Tag: Cyprus

  • Trusting the Greeks

    Trusting the Greeks

    In reality, the problem that lies at the root of the Cyprus problem and needs to be solved is the problem of ‘trust’.

    The number of Turkish Cypriots who sincerely trust the Greek Cypriots and Greeks is almost negligible.

    The roots of this mistrust go back to the early 20th century, but if we leave the past in the past and return to the present, we see that nothing has changed since then.

    As you know, the Greek Cypriots prevent all kinds of initiatives that will mention the name of the TRNC, that will bring the TRNC to the top and that will give the Turkish Cypriots a breath of fresh air. This includes touristic visits, economic and scientific activities.

    The Greek Cypriots are doing their best to isolate from the world the state that the Turkish Cypriots, who were subjected to a genocide between 1955 and 1974, similar to the genocide in Gaza today, managed to establish – as a result of their liberation in 1974 with the help and support of the motherland Turkey -.

    The Greeks, who have been terminating the negotiations that have been going on since 1968 to establish a so-called common state with the Turkish Cypriots, each time with a megalomaniacal attitude and with lame excuses, overturning the table and leaving, today, as if they were not the ones who left the negotiation table, they are trying to get the Turkish Cypriots to sit at the table, they are travelling from door to door and trying every way to put pressure on Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots.

    Recently, they did everything in their power to prevent our President Ersin Tatar from travelling to Australia and meeting with Australian local administrators and government members.

    They tried to do so, but this time they were not successful and for the first time a TRNC President was welcomed, hosted and visited Australia as ‘President’, even if not officially.

    The Greek Cypriots, who prevented the Turkish Cypriots from participating in international sports competitions, prevented the Turkish Cypriots from connecting to the world with direct flights, prevented the Turkish Cypriots from becoming an ‘observer’ member of the Organisation of Turkic States established by states of Turkish descent, and plotted all kinds of intrigues to prevent the Turkish Cypriots from establishing academic, commercial, industrial, social and cultural ties with the states of the world, have run out of credit, and it has become impossible for them to expect love and respect from the Turkish Cypriots.

    Although the UN representatives meet with the anti-TRNC people in the TRNC and present them as the general opinion of the Turkish Cypriots, the vast majority of the Turkish Cypriots do not want to establish a common state with the Greek Cypriots, who have been carrying out armed, economic and political attacks to destroy them for the last century, and where they will be relegated to minority status like the Maronites, Armenians and Latins after a while.

    The inhumane practices of the Atlantic Alliance, which isolates them from the world and does not recognise laws and rules, has been a great lesson to the Turkish Cypriots about who they can trust. 

    05.27.24 Trusting the Greeks

    The Atlantic Alliance, which has been providing financial and arms support to the terrorist formation operating under the names of PKK, YPG and similar names in the territory of North East Syria for years, is now trying to give legal status to their existence by supporting them to hold local elections illegally, but unfortunately, it has not imposed any sanctions to be taken seriously on the rulers of the ‘Hellenic Republic of Cyprus’, Greek Cypriots and Greece, who declared the ‘Hellenic Republic of Cyprus’ by overthrowing the internationally recognised ‘Republic of Cyprus’ by staging a coup d’état in Cyprus on 15 July 1974 and declared the ‘Hellenic Republic of Cyprus’ and announced the annexation of the island of Cyprus to Greece the next day. (Turkey, which saved the Turkish Cypriots from genocide and extinction, was subjected to an ‘arms and financial embargo’ immediately after the 1974 Peace Operation). In the United Nations Organisation, of which they are the protector and founder, they took the decision dated 18 November 1983 and numbered 541, which is a disgrace to humanity, isolating the Turkish Cypriots from the world.

    Now, while they are trying to illegally create a terrorist state in North East Syria, which will be completely under their control, I leave it to you to interpret the aim of bringing together two communities that have fought each other and whose anger has not subsided on the island where the world’s longest-lasting conflict is taking place, and giving the administration to the Greeks. Here, there is a 41-year-old state with all its institutions – not counting the Federated State – and there is an attempt to have terrorists establish a state there!

