Tag: Dağlık Karabağ (Nagorno-Karabakh)

  • Putin Finally Reveals His Solution to the Artsakh Conflict

    Putin Finally Reveals His Solution to the Artsakh Conflict

    Publisher
    The California Courier

    tank karabag ermenistan azerbaycan

    After Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted and failed to establish a ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Armenians around the world have been wondering why is he so reluctant to intervene more forcefully in the Artsakh War and stop the bloodshed.

    There have been many speculations about Putin’s unexpected hands off approach to the Artsakh conflict, including several conspiracy theories which are not worth mentioning.

    During an interview with a Western journalist last week, Putin finally revealed his plans to resolve the Artsakh conflict.

    This is what Putin stated: “You said that Russia has always had special ties with Armenia. But we have always had special relations with Azerbaijan too. More than two million Armenians and about two million Azerbaijanis live in Russia. These are not only those people who came for temporary work, but also those who live here almost permanently. Working in Russia, they send billions of dollars to support their families. All these people have very stable, close ties in Russia at the humanitarian level, interpersonal, business, family. Therefore, for us, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are equal partners. And it is a great tragedy for us when people die there. We want to build full-fledged relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. In each case of building relations with each of these countries there is something that distinguishes our relationship with another partner. Well, with Armenia this is Christianity. But we have very close ties with Azerbaijan in other areas as well. As for the religious component, I want to draw your attention to the fact that almost 15 percent of the population of the Russian Federation is Muslim. And even in this sense, Azerbaijan is not a foreign country for us. But what we definitely cannot forget is what happened in the fate of the Armenian people, the Armenian nation, during the First World War; a huge tragedy for the Armenian people. This is the second part. The third is that this conflict began just as an interstate conflict and a struggle for territories. It began as an ethnic confrontation. It is also unfortunately, a fact when in Sumgait [Azerbaijan], and then in Nagorno Karabagh, cruel crimes were committed against the Armenian people. We must take all this into account in a complex. At the same time, we understand that a situation in which a significant part of the territory of Azerbaijan has been lost by the country cannot last forever. Over the course of many, many years, we have proposed a variety of options for resolving this crisis in order to stabilize the situation for a long historical perspective. I will not go into details now, but believe me, it was hard work to bring the positions closer together. At some moments, it seemed that a little more, a little more, one more step, and we would find a solution. Unfortunately, this did not happen and today we have a conflict in its worst form. And the tragedy is that people are dying. You know, there are many losses on both sides. According to our information, there are more than two thousand dead on each side. The total death toll is already approaching five thousand. I draw your attention to the fact that 13,000 Soviet soldiers died in the 10 years of the war in Afghanistan. And in Karabagh, in such a short period of time, almost five thousand people have already died. How many were injured! How many people are suffering, how many children! Therefore, this is a special situation for us. Yes, the Minsk Group was created in 1992. Russia, France, and the United States as co-chairs, we are responsible for organizing this negotiating process. It is clear, I am 100 percent sure here that all participants in this process sincerely strive for the situation to be resolved. However, no one is as interested in this as Russia. This is happening in a broad sense with our people with our friends, with our relatives. Therefore, we take a position that would allow us to enjoy the trust of both sides and play an essential role as mediators in the settlement of this conflict to bring their positions closer. I would very much like this compromise to be found. As you know, I am in very close contact with both President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan. I talk to them on the phone several times a day. Our foreign ministers, defense ministers, heads of special services are in constant contact. You know the foreign ministers of both countries came to visit us. They met in Washington on October 23rd. I very much hope that our American partners will act in unison with us and help the settlement. Let us hope for the best.”

    I transcribed this lengthy translation of Putin’s remarks without any omission in order to provide the full context of his statement.

    Obviously, Armenians are not happy with Pres. Putin equating with Armenia Russia’s relationship with Azerbaijan. Armenia is a strategic ally of Russia with a mutual defense treaty and with a Russian military base located on its territory. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, is a puppet of Turkey and has taken many steps to undermine Russia’s geopolitical interests, such as the Azeri gas and oil pipelines that reduce the need for Russian oil in Europe.

