Tag: DHKP-C

  • Untangling the Threads of Terrorism in Turkey

    Untangling the Threads of Terrorism in Turkey

    Scott Stewart

    Scott Stewart supervises Stratfor’s analysis of terrorism and security issues. Before joining Stratfor, he was a special agent with the U.S. State Department for 10 years and was involved in hundreds of terrorism investigations.

    Emergency services respond to a March 19 attack on Istanbul’s Istiklal Street, an area popular among tourists. Turkey faces a terrorist threat from three distinct groups, each with its own methods. (BURAK KARA/Getty Image

    image003

    Three strands of terrorism currently have Turkey wrapped in a deadly embrace. One strand made its presence felt March 19, when a suicide bomber detonated his device among a group of tourists on Istiklal Street, one of Istanbul’s main pedestrian shopping areas, killing at least four people and wounding dozens, including 24 foreigners. The attack occurred near a local government office, in an area that includes restaurants, cafes and foreign consulates. Turkish authorities have since identified the bomber as a Turkish member of the Islamic State they had been seeking to arrest. Unfortunately, he was able to attack before he could be apprehended.

    The second thread is the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), a domestic militant group that seeks independence or autonomy in southeastern Turkey and that is a direct offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). On March 13, the TAK detonated a car bomb that killed 37 in a central Ankara neighborhood, its second large vehicle bomb attack in the Turkish capital this year.

    The third strand is the Marxist Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C). Two female operatives from the group attacked a police bus with firearms and a hand grenade as it was approaching a police station in Istanbul’s Bayrampasa district on March 3. They succeeded in wounding two officers before being confronted and killed by police.

    Though all three of these groups employ terrorism, each does so in a distinct manner. When these strands are unraveled and examined separately, important lessons can be gleaned about the capabilities of each group and the threat each poses.

    Focusing on the How

    Terrorist attacks do not just happen. They are the result of a process called the terrorist attack cycle. While every terrorist actor must follow the cycle to conduct an attack, the manner in which they do varies. By examining the terrorist tradecraft employed by a specific group and focusing on how attacks are conducted, it is possible to detect discernable patterns. These patterns can then be used to help identify the operative or group responsible for a particular attack. This is especially useful in a case where no organization claims responsibility for an attack or a group uses a false name in an effort to hide its hand.

    Terrorists can and do improve their tradecraft, but this is normally an evolutionary process rather than a quantum leap, and there are normally indicators of a group’s evolving capabilities. This process of incremental advancement can be skipped when a terrorist actor receives outside assistance and training by someone with more advanced capabilities. This has historically been a state sponsor such as the Soviet KGB or East German Stasi, or a more experienced terrorist organization such as the Irish Republican Army, which taught bomb making in terrorist camps in Lebanon, Libya and Yemen. In recent years, such a leap occurred in Nigeria in mid-2011 when Boko Haram and Ansaru suddenly transitioned from using small improvised grenades to successfully employing vehicle bombs. This happened after Nigerian militants reportedly received training from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al Shabaab.

    The Islamic State in Turkey

    Islamic State attacks inside Turkey have been for the most part unsophisticated and aimed at soft targets. In January 2015, the pregnant Chechen widow of an Islamic State fighter detonated a hand grenade at a guard post outside a tourist police station in Istanbul’s Sultanahmet district, killing herself and one police officer. It is unclear whether the group was responsible for the attack or if the woman planned and executed it herself. But in mid-2015, the Islamic State began a carefully orchestrated campaign of attacking Kurdish interests in Turkey in an effort to increase Kurdish/Turkish tensions. In June 2015, a pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) rally was targeted by two bombs left in the crowd in Diyarbakir, leaving four HDP members dead and over 100 injured. In July 2015, a suicide bomber attacked a rally at a Kurdish cultural center in Suruc, killing 33 and wounding over 100. Then in October 2015, a double suicide bombing at an HDP rally killed 103 and wounded more than 400 in the deadliest terrorist attack in modern Turkish history.

    In 2016, the Islamic State shifted its focus to tourist targets. On Jan. 12, a suicide bomber attacked a group of foreign tourists near the Blue Mosque in Istanbul’s Sultanahmet district, killing 13 — mostly German tourists — and wounding nine. The March 19 suicide bombing on Istiklal Street mirrored this attack.

