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  • Parliamentary elections in Uzbekistan

    Parliamentary elections in Uzbekistan

    uzbekistan mapThis year’s most crucial political event in Uzbekistan is to become the parliamentary elections due on the first Sunday of the third decade of December. Uzbekistan has a bicameral parliament. The Legislative Chamber (lower house) consist of 150 members. One hundred and thirty five of them are elected in accordance with territorial electoral districts on the multiparty basis. Fifteen seats are granted to the Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan, given the importance of nationwide issues related to ecology, public healthcare and protection of the environment. The Senate (upper ouse) is formed from among the deputies of local representative bodies of government during their joint sessions, in equal quantity – per six persons – from the Republic of Karakalpakstan, regions and the city of Tashkent. Sixteen members of the Senate are appointed by the President of Uzbekistan from among the most authoritative citizens of the country. The term of office of the Parliament is 5 years. In accordance with the results of parliamentary elections in 2009, four political parties are represented at the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan: the Movement of Entrepreneurs and Businesspeople – the Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (UzLiDeP), the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDPU), the Milliy Tiklanish (National Revival) Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, and Adolat (Justice) Social Democratic Party of Uzbekistan. The forthcoming elections are to substantially differ from the previous ones, since they are going to be held amid the enhancement of powers of the parliament and further deeping of democratization of electoral system. As part of implementation of the Concept of Further Deeping of Democratic Reforms and Establishing Civil Society in the Country, put forward by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov at the joint session of both chambers of the parliament on November 12, 2010, amendments were introduced in 2011, 2012 and 2014 to some articles of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Articles 32, 78, 80, 93, 96, 98, 103 and 117) and laws on elections, which serve as a legal basis for further democratization of the activities of legislative and executive branches of power, as well as the electoral system. A number of amendments and addenda have been introduced into the electoral legislation to clearly identify the forms and methods of election campaign, inadmissibility of its conduct not only on the election day, but also a day before the voting, elevation of effectiveness in the mechanisms of securing equal opportunities for candidates and political parties during this crucial phase of the election campaign, along with the creation of additional legal guarantees for early voting, the establishment of polling stations in places of detention. Legal mechanisms of securing transparency during elections have been enhanced. The Central Election Commission (CEC) has been vested with a status of permanently operating and independent constitutional body. The mechanism of its activities has been defined that provides for the preparation and holding of elections without interference of any other government body, and principles of its activities have been approved: that is, independence, legality, collegiality, publicity and fairness. A law is to be passed in the nearest future to envisage a substantial expansion of powers and the consolidation of financial independence of the CEC. In May this year, the CEC approved an action plan to prepare and hold elections to the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan, regional, district and municipal Kengashes (Councils) of people’s representatives in 2014, which includes a set of measures to ensure the legality, transparency, openness and publicity at all stages of the election campaign. The openness and transparency in the work of all electoral commissions is to be provided by way of holding their meetings with participation from political parties, mass media and observers. The participation of observers from international institutions and foreign states is also envisioned along with the observers and authorized representatives of political parties. The action plan also stipulates the creation of extensive and equal opportunities for political parties and candidates for deputies in utilizing the possibilities of mass media during the election campaign in order to inform the electorate and general public about their election programs, along with providing the voters with timely updates the voters about the progress of preparation and conducting of elections. Therefore, a great significance is attached in Uzbekistan to the conduct of forthcoming parliamentary elections at a high level in accordance with international norms and principles, for their results are to define the strategy and path of development of the nation for the next 5 years.     Embassy of Uzbekistan  Republic  in Azerbaijan

  • Turkey is again with Erdogan

    Turkey is again with Erdogan

    ali askerThe Turkish government banned YouTube last week, after Ankara made the same with Twitter. According to the western media  there are more than 10 million Turkish users on Twitter in Turkey. Independent experts said that the crackdown is related with nationwide municipal elections, which was held this Sunday. The lecturer of Turkish Karabuk University, Doctor of Law Ali Asker answered questions for newcafe.ge.

    –          Why Government banned Twitter and Youtube? What are the main and real reasons?

    –          There are official and unofficial explanations about the banning the access to social networks. Government declares that, they banned the access to Twitter because Twitter had not obeyed Court’s decision. According to the official procedures the implementation of the decision should have taken place within a month. But what about Youtube? Government says it is related to the state security issues. The reason was shown that the content of the discussion about Syria conflict in Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was leaked to the press, the Turkish Telecommunications Communication Presidency decided to ban the access to Youtube. The ban is still continuing.

    –          How the society reacted to the banning? What is the reaction of the political parties and media?

    –          The opposition declared there is no legal basis for the decisions. They even think it is government’s provocation. People in social networks the government in engaging in corruption. At the same time there is not unanimous opinion among the representatives of ruling party related with the issue. Turkish President openly protested against the case. Media criticizes the government and consider the decision as the pressure on freedom of thought. The number of people who protesting against the Government’s decision gradually increases. But it seems that the Prime Minister Erdogan doesn’t have any plan to recede yet. On the contrary he appealed to the court to begin the criminal case about some media representatives “who offend the authorized person of state” with their “abusive twits”.

    –          What do you think, is the Prime Minister Erdogan able to keep his power? What can you say about current political climate in Turkey?

    –          I think that Erdogan party (AKP) can pass the election as first party again. But it is very important to balance power in major cities.  In Istanbul, opposition candidate Sarigul (from CHP – opposition party) is a strong candidate. However the social base of Istanbul reduces the assumptions that CHP will take victory. The conservative part of the society in Istanbul is as strong as always. But in Ankara we can see different results in this election. In Ankara Mansur Yavash (from CHP) is a strong opponent, at the same time he has nationalist views, therefore his vote potential could be serious in Ankara.

    30 March elections are local elections, but the process and the results are extremely important. It is important to pay attention to one issue: In the history of Turkish Republic, traditionally the right and left, secularization and Islamism were against each other in overt or covert way.  Same as today. But in recent years we witness some tension decrease. Especially in the conservative election potential. Left side is not as acute secularist as before. Taking into consideration the recent events in Turkey, we cannot  claim that the election (in Turkey) is a confrontation between Islamic and secular values. Because, there is a division in conservative side. In the other hand there are serious bribery charges against senior officials from the ruling party who respects primary the Islamic value. According to Islam bribery is one of the serious faults. I mean there is a traditional competition in this election as secularism – Islamism, but it is not as strong as before.

    – How Culen Jamaat (one of the main religious movement in Turkey, the leader of this movement Fatullah Gulen lives in US – J.M.) influences Turkey’s policy?