    Furthermore, the involvement of the Turkish military on Azerbaijan’s territory, a part of the Russian sphere of influence, undermines Russia’s interests. Even more alarming is Turkey’s recruitment of Syrian terrorists and their transfer to Azerbaijan to fight against Artsakh. This is an obvious danger to the national security of Russia. Putin did not mention the nefarious role of these terrorists.

    The Russian government has made it clear, however, that the mutual defense treaty with Armenia only applies in case of a foreign attack on the Republic of Armenia, which excludes the territory of Artsakh, even though there have been several missile attacks on Armenia’s mainland.

    Russia, on the other hand, has other interests with Turkey that it takes into consideration. These are:

    — Russia’s attempts in recent years to win over and separate Turkey from NATO.

    — Multi-billion trade between Russia and Turkey with Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missiles and the planned construction of a Russian nuclear power plant in Turkey.

    — Russia’s unwillingness to go to war against Azerbaijan and Turkey to protect Artsakh.

    — Russia and Turkey have conflicting interests in Syria and Libya where they have an uneasy understanding. The Artsakh conflict would place further pressure on the Russian-Turkish relationship should Russia become actively involved in the Artsakh war against Azerbaijan and Turkey.

    Most significantly, as Putin said in his above quoted statement: “a situation in which a significant part of the territory of Azerbaijan has been lost by the country cannot last forever.” In other words, Putin implies that he is willing to accept that Azerbaijan militarily reoccupies the seven regions surrounding Artsakh and then negotiate the settlement of the final status of Artsakh. This is totally unacceptable for Armenia and Artsakh. It is imperative to counter the military moves of Azerbaijan and Turkey in order not to allow them to create new facts on the ground which would weaken Armenia’s bargaining position. Furthermore, the loss of the territories surrounding Artsakh — the buffer zone — would further threaten the existence of Artsakh.

    Even more alarming, Putin announced that “many countries, including Turkey and a host of European states” should work together to find a consensus. Armenia and Artsakh would categorically reject Turkey’s involvement. How could Turkey, the instigator of the war, be considered a neutral mediator?

    Armenians are somewhat reassured that in recent days, various Russian officials have confirmed Russia’s treaty obligation to defend the territory of the Republic of Armenia from any attacks by Azerbaijan or Turkey.

    Armenia and Artsakh have difficult days ahead, left all alone to their fate. Only a resolute defense will safeguard the Armenian population of Artsakh.

  • Analysis of the Key ParticipantsIn the Artsakh War

    Analysis of the Key ParticipantsIn the Artsakh War

    At the time of writing this analysis, on Oct. 5, 2020, the war between Armenia and Artsakh on one side, and Azerbaijan, Turkey and Islamist mercenaries on the other, is continuing with countless deaths of soldiers and civilians, and widespread damage of cities and villages. This week, I will analyze the role of each of the key participants in the conflict: 

    AZERBAIJAN

    Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, refusing to accept Artsakh Armenians’ right to self-determination and following up on his numerous threats to solve the conflict militarily, launched a massive attack against Armenia and Artsakh on Sept. 27, 2020. Before the war, Azerbaijan secured the support of the Turkish armed forces and a large number of terrorists from Syria paid by the Turkish government.

    The Presidents of Azerbaijan and Turkey have ignored all appeals for ceasefire, including a joint statement by France, Russia and the United States. Aliyev announced that there will be no ceasefire and no negotiations until Armenian forces leave Artsakh. Azerbaijan and Turkey not only want to occupy Artsakh, but unleash a second genocide on Armenians. This is an existential threat to the Armenian people. It is a war against all 10 million Armenians worldwide. Fortunately, Armenians have understood the serious danger to their existence and have joined hands to repulse the enemy. After the Azeri/Turkish attack fails, Armenia should refuse all proposals for negotiations and safeguard the land of Artsakh which has been liberated with the blood of our brave young men. Azerbaijan and Turkey have attacked not only Armenian military targets, but also civilians in major cities and villages. This is a war crime for which Azerbaijan and Turkey should be held responsible in front of the European Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice. 