    While the Islamic State has demonstrated that it can reach targets in Istanbul and Ankara, to date, none of the Islamic State attacks in Turkey have demonstrated a high degree of terrorist tradecraft. As we have previously noted, the Islamic State has struggled to project its terrorist power beyond its core areas of operation, and has not exhibited the same type of advanced transnational terrorist tradecraft capabilities that al Qaeda possesses. Because of this, even foreign attacks directly tied to the Islamic State’s core, such as the November 2015 Paris attacks, have been simple attacks directed against soft targets rather than more sophisticated attacks.

    To date, relatively simple attacks have met the group’s needs in Turkey, but given the low body count in the March 19 bombing, it might not be surprising to see the group shift to armed assaults in Turkey in an effort to generate higher death tolls. The group will likely have to develop more sophisticated surveillance and other capabilities before it will be able to successfully attack better-protected targets in hostile environments such as Ankara and Istanbul. Because of this, and the current campaign of targeting foreigners, we can anticipate additional Islamic State attacks against locations where foreigners congregate, such as tourist sites, restaurants, hotels, etc. These may include armed assaults in addition to suicide bombings.

    The TAK

    There is some uncertainty regarding the relationship between the PKK and the TAK. Some observers claim that the TAK is a radical splinter that broke away from the PKK. Others maintain that the TAK is actually a PKK urban warfare unit using another name to deflect blame from the political group, or an autonomous unit that subscribes to the PKK’s general philosophy but does not operate under its direct guidance. Stratfor ascribes to the latter position because of the close correlation between TAK attacks and the PKK’s cease-fire — they ceased attacks before the cease-fire was proclaimed in March 2013, and resumed them shortly after the cease-fire was ended in November 2015. If the TAK was really a more radical splinter of the PKK, it could have been expected to conduct attacks after the PKK proclaimed its unilateral cease-fire. For its part, TAK claims it is separate from the PKK, but Stratfor believes it is more important to judge the group by what it does than what it says for public consumption.

    The TAK began their activity with a series of low-level attacks against tourist sites along the Aegean Sea in 2005-2006. Unlike the recent Islamic State attacks in Istanbul, these strikes were meant more to scare tourists away and damage the Turkish economy rather than produce a large body count. In 2008, the TAK shifted its operations to target Istanbul, with deadly effect. The group’s first attack in Istanbul in October 2008 killed 17 and injured more than 150. In October 2010, it initiated a series of suicide bombings in Ankara, targeting police and security forces. As noted, TAK operations correlate closely with PKK sentiments. When the PKK negotiated with the government, proclaiming a cease-fire in 2013, the TAK attacks ended.

    But while the TAK temporarily ended hostilities, it appears that the group’s operational activity did not cease. The group announced its reactivation in a spectacular fashion in December 2015 with a mortar attack on Istanbul’s Sabiha Gokcen International Airport. The attack, launched at 2 a.m. local time, killed one airport worker and damaged several aircraft parked on the tarmac. The timing of the attack indicated that it was likely meant to be more symbolic than deadly. A much deadlier attack would come in February when the TAK targeted a military transport bus near a military housing complex in Ankara with a suicide car bomb that killed 29 and wounded dozens more.

    Then, on March 13, the organization conducted another suicide car bomb attack against a bus, this one near a transportation hub in the heart of Ankara. That particular action killed 37 and wounded more than 120. In a statement claiming credit, the TAK said that the attack had been intended to target security forces rather than civilians but noted that further civilian casualties are inevitable.

    The TAK and PKK have long focused their attacks on security forces, so the statement’s claim that civilians were killed by mistake could be true. However, the Turkish military’s recent operations against the PKK in southeastern Turkey have been heavy-handed, and a number of civilians have died as a result. Because of this, it is possible that the TAK was retaliating for the Kurdish civilian deaths and glossing over that fact for the international audience. These Kurdish terrorist groups have no real motive to attack foreigners, and indeed, they are attempting to appeal for outside support to pressure Turkey to stop its campaign against them. So, directly attacking foreigners makes little sense. Still, with the TAK using powerful suicide car bombs in its current campaign, there is a possibility of foreign citizens being caught in the wrong place at the wrong time. The TAK does not appear to be experiencing a shortage of explosives or willing suicide operatives. In addition, the group seems to have a robust planning and logistics capability. Therefore, we can expect more attacks directed against security forces in Ankara and elsewhere. However, to date the TAK has not exhibited the ability to directly attack hardened targets, such as ministry buildings or government officials with protective details.

    Foreigners visiting government buildings and security force installations are at risk, as are foreigners living near government installations or along routes used by security force transport buses. Given that the group has at least one mortar, it is likely that they will conduct other indirect fire attacks at government facilities in addition to continued suicide bomb attacks.

