Turkish Forum

Tag: DHKP/C

  • Drug Smuggling As Main Source of PKK Terrorism

    Drug Smuggling As Main Source of PKK Terrorism

    Friday, 26 September 2008

    Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sedat LACINER is director of USAK,

    Ankara-based Turkish think-tank and International Relations lecturer. BA (Ankara U., Turkiye), MA (Sheffield, UK), PhD (King’s College London, UK)


    Some claim that Turkey is one of the transit countries of the drug trafficking, not a consumer; so the fight against narcotic should not be involved with in the priority struggles of Turkey. Even, within some conversations, it is possible to hear that narcotic money has an additional value for Turkey. Data on drug usage verifies the fact that Turkey is not a crucial drug consumption market, it is mostly a transit country. Due to drug smuggling, billions of dollar have entered to the country. However, these are not the whole part of the schema. To clarify Turkey just as a “transit country” is not sufficient. In the mean time, Turkey has become one of the crucial narcotic centers of the world. Every drug bags, pass through Istanbul and other Turkish cities to the Western Europe this turns back as a terror, crime organization, violence on the street and loss of government power in Turkey. Besides, this process continues for decades; drug-violence-degeneration triangle insidiously prejudice Turkey internally. At that point, drug trucks, passes from Turkey, should be stopped so as to re-construct order in Turkey, re-gain government authority by the government itself.

    Terrorist organizations are based on two main columns: The first one is ideological/political base. Terrorist organizations exploit mistakes of states, areas where there is no state authority; the more these exploitation facilities continue, the more these organizations grow fast. The second important column terrorist organizations based is the economic infrastructure. Money is requisite for weapons, explosive materials, daily needs of terrorists etc. Contrary to general perception, money mostly has not come “directly” from other countries. When other countries want to assist, they prefer utilizing from “natural ways”; randomly cash money is given directly to the terrorists by foreign countries. There are two fundamental principles to maintain economic infrastructure of terror. 1) tribute \ blackmailing \ donation, 2) robbery, 3) narcotic money, 4) other illegal revenue. Among these, since it is relatively easier way and more sustainable, mostly, narcotic money catches attention. If it is considered that world’s drug market is around 400-500 billion dollars, this amount will not only sustain terrorist organizations but also countries. The money, circulated in the drug market, is almost equal to the USA’s defense expenditure in a year and it is approximately over Turkish gross national product. In Europe, one of the most important regions of the huge market, the PKK, time to time, has controlled 80 % of the market; so it is not difficult to comprehend how the PKK can stand for more than two decades.

    When the PKK constituted as a terrorist organization, it did not take it so long to discover the drug smuggling money. At the beginning of 1980’s, it started to act in both producing and transportation sectors of illegal drug business. In 1982, the PKK begun to produce hemp and opium poppy around the Lebanese camps (Baelbek and Hermen) that were under Syrian control. Ports of Beirut, Sayda, Sur, Miryan, Abdeh and Tripoli were the main transit points of this transition. Drugs were sent to ports of Greek Cyprus, Greece and Italy; and from this forwarding, the terrorist organization sustained significant amount of revenue for the years. It is unfortunate that Syria, Greek Cyprus and Greece ignored (or supported) the PKK drug business in order to support this terrorist organization against Turkey. In the beginning of the 1980’s, another considerable role of the PKK was in the line that comes from Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran, crosses Turkey and reach to Europe. As it is known these three countries were called “golden crescent” for drug smuggling. Behind the ‘Golden Crescent’ Laos – Thailand – Birmania countries are ‘Golden Triangle’ for drug producing and smuggling. In other words, most crucial producer countries are located in the east of Turkey, and Turkey is one of the most crucial routes for the European drug market. It did not take too long for the PKK militants to notice how a ‘lucky position’ they had to control drug trafficking between the East and the West. Terrorists realized the huge wealth, and firstly begun business by allowing transition and sustaining “security services” for ordinary smugglers. During the 1980s it was not difficult for the PKK to secure international drug transportation in the region because it was organized almost in every district and villages of eastern Turkey. When its organizations advanced in Istanbul, other Western big cities and Western European countries, drug dispatching and distribution has become easier for the PKK. Especially, over Afghanistan-Iran-Turkey-Eastern Europe-Southern Europe-West Europe line, tons of morphine, heroin, liquid hashish and other drug materials were transferred under the PKK control. The PKK has not only played a significant role in the East-West route drug transportation but also in the West-East transportation of chemical goods for processing of raw drug materials in the East. At the end of 1980s, it was realized that the real money was in the processing business. When raw drug materials were processed, its price increases geometrically. At that point the PKK, firstly in the East and Southeast Anatolia, later in different regions of Turkey and in some East European countries, constructed processing drug laboratories.