    Armenia should also file a complaint with the United Nations since Azerbaijan is a signatory to the UN “International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries.” The Convention calls for punishment “by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those offenses.”

    TURKEY

    Turkey should have no role in the Artsakh conflict. Erdogan keeps talking about one nation, two states, referring to Azerbaijan and Turkey. Why does he then not accept the same concept for Armenia and Artsakh? He has no right to speak about Artsakh’s status, since Turkey itself occupied Northern Cyprus in 1974.

    For far too long, Turkey has armed and trained terrorists in Syria, Iraq and Libya, and now in Azerbaijan. The international community is just as guilty as Turkey for not sanctioning it for its terroristic activities. Erdogan has learned that he will get away with murder and no country will say a word. It is time to muzzle Erdogan and check his expansionist desires.

    Besides the physical war, there is also a war of propaganda and falsehoods being waged by Azerbaijan and Turkey. As usual, Turkey is lying about the most obvious facts. If it can deny the genocide of 1.5 million Armenians, it can also deny that it has military forces and advisors in Azerbaijan fighting against Armenia and Artsakh. Turkey also denies that it has recruited Islamist terrorists to fight in Artsakh.

    TERRORIST MERCENARIES

    Hundreds, if not thousands, of Islamist terrorists have been recruited by Turkey from Northern Syria to go to Azerbaijan to fight against Armenia and Artsakh. Many of their phone calls have been recorded in recent days stating that they were misled by Turkey into believing that they will only perform guard duties, not fight in a war. The terrorists stated that they want to leave, but are prevented from doing so. They have come to Azerbaijan after Turkey offered them a couple of thousand dollars a month. Despite the denials of Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia’s National Security Services have recorded the terrorists’ phone calls speaking in Arabic and Turkish and advising their fellow terrorists not to come to Azerbaijan.

    RUSSIA

    Russia is the only world power that can stop the fighting as it has done many times before. Either Russian President Vladimir Putin is unable to pressure Azerbaijan and Turkey to declare a ceasefire or unwilling to do so, until it can secure concessions from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey for its own benefit.

    The problem is that Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) which has a mutual defense agreement with Russia and several other former Soviet states. So far Armenia has not applied to CSTO to come to its defense from Azerbaijan’s attacks on the Republic of Armenia, announcing that it can protect its own territory. Armenia should ask CSTO to secure its protection from attacks by Turkey and Azerbaijan. If Armenia applies and CSTO rejects to fulfill its treaty obligations, then we will know that CSTO is a paper tiger. There may be behind the scenes discussions between Armenia and CSTO to come to Armenia’s rescue at the appropriate time, before Armenia is in danger.

    Supporting Armenia is also in Russia’s own interest. First of all, the Caucasus region is considered Russia’s sphere of influence which Turkey should not be allowed to encroach. Secondly, the Islamist terrorists that Turkey has sent to Azerbaijan could end up being a threat to Russia’s security. The sooner Russia pressures Azerbaijan and Turkey to send the terrorists back, the better for its own interests.

    Armenia is also displeased that Russia sells sophisticated jets and missiles to Azerbaijan. This is an inappropriate conduct for a strategic ally of Armenia. It is understandable that Russia is making these military sales for its own economic benefit, but Armenians have to constantly remind Russia that it is undermining its own reputation in Armenia by supplying weapons to Armenia’s enemy.

    IRAN

    The Iranian government has always maintained a neutral position in the Armenia Azerbaijan conflict. In the current war, Iran was alarmed when Azeri missiles fell inside the Iranian territory killing a child. Iran also expressed its serious concern with Azerbaijan importing mercenary terrorists which could pose a danger to Iran’s security.