    – Gulen Jamaat is the strongest community in Turkey. They have human potential in different positions. They have certain power in media sector and trade. The Government used heavy phrases against Gulen and it caused different reaction both domestically and abroad. In this process there is one subtle point which we should pay attention. There is distance among the Gulen Jamaat and other Islamic communities, even they are competitors. Therefore Gulen’s people have not any serious opportunity to influence the results of these elections. I thing the process which will start after elections will create great interest, so let see.

    – What do you think the Turkish Government will do concerning banning social networks?

    – Social networks in Turkey will be opened. Ankara Administrative Court already has the decision about the opening the Twitter. I think the Government will change its decision after the social pressure is over.

    http://www.newscafe.ge/

  • Integration and ethno-cultural identity: the nature of the relationship

    Integration and ethno-cultural identity: the nature of the relationship

    Azerbaycan flag

    Gulnara Inandzh, Director of International online information-analytical center “Etnoglobus”, the editor of the Russian section of the US-Turkish resource tirkishnews.com, representative of “Gumilev” center in Azerbaijan, mete62@inbox.ru


    Collapse of the Soviet Union, then start of globalization has created a new environment for the realization Ethnopsychological self-identy.

    Soviet policies aimed at developing the conscience of the Soviet man, erasing ethnicity and religion, suddenly painted in bright colors the most radical of these factors of identity.

    During first years of the new independent states, in Azerbaijan, political nationalism ran in parallel with ethnic nationalism, including with numerous, mainly Turkic ethnic groups. With the strengthening of state nationalism of Azerbaijani Turks declined in parallel reducing ethnic nationalism which is not the major ethnic groups living in the country.

    However, the ethnic self-identity of the Azerbaijani citizens calling themselves as “Azerbaijanis” and citizens calling themselves as “Turks”, ” Lezghian”, “Avars”, “Talish” runs parallel. But in the mass consciousness there is no aggression and absolutism in self-identity. But also an understanding of the definition of “Azeri” as a political nation or state is too weak.

    For example, it is difficult and sometimes impossible to explain the Azerbaijani Turks, still retained the format of the Soviet definition of “Azeri” that Lezghians Talish and Jew living in Azerbaijan, are also “Azeri”. Also jealous Lezghians Talish and Avar does not want to plead Azerbaijani as again under Soviet format believes that this is definition element, diverting his identity by the wayside.

    Such an approach to the title “Azerbaijani” takes place among ethnic groups that do not have their own state. Deep in the subconscious behind it there is self-preservation instinct on the background of globalization, when the process of integration and merger of cultural values.

    The so-called “Arab Spring” again exposed ethnic and religious feelings. Studies, as well as own fieldwork shows that in this international call, in Azerbaijan religious expression and ethnic identity prevails over, sometimes mixing them.

    But the rise of ethnic consciousness is based on mythologizing history, historical figures searches among their ethnic group. (1)

    Azerbaijan, participating in transnational and regional projects, accelerates the process of engaging in the process of globalization and its reverse side – localization. Localization develops regional and local identity. As a result of globalization, localization also acts as a catalyst of ethnic mobilization. (2)

    The above identification format proposes a new way of thinking and identification – Eurasianism. This kind of format is new thinking for the Azerbaijani society. Part of the country is included in the European and Asian geographical space. One of the two villages located nearby according to this section may be both in Europe and Asia. What do they think of it? What continent do the residents of these villages belong to? They are likely to be called the name of his village, then their ethnicity, depending on where it is rural or political nation – Azerbaijani, then religious affiliation – Muslims. But they don’t care whether they are European or Asian.

    Outside the country Azerbaijanis are considered as the eastern people, Muslims. And by presenting to our public consciousness a new format of thinking, we need to define and explain what the purpose of it is. If there is still a debate about ethnicity and political nation, those who do not want to consider himself a nation, and remains in its ethnic house, suggest a Eurasian identity.

    Gumilev’s Eurasian idea was transferred to the political arena and has become a leading link in Russia’s foreign policy thus becoming virtually a new format for the unification of the Eurasian geography. That is, this is the idea of ​​Eurasian identity manifested itself on the political plane. In such a case Eurasianism will be dictated from above, if the political authorities decide to join it. Dictated from above new factor of integration or association will not be framed as an ideological component, and would mean only to carry political- geographical name. It means that Azeri do not have to adapt to the new identity. In this case, the proposed policy of Eurasian idea does not compete or clash with ethnic and national identity, but it is the basis for cultural and economic integration.

    With the growing economic and political status of Azerbaijan, national identity takes a new quality. Today being an Azerbaijani is prestigious, for example, equals with Europeanized Eastern man, a Muslim with a modern way of thinking. Azerbaijanis are now not only migrant workers but also employers. Azerbaijan already began to receive migrants from southern Russia, Asia and Iran. This is due to participation of Azerbaijan and the role of Azerbaijani business as an employer in the south of Russia.

    Here it would be appropriate to consider the involvement of Azerbaijan in the economy of the south of Russia, which includes not only economic, but also cultural and social integration.

    Economic and political development of Azerbaijan assigns it the role of the employer that changes the attitude towards the state and the people. Russia invited foreign private and public companies, including Azerbaijani investors to participate in the development of economy in southern Russia.

    Southern borders of Russia, bordering with two regional states, Azerbaijan and Georgia, is a strategically important reference point of Russia. In order to establish peace in the south of the country, the federal center along with operational activities implement economic reforms, aimed at serving as establishment of new jobs, growth of social conditions of the population and reduction of migration.

    But at the same time, given the desire of foreign powers to separate the south of the country, including the North Caucasus from Russia, the Kremlin approaches the foreign investors carefully, without allowing them into the regional economy.

    In this case, absence of geopolitical ambitions in the North Caucasus and the reluctance to become an instrument of foreign games in the region, makes Azerbaijan successful and trusted source of investment in the economy of the south of Russia. Many factors contribute to this, including economic potential, similarity of mental traits, natural infrastructure, a large market, etc.

    State border treaty, signed in 2010 between Baku and Moscow accompanied the opening of the North Caucasus economic fields for the Azerbaijani business.

    In the summer of 2011 Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, the special representative of the President of Russia in the North Caucasus Federal District (North Caucasus Federal District ) Alexander Khloponin, with the delegation of heads of all the North Caucasian Republics came to Baku to discuss the subject. Immediately thereafter, the Minister of Economic Development of Azerbaijan Shahin Mustafayev visited seven republics of the North Caucasus and business forums and business meetings were held. (3)

    Paying particular attention to economic cooperation with Azerbaijan, plenipotentiary representation of the Russian President in the North Caucasus Federal District creates a special council to supervise the execution of the decisions relating to the subjects of the federation in the region and also plans to open a representative office of North Caucasus Federal District in Azerbaijan.

