7 per kWh had been found too expensive. Turkey also is investing extensively in natural gas power plants, which reportedly produce electricity for around 7 to 10 cents per kWh (Referans, January 20; Today’s Zaman, January 20).

    The chairman of the Electricity Producers Association, however, cautioned that although the price was high, it was also important to remember that this tender model was a first in the world. Under this model, the private sector was assuming all the risks for such a large-scale investment, which might account for why the offer turned out so high. A board member of the Chamber of Electrical Engineers, however, said that since there was no competition, the chamber deemed the tender illegal and incompatible with Turkey’s national interests (ANKA, January 20).

    The same day, the consortium submitted another letter with a revised price. Since the 21.16 cents was offered in September, the company said it wanted to adjust the price, reflecting changes in the world economy and energy costs (www.cnnturk.com, January 19). Guler avoided commenting on the amount but said that there was no obstacle to renegotiating the price. TETAS, however, concluded that the rules regulating the tender prohibited submission of revised
    , because a new price would in essence constitute a new offer. On a TV show the same night, Guler said that the revised letter had been rejected (Anadolu Ajansi, January 19).

    The Turkish press speculated that in its report to the cabinet, TETAS would probably suggest rejecting the consortium’s offer (Vatan, January 21). Responding to questions on this subject, Guler told reporters that the tender process was proceeding well, and a cancellation was not on the agenda (Anadolu Ajansi, January 23).

    The government is keen on building nuclear power plants to diversify Turkey’s energy sources, and plans for the construction of two more plants are also underway. For obvious reasons, environmentalist groups have opposed Turkey’s nuclear energy projects since the beginning. Even the representatives of the energy sector continue to question the government’s policy on nuclear energy, in particular its hasty approach. Moreover, as Turkey is seeking to reduce its dependence on Russian gas, which accounts for 35 percent of Turkey’s electricity production, it would be ironic to award the tender to a Russian company. The government’s disregard of the global financial crisis and insistence on proceeding with these costly projects is also a cause of concern (Today’s Zaman, January 20).

    Guler continuously emphasizes that although Turkey is looking to increase its use of hydroelectric and renewable energy sources, it does not have the luxury to ignore nuclear energy. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether the government will be able to realize Turkey’s nuclear energy ambitions, which have been thwarted for decades. As things stand, most observers see little chance that the cabinet will approve the Russian offer for the Akkuyu plant. In the unlikely event that the cabinet does endorse the Russian offer, Turkey will most probably bargain to decrease the price before it signs the final agreement.

    The government, however, might have learned some lessons from its handling of the project so far. Preparations are reportedly under way to streamline the nuclear energy policy. As a first step, it would push for revising the Nuclear Tender Law. Since the current law prevents opening a second tender, allowing flexibility on that score would be the first rule to change. Also, the current competition model, which discourages many possible contenders from participating, is likely to be amended. Instead of a free market model of private companies undertaking construction, a model based on greater public involvement is likely to be considered (www.ntvmsnbc.com, January 21).

    https://jamestown.org/program/is-the-russian-led-consortium-trying-to-overcharge-turkey-for-its-first-nuclear-power-plant/

  • Turkey Is Optimistic About Nabucco as Budapest Summit Approaches

    Turkey Is Optimistic About Nabucco as Budapest Summit Approaches

    Turkey Is Optimistic About Nabucco as Budapest Summit Approaches

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 10
    January 16, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    In the midst of the gas transit row between Russia and Ukraine and discussions on diversifying the continent’s energy supplies, Turkey is pleased to see an opportunity for itself.

    Turkey is seeking a mediating role in the diplomatic standoff between Russia and Ukraine. Following his visit to Moscow, Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Guler told reporters that Turkey’s talks with the two parties were continuing and it was ready to mediate, if necessary by hosting a meeting in Turkey. Noting that some Balkan countries that were hit by the crisis, such as Bulgaria, were demanding gas from Turkey, he announced that Ankara was holding talks for building alternative supply routes to them. It will be similar to Turkey’s exports to Greece and might help these countries weather future energy interruptions. Guler also was content that the importance of the Nabucco project for diversifying Europe’s energy supplies was appreciated. He told reporters that Turkey was determined to realize this project, and concrete steps to make it operational would be taken soon (Anadolu Ajansi, January 15).