    What kind of global justice is this? Who, why and how should we trust?

    Prof. Dr. (Civil Engineer), Assoc. Prof. Dr. (UA. Relations) Ata ATUN

    Member of the Advisory Board of the TRNC President

    TRNC Republican Assembly 1st Term Deputy

  • We Own Cyprus

    We Own Cyprus

    This was the catchphrase of the Greek Cypriots between the years 1960 to 2017 in Cyprus.

    The Greek Cypriots and Greeks, who leaned their backs to the Atlantic Alliance and the Christian world, thought and acted as if the island of Cyprus was their private property, their homeland, an integral part of the Great Byzantine Kingdom, and kept saying “We are the owners of Cyprus”.

    In order to cleanse the island of Cyprus from the Turkish Cypriots, relying on the Atlantic Alliance and the Christian world, they applied the genocide, same as the armed attacks in Gaza of today, to us, the Turkish Cypriots during years 1963 to 1974.

    When the Atlantic Alliance and the Christian world, which claim to be the flag bearers of “Human Rights, Peace and Justice”, did not raise voices such as “What are you doing, stop the massacres and genocide, you are violating human rights”, the brutal genocide they inflicted on us continued for 11 years till 1974.

    They thought that they had the right to take away all the materialistic and spiritual life opportunities of the Turkish Cypriots by the armed attacks, to crush the Turkish Cypriots, to destroy them, to squeeze them into a tiny area like three percent of the island and only allow them to breathe, and they thought they were successful with the full scale support of the Atlantic Alliance and the Christian world.

    In the second stage of the so-called negotiations that started in 1968, they would get up from the negotiation table whenever they felt like it, they would immediately reject the peaceful proposals made to them, they would try to corner the Turkish Cypriots by making proposals that would never happen and could not be accepted, they would put them in a difficult position and try to put them in a guilty position. Although it was agreed at the last stage of these negotiations to grant partial autonomy to the Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriot leader of the period, Makarios, said, “I will not give the Turkish Cypriots even a neighbourhood headman ship, let alone an autonomy”, revealing that the negotiations were made for show and ended them.

    Such was the mindset of the Greeks, such was the idea that they owned the island of Cyprus.

    In July 1974, when the Colonels’ Junta in Greece staged a coup d’état on the island, overthrew the 1960 Republic of Cyprus, declared the “Hellenic Republic of Cyprus”, annexed the island to Greece and declared it as part of the Greece, the situation suddenly changed. Turkey, as a guarantor, had to intervene in order to re-establish the abolished 1960 Republic of Cyprus in the manner and method clearly stated in Annex 1, Article 4 of the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. In this way, the Turkish Cypriots were freed from captivity and were able to establish their own sovereign state in the northern parts of the island.

    The negotiations, which started in 1977 to stop the armed conflicts on the island of Cyprus and to restore the 1960 Republic of Cyprus, ended in 2017 in Crans Montana, where the last stage of the negotiations was held, with the Greek Cypriots leaving the table due to their megalomanic and maximalist demands and behaviours.

    The power and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance, which has been going on in the world since 1945, has started to decrease. The political and economic support of the Russian Federation and its allies, which unconditionally supported the Greeks and Greek Cypriots within the Christian world, came to an end. In the process, the mountains on which the Greek Cypriots had leaned and cocked their backs collapsed.

    Once upon a time they were saying “We are the owners of the island of Cyprus. Whatever we say, whatever we want, only happens”. By the time the political situation dramatically changed. The Greek Cypriots and Greeks are now begging and pleading for the Turkish Cypriots to sit at the negotiation table. They are trying to get the support of the strong partners of the Atlantic Alliance such as the UN, the US and the EU to intervene, but no positive results.