    When the PKK reached its one of the political aims by composing a Kurdish diaspora close to itself in the Western European countries, it became a real boss in the drug business between Golden Crescent and Western Europe without any serious rival. In most of the cities in Europe, the PKK had thousands of members and huge sympathizer network that assist it in drug business. The terrorist organization helped many Kurdish people to immigrate illegally to Western Europe, and all these people were forced to pay significant part of their income in their new life. Apart from these so-called donations, Kurdish immigrants were forced to help the PKK’s drug businesses in Western European cities. Since there was no second group organized as the PKK did in the East and in the West, within a short time, the PKK strengthened its power in European drug market in terms of production, transportation, distribution and marketing. Kurdish children including 10-15 years old ones became drug seller in front of the pubs, pavilion, and even around certain schools in many European capitals.

    In 1991, a PKK confessor said that between 1988 and 1990, he carried more than 300 kg heroin to Europe by his own. According to Interpol, in 1992, the PKK was orchestrating 80 % of the European drug market. This relationship was in the fields of processing, transportation, securing transportation, distribution, and marketing. With reference to 1992 Interpol data, the number of Kurdish organizations related with drug business was 178; and most of them were under the PKK control or they gave tribute to the PKK. Ikbal Huseyin Rivzi, Interpol’s chief narcotics officer, explained that the PKK was heavily evolved in drug trafficking as a means to support terrorism in Turkey. At the same year, the reports of the Italian police clearly showed that the PKK set up special teams for international drug business. German high rank officials also stated that the 75 % of heroin caught in this country in 1994 was belonging to Kurdish origin Turks. Moreover, 70 % of drug sale in Germany was made by the PKK. Other sources similarly indicate that the PKK controlled between 60 % to 70 % of the European illegal drug market in 1994. The number of the imprisoned PKK members related with drug crimes in Germany was 30 in 1994. In the same year, the amount of the captured PKK drug was nearly 1.6 ton.

    By this way, drug business has become most important revenue of the PKK terrorist organization. The 1996 UN Narcotic Audit Committee’s Report indicated the reason how the PKK still stands, as narcotic money. 1997 Sputnik Operation (Belgium) showed how the PKK launders narcotic money. The terrorist organization in these years laundered money under the name of donation or aid to so-called cultural, children, women etc associations in London, Paris, Brussels and other European cities. This money has been collected in certain accounts; later, laundered money has been spent for MED TV (now Roj TV), weapons, explosives, militia training and for other PKK businesses. Another laundering method is jewelry buying-selling and some other legal investments.

    In 1997, relationship between the terror organization and drug smuggling begun to disturb more the Western European countries, and with some operations, terror organization was forced to take more measures to hide its illegal activities. When risks increased in drug business, the PKK started a propaganda campaign claiming that it was not in any illegal drug business. The organization further claimed that these accusations were part of the Turkish Republic’s ‘propaganda game’ against the PKK. According to the PKK propaganda, those people who were caught by police had not any relationship with the PKK. In this regard, the PKK, thanks to its social and so-called cultural organizations, started a great “No to Drug” campaign in many European countries in 1998. With these kind of campaigns, as expected it was not possible for the PKK to clear itself in the eyes of European police and other security forces. However, it shouldn’t be forgotten that English or French police and judiciary are working within political system, and public opinion naturally influences their works against the criminals. May be this is the point that Turkey cannot intercept fully, but the PKK utilizes, perfectly. While Turkey generally perceives all Europe (even the West in general) as a single body, the terror organization successfully abuses the Western democracies’ weaknesses and the Western pluralist political and legal structures.