    According to the deputy envoy to North Caucasus Federal District Sergei Subbotin, “A task was put before North Caucasus Federal District leaders aiming at development of relations with Azerbaijan, and it is high time to control the effectiveness of these tasks. Effective solution of all tasks depends primarily on effective control. ” (4)

    Participation of Azerbaijani business is particularly felt in Stavropol and Krasnodar regions of Russia. For example, in 2009, Azerbaijan won the 3rd place in terms of foreign trade with the Stavropol Territory – $ 123.3 million, which is 8.7 % of the total foreign trade turnover of the region, and trade with the Krasnodar Territory – $ 71.4 million.

    In 2010 national company “Azersun Holding” put into operation a tea-packing factory in Belorechensk (Krasnodar region) with a total of more than $ 3 million. and started the construction of a cannery in the same amount. Totally the company has invested in the infrastructure of the Krasnodar Territory $ 22 million.

    In September 2011 Azerbaijani company “Matanat – A” started construction of Materials Plant in Uspensky district of Krasnodar region ( project worth of 30 million euros).

    In early June of this year in Volgograd during the fourth forum “Russia -Azerbaijan: interregional dialogue 2013” business exhibition was organized where the Russian regions and Azerbaijan demonstrated products of industrial and processing enterprises. The exhibition was attended by more than 40 producers in the region , including plants such as “Volgogradneftemash “, ” VZBT “, ” united Tsarician manufactory “, ” Volzhsky Abrasive Plant ,” ” Kamyshinsky textiles “, “Brewers”, “Config”, “Gardens Pridonya” , “King – product” and other productions.

    According to the Minister of Economy, Foreign Economic Relations and Investment Elvira Lagutina, Azerbaijan today is one of the largest customers of the Volgograd region. Currently, the region has 10 enterprises with the participation of the Azerbaijani capital, trade is growing with the republic – by the end of 2012 it exceeded $ 140 million.

    – Azerbaijan is interested in Volgograd APK, bus manufacturing, chemical products and other enterprises. Besides, there are also prospects in the implementation of joint investment projects, including the construction of hotels and the creation of platforms in the field of agricultural processing. Azerbaijan also purchased Drilling Equipment Plant in Volgograd. (5 )

    Federal center is very interested in the development of the region and creates maximum conditions for investment.

    “The district used the most advanced tools to stimulate investment and development – government guarantees and investment insurance that does not exist in any other region of Russia. North Caucasus Development Corporation was established” – said Russian presidential representative in the North Caucasus Federal District Alexander Khloponin, inviting Azerbaijani investors to the region. (6 )

    We also should note the need to establish a free trade zone in the region, which should abolish movement between Azerbaijan and Russia, to promote mutually beneficial trade and rapprochement and closer ties of the two countries, to attract Azerbaijani investors. This should also be accompanied by the creation of conditions for labor migration between Azerbaijan and in southern regions of Russia.

    Russian side is trying to bring economic relations between Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus Federal District from framework of trade relations into the direction of the development of modern industry and technology and innovation. It is noteworthy that as evidenced above examples, the participation of Azerbaijani business in southern Russia is seriously interested in Moscow.

    (Speech at the conference titled “Alternatives for regional developmenThe Shabunin readings, 11-12 October 2013, Volgograd)

  • Cooperation between Iran and Azerbaijan in the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh and Palestinian Conflicts

    Cooperation between Iran and Azerbaijan in the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh and Palestinian Conflicts

    iran azerbaycanGulnara İnanch, director of «Etnoqlobus» (ethnoglobus.az ) International Online information analyses center, editor Russian sector turkishnews.com

     

    Political processes occurring in the Middle East gave a new stimulus to geopolitical events. Arabic Spring, although contrasting, opened a new phase for the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, it began to require new game conditions.

     

    There have really been geopolitical times when partial or phase-by-phase solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict seemed to be possible. For example, in 2009 official Baku almost was able to get consent of world’s leading powers regarding liberation of 5 regions around Nagorno-Karabakh being under Armenian occupation. Armenian government also agreed for it instead hoping for softening of blockade from Azerbaijan side.

     

    At that time, with the pressure of White House and European Union, Armenia-Turkey negotiations were underway. West wishing to exert influence on Russia through Armenia was insisting on opening of borders between Turkey-Armenia.

     

    For implementation of this plan, military operations were to commence and Armenian military forces were to be driven out from the occupied territories. These operations would calm down Armenian nationalists thus persuading Armenian society about necessity of returning 5 regions. In that case, Armenian site would not loose their image while signing of treaty regarding solution of first phase of the conflict.(1)

     

    That phase, much to our regret, was not completed. As the gas projects of Caspian Sea had not been defined accurately at that time, West and Russia postponed to use the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a tool for pressure.

     

    Now there is new a chance, as we have already mentioned above, for phase-by-phase solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This time, along with West, East players also join the game. Azerbaijan, thanks to regulated and future intended policy, has become a new political and economic center not only in the region, but also in all over the world, including in the Islamic world.

     

    While investigating current phase of the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, we focus on two states having special relations with Azerbaijan – Iran and Palestine. In autumn 2012 UN General Assembly adopted a resolution regarding giving Palestine non-Member Observer State status as a result of which world community began to see Palestine as an independent state in the Middle East. It should be noted that the fact that Palestine, which  had to be established as a state in 1947 along with Israel upon the Decision of United Nations, already is being recognized as a state amid “Arabic Spring”.

     

    It should be noted that it is not accidental that Azerbaijan also voted for giving Palestine non-Member Observer State status in the United Nations. Official Baku has always supported establishment of Palestinian state and division of Quds.

     

    After the visit of Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov to Ramallah in the spring of 2013, bilateral relations began to develop fast. Palestinian Foreign Minister has noted high reputation of Azerbaijan in several respected organizations such as UN Security Council, Organization of Islamic Cooperation and Non-Aligned Movement. (3) Thus, Ramallah has hinted its hopes for future support by Azerbaijan in the mentioned organizations.

     

    Azerbaijan, for the purpose of helping Quds and Palestine, hosted the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Foreign Ministers‘ Conferences in June. In this conference Azerbaijan put forward initiative of providing aid in the amount of 5 million dollars to important facilities in Quds.

     

    Relations between Azerbaijan and Palestine had never been so positive. Palestine-Azerbaijan relations give both sides mutual benefits from political, economic, trade and cultural point of view. Next year forum of Azerbaijani and Palestinian traders and businessmen will be held in Azerbaijan. (2)

     

    Beginning from last year official Baku started to work for recognition and socialization of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the Islamic world aiming at recognition of status of Quds for Nagorno-Karabakh in the Islamic world. This issue was also on the agenda during Mammadyarov’s visit to Ramallah. In order to popularize this issue, Palestine may direct the attention of the Islamic world to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue thus achieving support of Islamic world in solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in favor of Azerbaijan.