    The DHKP-C

    The Marxist Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front can trace its lineage back to the old Revolutionary Left or Dev Sol militant group that has been fighting the Turkish government since the 1970s. Yet despite this long and violent heritage, the DHKP-C is more ambitious than it is capable. Since 2000, the group has carried out only about a dozen effective armed assaults, suicide bombings and assassinations. Many of the group’s attempted attacks have been thwarted or botched, including a May 2003 attack in which a DHKP-C member accidentally discharged her suicide device inside a restroom. The group was also behind the failed February 2013 suicide bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Ankara.

    What the group lacks in capability it makes up for in persistence. Two members of the group stormed an Istanbul courthouse and took a prosecutor hostage before being gunned down — the prosecutor was also killed during the exchange of fire. In August 2015, the DHKP-C employed a car bomb and armed assault against a police station in Istanbul’s Sultanbeyli district in an attack that killed one police officer. The same day, two of the group’s members also attempted an amateurish armed assault against the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul.

    The March 3 attack against a police bus in Istanbul was perhaps inspired by or modeled after the February TAK bus attack in Ankara, but its execution displayed the hallmarks of a typical DHKP-C attack. Security camera footage of the attack showed that the female operatives were ill at ease with their firearms and displayed poor marksmanship fundamentals. Also, the hand grenade they threw at the bus did not detonate. With this amateurish execution, it is not surprising that despite choosing a soft target, only two police officers were wounded and none killed.

    The DHKP-C is mostly focused on attacking the Turkish government and U.S. diplomatic facilities. Because of this, tourists and business travelers are not likely to be directly targeted but could be unintended casualties or be caught in the wrong place at the wrong time.

    These three groups differ in capability, motivation, intent and tradecraft, but they are all deadly, and can all be expected to continue to go after soft targets in Turkey for the foreseeable future. Of these, the TAK is the most capable at the present time, but the Islamic State is the most likely to directly target foreigners.

  • Turkish Police Foil Al-Qaeda US Embassy Plot

    Turkish Police Foil Al-Qaeda US Embassy Plot

    Turkish police have uncovered and foiled an alleged plot by Al-Qaeda to bomb the United States embassy in Ankara, as well as a synagogue and other targets in Istanbul, Turkish media reported on Friday.

    img415813As a result of a February raid in Istanbul and the northeastern city of Corlu, police had arrested 12 people, including eight Turks, two Azeris and two Chechens, and seized 22 kilograms of explosives, CNNTurk reported.

    Police also found documents that allegedly revealed plans by the group, which they described as a Turkish cell of Al-Qaeda, to attack a synagogue and a museum in Istanbul.

    The embassy in Ankara was the target of a suicide bombing on February 1, which killed a Turkish security guard. That attack was claimed by a radical Marxist and anti-US armed group, The Revolutionary People’s Liberation Front (DHKP-C), blacklisted by the United States and the European Union as a terrorist organization.

    via Turkish Police Foil Al-Qaeda US Embassy Plot – Middle East – News – Israel National News.

  • Turkey Bombings: DHKP-C, Marxist Group, Claims Attacks On Ruling Party Headquarters, Justice Ministry

    Turkey Bombings: DHKP-C, Marxist Group, Claims Attacks On Ruling Party Headquarters, Justice Ministry

    ANKARA, Turkey — A banned leftist group that carried out a suicide bombing at the U.S. Embassy last month claimed responsibility for attacks on two government offices in the Turkish capital on Wednesday.

    Assailants fired a rocket at Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s party headquarters and hurled two hand-grenades at the Justice Ministry’s parking lot late Tuesday, wounding one person.

    The outlawed Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front, or DHKP-C, said it carried out the attacks in retaliation for a recent police crackdown on its members, in a statement posted on a website linked to the group.

    The statement said the group’s “warriors” attacked the two building, accusing Erdogan’s government of “injustices.” It also threatened more attacks.

    Hundreds of members of the group were arrested in a series of police raids in the past two months. A security guard was killed in the group’s suicide bombing attack at the U.S. embassy in Ankara last month.  DHKP-C has claimed responsibility for assassinations and bombings since the 1970s, but it has been relatively quiet in recent years.

    DHKP-C is considered as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States and the European Union.

    U.S. Ambassador Francis Riccardonne visited the ruling party’s headquarters on Wednesday to express his country’s solidarity with Turkey.

    via Turkey Bombings: DHKP-C, Marxist Group, Claims Attacks On Ruling Party Headquarters, Justice Ministry.