    Ahead of the Nabucco summit to be hosted by Hungary this month, it appears that Turkey’s hand has been strengthened. Despite calls for prioritizing energy security following a similar crisis in 2006, the EU has failed to reduce energy dependence, which has raised questions about the effectiveness of the EU’s energy policy (Hurriyet, January 15). The latest Russian-Ukrainian crisis prompted a debate on diversifying both sources and gas transportation routes through alternative pipelines. The EU and Russia now have incentives to support projects that bypass Ukraine. Gazprom’s Nord Stream and South Stream projects, under the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, respectively, are in progress. Since South Stream is a rival to the Nabucco project and European countries have differing preferences, it will be interesting to observe how pipeline politics develop.

    The Nabucco project, originally projected to open in 2013, will carry gas from the Caspian basin, the Middle East, and Egypt to Europe by routes stretching through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary and terminating at the Baumgarten hub in Austria. The 3,300-km (1,980-mile) project is expected to cost approximately €7.9 billion ($10.5 billion) (www.nabucco-pipeline.com).

    Nabucco has gained increasing favor because of efforts to open European access to the resources of the Caspian (EDM, January 6). The Czech Republic, which currently holds the EU’s rotating presidency, is intent on speeding up the preparations for Nabucco. Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek proposed that the EU make the realization of the project a top priority (www.trt.net.tr, January 14). Nonetheless, other EU members such as Italy back South Stream (EDM, June 25, 2007).

    One major obstacle to the project has been whether the consortium can secure enough gas to make the project feasible. Turkey, hoping to project itself as a major player in gas markets through Nabucco, has worked hard to find sufficient gas resources. Its efforts to bring Turkmenistan on board did not produce any results in mid-2008 (www.asam.org.tr, May 2, 2008), because of Turkmenistan’s contracts with Russia, and concerns about transporting the gas across the Caspian Sea. A trilateral summit between the presidents of Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey in late November 2008, however, was interpreted as “quiet support” for the Nabucco project (EDM, December 1). Since then, European leaders have also been encouraging Turkmenistan to join the project. Recently it was suggested that the prospects for realizing the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) had increased, particularly following the Russian-Ukrainian dispute. Although “the route and means for Turkmenistan’s gas to cross the Caspian Sea has not yet been decided,” it is claimed that the TCGP could be integrated into Nabucco (www.isn.ethz.ch, January 15). Nonetheless, Turkmenistan has yet to commit gas exports to Europe through Nabucco.

    Currently, the only supplier that is committed to Nabucco is Azerbaijan. Turkey has been pushing for including Iranian gas in the project, but the diplomatic standoff between Iran and the West over the Iranian nuclear issue raises questions about the likelihood of connecting Iranian Tabriz-Erzurum gas pipeline to Nabucco. Moreover, the reliability of Iran is also unclear, given the problems Turkey has encountered in its imports from Iran in the past. Turkey also hopes to connect gas from Iraq and Egypt to the Nabucco line.

    Turkey had even raised the possibility of Russia joining the Nabucco project. During his visit to Moscow in February 2008, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan invited his Russian counterpart to join the project (Turkish Daily News, February 21, 2008; EDM, February 28, 2008). Later, Guler argued that the South Stream and Nabucco projects could be combined (Today’s Zaman, March 21, 2008). Nonetheless, Russian officials continued to scorn Nabucco for being infeasible.

    Another concern is whether this ambitious project could be completed, given the global economic crisis. Reinhard Mitschek, Managing Director of Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH, maintained that “the actual situation of the markets is more or less a benefit for projects like Nabucco.” As positive developments, he referred to falling steel prices and the willingness of banks to support long-term infrastructure projects in times of crisis (www.nabucco-pipeline.com, January 9).

    Turkey’s demands from other shareholders (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Germany, and Austria), particularly those relating to the pricing mechanism, have been considered another obstacle by experts (EDM, December 12). Speaking after a working meeting in Istanbul on January 13, Mitschek maintained that the parties were close to signing the intergovernmental agreement, emphasizing consensus among countries involved in the construction project about how to “share the benefits and risks of the project equally, each owning a 16.6 percent stake in the project.” Mitschek argued that its flexibility in receiving gas from many sources and being open to different partners and commercial models was what gave Nabucco a competitive advantage over its rivals. He also counted the many benefits of the project to Turkey but said that “we should not mix the two issues. Our consortium is about the transmission of the gas, not about the trading of gas” (Today’s Zaman, Hurriyet Daily News, Milliyet, January 14).