    It is time for them to pay for “obstructing the two peoples on the island from living in PEACE”, which they are the cause of the failure of the Annan Plan by voting “NO – OXI” in the Annan Plan referendum held on April 24, 2004, relying on the Atlantic Alliance and the Christian world…

    Prof. Dr. (Civ Eng), Assoc. Prof. Dr. (Int Rel) Ata ATUN

    Advisory Board Member of the TRNC President

    TRNC Republican Assembly 1st Term Deputy

  • Cyprus Crisis

    Cyprus Crisis

    Cyprus Crisis 1974 – COLD WAR DOCUMENTARY

  • Turkish and Greek Cypriots mull mutual steps on drilling to restart talks

    Turkish and Greek Cypriots mull mutual steps on drilling to restart talks

    Hürriyet Daily News

    Barbaros

    Both the Turkish and Greek Cypriots are considering a halt to exploration activities for hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean, in order to restart settlement talks for reunification of Cyprus.

    Turkey’s Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa seismic vessel has taken a break in its activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and anchored off the Gazimağusa harbor as a “good will sign,” Turkish Cypriot spokesperson Osman Ertuğ has said, describing it as a “good will gesture” ahead of a possible resumption of Cyprus peace talks.

    “Barbaros is waiting outside the Gazimağusa harbor as a good will gesture, despite a Turkish maritime Navigational Telex [Navtex] order that is valid until April 6,” Ertuğ told reporters on March 27.

    The move aims to support the efforts of U.N. Special Adviser on Cyprus Espen Barth Eide, Ertuğ said, adding that their hopes are fueled for the resumption of Cyprus talks.

    Espen Barth Eide
    In a recent visit to the island, Eide had signaled hope for restarting reunification talks between the two sides, telling the Turkish side that the Greek Cypriots “were obliged to give a break in drilling activities due to technical reasons, which would be an opportunity to get back to the table.”

    For his part, Ertuğ stated that if the Greek Cypriots are to demand that Turkey avoids collecting seismic data, then the Greek Cypriots should also end their unilateral drilling activities. “But if they show previously signed agreements as a reason to continue their collection, then we’ll continue our drilling too. Alternatively, let’s conduct those explorations together. At least, let’s not leave the reunification talks table,” he said.

     

    images?q=tbn:ANd9GcQw0vom2eYzkznUtcdusYtMxLxw2uix9V6kUXcj8HVBC e19KqON1gwHJE

    Osman Ertug

    Turkey’s reissuing of a new Navtex for seismic surveys of the Barbaros vessel is dependent on Greek Cyprus’s continuation of its unilateral drilling activities, Ertuğ added.

    He also claimed that the Greek Cypriots has abandoned negotiations not because of Turkey’s seismic surveys in the region, but because the talks were about to reach the “give and take” stage.

    “The Greek Cypriots are not ready for ‘give and take’ phase of the talks,” Ertuğ said.

    Greek Cypriot authorities said on Oct. 21 that the Barbaros had entered their exclusive economic zone and intended to stay in the area, according to a maritime advisory issued in early October.

    Nicosia is unhappy that Ankara is searching for oil and gas in the same area as the Cypriot government has already licensed exploratory drills, in an exclusive economic zone.

    In October 2014, Greek Cyprus suspended its participation in U.N.-led peace talks launched in February 2014, when the research vessel had entered the region that Greek Cyprus claims as its Exclusive Economic Zone.

    However, the Turkish side disputes Greek Cyprus’ rights to a swathe of sea to the island’s south and southeast that is rich in natural gas reserves, demanding an equal share of resources between the two governments of the divided island.

    March/28/2015

    Küfi Seydali

  • Natural Gas and the Cyprus Question

    Natural Gas and the Cyprus Question

    Turkeyresearch: “Natural Gas and the Cyprus Question”

    Author: Assistant Professor Tolga Demiryol, İstanbul Kemerburgaz University Date: Mar 19, 2015