  • Turkey, Syria and the dynamics of ‘cold war redux’

    Turkey, Syria and the dynamics of ‘cold war redux’

    Turkey, Syria and the dynamics of ‘cold war redux’

    Karabekir Akkoyunlu 17 February 2013
    Subjects:

    • Conflict
    • Civil society
    • Democracy and government
    • Economics
    • International politics
    • Russia
    • Iraq
    • Iran
    • EU
    • United States
    • Syria
    • Turkey
    • middle east
    • Can Europe make it?
    • Geopolitics
    • Violent transitions
    • Arab Awakening
    • Security in Middle East and North Africa
    • Syria’s peace: what, how, when?

    Syria’s neighbours, including Turkey, have the most to lose from an intensifying Syrian conflict, as they directly bear the brunt of it. Thus it is imperative that there is some sort of dialogue across the geopolitical divide. The EU is conspicuous in its absence.

    Ecevit Şanlı, the man who carried out the suicide attack at the US embassy in Ankara on February 1, was not a radical Islamist. Unlike the perpetrators of the previous two attacks against western diplomatic interests in Turkey – the bombing of the British and the US consulates in Istanbul in 2003 and 2008, respectively – the 40-year-old militant did not have ties to any jihadist network.

    Şanlı belonged to the ‘Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front’ (DHKP-C), a Marxist-Leninist group known for targeting police officers and NATO personnel in Turkey during the 1980s and the early 90s. The group’s emergence as the culprit of the Ankara bombing has rekindled memories of Cold War-era tensions. But more than just a blast from the past, the incident reveals the shifting alliances and emerging battle lines across Turkey, and indeed, much of the Middle East today.

    Less than two weeks before the embassy attack, the Turkish police rounded up 85 people in a countrywide raid against alleged members and collaborators of the DHKP-C. Among those detained were students, musicians as well as 15 lawyers from the Progressive Lawyers’ Association, which handles high-profile cases of police brutality, torture and other civil rights violations.

    A week later, Pinar Selek, a feminist writer and sociologist researching on Kurdish rights, was sentenced to life in prison in a case that has sparked considerable international furore. Selek has been accused of involvement in an explosion in Istanbul’s Spice Bazaar that killed 7 people in 1998 – a charge she was already acquitted of three times in the past.

    And in late December, several hundred students clashed with a 3,500-strong police force inside the campus of the Middle East Technical University (ODTU) during a visit by the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. ODTU was the heart of the left-wing student movement in Turkey during the 1970s and still cherishes that reputation as an institution. A dozen students were detained after the clashes for suspected links to the DHKP-C.

    Cold War redux…

    Indeed, there seems to be more than just a flavour of the Cold War in Turkey’s emerging political divide. On one side of this divide, there is the Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, led by charismatic Erdoğan to a third successive general election victory in 2011 on the back of a booming economy and growing international stature. This is the party that put in place sweeping democratising reforms during the early 2000s and officially initiated Turkey’s membership talks with the European Union in 2005. But as Erdoğan’s government grew in strength, taming the country’s powerful military guardians along the way, it also adopted a visibly authoritarian rhetoric with forceful nationalist and Sunni Islamic undertones. This rhetoric has been reinforced by Erdoğan’s personal ambition to replace Turkey’s existing parliamentary system with a presidential one, which he plans to take over from 2014. This could be a powerful presidency in the US mould, but crucially with few of its checks and balances, it is arguably more along the lines of Mohammad Morsi’s presidency in Egypt.

    On the other side – also comparable to the emerging Egyptian bloc against Morsi – we come across a wide spectrum of highly disparate and often antagonistic groups that unite in their opposition to the AKP, and in little else. These include, roughly, social democrats who criticise the government’s neo-liberal socio-economic policies; liberals disillusioned by its abandoned pursuit of EU membership; hardliner leftists who vehemently oppose Turkey’s NATO and EU engagements; Alevis and Kurds who have been marginalised by the hegemonic Sunni-Turkish patriarchy now upheld by Erdoğan’s government; as well as secularist Turks who represented that patriarchy until recently and despise the AKP not only for its promotion of religious and ‘provincial’ values and its campaign against the Kemalist military, but also for its periodic ‘concessions’ towards the Kurds.

    Astonishingly, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), has been at pains to accommodate all these groups at once. As a result, the party has become largely dysfunctional, marred by fighting between its ideologically irreconcilable factions, and thus posing scant challenge to Erdoğan’s highly disciplined and hierarchically organised party machinery.