    ISRAEL

    It is shameful that the Israeli government continues to provide sophisticated drones and missiles to Azerbaijan in return for Azeri oil. Would Israel, if it existed during World War II, have sold weapons to Hitler in return for financial gains? No wonder Armenia last week recalled its newly-appointed Ambassador from Tel Aviv. American Armenians should impress upon American Jews and American Jewish organizations that Israel’s arming of Azerbaijan is morally repugnant and it will be held responsible for the deaths of Armenian civilians and soldiers. Even during the height of this war, scores of Azeri cargo planes have been seen in Israel loading advanced weapons for Azerbaijan!

    FRANCE

    France is the only country in the world that has told the truth about the conflict. French President Emmanuel Macron declared that Azerbaijan was the one that initiated the attack on Artsakh and also confirmed that Turkey has sent Islamist terrorists to Azerbaijan. It is not clear what France will do beyond mere words, nevertheless, Armenians worldwide appreciate the French position.

    UNITED STATES

    The United States, if it wanted to, could also pressure Turkey to stay out of the Armenian-Azeri conflict. Unfortunately, despite Pres. Trump’s statement that he will look into the conflict, nothing has been done. Trump’s close friendship with Erdogan does not give Armenians any comfort that the United States will play a moderating role in the conflict, particularly at a time when Trump is infected with the coronavirus.

    The only positive action coming from the House of Representatives is its planned adoption of Resolution 1165 which condemns Azerbaijan for its attack on Artsakh and denounces Turkey for its participation in the war on the side of Azerbaijan. Going beyond condemnation, the United States should sanction Azerbaijan and Turkey, cut off all military and foreign aid to both countries, and designate them as terrorist states!

    CONCLUSION

    In conclusion, Armenia cannot rely on anyone but its own people to defend its homeland. It is very encouraging that Armenians worldwide have come to the support of Armenia and Artsakh donating funds and humanitarian supplies. All Armenians have to continue to counter Azeri and Turkish military and propaganda attacks. When Azerbaijan sees that its military has failed to yield any results, it will be forced to admit that Artsakh will never become a part of Azerbaijan. After these vicious Azeri and Turkish attacks, no Armenian will agree to have the Artsakh people live under the brutal rule of the corrupt dictator Aliyev.

  • Recent Harvard Lecture: Self-Determination for Nagorno Karabakh

    Recent Harvard Lecture: Self-Determination for Nagorno Karabakh

    While the Turkish-American community was as usual pre-occupied with arts and entertainment ), during the exact same time the Armenian diaspora was busily continuing to lay the groundwork for an independent Nagorno-Karabağ.

    I have attached the complete text of former Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian’s April 12, 2018 speech at the Harvard University Law School below. Turks as well as Azeris should pay heed since it not only mentions Nagorno-Karabağ but refers to “Kurdistan” as well and quite obviously the thesis of “Self-Determination” Oskanian was attempting to make would apply in both cases if one were to subscribe to it.

    Enis Pınar

    Kimden: USC Institute of Armenian Studies [mailto:armenian=Yerine USC Institute of Armenian Studies
    Tarih: Thursday, April 5, 2018 7:06 PM
    Konu: Self-Determination Under International Law: With Vartan Oskanian

    April 12 – Harvard Law School Pound Hall – 12-1pm

    After a series of lectures at University of Southern California, in a class called IN PURSUIT OF INDEPENDENCE, Vartan Oskanian, former Foreign Minister of Armenia, will be heading to Harvard University for a lecture on a matter that is at the crux of Armenia’s existence and future development.

    Vartan Oskanian served as Armenia’s foreign minister from 1998 to 2008 and is the founder of Civilitas Foundation, a Yerevan-based education and advocacy NGO. He is a graduate of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Mr. Oskanian was a visiting assistant professor at the American University of Armenia and currently a visiting lecturer at the University of Southern California and Tufts University.