    On the other hand, by supporting Quds, it is possible to neutralize possible impact of world’s Armenian lobby living in Arabic countries on policy of these Arabian states.

     

    Another factor in phase-by-phase solution of the conflict and achieving the status of the Islamic word’s problem for the Nagorno-Karabakh is Iran.  During the visit of Ramiz Mehdiyev, head of Presidential Administration of Azerbaijan and Sheikh-ul-Islam Haji Allahshukur Pashazadeh, chairman of Caucasian Muslim Board (CMB) to Iran in April, focusing on Quds and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts in the Islamic world and international community in parallel was discussed. Promises of Iranian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Mohsen Pak Ayin to protect any state supporting Palestinian people, on which both Iran and Azerbaijan have the same views, reconfirm the position of official Tehran on the conflict (4).

     

    Iranian ambassador in his interview gave explanation on his view: «Iran wants to use its resources in the solution of the conflict. Official Tehran has prepared a plan for parties about solution of the conflict. In case of necessity, we will submit it.» (5)

     

    As the geography of tension in the Middle East expands, Iran, for the purpose of establishment of stability and peace in the region, tries to achieve solution of conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Tehran thinks that any kind of disorder of security in the region will have negative impact on Iran.

     

    Both Baku and Tehran have the same views on OSCE Minsk Group’s insufficient activity in the solution of the conflict. Tehran also highlights that only regional states can be helpful in the solution of the conflict.

     

    Statement by Supreme leader of Iran Ali Khamenei on the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is important from the point of Tehran: “Karabakh is the Islamic land … Karabakh and the issue of its belonging to Azerbaijan will be supported.

    … No matter how times passes we will not forget the fact that Karabakh is the Islamic lands. Karabakh will be freed by the muslim Azerbaijani nation”.

     

    Researches show that Iran is seeking the ways how to be involved in the solution of the conflict.

     

    There are opportunities for Azerbaijan, Palestine and Iran to take advantage of the situations occurred in the world. Iran, in order to demonstrate that it is not going to be satisfied just with promises, holds events in Tabriz dedicated to the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict thus aiming at popularizing the Karabakh problem among the Azerbaijanis living in Iran in the level of Quds problem.

     

    Iran has a chance to be involved in the solution process of the problem since it is cooperating with both conflicting parties. However, Iran will have to demonstrate that it is not the country supporting Armenia as it is widely thought in Azerbaijan and prove that words of Iranian Supreme Leader “we have the same blood running in the veins” are not just the word.

     

    According to Azeri experts, Azerbaijan will ask Iran to impose economic sanctions against Armenia and if Iran fulfils Azerbaijan’s wish, Iran will be considered as a friend country in the view of Azerbaijanis. (6)

    In this regard, thoughts that R.Mehdiyev stated in Iran characterize the intention of official Baku: «Azerbaijan considers Iran its older friend. Azerbaijan attaches huge importance to Iran’s support. We consider that our countries should be next to and support each-other. We think that it is reasonable to have strong and stable Iran in the neighborhood ». (7)

     

    With Iran’s newly elected president Hassan Rouhani there are hopes all over the world on elimination of long lasting tensions with official Tehran. Because all the regional countries, including Azerbaijan gets its share from the tensions around Iran. In bilateral relations of Azerbaijan Iran is considered as sensitive guest which prevents official Baku to play open game in its foreign policy as a result of which we occasionally witness tensions between our countries.

     

    Latest meetings in Tehran and Baku between Iranian and Azerbaijani officials enable us to think that relations between these countries are in new flat. Establishment of mutual confidence between our countries may allow Iran and Azerbaijan to join efforts in the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh and Quds conflicts.

     

    German chancellor Angela Merkel has cheered Iran’s proposal to be mediator in Syrian problem. France also would like to see Tehran among the mediators holding negotiations with Damascus. Telephone calls between the Iranian and US presidents after long year’s political stagnation, particularly, agreement achieved in Geneva on 23 November on Iran’s nuclear program allow us to believe in serious changes to occur in the region. In this case, in order to demonstrate that West is sincere to build amicable relations with Iran, it may involve Iran as a mediator in the solution of regional conflict, including in the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

     

     

     

    1.

    2.

    3.

    4.gumilev-center.az

    5. https://interfax.az/view/581413

     

    6. ethnoglobus.az

     

    7. Azerbaijan in the world, ADA Biweekly Newsletter, vol 6,№ 14. jule 15, 2013

     

  • Iran  must deal with the reality that Azerbaijan has become a strong country

    Iran must deal with the reality that Azerbaijan has become a strong country

    Azerbaycan Iran bayragiGulnara Inandzh

    Director, Ethnoglobus

    An International Online Information and Analysis Center, editor Russian section turkishnews.com,

    email- mete62@inbox.ru

    Two recent visits by Baku officials to Tehran, Ramiz Mehdiyev, the head of the Presidential Administration, and Allahshukur Pashazade, sheikh-ul-Islam and head of the Administration of Muslims of the Caucasus, have attracted attention not only because they follow on the heels of Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov’s visit to Israel, but because they represent an effort to rebalance the relationship between Azerbaijan and Iran in both the political and religious spheres.

    None of these visits was the result of a last minute decision: all are likely to have been planned for months; and consequently, it would be a mistake to call them a coincidence.  Indeed, four years ago, a similar “coincidence” occurred when then-Iranian President Ahmadinejad and then Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman visited Baku almost simultaneously.  This time around, Tehran assessed the visits of Mehdiyev and Pashazade as something extraordinary, given that they took place just before the Iranian presidential elections and thus helped to define the environment in which the new reformist Iranian leadership would be forced to operate.

    Iran now must deal with the reality that Azerbaijan has become a politically and economically strong country not only in the region, but in the world, and thus it is not entirely surprising that official Baku and Tehran have been seeking rapprochement and the achievement of balanced relations, not simply at the level of diplomatic words but truly friendly and trusting ties.  That is certainly suggested by the comment of the Iranian ambassador in Baku about the need to demonstrate the high level of trust between the two governments.

    Regarding the issue of mutual support, the Iranian foreign ministry noted that during Mehdiyev’s visit, the two sides discussed the Syrian crisis, something of enormous importance to Tehran and something on which, the ministry said, the two sides had succeeded in bringing their respective positions closer into line. [1] A second issue the two sides discussed was the creation of an independent Palestinian state.  Azerbaijan favors that and also supports the division of Jerusalem between Palestine and Israel.