    For the AKP government the line between legal and illegal opposition has become blurred. The prime minister readily labels whoever clashes with his ubiquitous police force as terrorists. His former interior minister, Idris Naim Şahin, once notoriously declared that a terrorist did not have to be an armed militant, but could also be a poet, painter, singer, satirist or academic. With its broad and highly illiberal scope, the current anti-terrorism legislation reflects Şahin’s worldview.

    The legislation allows for left-leaning students, artists and activists to be easily linked to groups like the DHKP-C on spurious grounds, and landed in prison. The same goes for prominent Kurdish politicians, elected mayors, academics, publishers and lawyers who were arrested en masse between 2010 an 2012 for aiding and abetting the urban faction of the Kurdish separatist group PKK. At the other end of the spectrum, scores of secularist journalists, academics and Kemalist activists have found themselves behind bars alongside hundreds of military officers on charges of coup-plotting and membership in an ultra-nationalist terror network known as Ergenekon.

    But such measures have done little to eliminate militant groups or curtail their activities. On the contrary, marginal groups like the DHKP-C appear emboldened, as evidenced by the US embassy attack in Ankara. More people died in fighting between an energised PKK and the Turkish state between the summer of 2011 and the fall of 2012 than at any time since the apprehension of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999. And legal inconsistencies and suspicions of political revanchism have watered down the Ergenekon case, dampening hopes that it would provide an historic opportunity for the Turkish state to cleanse itself of its ultra-nationalist, criminal and putschist elements – the so-called “deep state”.

    This is the dark underbelly of a country that has been widely praised as the ‘victor of the Arab Spring’ and presented by foreign policy strategists on both sides of the Atlantic, and indeed by the Obama administration itself, as a shining model of stability, democratic governance and ‘moderate Islam’ for the ascendant Sunni Islamist movements across the Arab world. Does this suggest there is a fundamental disconnect between Turkey’s own socio-political fault lines and the regional dynamics of the new Middle East? It does not. On the contrary, the two are intimately connected.

    …with a sectarian twist

    Turkey’s decision-makers saw in the Arab uprisings an opportunity to realise Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s longstanding vision of establishing Turkey as the “order setting agent” in a geography spanning from the Balkans to the Middle East, connected by trade and diplomatic ties based on a shared historical and religious heritage dating back to the Ottoman Empire. But the ‘Arab Spring’ also forced the Turkish government to abandon a fundamental pillar of this vision, Davutoğlu’s much-touted “zero problems with neighbours” policy, with the Bahraini uprising and the Syrian conflict redrawing geopolitical battle lines along the oldest schism within Islam: the Sunni-Shia rivalry. As the Syrian uprising evolved into full-blown civil war, the Turkish government has moved from being a friend of the Assad regime to being one of its staunchest opponents. Ankara’s volte-face has strained its carefully nurtured ties with Syria’s principle supporters, namely Iran, Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Russia.

    The conflict has also thrown Turkey on the same side with an odd mix of Sunni actors, including the Gulf Arab monarchies that are locked in rivalry with Iran, the Kurdish administration in Northern Iraq, whose relationship with the Shia-dominated central government in Baghdad has steadily deteriorated, as well as popular movements like Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestinian Hamas; all, with the exception of the latter, staunch allies of the US. To this, we may even add a range of ultra-conservative Salafist groups and violent jihadist networks. Finally, it has brought Turkey firmly into the fold of NATO following a brief spell of autonomous foreign policy making, putting to rest, for now, the alarmist discourse of Turkey’s imminent departure from the west. Drawn together by shared strategic interests arising out of the Arab uprisings, the US and the Turkish governments have entered what Davutoğlu has called the “golden era” of bilateral relations.

    If the foreign policy strategists in Ankara calculated Assad would meet the same speedy end as Tunisia’s Ben Ali or Egypt’s Mubarak, to be replaced by a Sunni-dominated government that would look to Turkey as a close ally and model, soon they had a rude awakening. By 2012, Turkey was on the receiving end of a bulging refugee crisis, disrupted trade relations and occasional mortar fire by the Syrian army across its southern border, not to mention an enlivened PKK carrying out violent attacks inside the country. But instead of rallying the public behind its leaders in the face of an external challenge, the Syrian conflict, and the geopolitical power struggle it has spurned in the region, has actually deepened Turkey’s existing divisions.