    The talk will be moderated by Anna Crowe, Lecturer on Law and Clinical Instructor at the Human Rights Program of Harvard Law School.

    Organized by:
    West Coast Law Students Association
    Middle East Law Students Association
    Harvard International Law Journal
    Harvard European Law Association

    Sponsored by the National Association for Armenian Studies and Research – NAASR

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    Former Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian Delivers Talk on Self-Determination at Harvard Law School (Full Transcript)

    April 16, 2018

    CAMBRIDGE, Mass. (A.W.)—Armenia’s Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Vartan Oskanian delivered a talk at Harvard Law School titled “Self-Determination Under International Law: The Cases of Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabagh,” on April 12.

    Oskanian speaking at Harvard Law School (Photo: Harout Ekmanian)

    The talk was organized by the joint efforts of Harvard Law International Journal, Harvard West Coast Law Students Association, Harvard European Law Association, and the Harvard Middle Eastern Law Students Association. It was moderated Anna Crowe, Lecturer on Law and Clinical Instructor at the Human Rights Program of Harvard Law School, and sponsored by the National Association for Armenian Studies and Re­­search (NAASR).

    Oskanian addressed the right of self-determination in the cases of Kosovo and Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabagh) through the dual lenses of international law and global politics, as well as the origins and the evolution of the right for self-determination, and what the sources of international law say about it. He also touched upon the currently active self-determination movements, including Kurdish and Catalan referenda, and assessed the impact and relevance to these movements.

    Before his talk at Harvard Law School, Oskanian delivered a series of lectures at the University of Southern California in a class called “In Pursuit of Independence.” Next fall, he will teach a course at Tisch College of Civic Life of Tufts University called “Special Topics in International Relations: The Politics of Self-Determination and Secession.”

    Below is the full transcript of Oskanian’s talk at Harvard Law School.


    ‘Self-Determination Under International Law: The Cases of Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabagh’
    Vartan Oskanian at Harvard Law School – April 12, 2018

    Thank you for the invitation. I truly appreciate this opportunity.

    Although my theme today is international law and, in particular, the law of self-determination and secession, let me reinforce the fact that I am not an international lawyer; have never argued or judged a case in international courts, nor represented any government in judicial proceedings. I am simply a practitioner of diplomacy.

    My diplomatic and ten-year tenure as foreign minister of Armenia, and as Armenia’s chief negotiator for Nagorno-Karabagh conflict with Azerbaijan, propelled me to the forefront of diplomatic activities of one of the most pressing and trying global transformations: that of the emergence of great number of new independent states at the end of the Cold War and subsequently a parade of sub-state self-determination claims each with unforeseen consequences.

    Nagorno-Karabagh was, and still is, one of them. So was Kosovo together with many others. This period coincided also with the emergence of many other secessionist movements outside the context of the unraveling of the USSR and Yugoslavia—South Sudan, Timor L’este, and later on Quebec, Scotland, and more recently Kurdistan and Catalonia.

    If you are pursuing a self-determination claim, you need to pose and seek answers to two fundamental questions: First, is there enforceable international law or its all politics? Can we speak of international law as a coherent activity? Second, is there a law on self-determination and secession that minority groups can rely on to support their claims? The answer to these questions depends on who you ask, what the circumstances are, and the geopolitical interests of the rich and powerful.

    There is a common belief in diplomatic and political circles that there are two kinds of international legal order. They concede the existence of law in areas such as trade, telecommunication or civil aviation while at the same time dismissing as mere unenforceable aspirations, laws on the use of force, human rights, sovereignty and self-determination. This duality of international law goes back, at least to early 1920s, to Hans Morgenthau, one of the founders of international relations and a realist in his outlook, who contrasted two different types of international law, a “functional international law” based on ‘permanent or stable interests’ and ‘political international law’ that was opportunistic, indeterminate and aspirational.

    Before I move to the second question, whether there is a law on self-determination and secession that minority groups can rely on to support their claim, let me briefly talk about the sources of international law.

