Turkey’s diplomatic missions will provide services to Azeri citizens. Turkey’s Ambassador in Baku, Hulusi Kılıç, said that in countries where Azerbaijan has no diplomatic mission Azeri citizens could receive diplomatic services from Turkish missions. Elhan Poluhov, spokesman for the Azeri Foreign Ministry, said that Turkey’s friendly proposal for providing services to Azeri citizens was accepted by his ministry.
Source: Newspot, No 95, June 2009
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Soner Cagaptay and Ata Akiner Hurriyet Daily News July 29, 2009 |
Tom Friedman is right, the world is flat. New communication technologies and globalization have created a flat world, erasing most social and political inequalities among nations. However, in this flat world, there is a new trend: from Italy and Turkey to Russia, Iran and China, where the governments control the media and the new communication tools, the world is tilted in favor of governments. What is more, this tilted world is not so equal, especially when it comes to politics.
Take Italy and Turkey, for instance. Both are democracies. Yet in both countries, the governing parties control much of the media, often distorting political debate in their favor.
In Italy, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who was a powerful media mogul when he entered politics, today controls much of the Italian media. According to Reuters, Mr. Berlusconi holds sway over 90 percent of Italy’s broadcast media through his private media holdings and by exercising political power over the state television networks. It should not come as a surprise that Italy was rated as “partly free” in Freedom House’s 2009 survey — in “Western Europe” only Turkey shared this ranking with Italy.
Mr. Berlusconi’s power over the media allows him shape the debate in favor of his government, as well as escape scandals that could finish him off politically. Mr. Berlusconi wins elections despite all odds and despite the shifting-sands nature of Italian politics. In Italy, the world of politics is tilted.
In Turkey, too, where the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan happens to be a close friend of Mr. Berlusconi, control over the media helps the ruling party shape the political debate in its favor. Since 2002 when the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, came to power, the government has used legal loopholes to confiscate ownership of independent media and sell it to its supporters. In 2002, pro-AKP businesses owned less than 20 percent of the Turkish media; today pro-government people own around 50 percent.
The AKP’s new found control over the media is not without consequences. A review of the newspapers and networks reveals a split country. AKP-affiliated media reports on Turkey as a perfect country, if not for the serious allegations of coup plots against the government. Meanwhile, media unaffiliated with the AKP portrays an imperfect country wrought with corruption and ineffective governance. The media divisions, among other reasons, have caused Turkey to be cut in half, split between AKP’s supporters and opponents. Still, as long as the AKP maintains control over half of the Turkish media, it will enjoy strong support. In Turkey, the world of politics is tilted.
Then, there is Russia, an effective single-party state. Russian leader Vladimir Putin, a close friend of Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Berlusconi, runs a state in which all media, with the exception of a few independent outlets, belongs to pro-government businesses or is in the hands of the Russian state. To put things in perspective, of the 26,000 newspapers, 16,500 magazines, 1,400 radio stations and 2,200 TV stations in Russia, the number of independent media outlets is in the single digits. Russian authorities regularly raid independent media offices and arrest journalists. Sometimes, even this is not enough: the flag bearer of Russian opposition Novaya Gazeta has tragically lost four journalists in the past eight years under mysterious circumstances.
This near absolute control over the media has allowed Putin to consolidate power in ways previously unthinkable in Italy and Turkey. United Russia, Mr. Putin’s party, regularly wins landslide victories in elections, most recently pulling in almost three-quarters of the electoral support in the 2007 Russian legislative election. Analysts often ask why Russia is unable to produce an effective political opposition to Mr. Putin. The roots of this problem lie in Mr. Putin’s monopoly over the Russian media: the more tilted the political world in favor of a government, the more the ruling parties can consolidate their power, ultimately preventing any opposition from gaining support. Mr. Putin must make his friends jealous for in Russia, the world of politics is almost irreversibly tilted.
Then, there is authoritarian Iran and China, where the world of politics is so tilted it cannot even be scaled. In these countries, the government controls not only traditional media, such as newspapers and TV networks, but also new tools of communication, such as the internet and cell phone communication.
When demonstrators took to the streets in the aftermath of Iran’s recent presidential elections alleging electoral fraud, the government blacked out media access and shut down the web and cell phone networks, effectively cutting Iran off from all media sources. Briefly, the internet and cell phones allowed the Iranian demonstrators to organize. However subsequently, the government’s ability to shut down the internet and cell phone communications provided the kiss of death for the anti-government protests, preventing the demonstrations from growing — in Iran, the world is sharply tilted in favor of the regime.
The same story repeated itself in a more perfect form during the recent riots in China’s East Turkestan (Xinjiang) region. Soon after the riots began, the government shut down internet access in the Uygur province, ending the demonstrators’ hope of using the web to organize. This step was followed by a total shut down of cell phone communications, including text messaging; isolating East Turkestan from the rest of the world -in Turkestan, the new world is so tilted that the Uygurs cannot even see beyond it.