    Abstract

    Can the natural gas reserves off the coast of Cyprus be a panacea to finally bring the enduring conflict on the island to a peaceful conclusion? Or will energy be yet another factor further widening the rift between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities? Evidence indicates that energy resources have so far aggravated rather than placated the tensions in Cyprus. The discovery of natural gas in the Aphrodite field, and the ongoing drilling efforts in adjacent blocks, have not only re-animated existing disputes like the demarcation of maritime borders but also spawned new issues including the distribution of future gas revenues between the two communities. The Turkish and Greek communities are currently caught in a deadlock, where neither party has sufficient incentives to coordinate. This article describes two scenarios in which the gas-powered conflict in Cyprus can unfold: 1) a grand consensusscenario, under which the disputing parties would insist on the resolution of all political disputes as a precondition for energy cooperation, 2) alimited bargaining scenario, where actors would choose to prioritise resource development over the settlement of political conflicts, with the expectation that the resulting energy interdependence would generate robust incentives for political settlement. While the latter scenario is achievable in principle, it would nonetheless face serious constraints in practice, including the domestic political costs of energy cooperation, volatile market conditions (discovery of additional gas reserves and the declining global energy prices), the availability of alternative markets and suppliers, as well as  potentially disruptive regional geopolitical dynamics .

    Introduction

    When significant gas reserves were finally confirmed in the Eastern Mediterranean, some analysts spotted in them a glimmer of hope for peace and prosperity in the region, particularly in Cyprus (Bryza, 2013; Grigoriadis, 2014; Gürel and Le Cornu, 2014; International Crisis Group, 2012; Khadduri, 2012; Pericleous, 2012; Van Rompuy, 2012; Wilson, 2014). The assumption underlying the proposition that energy could be a facilitator of peace in Cyprus is straightforward: the discovery of natural gas and the prospect of additional riches raise the opportunity costs of the present stalemate between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot administrations, providing “dollars-and-cents reasons for easing the estrangement or bringing it to an end” (Wilson, 2014: 105). Assuming that actors sufficiently value the absolute gains to be obtained from the monetization of natural resources, they would thus be extra-incentivised to resolve any outstanding political conflicts that stand in the way of profits.

    Natural resources, however, could be a ‘curse’ as well as a blessing, as history has revealed repeatedly. Contrary to the widespread expectations that potential energy wealth would facilitate cooperation, the prospect of natural gas bounty so far deepened and complicated the disagreements in Cyprus.

    The gradual escalation of energy-fueled tensions between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities over the past few years reached a critical juncture on October 7, 2014 when President Anastasiades unilaterally suspended UN-mediated peace talks. The official reason for the suspension was Turkey’s plans to search for oil and gas in waters where the Greek Cypriot-administered Republic of Cyprus (RoC) had declared its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), a decision that has been disputed by both Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Following the collapse of talks, the National Council of Cyprus announced a series of measures against Turkey, including blocking Turkey’s bid for EU membership. The RoC took the matter to the European Council meeting on October 23-24, upon which the Council officially urged Turkey “to respect Cyprus’ sovereignty over its territorial sea and Cyprus’ sovereign rights in its EEZ” (European Council, 2014). Ankara did not budge from its firm stance. In the National Security Council meeting on October 30, Turkey re-affirmed that it would take any measures necessary to defend TRNC and its sovereign rights. On November 9, Bülent Bostanoğlu, the Commander of Turkish Naval Forces, announced that Turkey continued to monitor the activities of Cypriot and Israeli elements and, if needed, the Turkish Navy would act in accordance with the rules of engagement.

    As of February 2015, there is no indication of when, if ever, the reunification talks would resume.

    How We Arrived at the Current Deadlock

    The energy landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean changed dramatically over the past five years. Following the major gas discoveries offshore Israel (Tamar field in 2009 and Leviathan field in 2010), in December 2011 another deep water reserve was confirmed off the coast of Cyprus. The so-called Aphrodite field was initially appraised to contain more than 200 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas, while later studies revised it down to 140 bcm. Despite the smaller than expected size of the reserves, Cyprus will have almost all of its gas available for exportation, given its limited domestic energy consumption.