    Unlike national law which is made in the legislature, international law creation is much more complex, and has a multitude of sources.

    There are several sources of international law. One is international treaties and conventions; the second is international custom and the general principles of law, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; and third, the subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law, such as judicial decision and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists. This also includes the United Nations General Assembly resolutions. For example, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Sovereignty (1965), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States (1970), etc., are all treated as strong evidence of rules of customary international law.

    The law of self-determination has its roots, not in treaties, that would have made things much simpler, but in the customs, general principles of law and the subsidiary means, such as UN General Assembly declarations and resolutions, judicial decisions and the writings of qualified publicist. And that is why the right of self-determination is more elusive in the context of law. And if we add to this that the issue of self-determination falls also in the domain of Morganthau’s “political international law,” it becomes even clearer the complexities associated with it and the divide it creates between the opponents and proponents of the right for self-determination..

    The principle of self-determination developed as political idea and corollary to growing ethnic and linguistic political demands in the 18th and 19th centuries. Those times equating a nation with a homogeneous populace was very common. It gained prominence when President Wilson became the most public advocate of self-determination as a guiding principle in the post-war period, but was never fully implemented as the allies were guided mostly by political considerations to buttress Germany and the Soviet Union.

    It was only after the founding of the UNin 1945 that the principle of self-determination began a gradual shift to a more enforceable right to freedom from colonial rule. The UN Charter, of course, explicitly refers in its Article 2(1) to the self-determination of peoples, but it is its Chapters XI and XII on non-self-governing and trust territories that gave the principle its more enforceable character, eventually transforming self-determination from principle to right.

    During the 1950s and 1960s The UN General Assembly passed several resolutions granting independence to colonial territories and countries. All of them had two things in common; the focus was on territory rather than people and had a “safeguard clause” stressing the preservation of territorial integrity, by stating that “any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”

    In 1966, the adoption of two international human rights covenants—one on economic, social, and cultural rights, the other on civil and political rights—raised, for the first time, true possibility that international law might provide some support for other form of self-determination. Both covenants state that “all peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of the right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”

    And in 1970, the General Assembly unanimously approved a landmark resolution, known as the “Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States.” This Declaration was unique and groundbreaking for two reasons: one, for its expansion of the scope of the right of self-determination arguing that it be implemented through the “establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people;” two, while like the resolutions that preceded it, emphasized the preservation of territorial integrity, for containing a qualification specifying that the protection of territorial integrity applies to states “possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or color.”

    There is no consensus among scholars or governments on how this qualification affects the relationship between the right of self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity. Some have argued that the principle of self-determination can be accorded priority over the principle of territorial integrity if a state is not possessed of a government representing the whole people. Others, of course, disagree.

    In my view, what has preceded and followed this particular qualification established in the “Friendly Relations” resolution, does provide bases to argue for the existence of what came to be known in the parlance of international law as the right for “remedial secession.” One may go back to the early 1920s to see evidence of this norm in the Aaland Island case, when non of this trajectory of the evolution of the self-determination law, whether in the context of decolonization or outside of it, ever existed.. And the juxtaposition of the natural law reasoning with the positivist tradition renders this notion even a more credible and applicable norm of international law.

    Aaland Islands, located in the Baltic Sea between Sweden and Finland, were under Swedish control from 1157 to 1809 and retained their Swedish linguistic, cultural heritage thereafter. After Sweden’s defeat by Russia in 1809, Finland, including Aaland, was ceded to Russia, and Finland became an autonomous Grand Duchy within the Russian Empire. In 1917, shortly after the March Russian Revolution, Finland declared its independence in December 1917. Riding the Wilsonian self-determination wave, the Swedish population of Aaland opted for unification with Sweden causing serious turmoil and instability in the region. To address the issue, the League of Nations appointed two bodies of experts, each with a little different task, to examine the question.