    After capture of Abdullah Ocalan, head of the PKK, and with the dramatic decrease of clashes in the Anatolian mountains, the organization begun to give more importance to drug business than before. Between 2004 and 2005, the amount of drug just caught in the Netherlands was more than 400 kg. With reference to 2005 European data, the PKK is the primary actor of the illegal European drug trade. BBC stated that, 80 % of European drug market was Turkish origin (it means Kurdish origin); and the PKK manages it. The BBC also reports that the number of the PKK members in British prisons is more than 1000. According to Turkish authorities, the number of PKK members caught with drug is around 700 between 1984 and 2000. These numbers clearly stated that the PKK has worked with hundreds of people in each country on the transition route.

    When all these data is considered, it won’t be so extreme to say that the PKK has developed by narcotic money. In the mean time, a new kind of mafia emerged in drug, smuggling, and tribute \ robbery areas. This formation, can be called as ‘PKK mafia’, has developed its own mentality beyond terrorist organization’s classic mentality. In course of time, participations begun to this network from outside; and a network, stretched to three continents (Europe, Asia and Africa), was created. Surprisingly, some organizations, defined themselves on the contrary to the PKK, have also begun to participate to this PKK mafia network. Thus Turkist or Kurdist ideologies curtailed the real intentions and the drug money undermined public order and state authority in the country. So as to secure drug production, processing, transportation, distribution and marketing; this network has reflected itself differently and spreaded even inside the state body. The criticism made by European countries in the mid-1990s, was about the fact that drug bosses had friends in the Turkish cabinets. Although these claims seem to be more exaggerated, it is so remarkable that organizations that reflect themselves to public under different ideology and utilize from state power in some cases, has been cooperating with the PKK. It can be argued that the Deep State problem, extreme nationalisms and terrorism in Turkey have been financed by the drug smuggling money for the years.

    In brief, illegal drug trade is the most crucial financial source of terror and collapse of legal state in Turkey. In order to end terror, if Turkey succeeds in ending drug smuggling it will get more effective solutions than bombing Kandil Mountain. Turkey on the one hand must eliminate the areas that are exploited by terrorists and extremists, and at the same time it must destroy financial infrastructure of terror and other crimes by cutting drug smuggling. Otherwise, the Turks will continue to live with the problems like robbery in streets of Istanbul, terror in mountains of southeast Anatolia and political assassinations in most sensitive times. We should also note that Turkey desperately needs immediate help of the European countries in its combat against terrorism. The ‘monster’ so big for Turkey, and the Turks cannot overcome the problem without the EU. At the same time, the drug smuggling mainly targets the youth of the Western European countries, and the EU cannot stop the illegal drug problem without a real co-operation with Turkey.


    —
    Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sedat LACINER is director of USAK, Ankara-based Turkish think-tank and International Relations lecturer. BA (Ankara U., Turkiye), MA (Sheffield, UK), PhD (King’s College London, UK)

    slaciner@gmail.com

     

  • Turkey military reports major gains against terror

    Turkey military reports major gains against terror


    Thursday, September 18, 2008

     

     

    ANKARA — The Turkey military has determined that the Kurdish insurgency was heading for a breakdown.Turkish Chief of Staff Gen. Ilker Basbug said the Kurdish Workers Party, or PKK, has been severely harmed by a Turkish military offensive over the last year. Basbug, who assumed his new post in August 2008, said the PKK has sustained hundreds of casualties in 2008 in Turkish air and ground operations.

     

    “The PKK is moving towards the breaking point now,” Basbug told a briefing on Sept. 16. “I do not say they are at the breaking point. How can we benefit from this? If we can succeed in it, then we can reach at breaking point.”
    Officials said the Turkish military has urged the government of Prime Minister Recep Erdogan to extend permission for the campaign against the PKK in northern Iraq. Parliament has approved Turkish military operations in Iraq until Oct. 17.

    Basbug said the PKK’s operational ability has been sharply eroded. He said PKK operations dropped from 6,446 in 1994 to 1,171 in 2008. Civilian casualties in 2008 were reported at 42, in contrast to 992 in 1994.”This means it is a big mistake to say that we got back to the 1990s in the fight against terrorism,” Basbug said.