    The third issue the two sides discussed was the equation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Palestinian problem, again something on which the two sides agreed.  The fourth issue involved Iran’s commitment not to support the Talysh movement or any other separatist group in Azerbaijan, a commitment former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami had made to the late Azerbaijan President Heydar Aliyev.  And the fifth concerned the conflict between Iran and Israel, a conflict that the Israelis would like Baku to help resolve and something, which explains the proximity of the visit by Azerbaijani officials to Tehran and Israeli officials to Baku. [2] Because of that possibility, of course, both Israel and the US support good relations between Tehran and Baku, and just as was the case four years ago, Azerbaijan is in a better position to serve as an intermediary than anyone else.

    It is no accident that as these visits were taking place, Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov spoke to the American Jewish Committee Global forum in Washington.  Jewish organizations made clear that they were interested in all possible contacts through intermediaries with Tehran, including those that Azerbaijan could offer, including the follow on visit by Pashazade to Tehran, a visit that the Iran side characterized as one that reaffirmed the shared Islamic heritage of the two neighboring states.

    “In our veins,” Seid Ali Khamenei, the spiritual leader of Iran said, “flows one and the same blood,” words that reflect another slogan which has been used in Tehran about relations with Azerbaijan, “two states—one nation.”  Obviously, the Iranian religious leadership along with political ties wants to ensure close religious links as well.

    As a religious state, all of Iran’s foreign policy is built on the basis of Islam and on the support of Islamist groups in various countries.  Pashazade in this context had as his task dissuading the Iranian clerics from providing moral and material support to Azerbaijani Islamists.  The two sides were able to agree on the need to block any mass penetration of radical Islam into either country.

    Thanks to the efforts of the Iranian religious establishment, the spread of the radical wing of Salafism into the region has been limited.  The prolongation of the conflict in Syria, however, creates a favorable basis for the spread of terrorism in much the same way that the Russian-Chechen war did in the 1990s.  Consequently, Baku and Tehran have many reasons for cooperation.

    With its new president, Iran will be moving toward a new political level both internally and externally.  It will certainly want to advance Iranian-Azerbaijani relations in ways that are consistent with the needs of both sides.  And as Alex Vatanka, an expert at the Middle East Institute in Washington, has pointed out on the pages of Azerbaijan in the World, Azerbaijan is precisely the country with which Tehran will be reviewing its entire range of policies in order to boost cooperation rather than incite a new round of competition.

     

    Notes

    [1] See https://www.amerikaninsesi.org/a/irsn_azerbaijan/1660588.html (accessed 13 July 2013).

    [2] See https://www.turkishnews.com/ru/content/2012/06/11/Азербайджан-может-стать-посредником/ (accessed 13 July 2013).

    AZERBAIJAN IN THE WORLD

    ADA Biweekly Newsletter

    Vol. 6, No. 14

    July 15, 2013

     

  • HUMAN RIGHTS HISTORY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

    HUMAN RIGHTS HISTORY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

    MakeyVladimir Makei  is Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus (since August 2012).

    The issue of human rights has been looming large on the global politics agenda over the past two decades. Indeed, international relations have been increasingly viewed and conducted through the prism of human rights. Furthermore, human rights have been elevated by the international community in terms of importance to peace and security. This shift in global attitudes was duly reflected in the UN documents. In September 2005, at its 60th session, the UN General Assembly adopted the World Summit Outcome Resolution 60/1, which called, inter alia, for strengthening UN human rights mechanisms.

    Meanwhile, no other issue on the international agenda appears currently to be as much politicized and divisive as human rights. The division basically relates to the primacy that different states and groups of states attach either to individual or collective human rights. This article attempts to demonstrate that approaches to human rights stem from the countries’ specific historical experience of development, which in some cases forged a centralized and collective nature of societies, whereas in others they were conducive to decentralization and individualism. Understanding the historical reasons behind other countries’ different stance on human rights may contribute to non-confrontational international relations.

     HUMAN RIGHTS HISTORY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

    Human rights ostensibly trace their origin to numerous world religions, which taught individuals to respect other individuals and treat them in a humane way. Nonetheless, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. argued in The Cycles of American History (1999): “Since religion [Christianity] had traditionally ordained hierarchy and inequality, and since it had traditionally disdained earthly happiness, early human rights formulations, as with Voltaire and later in the French Revolution, had a markedly anti-religious cast.”

    An important antecedent of human rights, which goes back to the classical Greek and Roman traditions, was the idea of natural rights ? that is, some rights that come to people naturally. Yet the notion that natural rights have immediate, specific and universal application gained a foothold only a few centuries ago. In particular, the U.S. Declaration of Independence (1776) and subsequent Constitution were premised on the idea of natural rights.

    The British anti-slavery campaign of the late 18th and early 19th century further contributed to spreading the idea of natural rights, and forestalled the West’s human rights activism in the 20th century.

    Another milestone in the human rights history was the U.S. Civil War that ended slavery in that country, although racial discrimination persisted there for another century. Even though the U.S. was built upon the idea of natural rights, these rights were accorded only to the white population, since the black population was regarded to relate to the whites’ “property rights,” a category that at that time was in fact an inalienable part of natural rights.

    The next critical point in the history of human rights was the UN Charter of 1945, and more specifically, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights endorsed by the UN General Assembly in December 1948. The latter document was spurred by the tragic memory of the immense human losses suffered during WWII. Interestingly, the Universal Declaration referred to civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural ones, although the constituency for the second set of rights was not as strong in 1948 as it would emerge later, in the 1960s, when a wave of decolonization swept the world.

    The UN Declaration was followed by a series of subsidiary UN conventions, including two Covenants ? On Civil and Political Rights and On Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which were adopted in 1966 and entered into force for the signatory states in 1976.

    During the Cold War, the issue of human rights largely remained in the background of great power politics. Throughout much of that period, the major antagonists, despite their opposing ideologies, placed their mutual relations on the logic of pragmatism and Realpolitik rather than on ideological underpinnings and human rights. This approach was best manifest in the detente policy.

    Nevertheless, the idea of human rights was inherent in the Cold War, as the Western world assailed the communist world for abuse of people’s civil and political freedoms and the communist countries attacked their opponents for neglect of people’s social and economic rights. A marked departure from the Realpolitik pattern occurred under President Carter, who significantly elevated the issue of human rights in U.S. foreign policy, and especially under Reagan, who put ideology over pragmatism. According to Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., the Reagan administration, more than any other U.S. administration, used a double standards approach to human rights: it condemned totalitarian regimes like the USSR for abuse of human rights, while condoning their violation by authoritarian regimes that happened to be U.S. allies.

    With the end of the Cold War human rights acquired new importance. A major hallmark of that period was the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna ? the largest ever gathering on human rights. The Conference adopted the Vienna Declaration that confirmed the equal status of individual political and civil rights, and collective economic, social and cultural rights.