    Their decision was negative, and they basically argued that granting them their wish “it would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the very idea of the State as a territorial and political unity.” However, the Commission did suggest that under extreme oppression, self-determination by Aaland citizens might be possible. “The separation of a minority from the state of which it forms a part and its incorporation in another state can only be considered as an altogether exceptional solution, a last resort when the state lacks the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees.” This is a clear articulation for the right for remedial secession

    In 1993, one of the rounds of Nagorno-Karabagh talks was organized in Mariehamn, the capital of Aaland Islands in Finland. Finland, at that time was, along with Russia, the co-chair of the Minsk Group process on Nagorno-Karabagh. Their purpose was to demonstrate to all participants, Armenian and Azeri, but particularly for the Nagorno-Karabagh representatives, how workable it is Aaland’s autonomous all Swede minority status within Finland. We stayed on the Island for about a week, and along our daily regular talks, were given tours to governmental institutions, had talks with officials and regular citizens. Clearly, it was a happy Swedish island, and the Swedish minority was the master of its faith and future. The only reminder of Finnish sovereignty over the Island were the Finnish flags on top of government buildings. As we were wrapping up the talks and the trip in general, the head of Nagorno-Karabagh delegation made an astounding statement: “We have truly liked what we have seen here, and I can officially declare that we will accept a similar autonomous status for Nagorno-Karabagh.” Then came the punchline: “but within Finland; not Azerbaijan.” We all laughed. But this is very telling and goes directly to heart of the notion of “remedial secession.”

    Another example of institutional practice that supports the idea of secession as a remedial right was the Canadian Supreme Court interpretation of self-determination and secession in its 1996 landmark decision. The Federal Government of Canada asked the court for an advisory opinion on several aspects of Quebec separation, hoping that the result might discourage Quebecers from voting for it. The Court’s opinion was that “a right to secession only arises under the principle of self-determination of peoples at international law where a people is governed as part of a colonial empire, where a people is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation; and possibly where a people is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of which it forms part.”

    Interestingly, the Canadian Supreme Court in its decision also introduced a caveat, stating that if a referendum found in favor of independence, the rest of Canada “would have no basis to deny the right of the government of Quebec to pursue secession.” In my view, this statement has extremely consequential effect on the political aspects of the law of self-determination, and I will ask you to hold on to this thought until I come back to it towards the end of my talk.

    Then, of course, there is the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. As you know, on February 2008 Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence. In October of the same year, the General Assembly decided to ask the Court to render an advisory opinion on the following question: “Is the unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?” The court in its advisory opinion said that the practice of states both in the context of decolonization and outside of it “does not point to the emergence in international law of a new rule prohibiting the making of a declaration of independence in such cases.” That means the international law neither forbids nor supports secession. It is simply agnostic about it. Thus, the ICJ itself, in his opinion, adopted a very narrow approach, not providing any guidance regarding the contemporary scope of self-determination.

    However, the value of the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion is not in its opinion per se, rather in its explanatory notes and the positions expressed by the more than forty or so states in their written and oral presentations to the court.

    There are three important takeaways from all this which, in my view, reaffirm certain understandings that are critical in establishing positions regarding the right of self-determination in international law.

    One is that as several participants in their arguments before the court contended that a prohibition of unilateral declaration of independence is implicit in the principle of territorial integrity, the court responded that the scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between states, citing the UN charter, the Friendly Relations resolution and OSCE Helsinki Final Act. Indeed, Article two of the UN Charter provides that “all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of many State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

    Two is, that when several participants invoked resolutions of Security Council condemning particular declarations of independence, such as Southern Rhodesia (1965), Northern Cyprus (1983) and Respublika Srpska (1992), the court responded that the illegality attached to those declarations of independence stemmed not from the unilateral character of the declarations as such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norm of general international law.

    Three is, that the Court simply noted—taking no position—that “radically different views” were expressed on the question of whether a right of remedial secession exists and, if so, in what circumstances and if those circumstances were present in Kosovo.

