Tag: Downloads

  • Create a situation which Tehran might find difficult to control

    Create a situation which Tehran might find difficult to control

    Rouhani 1Gulnara Inandzh

    Director, Ethnoglobus (ethnoglobus.az)

    An International Online Information and Analysis Center , mete62@inbox.ru

    (Baku- Tehran-Baku)

     

    The election of Hasan Rowhani as the new president of Iran is part of a much larger process: an effort by the political elite to recapture authority in the population by launching a top-down political transformation lest outside forces provoke one and create a situation which Tehran might find difficult to control.

    That transformation, one not often remarked upon by outsiders, reflects the fact that Iranian nationalism is today a more important force than is Islam and the country’s imperial ambitions are more important than Muslim brotherhood, however defined.  Those close to the Iranian political elite understand that, and they recognize as well that slogans against Zionism and the United States are no longer enough to satisfy the increasingly poor population of what should be one of the wealthiest countries on earth.

    The policies of incumbent Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which have simultaneously led to international sanctions and massive corruption, have left Iranians angry, because they are bearing the burdens of his policies without gaining any of the supposedly positive achievements he liked to point to.  Consequently, they voted for Rowhani, but despite what many observers have said, they did so with the full approval of many around the top leaders who recognize that Iran cannot and must not continue as it has.

    One area where change is now likely is the relationship between the religious authorities and the state that was set up by Ayatollah Khomeini more than 30 years ago and has remained largely unchanged.  Iranians can be dissatisfied with the religious authorities, but all those with whom I have spoken willingly reassert their love for their government.  The national policy of the Iranian state thus rests on an imperial ideology as a necessary response to the ethno-psychology of the population.  And that state is prepared to make a correction on religion-state relations by taking that factor into account.

    Iranians will not support any actions that they believe harm the interests of the state and thus oppose any moves from the outside to oppose it.  That is something the West does not understand, but there is something else the West has failed to notice: the authorities in Tehran have developed political strategies to make mid-course corrections and even fundamental reforms.  And right now, as the election shows, they are in the middle of something that we are justified in calling a top-down transformation, a change in the key arrangements of the state without violence.

    The first step in this direction was paradoxically made by Ahmadinejad who deprived the Muslim leaders of their immunity.  The second was the victory of the United Front of Conservatives in the March 2012 elections, which led Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to reappoint a number of reformers from the administration of former president Ali Rafsanjani.  And the third step in this process was the explicit call by Hasan Rowhani for political and economic reform and direct contacts with the United States, two issues that had earlier been taboo.

    Rowhani’s election and in the first round at that shows that Iranians are ready for reform, and the support he has received from Ayatollah Khamenei shows that the reformists are winning ever more positions in Tehran and Qum and that the governing structure of Iran that Khomeini put in place after the 1979 revolution is going to change, albeit slowly and carefully lest they trigger instability.  As these changes are put in place, the Muslim leadership and the secular politicians will work in parallel, dividing the social-political and economic spheres.  Polls of Iranians carried out in Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran show that a majority of them want to live in a secular society, but not to break altogether with their Muslim roots. 

    Anyone visiting Tehran can see evidence of that: The majority of women there wear not the chadra, but scarves and long dresses, but not those reaching the ground.  In some places, it is even possible to observe women who are not covering their heads, something that would have been unthinkable only a few years ago.  Such examples could be multiplied, and they suggest that Iran, all the rhetoric notwithstanding, is opening up to secular culture and lifestyle.

    Over the course of the last 30 years, a new generation of religious scholars in contemporary European dress has appeared in Iran.  Its members speak foreign languages, are not trapped by Muslim dogma, are open to Western scholarship, and are quite tolerant.  They and the new generation of Iranians, religious and non-religious alike, are going to lead Iran into a new stage of its history.  In sum, Iranians are effecting domestic transformation lest someone from the outside attempt to start that process.