    Basbug said the PKK has been struggling to replace its dead fighters. He said recruitment, mostly targeting teenagers, takes place in Iran, Syria, Turkey and Western Europe.

    “There is an impression that the majority of recruitments from Turkey are from southeastern Anatolia,” Basbug said. “But this is not true. One-third of the organization is comprised of Syrians.”

    The chief of staff said the military has sought to foil the PKK in its recruitment stage. He said the Kurdish insurgency group has been targeting youngsters ages 14 through 18.

    “If we can save them from the hands of the organization we will do a big job,” Basbug said. “Campaigns should be held to find jobs for unemployed children.”

     

  • WORLD TRIBUNE: Turkey military reports major gains against terror

    WORLD TRIBUNE: Turkey military reports major gains against terror

    WORLD TRIBUNE:  Turkey military reports major gains against terror

    ANKARA — The Turkey military has determined that the Kurdish insurgency was heading for a breakdown. Turkish Chief of Staff Gen. Ilker Basbug said the Kurdish Workers Party, or PKK, has been severely harmed by a Turkish military offensive over the last year. Basbug, who assumed his new post in August 2008, said the PKK has sustained hundreds of casualties in 2008 in Turkish air and ground operations.  “The PKK is moving towards the breaking point now,” Basbug told a briefing on Sept. 16. “I do not say they are at the breaking point. How can we benefit from this? If we can succeed in it, then we can reach at breaking point.” Officials said the Turkish military has urged the government of Prime Minister Recep Erdogan to extend permission for the campaign against the PKK in northern Iraq. Parliament has approved Turkish military operations in Iraq until Oct. 17. [link]

    JAMESTOWN:  TGS still the ultimate guardian of secularism in Turkey, Basbug insists

    The Turkish military is as committed as ever to defending the principle of secularism enshrined in the country’s constitution but will resist attempts to be dragged into party politics, General Ilker Basbug, the new chief of the Turkish General Staff (TGS), told journalists in Ankara earlier this week (NTV, CNNTurk, September 17). Basbug was speaking during the second of what the military called “Communication Meetings.” On September 16 Basbug met for three and a half hours with leading Ankara-based members of the domestic and foreign print media. On September 17 he held a similar three-and-a-half-hour meeting with representatives of radio and television channels. [link]

  • Turkish army declares some regions as security zones

    Turkish army declares some regions as security zones

    The information note listed these areas as some parts of Sirnak, Siirt, Hakkari and Van.

    The Turkish General Staff declared on Thursday some regions as temporary security zones.

    Turkey’s General Staff announced some areas in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions as temporary security zones, an information note posted on the General Staff’s web-site said.

    The information note listed these areas as some parts of Sirnak, Siirt, Hakkari and Van, and said that these areas would be temporary security zones from September 13th to December 13th.

    Source: www.worldbulletin.net, 11 September 2008

  • GÜLEN, KÜÇÜK, AND THE EDUCATION OF SOUTH KURDISTAN

    GÜLEN, KÜÇÜK, AND THE EDUCATION OF SOUTH KURDISTAN

    Asagidaki yazi Kurt kokenli bir siteden, ilginc aciklamalar var..
    MeltemB
     

    Saturday, August 23, 2008

     

    “Gulen gave a new decree and a new kind of mobilization to assimilate Kurds and to steal their minds by injecting religious ideology and by causing them to sell their birthright.”
    ~ Aland Mizell.

    At the beginning of the month, I posted some news about the Ergenekon gang that had been published in Taraf. At the time, I mentioned that the nexus of the Ergenekon indictment could be found in a weirdo named Tuncay Güney:

    It would appear, however, that the lies surrounding the issue of “The Antidote” stem from Tuncay Güney, a one-time, small-time journalist in whose possession the original Ergenekon documents were found in 2001. Güney has been linked to Fethullah Gülen and Gülen’s Samanyolu TV. Güney claims to have brought the photos of Öcalan and Perinçek to MİT. He claims to have taken a bribe of $15,000 to PKK in order not to shut down Gülen’s schools in Hewler, although how PKK would have had any control over anything in Hewler is a huge question. Perhaps the KDP took the bribe by introducing themselves as PKK members? Güney also claıms to have delivered money from Fethullah Gülen to ultra-fascist Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu so that he could establish the BBP. 