    At the same time as the AKP officials exchanged threats with their Syrian counterparts, parliamentarians from the opposition CHP paid cordial visits to Damascus, meeting regime representatives. While the pro-AKP media have been covering extensively the atrocities carried out by the Assad regime, opposition news outlets tend to detail the massacres perpetrated by the Free Syrian Army. However, it would be far too simplistic to suggest that domestic criticisms of the government’s Syria policy have been driven purely by an ideological affinity for the Assad regime. This may be the case for hardliner leftists, who read the Syrian conflict as a struggle between the forces of western imperialism, of which the AKP is considered a top agent, and those of the anti-imperialist resistance, very much in line with the discourse put forward by the Shia “axis of resistance”, or indeed for secularist Turks, who sympathise with the fate of a secular dictatorship being taken apart by western-backed Islamists.

    But there are in fact other, arguably less ideological reasons for this ambivalence as well. Tensions have been rife between Turkey’s small Alawite community (referred to as Nusayri in Turkey) and the free roaming Salafists and jihadists who have been using Alawite-populated towns in the border province of Antakya as safe haven in their fight against the Alawites of Syria. For the country’s much larger Alevi community, which shares with the Alawites a distant Shia heritage, the government’s Sunni discourse has become more aggressive and hegemonic over the course of the Syrian conflict. And for yet others, the moral high ground that the Turkish prime minister has claimed by championing the causes of freedom and democracy in the Arab world clearly contradicts his government’s illiberal and anti-democratic tendencies at home. This in turn raises the question whether Turkey’s promotion by the US as a model for the emerging Arab polities has more to do with the country’s success in terms of human rights and democratisation, or the strategic needs of the western security establishment in the new Middle East.

    What is to be done?

    Ultimately, the bombing of the US embassy in Ankara by a leftist militant group at a time when NATO is deploying Patriot missiles on Turkey’s border with Syria comes as a telling sign of the changing times and dynamics for Turkey and for the region as a whole.

    With the western security establishment once again aligned with a constellation of Sunni actors, it signals, if not the definitive end, at least a temporary break from the culture wars spawned by Osama Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda and George W. Bush’s neo-conservatives that culminated in the terrible conflict in Iraq. But the new arrangement – somewhat reminiscent of the Cold War-era geopolitical alliances and rivalries, with a sectarian twist and more independent regional players – is already proving as polarising and destructive as the old one. What can (or should) Turkey, its neighbours and its western partners do to avoid a further slide down this dangerous path?

    To start with the obvious, the future course and the outcome of the Syrian conflict are of vital importance for all concerned. Contrary to popular wisdom, the critical issue here is not whether Bashar al-Assad will stay or go, but rather how Syria’s different ethnic and religious communities can coexist after all the violence. As things stand, there are two possible scenarios: the first is an all out war until one side completely destroys the other. This is the path collectively taken so far and it is the most perilous one: the battle of Syria is no longer just a battle for Syria; it is also for survival and hegemony in the wider region. As such, a fight ‘till the bitter end’ has the potential to create a vicious cycle of violence and retribution within a much larger geography than Syria. Indeed, it is difficult not to see the link between an intensifying Syrian conflict and escalating military tensions in the Persian Gulf.

    The other, admittedly more difficult scenario involves a compromised settlement with the participation of all involved parties. This can only happen if and when these parties come to a realisation that continued violence in Syria only further destabilises the Middle East. Syria’s neighbours, including Turkey, have the most to lose from this, as they directly bear the brunt of the conflict. Thus it is imperative that there is some sort of dialogue across the geopolitical divide. For Turkey, this also necessitates – and can in turn facilitate – internal socio-political dialogue. Cautious attempts between Turkey, Iran and Russia to re-establish cooperation at the end of 2012 can be seen as a constructive step in this direction.

    Secondly, Turkey’s western partners, especially the United States, should stop promoting Turkey as a ‘beacon of stability, democracy and moderate Islam’ for the region. Not only does this narrative paint a misleading picture of the country at present, but by adding to the hubris of its governing elite, it also arguably contributes to their slide towards authoritarianism. But even if the Obama administration did have leverage over the AKP government to influence its domestic conduct, it is still questionable whether it would have the intent to use this to nudge Turkey towards a democratic agenda at the risk of jeopardising the existing strategic relationship.

    Conversely, the one western actor that until recently possessed both the intent and the leverage to steer Turkey towards a democratic path has been conspicuous in its absence from the discussion. Yet for all its internal woes, the European Union cannot afford to divest itself from its Mediterranean neighbourhood. It might be argued that Europe’s socio-economic crises and Turkey’s entanglement in the Middle East’s confrontations have put too wide a wedge between the two sides. But this is also precisely what makes re-engagement and regional cooperation desirable, even a necessity for both actors, despite the apparent lack of enthusiasm in resuscitating Turkey’s stalled accession process to the EU.