    Guler told reporters that Turkey had submitted its own draft of the intergovernmental agreement to its partners and was awaiting their response (Cihan Haber Ajansi, January 15). Nonetheless, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has not confirmed that he will take part in the Budapest summit. Disagreements over Turkey’s demands, as well intra-EU bargaining, are likely to continue until the leaders meet on January 27.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-is-optimistic-about-nabucco-as-budapest-summit-approaches/

  • “We Will Not Let Our People Go Cold,” Says Turkish Energy Minister

    “We Will Not Let Our People Go Cold,” Says Turkish Energy Minister

    “We Will Not Let Our People Go Cold,” Says Turkish Energy Minister

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 4
    January 8, 2009 04:20 PM
    By: Saban Kardas

    The dispute between Russia and Ukraine over natural gas prices continues to threaten the energy supply to Europe in the midst of plunging temperatures (EDM, January 5). The disruptions caused by the row between the Russian gas company Gazprom and Ukraine’s Naftohaz has already led to the halting of deliveries to many European countries that are dependent on Russian gas. Amid mutual accusations and contradictory claims by both parties, several European leaders and European Union officials have asked those involved to relax tensions (BBC News, January 7).

    As a country that depends heavily on natural gas for electricity production and household heating, Turkey is also discussing the implications of the crisis. Turkey’s gas imports from Russia amount to 65 percent of its total needs of 135 million cubic meters (MCM) per day. Turkey imports 40 MCM of gas from Russia a day via the West pipeline passing through Ukraine and Bulgaria and another 35 MCM through the Blue Stream pipeline underneath the Black Sea. Turkey also imports around 15 MCM of gas from Iran and 17 MCM from Azerbaijan per day. The state-owned Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS) has signed various contracts to secure the import of the following amounts annually: 16 billion cubic meters (BCM) via Blue Stream, 14 BCM through the West pipeline, 10 BCM from Iran, and 6.6 BCM from Azerbaijan. Moreover, BOTAS has also signed agreements with Nigeria and Algeria for 1.2 BCM and 4 BCM, respectively, of liquefied natural gas (LNG) (Cumhuriyet, January 7).

    The International Energy Agency (IEA) maintains that if the gas supply and winter conditions remain unchanged, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece may face problems (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, January7). Since Turkey already confronted a similar crisis in 2006, it has had greater experience in learning how to deal with these types of shortages.

    At the beginning of the crisis, representatives from BOTAS and the Energy Ministry announced that the Ukrainian crisis was not affecting Turkey and the gas flow from both West line and Blue Stream, as well as from Iran, was continuing. They also noted that Turkey did not expect a cutoff in the West line but that there were contingency plans in case this did happen. BOTAS officials noted that the underground tanks were full and Turkey could increase the capacity of Blue Stream up to 50 MCM by activating a compressor station in Corum (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, January 2).

    When the news about Russia’s decision to cut off gas to Ukraine arrived, Energy Minister Hilmi Guler told reporters that gas supplies from the West pipeline had been completely halted. Guler also noted that the gas supplies from Blue Stream would soon be increased to 48 MCM per day. He assured the Turkish public, “We will not let our people go cold” (Anadolu Ajansi, January 6).

    Guler announced that Turkey had already started to implement some precautions. First, the ministry asked the power stations producing electricity from natural gas to switch to secondary fuels. Although Reuters reported that in three stations electricity production had been halted (Hurriyet Daily News, January 8), energy officials have denied these claims, saying that production was continuing normally (Cihan Haber Ajansi, January 8).

    Moreover, if the supply shortages continue, the ministry plans to cut gas delivery to industrial facilities producing their own electricity from natural gas that is sold at subsidized prices. Since falling industrial production due to the global economic crisis has already reduced Turkey’s energy consumption, such reductions would probably not create major power supply problems. Nonetheless, experts note that using alternative sources such as fuel oil to produce electricity is likely to increase production costs by up to 20 percent (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, January 7).