    Zaman has some additional weird tidbits about Güney:

    “Meanwhile, in an interview with the Yeni Şafak daily, Tuncay Güney, a former journalist whose ties with various secret services, both domestic and international, have been documented, stated that Kurdish separatist terrorism would come to an end if the Ergenekon gang wanted that to happen. Güney, who now lives in Canada and works as a rabbi, has suspected ties to the group. Güney came to prominence when the first documents related to the Ergenekon gang were seized on his computer in a 2001 police raid.

    “Güney, currently a rabbi at the Jacobs House Jewish Community Center in Toronto, praised Ergenekon prosecutor Zekeriya Öz for having “done a great job” so far in the investigation, although he expressed doubts that the operation would be very successful in the end. “However, they are very close to the end and I think it is very difficult moving on further from this point. There is no power in Turkey that can stop Ergenekon,” he said, expressing doubts that the investigation will bring about the collapse of the crime group.”

    A check of YouTube reveals that Güney does, in fact, appear to be a member of an Orthodox Jewish community in Toronto, although he now denies any connection with Fethullah Gülen, as his appearance on Mehmet Ali Birand’s 32. Gün indicates. If the first Ergenekon documents were found in Güney’s possession, why has he not been indicted? Did he cut a deal and, if so, what kind of deal was it? Is his life now, in an Orthodox Jewish community in Toronto some kind of strange “witness protection” program?

    Now, there’s more from Güney on the connectıon between the Ergenekon gang, Fethullah Gülen, and Gülen’s schools in South Kurdistan, from Milliyet:
    Küçük knows Gülen for a long time 

    Güney, in his statement in 2001, claims that he and Mehmet Demircan, an important name in Fethullah Gülen’s movement, spent intense efforts to gain Küçük into the movement and that the two [Gülen and Küçük] knew each other for a long time.

    Tuncay Güney’s statement in 2001, which he gave to Istanbul police, is one of the most fundamental pieces of evidence that Ergenekon prosecutor Zekeriya Öz, is working on. In this statement, Tuncay Güney gave a detailed explanation of Fethullah Gülen’s movement. In the Ergenekon indictment’s 442nd file, there are interesting claims that Güney made. Here, Güney claims that, since the 1970s, Fethullah Gülen knew retired Brigadier General Veli Küçük, who is under arrest in the Ergenekon case, from the right-wing National Struggle Movement (MMH). Güney explained that he learned that Küçük and Fethullah Gülen knew each other for a long time, while he and one of Gülen’s prominent members, Mehmet Demircan, made efforts to gain Küçük to the movement.

    “All of them are strugglers for nationalism”

    When Tuncay Güney was detained in 2001 for by Istanbul police for fraud, he was working for Samanyolu TV, which is linked to the Fethullah Gülen movement. In the statement he gave to police while under interrogation, he pointed out that taking advantage of his position, he had the possibility to meet with important names in Fethullah Gülen’s movement.

    Within this framework, Güney mentions that he and Demircan tried to gain, the then active duty Veli Küçük, for the movement. “When we gain him, we will be more powerful in the eyes of Fethullah Gülen,” Güney says.

    Again, referring to Demircan, Tuncay Güney ascribed the information that Gülen knew Veli Küçük from the National Strugglers’ Movement. “Look at all of Fethullah Gülen’s members; they are all National Strugglers,” he said.

    Support for Gülen’s schools

    In his statement, Güney said that Veli Küçük helped Fethullah Gülen to open a school in Northern Iraq [South Kurdistan]. According to Güney’s statement, they had stopped in Diyarbakır, where they were on the way to Erbil, in order to open private Irbil Light College. There (in Diyarbakır), they called Veli Küçük to let him know they were there, thus Jandarma Regional Commander Eşref Hatipoğlu met them. Hatipoğlu sent Güney and Gülen’s members to Silopi in a military helicopter. From there, the group passed to Nehciban (there he means Neçirvan) and talked to Barzani and Talabani.