    AZERBAIJAN IN THE WORLD

    ADA Biweekly Newsletter

    Vol. 6, No. 12

    June 15, 2013

  • The Azerbaijan-Turkey-Israel triangle both in Tel Aviv and in the Muslim Middle East

    The Azerbaijan-Turkey-Israel triangle both in Tel Aviv and in the Muslim Middle East

    Gulnara Inanc
    Director, Ethnoglobus
    An International Online Information and Analysis Center
    (mete62@inbox.ru)
    The first ever visit by an Azerbaijani foreign minister to Israel and Palestine, a visit all sides called historic, underscored the growing strategic partnership between Baku and its two partners in the Middle East.  The first person Elmar Mammadyarov met in Israel was the chairman of the Knesset Commission on Foreign Affairs and Defense, Avigdor Lieberman, who had long lobbied for close cooperation and a strategic partnership with Azerbaijan.  In large measure as a result of his efforts, earlier attempts by the Armenian lobby to raise the so-called “Armenian genocide” in the Knesset were blocked.  Last year, in response to the latest such attempt, Israeli President Shimon Peres and A. Lieberman, who was then Israeli foreign minister, openly declared that because of the country’s strategic partnership with Azerbaijan, the issue of the “Armenian genocide” would not be discussed in the Knesset.
    Mammadyarov arrived in Tel Aviv on March 24th, the very day Armenians have declared a memorial day for the “genocide.”  Armenian media on that occasion put out information about a Knesset discussion of the “genocide,” but that did not happen.  Undoubtedly, it was very important for Azerbaijan to receive reassurance that the recognition of the so-called “Armenian genocide” would not be considered in the Knesset.
    Among the notable outcomes of the Azerbaijani foreign minister’s visit to Israel was Baku’s declaration on his return that Azerbaijan is ready to sign a broad agreement concerning the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. [1] Israel beyond any doubt is not in a position to promise something regarding that conflict or to resolve it in some way.  But Tel Aviv is in a position to seek the broader support of Jewish groups around the world regarding the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict.  And consequently, the growing ties between Azerbaijan and Israel open the way for progress in the talks just as was the case some five years ago.
    Earlier this year, the Jewish community of the United States held a conference on “Israeli Relations with the States of the South Caucasus.”  Avigdor Lieberman, with whom Foreign Minister Mammadyarov met in Israel, and President Shimon Peres have been devoting particular attention to the development of relations with the South Caucasus countries in general and Azerbaijan in particular. [2] Following his meeting with Lieberman, Mammadyarov went to Ramallah where the Palestinian authority declared its support for Baku’s position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and on the issue of the so-called “Armenian genocide.”
    Azerbaijan supports the independence of Palestine and the division of Jerusalem, and in response to this support, it is seeking Palestinian backing on the two issues of greatest importance to itself.  A conference in Baku scheduled to be held later this summer can be considered part of the result of the Ramallah talks.
    Palestine enjoys authority and is at the center of attention of the Islamic world.  Azerbaijan, in turn, has grown into an economically and politically powerful country not only in the South Caucasus, but more broadly as well.  Rid al Maliki, the foreign minister of the Palestinian Autonomy, stressed this in his meeting with his Azerbaijani counterpart, noting that Azerbaijan enjoys authority in the leading international organizations. [3] Therefore, the support of Ramallah is significant, because it brings with it the attention of the Islamic and international community.  Thus, Azerbaijan was able to achieve its goal of gaining Palestine’s support for its positions.  In view of this, it is worth recalling the declaration made by Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, Prince Haled ben Saud ben Haled, that the international community must mount pressure on Armenia to secure a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict [4] and a second declaration by Iranian leader Ali Khamenei that “Karabakh is a Muslim land … something that is supported at the highest levels.”
    Both of these declarations can be seen as the result of Baku’s careful and balanced foreign policy.  Of course, one should focus attention on the fact that this historic visit to Israel took place after the Turkish-Israel rapprochement.  Interestingly, one of the clearest opponents of that rapprochement, A. Lieberman, nonetheless agreed with it.  The Israeli media suggested that he had not been informed about the plans for this new coming together.  Lieberman thus had to “close his eyes” and put out the red carpet for Mammadyarov.  Having lost its Arab partners after the Arab spring, Israel had no choice but to return to strategic relations with Turkey.  That, in turn, has increased the importance of the Azerbaijan-Turkey-Israel triangle both in Tel Aviv and in the Muslim Middle East.
    Azerbaijan’s geographic location next to Iran also increases its strategic significance, something that Israeli President Peres went out of his way to stress.  This does not mean that Baku offered or is planning to offer its territory as a place des armesfor a military operation against Iran.  Baku has repeatedly indicated that cooperation with Israel does not include that and is generally not aimed against Iran, even though many observers tend to see Baku’s cooperation with Israel as the former’s way of restraining Iran.
    Notes
    [1] See https://www.amerikaninsesi.org/a/elmar_memmedyarov/1649480.html (accessed 28 April 2013).
    [2] See http://izrus.co.il/dvuhstoronka/article/2012-02-28/17144.html#ixzz2QngVkiJZ (accessed 28 April 2013).
    [3] See  (accessed 28 April 2013).
    [4] See  (accessed 28 April 2013).
    AZERBAIJAN IN THE WORLD
    ADA Biweekly Newsletter
  • THE KURDISH TRIBES OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