    Furthermore, like other countries, Turkey has started tapping strategic reserves and using LNG. Guler noted that six ships were scheduled to bring additional LNG in January; and, if need arose, Turkey would seek additional deliveries. According to official sources, if deliveries arrive as scheduled, Turkey will be unlikely to experience major shortages. At the same time, Turkey is working to expand the daily supply capacity of its underground reserve depots.

    A source from the Iranian Embassy in Ankara said that Iran was ready to increase its gas exports to Turkey to offset the shortfall, as long as Iran’s domestic consumption did not prevent it (Today’s Zaman, January 7). Minister Guler said, however, that additional supplies from Blue Stream would be enough to maintain the supply balance and that Turkey would not take up the Iranian offer. Last winter, when Iran cut exports to Turkey due to its own domestic needs, Gazprom helped avoid shortages by increasing its supplies to Turkey. Given this experience, Turkey’s reluctance to rely on the Iranian option is understandable.

    Overall, the goal of these measures is to reduce the impact of the crisis on households. Since major metropolitan areas rely on natural gas for heating, the public has become increasingly worried about these developments. In response to this concern, the IGDAS gas distribution company in Istanbul issued a statement maintaining that the gas and LNG depots supplying the city had sufficient reserves and that there were no grounds for anxiety about shortages in Istanbul (www.nethaber.com, January 6). The precautions in place have already reduced Turkey’s daily consumption from 130 MCM to 107 MCM (www.cnnturk.com, January 7).

    Despite the optimistic statements from official sources, energy expert Necdet Pamir maintains that Turkey’s reserve capacity is too limited, which makes it vulnerable to such supply shocks. Moreover, Pamir notes that switching to secondary sources for electricity production by buying LNG on spot markets incurs additional costs (www.cnnturk.com, January 7). Some experts claim, however, that under the contract between Turkey and Russia, Gazprom will have to compensate Turkey for its losses (Cihan Haber Ajansi, January 6).

    Other experts refer to the positive implications of the crisis for Turkey. Bahadir Kaleagasi, the Turkish Industry and Business Association Representative to the EU, notes that the row once again demonstrates the vulnerability of Europe’s energy supplies. The EU will come under pressure to diversify transportation routes, which will strengthen Turkey’s position in negotiations over the Nabucco project for supplying Europe with gas by means of pipelines going through Turkey (ANKA, January 7).

    https://jamestown.org/program/we-will-not-let-our-people-go-cold-says-turkish-energy-minister/

  • ANOTHER SMALL STEP FOR NABUCCO

    ANOTHER SMALL STEP FOR NABUCCO

    Caucasus Update, Issue 13, December 8, 2008

    Released by Caucasian Review of International Affairs (www.cria-online.org)

     

    In late November a trilateral summit was hosted in the city of Turkmenbashi , on Turkmenistan ’s Caspian coast. In attendance were President Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedov, the host; President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan , and President Abdullah Gul of Turkey . Apart from a number of cultural and transportation agreements, the three leaders were there to discuss the much-hyped Nabucco project. Nabucco would transport Central Asian and Azerbaijani gas to Europe, via an undersea pipeline in the Caspian Sea, through Azerbaijan , Georgia and Turkey . The project would do for gas what the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline did for oil – tap into Central Asian resources bypassing Russian territory.

     

    The concluding statements emerging from the summit were typically vague. However, Vladimir Socor at the Jamestown Foundation has suggested that the official line was to avoid publicly naming particular projects for fear of offending Russia (although the Kremlin can hardly have doubted the topic of discussions). This explains the oblique reference to Azerbaijan and Turkmeniatan’s “common position on the policy of diversification of exports of energy resources to the world”, and President Gul’s ‘keen interest’ in energy collaboration. Similar rectitude with the name of Nabucco was observed during a recent oil and gas conference in Ashgabat.

     

    Such reluctance on the part of the Turkmen government was to be expected, however frustrating to Western energy pundits. The country’s secretive attitude towards its oil and gas wealth is a reflection of its isolationist political stance. It is highly unlikely that President Berdimuhammedov will be prepared to publicly back a project of Nabucco’s size without cast-iron guarantees on transit infrastructure, destination markets, and prices. However, the references to energy diversification and the role of the Caspian region’s energy potential as a bridge between Asia and Europe are extremely significant, signalling that, in principle at least, Turkmenistan is on board.