The flat new world is better off in many ways compared to the world of the past. Yet, ironically the same forces that are flattening the world can also tilt it, empowering authoritarian states, and allowing undemocratic trends to take roots in democratic societies. In the 21st century, one hopes that the world is not only flat, but also, and more importantly, that it is also even.
Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. Ata Akiner is a research intern in that program.
Size matters
Wednesday, July 22, 2009
SONER CAGATAY
There are three categories of countries in international politics: global powers that can afford to do nearly everything they want; small and weak states that need to latch on to large states to protect their interests; and middle-sized states, which, though they are not powerful enough to shape global affairs by themselves, wield international influence through alliances and by building regional constituencies.
For a long time, Turkey was in the category of small states, attaching its foreign policy unequivocally to that of the United States. Over the past decade, under the rule of the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, Turkey has graduated to the class of middle-sized states. On July 15, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recognized this development, calling Turkey an “emerging global power.” But what are the parameters of Ankara’s middle-sized power status? Now that it is in a new league of states, should Turkey attempt life without America, or does Ankara still need Washington?
Turkey not only has NATO’s second largest military, but also is a new member of the G-20. What is more, thanks to the AKP’s activist foreign policy, Turkey wields influence across many regions, from the Middle East to the Eastern Mediterranean, and Central Asia. Ankara stands at a historic juncture and possesses the ability to shape politics beyond its borders if it pays attention to the two following parameters.
First, Turkey can maintain its newfound global role only if it builds international constituencies. To this end, Ankara needs to project its political message and soft power in a consistent way. If Ankara vacillates overseas, its newfound international influence will wane.
So far, Ankara has struggled in this regard. Take China, for example. Turkey voiced strong criticism of the Chinese crackdown against the Uyghurs in early July, but has avoided taking a stance on the Tibet issue. Ankara will need to stand for human rights for both Muslim Uygurs and Buddhist Tibetans alike if it is to become a credible force in world politics. In this regard, Turkey should not only guard its existing constituencies, such as the Uygurs, but also reach out to and build new ones, such as the Tibetans. As a middle-sized power in global politics, Turkey needs to prove that its heart beats for Muslims and non-Muslims, and Turks and non-Turks, with the same strength.
Along the same vein, Turkey needs to project its soft power consistently in the Middle East. In this regard, too, Ankara has not had a perfect record. When Hamas emerged victorious in the 2006 Palestinian elections, Ankara voiced support for Hamas’ electoral victory in the name of democracy. Yet in the aftermath of the June 2009 elections in Iran, amidst widespread allegations of vote rigging, Ankara did not side with democracy, but instead congratulated Ahmadinejad on his “electoral victory” even as Iranians were being shot in the streets of Tehran. If Turkey aims to wield influence in the Middle East by promoting itself and its values, such as democracy, it should do so for both Palestinians and Iranians.
The second parameter to ensure Turkey’s middle-sized power status is maintaining an alliance with a global power. This will help Ankara protect its interests in areas of the globe beyond its reach, as well as in organizations where it could be dwarfed by larger powers.
This is where Ankara’s relationship with the United States comes in. Fortunately, Turkey no longer is a foregone conclusion in Washington’s mind. But Ankara’s newfound importance in Washington should not be interpreted as the time for Turkey to conclude its long alliance with America. Like all middle-sized countries, Turkey can protect its interests better when allied with a global power. Take Turkey’s European Union, or EU, process, for instance. Turkey would not be in accession talks with the EU today if not for Washington’s continued backing.
In a similar fashion, Washington’s assistance to Turkey matters inside NATO. Ankara’s position in this alliance, which includes other middle-sized powers larger than Turkey, would be weaker if it were isolated. Turkey’s ties to Washington, in this respect, are essential. Washington’s motto in NATO, “Never leave the Turks alone,” best explains the United States’ utility to Turkey in NATO, as does Turkey’s access to U.S. military technology, a perk of its NATO membership.
To be sure, the benefits of Turkey’s relationship with the United States are mutual. Just as Turkey profits from its relationship with a global power, Washington needs the new Turkey in many places, such as Afghanistan and the Middle East. This new rapport requires adult thinking on both sides, and will soon be tested as Washington withdraws troops from Turkey. This test will happen regardless of whether or not the U.S. pulls its military out of Iraq through Turkey, and the question is whether the two sides will act as mature partners.
Far from looking for a life without America, Turkey should be looking for an upgraded relationship with the United States. Turkey has become a middle-sized power, size matters, and Ankara’s challenge is to step up to the plate.