    Notwithstanding, one fault line at the conference was clearly drawn between the Western nations, which proclaimed a universal meaning to human rights, and developing nations, which argued that human rights should allow for a different interpretation in non-Western cultures and that attempts to impose a universal definition amounted to interference in their internal affairs.

    In the wake of the Conference, a new UN office was established ? the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Finally, in 2006 the UN Human Rights Council was established to replace the UN Commission on Human Rights that had functioned since 1946. The latter move was aimed to put an end to the Commission’s politicization, but failed to do so. The issue of human rights continues to increasingly divide countries across the world.

     EURASIAN SOCIETIES: CENTRALIZATION AND A SENSE OF COMMUNITY PREVAIL

     

    First, a short note on definitions. Although the notion ‘Eurasia’ generally refers to the whole of Europe and Asia, for purposes of the present analysis ‘Eurasia’ stands here for Asia in its entirety and only those parts of Europe which include the western part of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Turkey. Europe proper is discussed in a separate section below.

    Francis Fukuyama in his book The Origins of Political Order advances the point that biological similarity of humans explains why separate societies came to similar political orders in the distant past. Specifically, all earlier sedentary societies that came to rely on agriculture were tribal societies in a sense that political and economic hierarchies were overwhelmingly structured in them along the lines of kinship and tribal ties. Fukuyama defines this phenomenon as “tribalism” or “paternalism”.

    However, the leaders in those societies at some point came to understand that tribalism and paternalism stood in the way of societies’ effective functioning since they served the interests of selected few in appropriating the resources that could otherwise be employed for the benefit of entire societies, most crucially in terms of economic development and military power. Essentially, tribalism and paternalism represented an earlier form of government corruption.

    Hence, early societies’ leaders embraced the need to fight tribalism. This was basically done by replacing kinship and tribal ties in governance with meritocracy. In other words, the key to societal successful development was to make it rely not on factors of birth or inherited wealth, but rather on the individual’s personal characteristics, such as intelligence, knowledge, integrity, commitment, etc. The extent to which societies eventually succeeded in that task determined their internal structure (centralized or decentralized), internal nature (collectivist or individualist), and, later, their attitudes to human rights.

    According to Fukuyama, China was the first society to successfully implement the task. In the 3rd century BC it was able by action from the top to establish a strong centralized state based on meritocracy. Europe, by contrast, was able to repeat a similar path only a millennium later.

    Fukuyama further argues that China’s development was ever since shaped by two concepts or doctrines. First, it was what he called “Legalism,” which sought to strengthen the state and tie individuals to it. Legalism’s success was possible by the meritocratic nature of China’s system of governance. Second, Legalism went hand in glove with a philosophical concept of Confucianism that emphasized such virtues as morality, family, tradition, community.

    Although at certain periods one doctrine dominated the other, they were not in conflict, but rather supplemented each other. As Henry Kissinger claims in his bookOn China (2011), the Confucian philosophy was about redemption of the state through virtuous individual behavior. Thus, Legalism and Confucianism both served to shape China as a centralized society with a strong sense of community. Basically, these two concepts are in work today and embody China’s current “Harmonious Society”.

    Individualism has never developed in that society. Instead, as Samuel P. Huntington notes, “For East Asians, East Asian [economic] success is particularly the result of the East Asian cultural stress on the collectivity rather than the individual.” He further argues that “the Confucian ethos pervading many Asian societies stressed the values of authority, hierarchy, the subordination of individual rights and interests, the importance of consensus, the avoidance of confrontation, ‘saving face,’ and, in general, the supremacy of the state over society and of society over the individual.”

    A very peculiar way to fight paternalism developed in the Ottoman Empire. Fukuyama notes that in their military campaigns the Ottomans enslaved Christian boys, whom they educated for future service in political and military administrations. The Mamluks, which were a ruling caste in Egypt in the centuries past, adhered to the same practice. This pattern worked successfully to a certain point as the Ottoman Empire was able to effectively utilize that human reserve with a view to centralizing and increasing its power.

    However, as the Ottomans ran up against increasingly assertive European countries and Persia in the 17th century, their scope for territorial expansion significantly diminished. As a result, the Ottomans soon succumbed to internal paternalism, which, among other factors, ultimately led to the Empire’s disintegration. Eventually, societies in the Asia Minor and the Middle East acquired a mixed record of state centralization/decentralization, but retained to a substantial degree the paternal nature of their societies. Consequently, individualism could not gain much traction there.

    As for Russia and Eastern Slavs, the development of their type of society up until the 13th century was in many respects similar to that of other European countries. In both Eastern and Western Europe, it was mainly associated with the establishment of numerous more or less decentralized political principalities. Yet the Mongol invasion of Eastern Europe in the 13th-14th centuries predetermined subsequent development of Eastern Slavs in a way different from those of its Western neighbors. The Mongol conquest significantly retarded Russia’s development, as it curtailed its ties with both Byzantium and Western Europe. As a result, as Fukuyama posits, “both Renaissance and Reformation passed Russia by.”

    Another critical juncture for Russia was the period of the Troubled Times, which came in the early 17th century as a result of royal succession fighting. The Troubled Times brought about a virtual disintegration and subjugation of the Russian state by foreigners.

    These two historical factors served to imbue the Russian society with the kind of its own doctrine of “Legalism,” that is, the need to centralize the state, lest it again fell prey to external forces. This, in turn, shaped a particular form of Russia’s governance. According to Fukuyama, Russian aristocrats, bearing in mind the Mongols and the Troubled Times, feared a weak state, thus they let the monarchy solidify its hold on power. More than that, this sense of insecurity was conducive to the situation, in which Russia’s lower gentry came to be subordinated directly to the monarchy rather than to top aristocracy, as was the case at that time in Western Europe.

    So, viewed in the political perspective, specific historical circumstances determined the establishment by Russians of a highly centralized state, which was also replicated in some territories that came under Russia’s control or influence in later periods. Furthermore, the same historical circumstances produced a socially critical effect, as well. Namely, they imbued Russians with a very strong feeling of “commonality,” a conviction that only by standing together they could overcome difficulties and make progress. It was, in a sense, Russia’s way of achieving redemption of the state through virtuous behavior of its people.

    Even though Russian and Eastern Slav societies, starting with Peter the Great in the 18th century, came to be divided by the two competing visions of their future associated respectively with Westernizers and Slavophiles, the specific historical circumstances of the earlier centuries seem to have clearly and irrevocably shaped their centralized and collectivist nature.