     

    Where would this leave Moscow ? Russia currently accounts for almost all of Turkmenistan ’s gas exports, and has been staging a rearguard action – or a determined offensive, depending on your viewpoint – against Nabucco for months. In November 2007 Gazprom struck a gas deal with Turkmenistan in which the Russian gas corporation would pay $130 per thousand cubic metres (tcm) in the first half of 2008, and $150tcm in the second half. This was a major rise from the 2007 level of $100, but it pales into significance next to the deal that Gazprom chief Alexei Miller made with Ashgabat in July. This would raise the price to around $350tcm: according to Mr Socor, once an expected rise in transit fees by other states is accounted for, Turkmenistan would still pocket between $225 and $295/tcm. An attractive offer. But President Berdimuhammedov remains unwilling to place all his eggs in one basket, however financially appealing, hence his moves towards Nabucco. It is not implausible that Gazprom will offer to pay even higher prices, since the July deal was already underpinned by political, rather than economic, motives. Pushing the price even higher would be a gamble for the Kremlin, already reeling from the financial crisis. In any case, even a price hike will not be enough to tempt Turkmenistan , provided that Nabucco’s other backers, principally the EU and Azerbaijan , remain committed. Azerbaijan has not yet given a positive response to Russia ’s offer to buy its whole gas at European prices, judging that such a Faustian pact would cost more in political terms than it would provide in economic terms. President Aliyev has insisted that, since Azerbaijan lacks the reserves to fill Nabucco alone, “this is not only our project”, implying that the West must apply pressure to Ashgabat instead of Baku .

     

    The EU is a different matter. The Union’s backing of Nabucco has been, like much of the EU’s policy towards the former Soviet Union , fitful and patchy. In mid-November President Berdimuhammedov made an unprecedented visit to Germany and Austria . As at the Turkmenbashi summit, no concrete plans were formally announced, but much noise was made about the chances for co-operation in the energy sector amongst others. Germany’s reputation as something of an apologist for Russia within the EU (certainly in the eyes of Britain and Scandinavia) makes these statements of intent rather interesting, suggesting that Berlin is willing to throw its weight behind Nabucco (the growing German support for Nabucco could also be linked to the ongoing difficulties with the construction of the North European Gas Pipeline from Russia to Germany). This probably reflects growing support for Nabucco amongst the Union as a whole. For instance, EU special representative to Central Asia Pierre Morel announced, after talks with President Berdimuhammedov on December 3, that the Union would take “concrete steps” towards including Turkmenistan in Nabucco (somewhat undermining the official veil of silence on the project in Ashgabat). It may take a dramatic event, such as an escalation of the current Ukraine-Russia gas dispute, to underline the urgent need for supply diversification and prod Europe into action.

     

    It would be unfair to characterise the EU as the only obstacle to Nabucco, however. Turkey has been surprisingly obstructive for a country so eager to portray itself as a regional energy hub. The prices it has offered for Azeri gas are unacceptably low for Baku , and it has also allegedly demanded 15% of the project’s supply to feed its own rising demand. In the light of Russia ’s ongoing offer to buy Azeri gas, this is a move that could conceivably backfire on Ankara . Although it will calculate – correctly – that Azerbaijan ’s commitment to Nabucco will force it into concessions regarding Turkish transit, this would sour relations at a time when Azerbaijan is already wary of Turkey ’s diplomatic overtures to Armenia .

     

    Energy analyst Andrew Neff has argued that planned gas links between Iran and Turkey will allow Ankara to use Iranian gas for domestic consumption and therefore allow Turkmen and Azeri gas to pass to Europe : the political complications with such an approach are obvious. This situation would create an uncomfortable scenario in which Europe was indirectly reliant on Tehran for the security of its gas security, since any cuts in supply to Turkey would draw off Azeri and Turkmen gas from the European route to feed Turkey ’s internal consumption.

     

    Nabucco still has a long way to go before becoming reality. Although there is a tendency to overstate the political, as opposed to economic, risks involved in any trans-national pipeline project, in this case the tendency seems justified. The problems with implementing Nabucco tap into a whole range of wider (geo)political issues – the EU’s relationship with Turkey , the future of the landlocked Central Asian states, Russia ’s role in Eurasia, and the isolation of Iran – of profound significance. One should not, therefore, underestimate the importance of the Turkmenbashi summit. Although it produced no clear victories for Nabucco, negotiating these obstacles will only be possible one small step at a time.