    “Veli Küçük’s teacher collared Erdoğan”

    Güney also made a statement about field officer Necabettin Ergenekon’s involvement with Gülen’s movement. According to Güney, Necabettin Ergenekon was Küçük’s teacher. According to Güney’s claims, Necabettin Ergenekon had talks with R. Tayyip Erdoğan, then the Refah Partisi (RP) Istanbul chairman. In one of these talks, Ergenekon caught Erdoğan by the collar and shook him. According to Guney’s statement, Erdoğan, in RP’s Tepebaşı office, was having a discussion with Necabettin Ergenekon about pan-Islamism. Then Ergenekon became nervous and grabbed Erdoğan by the collar saying, “This is bullshit, Tayyip; there won’t be pan-Islamism if there isn’t Turkism.”

    Güney said that the person who introduced him to Veli Küçük, was Veli Küçük’s teacher, Ergenekon. “The field officer in Izmit (Veli Küçük), is my student. I’ll take you and introduce you to him” said Ergenekon according to Güney.

    It was claimed that Küçük had named the Ergenekon organization after his teacher’s last name.

    He spied for Eymür about Gülen

    In his statement, Güney said that when he was in Fethullah Gülen’s movement, he was regularly informing MİT chairman Mehmet Eymür’s staff. Güney said, “When I was working there, Mehmet Eymür’s men would come and get information periodically . . . Besides this information, they were asking about the hot issues in the movement anyway.”

    In February, as war preparations against South Kurdistan were underway, Nêçîrvan Barzanî and the KRG gave the go-ahead for the foundation of a new Gülen university in Hewlêr. 

    There was no mention of anyone having given PKK a $15,000 bribe in connection with this Gülen enterprise, but that may be because any bribes would actually be given to the cehş of the KRG who are only too happy to contribute to the destruction of the Kurdish people for a price.

  • STRATFOR ; The Real World Order

    STRATFOR ; The Real World Order

    By George Friedman

    On Sept. 11, 1990, U.S. President George H. W. Bush addressed Congress. He spoke in the wake of the end of Communism in Eastern Europe, the weakening of the Soviet Union, and the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein. He argued that a New World Order was emerging: “A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor, and today that new world is struggling to be born. A world quite different from the one we’ve known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.”

    After every major, systemic war, there is the hope that this will be the war to end all wars. The idea driving it is simple. Wars are usually won by grand coalitions. The idea is that the coalition that won the war by working together will continue to work together to make the peace. Indeed, the idea is that the defeated will join the coalition and work with them to ensure the peace. This was the dream behind the Congress of Vienna, the League of Nations, the United Nations and, after the Cold War, NATO. The idea was that there would be no major issues that couldn’t be handled by the victors, now joined with the defeated. That was the idea that drove George H. W. Bush as the Cold War was coming to its end.

    Those with the dream are always disappointed. The victorious coalition breaks apart. The defeated refuse to play the role assigned to them. New powers emerge that were not part of the coalition. Anyone may have ideals and visions. The reality of the world order is that there are profound divergences of interest in a world where distrust is a natural and reasonable response to reality. In the end, ideals and visions vanish in a new round of geopolitical conflict.

    The post-Cold War world, the New World Order, ended with authority on Aug. 8, 2008, when Russia and Georgia went to war. Certainly, this war was not in itself of major significance, and a very good case can be made that the New World Order actually started coming apart on Sept. 11, 2001. But it was on Aug. 8 that a nation-state, Russia, attacked another nation-state, Georgia, out of fear of the intentions of a third nation-state, the United States. This causes us to begin thinking about the Real World Order.

    The global system is suffering from two imbalances. First, one nation-state, the United States, remains overwhelmingly powerful, and no combination of powers are in a position to control its behavior. We are aware of all the economic problems besetting the United States, but the reality is that the American economy is larger than the next three economies combined (Japan, Germany and China). The U.S. military controls all the world’s oceans and effectively dominates space. Because of these factors, the United States remains politically powerful – not liked and perhaps not admired, but enormously powerful.