    Finally, Turkey’s political actors should seize the opportunities that the new geopolitical arrangement throws out to mend its domestic divisions, not to intensify them. One such opportunity is presented by the strategic rapprochement between the Turkish government and the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq on the basis of intensive trade and energy links as well as a shared rivalry with the Maliki government in Baghdad. This is also a chance for Turkey to make amends with its own Kurdish population. To their credit, by publicly entering into negotiations for disarmament, the release of political prisoners and ultimately a peace settlement as of the new year, the AKP government and the PKK have shown that they are aware of this nascent opportunity and are willing to seize it.

    An end to the three-decade conflict would remove the most contentious issue that continues to polarise society and politics in Turkey at the present day, and profoundly alter regional dynamics in Turkey’s favour. This of course is by no means a foregone conclusion. The fragile process already faces pitfalls and obstacles, not least in the shape of an incentive to undermine it by Turkey’s southern neighbours – Iran, Iraq and Syria – or by its own deep state. It also risks being undone by the government’s nationalist instincts and the various sectarian and political divisions among the Kurds.

    Even if a settlement can be reached, there is no guarantee that this would make Turkey a more democratic country in the long term. One possible scenario is that it would strengthen the existing authoritarian tendency by opening the way for Erdoğan to become the all-powerful president that he intends to be on the back of a rising Sunni populism. But this is a risk that might be worth taking now and contending with in due course, especially considering the alternatives. Ultimately there is little doubt that a Turkey torn with ideological divisions, ethnic strife and sectarian tensions would very much look like the Turkey of the Cold War years and represent a source of instability for both its Middle Eastern and European neighbourhoods.

  • France-Turkey student sentenced on terrorism charges

    France-Turkey student sentenced on terrorism charges

    ANKARA: A court in Turkey on Friday sentenced a French-Turkish student to more than five years in prison for “terrorist propaganda” but allowed her to return to France pending an appeal, her lawyer said.

    The lawyer, Inayet Aksu, said the court in the northwestern city of Bursa had sentenced Sevil Sevimli, 21, to five years and two months in prison but freed her until her planned appeal and did not require that she stay in Turkey. She will however have to pay 10,000 Turkish lira (around 4,200 euros, $5,600) in bail before she leaves, Aksu said.

    The exchange student was arrested after joining a May Day parade in Istanbul and went on trial in September on charges that risked up to 32 years in prison. Aksu said that while she was initially accused of belonging to a terrorist organisation, she was only found guilty of disseminating propaganda on behalf of an outlawed group.

    Sevimli, who was detained for three months before her release under court supervision in August, is accused of links to the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C). The far-left extremist group is listed as a terrorist organisation by the United States and the European Union. It claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing at the US embassy in Ankara this month that killed a Turkish security guard.

    Since 1976, the DHKP-C has been behind numerous attacks against the Turkish state that have killed dozens. Sevimli has denied the accusations, calling them “ridiculous”. In November, Aksu told the judge, “Her only fault is to come to Turkey as a student with leftist ideas”.

    Born in France to Turkish Kurd parents, Sevimli was completing a final year of studies in Turkey under Erasmus, the inter-European university exchange scheme, at the time of her arrest. Her friends and supporters greeted the news of her imminent return to France, expected Wednesday, with joy.

    “It’s first off a huge relief to know that Sevil can leave Turkish territory,” said the head of her school in France, Jean-Luc Mayaud of Lyon-2 University.

    via France-Turkey student sentenced on terrorism charges – thenews.com.pk.

  • A Look at Turkey’s Past Gives Some Insight Into Its Unresolved Troubles

    A Look at Turkey’s Past Gives Some Insight Into Its Unresolved Troubles

    A Look at Turkey’s Past Gives Some Insight Into Its Unresolved Troubles

    By TIM ARANGO
    Published: February 8, 2013

    ISTANBUL — Two galleries in this city’s old European quarter recently opened exhibitions that showcase the political violence that convulsed the country in the 1970s. The echoes for contemporary Turkey were unmistakable.

    turkey-popup
    SITE Intelligence Group, via Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

    Alisan Sanli, identified as the bomber in the embassy attack last week.