    EUROPE: ARRIVING AT DECENTRALIZATION AND INDIVIDUALISM

     

    At the time when China succeeded in establishing a strong centralized state, Europe was dominated by the Roman Empire. But, unlike China, Rome’s governance structure was not based on meritocracy, but rather on patron-client relationships. As a result, the state was never sufficiently centralized. Furthermore, as British historian Chris Wickham argues in his book The Inheritance of Rome: A History of Europe from 400 to 1000 (2010), the erosion of that type of relationship by the 5th century AD was one of the main causes behind the Roman Empire’s collapse.

    In the aftermath of the Roman Empire’s disintegration European development proceeded at a somewhat different pattern than other societies in Eurasia opted for. Above all, Europe’s specific path was circumstanced by its geography. According to American evolutionary biologist Jared Diamond (Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, 1997), the European terrain with its numerous rivers, mountains and forests was conducive to the establishment of multiple decentralized political units, in contrast to Eurasia, whose more or less flat terrain was instrumental to setting there large centralized entities.

    Next, Europe’s own peculiar path of development was influenced by the rise and consolidation of the Catholic Church. First, Fukuyama writes, “the Catholic Church was in a position to consolidate itself, because… Europe’s geography made its political map fragmented, and hence, there was no truly centralized force to effectively stand in the Church’s way.” Second, the Church succeeded, because, as Fukuyama suggests, it was able to overcome “paternalism” within itself through the reforms of Pope Gregory VII (reigned in 1073-1085). According to eminent British religious historian Diarmaid MacCulloch, Gregory VII realized a vision of a universal church, which clashed with German emperors’ vision of a universal Empire. As a result, Europe got a fragmented map of countries and authorities. This development effectively signified that European political and religious authorities had to coexist and share power. They got accustomed to live in a decentralized environment, where they had to take into consideration others’ views. Thus, since the Middle Ages a decentralized Europe did not develop that sense of community that was characteristic of the more centralized Eurasian societies.

    Another development that served to entrench that trend was the Black Death that struck Western Europe in the mid-14th century. According to Fukuyama, the Black Death significantly reduced Europe’s population, which, in turn, forced the authorities to make concessions in the interest of a scarce labor force. This effectively entailed the abolition of serfdom in Western Europe and increased individual freedom, whereas serfdom in Eastern Europe went on for another several centuries.

    Yet decentralization produced an advantage of its own. Indeed, the geographical, political and religious conditions that made Europe decentralized also served to propel its development at a pace far exceeding that of other societies. Fukuyama argues that a decentralized Europe faced intense internal competition that drove its accelerated development, while centralized consolidated Eurasian empires did not face such a competitive environment, hence they had no incentive for perfection.

    Niall Ferguson in his famous book Civilization: The West and the Rest (2011) claims that European creative competition spurred by the continent’s decentralized nature, allowed Europe to make a quantum leap forward in its development. Competition bolstered another five factors ? science, property rights, medicine, the consumer society, and the work ethic. All taken together, these factors, which Ferguson calls the “six killer applications,” allowed the West (Europe and European descendants in North America and Austrasia) to significantly outpace the rest of the world in development. This all led to the Industrial Revolution in Europe by the early 19th century, which empowered it to dominate and impose its values on the rest.

    Moreover, Europe’s competitive environment was also conducive to social developments associated ? in a succeeding order ? with the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, which all served to increase and entrench the individual character of European societies. It seems that the Reformation was of particular significance in this regard. American political scientist Walter Russell Mead in God and Gold: Britain, America and the Making of the Modern World (2007) advances the point that the Reformation’s slogan “Scripture alone” led to different interpretations of the Bible, to the diversity of religious opinions, which served to emphasize the primacy of particular (individual) over general (common).

    Finally, it seems that the Western Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, as eminent British historian Eric Hobsbawm argues in The Age of Extremes: 1914-1991(1994), was yet another factor in the string of trends, developments and events that bolstered individualism and individual freedom at the expense of societal cohesion.NORTH AMERICA: FOLLOWING IN EUROPE’S FOOTSTEPS, BUT IN ITS OWN WAY

     

    Like in Europe, it was geography above all that served as a key factor in shaping a specific pattern of North America’s development.

    Daron Acemoglu and James A.Robinson in their study Why Nations Fail (2012) vividly depict how different the developmental patterns for South and North Americas were. Indeed, starting in the early 16th century, the Spanish and Portuguese were able to impose “extractive forms of governance” on locals in Southern and Central America. Crucially, these areas were very rich in resources, and also densely populated with indigenous people. Thus the colonizers subjugated the locals for the purpose of resource extraction.

    However, a similar pattern could not be replicated in North America as it lacked both precious metals and dense local populations. Hence, as the locals could not be forced to work for the European settlers, the latter had to work themselves for their own sustenance. The English Virginia Company that was then in charge of North American colonization had, therefore, to provide incentives in order to attract new settlers to North America. As a result, strong hierarchy and centralization failed to take root there. These developments produced an egalitarian society based on settler agricultural middle class.

    As economist William Easterly argues, as the basic food item produced by the majority of U.S. population (i.e. farmers) was wheat, such a situation contributed to establishing a middle-class society. In contrast, where the basic item was a rare commodity or product that was unavailable to all, and the profits were reaped by a small minority rather than by the majority, as was the case with sugar plantations in the Caribbean, such places, unlike the U.S.A., saw the entrenchment of inequality and oppressive forms of governance.

    Given the prevailing logic of U.S. farmers to engage in constant frontier expansion with the view to ratcheting up their primarily wheat-based agricultural production, that dominant class developed a strong sense of individualism, distrust of government, and stood for the removal of any kinds of constraints.

    Alexis de Tocqueville, a famous French connoisseur of an early America, in hisDemocracy in America written back in the 1830s, stressed the importance of individualism in the United States. He saw American individualism as self-withdrawal ? the tendency of each member of the community to “draw apart with his family and friends so that after he has thus formed a little circle of his own, he willingly leaves society largely to itself.”

    Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. provides an additional useful insight into the development of North American, specifically U.S., society, especially valuable in terms of its foreign policy impact. He argues that the United States’ politics was molded by a fusion of two traditions ? classic indoctrination and Calvinist judgment. As for the first tradition, the U.S. Founders had forebodings about America’s prospects because of previous negative experience with republican forms of government, but believed that their own experiment would escape the past pattern of classic republics’ doom. The second tradition was rooted in the Calvinist branch of Protestantism given that the first settlers were overwhelmingly religious Calvinist Puritans fleeing Europe. According to that tradition, as Schlesinger notes, “America was a redemptive history, a prophecy fulfilled, a new Israel.”