    The second imbalance is within the United States itself. Its ground forces and the bulk of its logistical capability are committed to the Middle East, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States also is threatening on occasion to go to war with Iran, which would tie down most of its air power, and it is facing a destabilizing Pakistan. Therefore, there is this paradox: The United States is so powerful that, in the long run, it has created an imbalance in the global system. In the short run, however, it is so off balance that it has few, if any, military resources to deal with challenges elsewhere. That means that the United States remains the dominant power in the long run but it cannot exercise that power in the short run. This creates a window of opportunity for other countries to act.

    The outcome of the Iraq war can be seen emerging. The United States has succeeded in creating the foundations for a political settlement among the main Iraqi factions that will create a relatively stable government. In that sense, U.S. policy has succeeded. But the problem the United States has is the length of time it took to achieve this success. Had it occurred in 2003, the United States would not suffer its current imbalance. But this is 2008, more than five years after the invasion. The United States never expected a war of this duration, nor did it plan for it. In order to fight the war, it had to inject a major portion of its ground fighting capability into it. The length of the war was the problem. U.S. ground forces are either in Iraq, recovering from a tour or preparing for a deployment. What strategic reserves are available are tasked into Afghanistan. Little is left over.

    As Iraq pulled in the bulk of available forces, the United States did not shift its foreign policy elsewhere. For example, it remained committed to the expansion of democracy in the former Soviet Union and the expansion of NATO, to include Ukraine and Georgia. From the fall of the former Soviet Union, the United States saw itself as having a dominant role in reshaping post-Soviet social and political orders, including influencing the emergence of democratic institutions and free markets. The United States saw this almost in the same light as it saw the democratization of Germany and Japan after World War II. Having defeated the Soviet Union, it now fell to the United States to reshape the societies of the successor states.

    Through the 1990s, the successor states, particularly Russia, were inert. Undergoing painful internal upheaval – which foreigners saw as reform but which many Russians viewed as a foreign-inspired national catastrophe – Russia could not resist American and European involvement in regional and internal affairs. From the American point of view, the reshaping of the region – from the Kosovo war to the expansion of NATO to the deployment of U.S. Air Force bases to Central Asia – was simply a logical expansion of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was a benign attempt to stabilize the region, enhance its prosperity and security and integrate it into the global system.

    As Russia regained its balance from the chaos of the 1990s, it began to see the American and European presence in a less benign light. It was not clear to the Russians that the United States was trying to stabilize the region. Rather, it appeared to the Russians that the United States was trying to take advantage of Russian weakness to impose a new politico-military reality in which Russia was to be surrounded with nations controlled by the United States and its military system, NATO. In spite of the promise made by Bill Clinton that NATO would not expand into the former Soviet Union, the three Baltic states were admitted. The promise was not addressed. NATO was expanded because it could and Russia could do nothing about it.

    From the Russian point of view, the strategic break point was Ukraine. When the Orange Revolution came to Ukraine, the American and European impression was that this was a spontaneous democratic rising. The Russian perception was that it was a well-financed CIA operation to foment an anti-Russian and pro-American uprising in Ukraine. When the United States quickly began discussing the inclusion of Ukraine in NATO, the Russians came to the conclusion that the United States intended to surround and crush the Russian Federation. In their view, if NATO expanded into Ukraine, the Western military alliance would place Russia in a strategically untenable position. Russia would be indefensible. The American response was that it had no intention of threatening Russia. The Russian question was returned: Then why are you trying to take control of Ukraine? What other purpose would you have? The United States dismissed these Russian concerns as absurd. The Russians, not regarding them as absurd at all, began planning on the assumption of a hostile United States.

    If the United States had intended to break the Russian Federation once and for all, the time for that was in the 1990s, before Yeltsin was replaced by Putin and before 9/11. There was, however, no clear policy on this, because the United States felt it had all the time in the world. Superficially this was true, but only superficially. First, the United States did not understand that the Yeltsin years were a temporary aberration and that a new government intending to stabilize Russia was inevitable. If not Putin, it would have been someone else. Second, the United States did not appreciate that it did not control the international agenda. Sept. 11, 2001, took away American options in the former Soviet Union. No only did it need Russian help in Afghanistan, but it was going to spend the next decade tied up in the Middle East. The United States had lost its room for maneuver and therefore had run out of time.