    On one wall are rows of old newspapers that chronicled through blaring headlines and grainy photographs the bloody street fighting and chaotic demonstrations that culminated in a military coup in 1980.

    “Socialist revolution can only be achieved in Turkey through armed victory,” is how one newspaper of the time described the aims of a radical left-wing group that promised to use “revolutionary terror” and “urban chaos” to realize Marxist rule.

    That bloody past burst violently into the present with last week’s suicide bombing of the American Embassy in the Turkish capital, Ankara. Initially assumed by many to be the work of Islamic extremists, the attack was quickly traced by the authorities to a man who sneaked into the country by boat from a Greek island in the Aegean Sea and was linked to a homegrown left-wing extremist group whose roots lie in the tumult of the ’70s.

    As such, the bombing — even though it struck an American target and was motivated in part by American policy in the Middle East — revealed more about modern Turkey, its violent past and potential for instability than it did about the United States’ campaign against terrorism.

    “This was no Benghazi,” wrote Ross Wilson, a former American ambassador to Turkey, in an online column for the Atlantic Council, referring to last year’s attack by Islamic extremists on a diplomatic outpost in Libya that resulted in the death of the American ambassador and three others.

    For Turkey, the attack was an unpleasant reminder that despite a decade of reforms under the current ruling party, which is rooted in political Islam and headed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey has yet to fully emerge from its dark past. Coming at a time when Turkey, with its prosperous economy and political stability, is trying to present itself as a model for countries convulsed by the Arab Spring revolutions, the attack served for many Turks as a reminder of the work left to put their own house in order.

    “I think what people have forgotten, because of what happened here in the last 10 years, was how violent Turkish politics used to be,” said Gerald Knaus, of the European Stability Initiative, a policy research organization based in Istanbul. “In the last 10 years Turkey tried to emerge from this period of political violence and confront the skeletons in its closet. But we’ve forgotten how many skeletons there were.”

    The attack also underscored how Turkey’s rulers sometimes use those skeletons to justify a growing crackdown on dissent, particularly with a campaign against the news media that has Turkey as the world’s leading jailer of journalists — more even than China or Iran.

    “If the activist who blew himself up today had possessed a press card, they would have called him a journalist,” Mr. Erdogan said in comments broadcast on Turkish television shortly after the bombing last week that were immediately condemned by the advocacy group Reporters Without Borders.

    Before the attack, Turkish security forces rounded up nearly 100 people accused of ties to the outlawed Revolutionary People’s Liberation Front, the organization the perpetrator belonged to, among them journalists, lawyers, even members of a rock band. The arrests were condemned by human rights groups as another example of Turkey’s broad use of antiterrorism laws to crack down on domestic opponents, particularly journalists and human rights lawyers, with no links to violent activities.

    “Turkey’s overbroad antiterrorism laws have been used against an ever-widening circle of people charged for nonviolent political activities and the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression, association and assembly,” Human Rights Watch wrote in a report condemning many of the arrests.

    Efkan Bolac, a member of the Contemporary Lawyers Association, was detained in that roundup but was released for lack of evidence.

    “A lawyer doesn’t become a rapist if he represents one, or a drug dealer if he represents one,” Mr. Bolac said. “They claim we are members of a terror group, but how is that possible when we spend our entire time at courthouses?”

    This week the American ambassador to Turkey, Francis J. Ricciardone Jr., said the F.B.I. was investigating the attack and suggested that the Justice Department might prosecute the group that carried out the bombing.

    Yet the attack seemed out of another time and carried a whiff of cold-war-era intrigue, when links between the C.I.A. and Turkey were central to efforts by the United States to counter Soviet influence in the region. It also upended the conventional narrative about modern terrorism. “You’d think 10 years after the war on terror things would be clearer rather than more obfuscated,” said Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University.

    In his column in The Hurriyet Daily News, Nihat Ali Ozcan, a security specialist at the Economic Policy Research Foundation in Ankara, likened the attack to a “cold-war-style proxy war” that he speculated was the work of Syria, given the historical links between the group and Syrian intelligence. His observation was reminiscent of the paranoia of a bygone era. At one of the art galleries here, newspapers chronicled the 1977 May Day celebration in Istanbul, when leftist groups gathered for a demonstration that turned bloody.

    “This attack is a provocation that links all the way to the C.I.A.,” one headline shrieked.

    Sebnem Arsu contributed reporting.

    A version of this article appeared in print on February 9, 2013, on page A4 of the New York edition with the headline: A Look at Turkey’s Past Gives Some Insight Into Its Unresolved Troubles.