    So, while the first tradition was secular, which “contemplated the United States as an experiment and was about realism, the second tradition was mystical, which took the U.S. as a destiny, and was about idealism.” Therefore, as Schlesinger argues: “The theory of America is [about] the divergence between the pragmatic conception of America as a nation, one among many, engaged in a risky experiment, and the mystical vision of America as destiny appointed by the Almighty to save unregenerate humanity.”

    The author claims that, owing to the second tradition, “Americans acquired the image of the saviors of the world,” while “the theory of the elect nation, the redeemer nation, almost became the official creed.” “The United States was founded on the proclamation of ‘unalienable rights,’” he continues “and human rights have had ever since a peculiar resonance in the American mind. Americans have agreed since 1776 that the U.S. must be the beacon of human rights to an unregenerate world. The question has always been how America is to execute this mission. The early view was that America would redeem the world not by intervention but by example.”

    Therefore, U.S. early foreign policy was guided more by pragmatism than by idealism. This attitude was best reflected in the famous speech by President John Quincy Adams (1821), in which he warned that “she [America] goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy”.

    But the growth of American power, as Schlesinger posits, also confirmed the messianism of those who believed in America’s divine anointment: “that there was a couple of real monsters roaming the world encouraged a fearful tendency to look everywhere for new monsters to destroy.” This trend has been steadily on the rise ever since President Woodrow Wilson brought the U.S. into WWI under the slogan to “make the world safe for democracy.”

    In Cycles of American History, written in the mid-1980s, Schlesinger was highly critical of U.S. mystical tradition. Specifically, he said that “Americans would do well to sober up from the ideological binge and return to the cold, grey realism of the Founding Fathers, men who lucidly understood the role of interest and force in a dangerous world and thought that saving America was enough without trying to save all humanity as well.”

    Schlesinger proceeded from the assumption that the morality of states was inherently different from the morality of individuals, and the individual’s duty of self-sacrifice and the state’s duty of self-preservation were in conflict. Indeed, one cannot help but agree with this historian’s dictum that “saints can be pure, but states must be responsible.”

    A similar position was expressed by another distinguished American, Reinhold Niebuhr, who argued in his Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932) that “a sharp distinction must be drawn between the moral and social behavior of individuals and of social groups, national, racial, and economic, and that this distinction justifies and necessitates policies which a purely individualistic ethic must always find embarrassing.”

    To sum it up, a strong sense of individualism developed out of the first North American settlers’ pragmatic experience, along with a strong tendency for messianism spurred by their religious experience served to shape the United States’ proclivity to embrace a pro-active stance on human rights, especially on those aspects that relate to individual rights. The strength of that stance, however, has never been constant, but rather circumstanced by the size of U.S. power relative to other powers in the world. Not surprisingly, in the Unipolar Moment environment characterized by unrivalled American power, this country’s drive to advance individual political and civil rights has become as strong as ever.

    A WAY TO END DIVISION

     

    The human rights debates, which have been high in the past two decades, have proven futile. They increasingly make it clear that it is impossible to change attitudes that are enrooted in centuries-old specific cultural, religious, and other underpinnings. Indeed, the reason for the West and the United States in particular to pursue policies that seek to transpose Western values on other societies, that is, democracy and human rights, go back to the past tradition of active Protestant proselytizing elsewhere.

    The policies of active proselytizing gained renewed momentum in the post-Cold War context, when Fukuyama’s “The End of History” thesis associated with liberal democracy’s victory over other forms of governance enjoyed a near-unanimous acceptance. As a result, Western countries became more imposing and less tolerant of others in the context of human rights in the United Nations, as well as in other international organizations.

    This attitude was duly reflected in the activities of the UN Human Rights Commission throughout the 1990s and the new century’s first few years. Western countries’ efforts to “flog” a number of non-Western countries by means of country-specific resolutions on the situation of human rights in the latter group that, in fact, had more to do with political rather than humanitarian considerations, created such an atmosphere that inhibited cooperation among UN Member States on many important transnational issues.

    On the eve of the UN 2005 Summit, however, the vast majority of states had realized that a state of affairs like that, when the issue of human rights essentially determined the levels of cooperation in other areas, could be counterproductive. As a sign of promising change, they all agreed to replace the UN Human Rights Commission with a UN Human Rights Council (HRC).

    They also decided to abandon the practice of country-specific human rights resolutions, and, instead, place the consideration of this issue on an ostensibly neutral tool associated with the universal periodic review (UPR). In other words, each and every state must undergo UPR and all should cooperate on countries’ human rights shortcomings revealed by UPRs rather than continue to engage in confrontational policies. Regrettably, this supposedly cooperative pattern has failed to take hold thus far, as political and perhaps some other considerations pushed Western countries to revert in the HRC to the previous practices, inherent to the UN Human Rights Commission. As a result, country-specific resolutions on human rights have been brought into usage again, whereas UPRs permeated with “traditional” individual vs. collective rights divisions, slowly but surely started to lose their attractiveness.

    Worryingly, since the West’s opponents, due to their own historically established societal mindsets, involved themselves more in building domestic peace and harmony than in proselytizing their values, it may appear to an ordinary observer that they have been on the defensive and, hence, that collective rights have been somehow lower in importance than individual rights. Yet this is a dangerous and flawed perception, which, regrettably, has captured to a large extent the human rights discourse over the past few decades.

    What one side has been vigorously advancing as purportedly being universal in nature, has in fact been nothing more than a mere reflection of its own historically constructed values and preferences. As Samuel P. Huntington said, “The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact, non-Westerners never do.”

    Therefore, there could hardly be tangible progress on human rights in such an inflamed environment, because the other side regards the former’s action as an attempt at cultural imperialism, which, according to Schlesinger, maintains that one set of values is better than another. Progress instead can emerge only if this issue is treated in a truly comprehensive and unbiased manner based on the appreciation of how specific societies came to embrace particular types of human rights.

    A way to end that division can be found, among other sources, in advice expressed over time by a number of outstanding American experts of society. To begin with, philosopher Reinhold Niebuhr, writing in the mid-20th century, in his The Irony of American History (1952) admonished his own country as follows: “Today the success of America requires a generous appreciation of the valid elements in the practices and institutions of other nations though they deviate from our own.”

    Furthermore, in the same book, Niebuhr gives another valuable piece of advice: “General community is established only when the knowledge that we need about one another is supplemented by the recognition that the other, that other form of life, or that other unique community is the limit beyond which our ambitions must not run and the boundary beyond which our life must not expand.”

    Thus, the issue of human rights must not be as divisive as it is, if only we begin to genuinely appreciate each other’s specific historical courses and treat each other accordingly. This is especially true now that globalization empowers identity politics, and relationship with ‘the other’ has become more fundamental than ever.

     http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Human-Rights-What-and-Who-Made-Them-Divide-the-World-16031