    And now we come to the key point. In spite of diminishing military options outside of the Middle East, the United States did not modify its policy in the former Soviet Union. It continued to aggressively attempt to influence countries in the region, and it became particularly committed to integrating Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, in spite of the fact that both were of overwhelming strategic interest to the Russians. Ukraine dominated Russia’s southwestern flank, without any natural boundaries protecting them. Georgia was seen as a constant irritant in Chechnya as well as a barrier to Russian interests in the Caucasus.

    Moving rapidly to consolidate U.S. control over these and other countries in the former Soviet Union made strategic sense. Russia was weak, divided and poorly governed. It could make no response. Continuing this policy in the 2000s, when the Russians were getting stronger, more united and better governed and while U.S. forces were no longer available, made much less sense. The United States continued to irritate the Russians without having, in the short run, the forces needed to act decisively.

    The American calculation was that the Russian government would not confront American interests in the region. The Russian calculation was that it could not wait to confront these interests because the United States was concluding the Iraq war and would return to its pre-eminent position in a few short years. Therefore, it made no sense for Russia to wait and it made every sense for Russia to act as quickly as possible.

    The Russians were partly influenced in their timing by the success of the American surge in Iraq. If the United States continued its policy and had force to back it up, the Russians would lose their window of opportunity. Moreover, the Russians had an additional lever for use on the Americans: Iran.

    The United States had been playing a complex game with Iran for years, threatening to attack while trying to negotiate. The Americans needed the Russians. Sanctions against Iran would have no meaning if the Russians did not participate, and the United States did not want Russia selling advance air defense systems to Iran. (Such systems, which American analysts had warned were quite capable, were not present in Syria on Sept. 6, 2007, when the Israelis struck a nuclear facility there.) As the United States re-evaluates the Russian military, it does not want to be surprised by Russian technology. Therefore, the more aggressive the United States becomes toward Russia, the greater the difficulties it will have in Iran. This further encouraged the Russians to act sooner rather than later.

    The Russians have now proven two things. First, contrary to the reality of the 1990s, they can execute a competent military operation. Second, contrary to regional perception, the United States cannot intervene. The Russian message was directed against Ukraine most of all, but the Baltics, Central Asia and Belarus are all listening. The Russians will not act precipitously. They expect all of these countries to adjust their foreign policies away from the United States and toward Russia. They are looking to see if the lesson is absorbed. At first, there will be mighty speeches and resistance. But the reality on the ground is the reality on the ground.

    We would expect the Russians to get traction. But if they don’t, the Russians are aware that they are, in the long run, much weaker than the Americans, and that they will retain their regional position of strength only while the United States is off balance in Iraq. If the lesson isn’t absorbed, the Russians are capable of more direct action, and they will not let this chance slip away. This is their chance to redefine their sphere of influence. They will not get another.

    The other country that is watching and thinking is Iran. Iran had accepted the idea that it had lost the chance to dominate Iraq. It had also accepted the idea that it would have to bargain away its nuclear capability or lose it. The Iranians are now wondering if this is still true and are undoubtedly pinging the Russians about the situation. Meanwhile, the Russians are waiting for the Americans to calm down and get serious. If the Americans plan to take meaningful action against them, they will respond in Iran. But the Americans have no meaningful actions they can take; they need to get out of Iraq and they need help against Iran. The quid pro quo here is obvious. The United States acquiesces to Russian actions (which it can’t do anything about), while the Russians cooperate with the Unit ed States against Iran getting nuclear weapons (something Russia does not want to see).

    One of the interesting concepts of the New World Order was that all serious countries would want to participate in it and that the only threat would come from rogue states and nonstate actors such as North Korea and al Qaeda. Serious analysts argued that conflict between nation-states would not be important in the 21st century. There will certainly be rogue states and nonstate actors, but the 21st century will be no different than any other century. On Aug. 8, the Russians invited us all to the Real World Order.

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