    THE KURDISH TRIBES OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

    THE KURDISH TRIBES OF THE OTTOMANEMPIRE
    BY MARK SYKES
    PREFACE

    kurdishtribes

    THE materials collected in the ensuing pages are the results of about 7,500 miles of riding and innumerable conversations with policemen, nluleteers, mullahs, chieftains,sheep drovers,horse dealers,carriersand other people capable of giving one first hand information. The results I fear are extreinelymeagre,but I hope they may prove of use to future travellers.

    As hardly anything has been written on the subject in the English language heretofore,I have not been able to make a study of the Kurds from a biblio-graphical point of view. However, I trust that this will not detract from the interest of the work. I may add that I had amongmy servantson my last journey representatives from the three most importantsections of the Kurds,so that I was able to obtain interpreters without any great difficulty,a matter of someimportance amidst the conflictingdialects of the nomadsand sedentarymountaineers.

    In preparing the following list of the varioustribes of the Kurdish race I have endeavoured to simplify the work of future students by marking down and cataloguingas many of the tribes as have come either directly or indirectlyunder my notice.

    After variousabortiveattempts at setting them down in a manner comprehensible to any one but myself, I have decided for the purposesof this work to break up the regionsinhabitedby Kurds into six zones; to each of these zones a section of the catalogueis devoted, each section containinga separate enumeration.

    The Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman Empire by Mark Sykes [1]
    Source: The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol.38 (Jul. – Dec., 1908), pp. 451-486 PDF Download

  • What Do the Kurds Think?

    What Do the Kurds Think?

    by Yigal Schleifer

    The European Council on Foreign Relations recently released an interesting study called “What Does Turkey Think?”, which consists of several essays by prominent Turkish analysts who take a look at key keys issues facing Turkey foreign and domestic policy. The whole study is worth reading, but I found an article written by Osman Baydemir, the Kurdish mayor of Diyarbakir, particularly interesting — especially in light of recent events.

    Baydemir is a member of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party, which was able to get 36 of its members into parliament following Turkey’s recent elections. The party, though, is refusing to take parliament’s membership oath because several of its MP’s are currently in jail awaiting trial on terror-related charges and the courts are refusing to release them.

    Although Baydemir’s article came out before the election, it sheds light on how the BDP looks at Turkish politics and what animates its own politics. From his piece:

    For those who are not in power, there is little democracy. There is no legal protection for workers whose factories are closed down, for women who are murdered by their husbands, and for children given 100-year jail sentences for throwing stones at armed policemen, or for regions in which the natural environment has been destroyed. The most significant cause of insecurity is the fact that, from the day it was founded, the republic has been informed by a belief that “the people do not know what is best for them, but we do”. This has shaped efforts to modernise and then democratise society from the top down, using radical methods to realise an exclusionist enlightenment mission.

    This top-down approach to democracy has simply been passed down from republican elites to the AKP. Like its predecessor, the AKP government asserts that “we know best”. People have an impression that the AKP represents a soft form of liberal piety because it stood for change and shows respect to women who do not wear the headscarf and nominates them for candidacy. However, the AKP government’s practices are very much at odds with its democratic image. Many now believe that the party is driven by authoritarian thinking. By winning a parliamentary majority, the AKP aims to establish full hegemony, which entitles it to the discretionary use of power. The AKP’s position in the new constitutional debate as and on constitutional amendments passed in parliament cannot be seen as democratic.

    A fundamental principle of democracy is recognition of “the other”. The party’s support of the 10 percent electoral threshold, which prevents the formation of coalition governments and means that the will of the people – foremost of the Kurds – is not fairly reflected in parliament. Prime Minister Erdoğan believes neither in the essence of democracy nor in elections but above all in the principle of subordination. The presidential system he pursues fosters this culture of submissivene

    via Turkey: What Do the Kurds Think? | EurasiaNet.org.