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* Regional trend: Turkey’s rise
Turkey is continuing along its ascendant path, in line with STRATFOR’s expectations. The priority for Turkey is to expand its power in the Middle East, beginning with Iraq, where the United States is taking a step back from day-to-day security operations and where Turkey is taking a step forward in managing the country’s rival factions. The Turks are counting on Iraqi energy to boost Ankara’s profile in the region as a major east-west energy transit hub. But with Iraq bogged down in sectarian feuds, Turkey has its work cut out in trying to bring its own version of order to the country. The Turks will continue building relations with key Iraqi politicians, but will also take a more nuanced approach in dealing with the Kurds, using less military coercion and more political and economic persuasion. By playing on Kurdish fears of encirclement by Iraqi Arabs, the Turks will aim to persuade the Kurds that Turkey can guarantee Kurdish political and economic security, as long as the Kurds play by Turkey’s rules – which include abandoning any separatist ambitions. Recognizing the problems the United States is encountering in its Iran strategy, the Turks will be careful to maintain a healthy relationship with Tehran. The time may not be ripe for Iran to seriously engage the West, but Turkey is positioning itself to become a mediator in this long-standing dispute. Once Turkey reaches beyond the Middle East, the road gets rougher. Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party is attempting a complex balancing act between the East and West in trying to create the geopolitical space for Turkey’s expansion. Ankara sees itself as an independent player and has no interest in becoming a pawn in the ongoing U.S.-Russian struggle over Eurasia. Thus, Turkey must flirt with multiple options and act as unpredictably as possible in conducting its foreign affairs so that it does not permanently breach relations with either side. To this end, Turkey will entertain deals on non-Russian energy routes like the Nabucco pipeline and push for EU membership to keep one foot in the West, but will also work closely with the Russians on energy and defense deals to avoid trouble with Moscow and keep its Russian-chaperoned negotiations with Armenia alive. Turkey is likely to encounter the most resistance to its resurgence in former Soviet territory. The Turkish government continues to push a pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic agenda to raise its profile among Turkic-speaking peoples in the Caucasus and Central Asia, but a number of these post-communist regimes – Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, in particular – are extremely wary of Turkey’s intentions and increasingly Islamist branding. This simmering backlash could give Russia additional leverage in countering Turkey’s regional rise.
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But Ankara is becoming known for something else that’s of great strategic interest to Americans: an active foreign policy that may help resolve conflicts in critical regions where the United States has faltered. That includes the troubled Caucasus region, where Russia just warred with Georgia, and the Middle East.
“If you list the key issues which Turkey and the U.S. pursue, you’d be amazed by how many parallels there are,” Turkey’s president, Abdullah Gul, told a small group of visiting U.S. journalists and think-tank experts in an interview in his office this week.
Indeed, almost every foreign crisis on the American agenda is also a concern for Gul. Turkey sits at the crossroads of Asia and Europe, bordering not only the European Union, but also Georgia, Iraq, Iran and Syria. It has been adversely affected by growing Mideast chaos since the Iraq war.
Turkey also sits at an energy crossroads. Efforts to build new oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia and the Caucasus – pipelines that will circumvent Russia and make Europe less dependent on it – all rely on Turkey. A crucial pipeline from Azerbaijan through Georgia uses the Turkish port of Ceyhan.
Instability in its environs has prompted Turkey to become more active in efforts at conflict resolution. “In regional foreign policy, we had numerous problems with our neighbors,” Gul said. “They must be resolved, or there cannot be peace.”
Turkey’s emphasis has been, for the most part, on soft power and diplomacy. It is the only country with fair to good relations with every country in neighboring regions: close ties to Israel as well as to Arab states; good relations with Iran and carefully managed relations with Russia; and close ties to Georgia.
Two of Turkey’s many mediation efforts could have a positive impact on key concerns of the United States. First is Turkey’s recent overture to Armenia. The two nations have deep disagreements over how one million Armenians were killed in the early 20th century; Armenians call it genocide, while Turkey insists it was the result of warfare.
In September, Gul became the first Turkish president in history to visit Armenia. Gul had sent congratulations to Serge Sargsyan upon his election as Armenia’s president, and Gul in turn was invited to attend a soccer match between the Turkish and Armenian teams in Yerevan. Both leaders faced strong domestic opposition to the visit.
“Of course, I didn’t just go to watch soccer,” Gul said. “The major aim was to establish a climate in which we can operate from now on.”
The goal is to work toward normalizing relations between Armenia and Turkey and opening their border. Turkey also may be able to mediate the poisonous split between Armenia and a third Caucasus country, Azerbaijan; Armenia now occupies a large chunk of Azeri territory.
Progress on resolving these conflicts could have a positive spillover for the Russia-Georgia standoff and prospects for new pipelines. “Solving any [Caucasus] problem would affect us all positively,” Gul said. Turkey’s (and Armenia’s) efforts are a brave try.
A second example is Turkey’s mediation of peace talks between Syria and Israel. “We’ve worked hard to bring peace in the region,” Gul said. “Recently, that work became more visible.”
At a time when the United States preferred to isolate Syria, Turkey worked to get Syria and Israel back to the table (and kept Washington informed of the effort). Four rounds of private talks have taken place; they are now on hold as Israel forms a new government.
A Syria-Israel peace would end the current alliance between Syria and Iran and undercut Hezbollah, forcing Tehran to rethink its policies in the region. Such an outcome could also help resurrect the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
The bottom line: The next U.S. president should encourage Turkey’s mediation and take a cue from its soft-power efforts. Turkey’s diplomacy has opened up new possibilities for its American ally.