    This last point is hugely important because the bigger question and the more controversial part of the right of self-determination is not as much whether there is a right for remedial secession in international law. There is. Rather, the circumstances which one may maintain that would give rise to right to remedial secession are sufficiently present in any particular case.

    The determination of the presence of circumstances is more of a political decision rather than a legal judgment, and it is the very critical component around which law and politics intertwine. However, as a result of the new developments in international law after the end of the Cold War, now in addition to unlawful use of military force, oppression and atrocities committed, the protection of minority rights and entitlement to democratic government are key elements in determining the circumstances that may give rise to the right for remedial secession.

    Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabagh are very similar yet different. Both are geographically separate and ethnically, religiously distinct from the mother state. Both neighbor a country of their kin. Both have been disputed territories at one point in their history, both had autonomous status within their mother states during the Cold War, and their autonomous status revoked at one point. Both subjected to severe oppression and atrocities. The key difference is geopolitical.. Kosovo is at the heart of Europe and has history of triggering and implicating others in a broader conflict and jeopardize Europe’s and world’s peace and security. Hence the extraordinary global attention and the international community’s immediate and continued involvement in providing an early solution. Karabagh has taken a different path but gone through similar process. If ever Nagorno-Karabagh case goes to ICJ, the nature and content of the arguments will not be much different from Kosovo’s case.

    And finally let me introduce two overbearing political developments which, in my view, complements the existing legal framework in support of the right of self-determination and secession.

    First is that earlier, speaking of Canada’s Supreme Court decision on Quebec’s referendum I said hold on to the thought that the justices said that if a referendum found in favor of independence, the rest of Canada “would have no basis to deny the right of the government of Quebec to pursue secession.” This naturally means that political negotiations would have to follow to define the terms under which Quebec would gain independence, should it maintain that goal. This, clearly is a political decision; a recommendation of sort to reach a peaceful resolution.

    This also implies that references to the state’s own constitution as a non-negotiable bar, as is being employed in case of Kurdistan, Catalonia and also Nagorno-Karabagh, to any concessions or even negotiations do not represent good faith, and cannot be justification for use of force to suppress the movement.

    Second is that since the end of the Cold War, there has been at least a dozen of peace processes related to ethnic conflicts mediated by third parties and mandated by international organizations, where in their proposed solutions granting satisfaction to the aspirations of the minority groups have been the norm rather than the exception. Some have been fully implemented, others failed due to different circumstances and few others are still work in progress.

    But the fact is that after lengthy and arduous processes, the mediators, in all those cases where the historical, legal and military realities have tilted the balance on the self-determination side, seem to have always favored to arrive to the inevitable sooner than later. The Road Map for Peace for the Israeli/Palestinian conflict; the Good Friday Accord for Northern Ireland; the Machakos Protocol for Sudan; Ahtisaari plan and Security Council Resolution for Kosovo; the Baker Peace Plan for the Western Sahara, the Dayton Accords for Bosnia, UNSC Resolution 1272 for East Timor; the Comprehensive Agreement for Bougainville; the New Constitution for the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, the Madrid Principles for Nagorno-Karabagh.

    All self-determination or secessionist movements are, in essence and at heart, ethnic conflicts. They originate in history; get litigated, adjudicated, argued and negotiated in international organizations; always have their military component, since one or the other side and, most of the time, both sides use force against each other to achieve their goals; and finally, if they ever get resolved, are resolved at the political level. It is true that at the end of day it is the politics that has the final word. But history, law, military outcome and geopolitical realities on the ground, are all critical in determining the fate of a particular claim, and inevitably forces the political hand even of the most ardent opponents, including the mother states, of the right of self-determination and secession.


    1 Comment

    1. avatarDave says:

    April 17, 2018 at 4:34 pm

    And so, mr. Oskanian, what is Artsakh’s case specifically?
    What are the arguments in its favor?
    Let’s admit that, ultimately, it depends on politics and military strength.