    The full article can be found here.

  • Kıbrıs Şehidi Hv. Plt. Yzb. Cengiz TOPEL ve 1964 Kıbrıs Hava Harekatı

    Kıbrıs Şehidi Hv. Plt. Yzb. Cengiz TOPEL ve 1964 Kıbrıs Hava Harekatı

    Cengiz topel
    Kıbrıs Şehidi Hava Pilot Yüzbaşı Cengiz Topel ve 1964 Kıbrıs Hava Harekatı  kitabına buradan ulaşabilirsiniz. PDF Kitap.

    Download

  • “ÖNCE VATAN” Andonian Paçavraları

    “ÖNCE VATAN” Andonian Paçavraları

    Aram Andonian  (1875, İstanbul – 1952, Paris)
    Aram Andonian (1875, İstanbul – 1952, Paris)

     

    Yazar ve sahtekâr sıfatlarına sahip Aram Andonian, 1920 yılında Naim Bey’in Hatıraları, adında bir kitap yazmış, bunu üç dilde İngilizce, Fransızca ve Ermenice yayınlamıştır. Kitapta sözü edilen sözde “belgeleri” Osmanlı liderlerine, özellikle Tâlât Paşa’ya mâl etmiş, ama hiçbir zaman asıllarını gösteremediği bu belgeleri daha sonra da kaybettiğini belirtmiştir.

    1. Dünya Savaşı’nın galip devletleri, daha sonra kimisi Malta’da alıkonacak olan Osmanlı liderleri suçlayabilecekleri belgeleri köşe bucak ararken, Andonian’ın ürettiği bu “telgrafllar”a hiç itibar etmemişlerdir. Aram Andonian sonunda, (26 Temmuz 1937 tarihli) Cenevre’ de (İsviçre) oturan bir Ermeni hanımefendiye (Mary Terziyan) yazdığı mektupta, kitabının bir tarih kitabı değil, bir propaganda çalışması olduğunu ve diğer kimselerin bu kitabı nasıl istiyorlarsa öyle kullandıklarını itiraf etmiştir.

    2007 senesinde kaybettiğimiz ve değerini ve dostluğunu yeterince bilemediğimiz Avusturyalı araştırmacı yazar Eric Feigl’in “Ermeni Mitomanyası” adlı kitabındaki önsözünden:

    Elbette, araştırmalarım sırasında başka birçok kişiyle tanıştım. Özellikle Ermeni Zoryan Enstitüsü Başkanı Dr. Gerard Libaridian’ı da anmak isterim. Dr. Libaridian ile Cambridge, Massachusetts’deki ofisinde uzun saatler geçirdik ve çok ilginç konuşmalar yaptık. Dr. Libaridian, zeki, hayat dolu, bilgili, becerikli ve kendine güvenen biri. Onunla yaptığımız konuşmaları konu alan bir oyun bile yazılabilir.


    Bu konuşma sırasında, ev sahibimin en ateşli ifadelerini sürekli not aldım. Birçok defa sözde “Andonian Belgeleri”nden bahsetti.

    Dr. Libaridian’ın bu belgelerin uydurma olduklarını bildiğini düşünmek makul gözüktüğünden, konuyla ilgili tek bir kelime üzerinde zaman harcamak istemedim. Konuşulacak daha ilginç birçok konu vardı. Ama özellikle, Aram Andonian’ın kitabı ve bu kitabın belgeleri üzerinde durdu.

    Sonunda, “Ama Dr. Libaridian, benim gibi siz de biliyorsunuz ki, ‘Andonian Belgeleri’ uydurmadır,”demek zorunda kaldım.

    Dr. Libaridian’ın, sitemkâr cümleme verdiği kısa ve net cevabını ve yüzündeki ifadeyi hiç unutmayacağım:
    “Eeee?”

    ***

    Eric Feigl  (1931 – 27 Ocak 2007)
    Eric Feigl (1931 – 27 Ocak 2007)

     

    Aram Andonian’ın sahte belgeleri ve bu belgelerin Ermeni yalanlarındaki rolü hakkındaki yazının tamamını ekte bulabilirsiniz.

    Yazının tamamı, Eric Feigl’in “Ermeni Mitomanyası” adlı kitabından alınmıştır.

     

    Download