    Besides the neighborhood countries like Egypt and Jordan, the two most important export destinations for the Eastern Mediterranean gas are Turkey and the European Union (EU), both of which are seeking to diversify their energy imports. Several alternative methods for gas exports are on the table, although parties are yet to agree on a solution that is both commercially and politically feasible. One option would be to construct an undersea pipeline from Israel and Cyprus to Greece. The so-called Eastern Mediterranean Gas Pipeline, however, presents a number of technical difficulties due to its length and construction depth, raising its costs considerably.[1] The other alternative that is particularly favored by the RoC is to construct a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) plant in Vasilikos in Southern Cyprus. The cost of the Vasilikos plant is estimated at US$10 billion but the Aphrodite gas alone will not be enough to make the plant financially viable. Unless additional reserves are discovered over the next two years, the only option for Cyprus would be to supply gas from Israel.[2] Given the high costs of Eastern Mediterranean Gas Pipeline and the Vasilikos plant, most industry experts agree that the best option to export Leviathan and Aphrodite gas would be a pipeline from Israel via Cyprus to Turkey. This route would be considerably cheaper, at approximately US$ 2.5 billion (Bryza, 2013: 39). The pipeline to Turkey would also provide Israel and Cyprus direct access to both Turkish and European markets. Once the gas reaches the port of Ceyhan in Southern Turkey, it would directly enter Turkey’s extensive pipeline system for domestic consumption as well as re-export via the planned the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) across Turkey and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) to Europe.

    Given the export options on the table, there is some validity in the proposition that the Cypriot gas offers mutual benefits to all parties involved, including the TRNC, the RoC and Turkey. The RoC and TRNC could share the revenue to be generated by the monetization of Cyprus’ gas. Turkey would not only diversify its natural gas imports but also can potentially be a part of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Corridor to Europe, which would in turn strengthen Ankara’s claim to be a critical asset for the EU’s energy security. Despite the considerable expected benefits from cooperation, however, energy resources have only further divided the parties.

    One major source of the divide between Turkey/TRNC and the RoC is the demarcation of maritime borders and the EEZs. In preparation for oil and gas exploration, the RoC has signed the EEZ delimitation agreements with Egypt (2003) and Lebanon (2007) and then passed a law in February 2007, defining 13 offshore drilling areas. Turkey and the TRNC protested fervently, claiming that the demarcation of maritime jurisdiction areas should be managed through arrangements among all concerned parties (Eissler and Arasıl, 2014; Stocker, 2012). After the RoC signed a critical EEZ agreement with Israel in 2010, Turkey reciprocated this by completing a maritime delimitation agreement with the TRNC in September 2011. In response to what was perceived as the RoC’s unilateralism, the TRNC issued a license to Turkish state-owned Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (Turkish Petroleum Corporation) TPAO for drilling in several offshore blocks, some overlapping with those of the RoC. Turkey also threatened to blacklist energy companies that are partaking in RoC’s drilling tenders but this tactic failed to stop Italy’s Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (Integrated Energy Company) (ENI) and South Korea’s Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS) from obtaining new licenses for adjacent blocks in 2013.

    Turkey/TRNC and the RoC not only disagree on who can explore gas and where but also how the future revenues from gas exports will be shared by the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Being in charge of the internationally recognised RoC, the Greek Cypriots claim that they have the sole sovereign right to develop the natural resources of the island. The RoC does not necessarily dispute that the island’s natural resources belong to both communities but maintains that revenues will be shared with the Turkish Cypriots only within the federal framework of a unified Cyprus. In contrast, Turkey and the TRNC object that the Greek Cypriots alone cannot represent the island, which they claim is against the 1960 Cyprus Accords and Constitution (Gürel and Le Cornu, 2014: 18). Turkey and the TRNC hold that the Greek Cypriots should not exploit resources before reaching a comprehensive political settlement.

    From Grand Consensus to Limited Bargaining

    The situation in Cyprus is thus currently deadlocked primarily because both Turkey/TRNC and the RoC insist on the settlement of all political and legal disputes before either party can legitimately explore for and export any natural gas. Part of the problem here stems from the fact both parties expect that the other side will make some political concessions. The underlying rationale most likely is that “each side assumes that the other has a greater need for the resolution of tensions than they do” (Gürel and Mullen, 2014). Turkey/TRNC assume that given the state of the RoC’s economy, the Greek Cypriots are in dire need of the revenue that natural gas exports would bring in. The assumption underlying Turkey’s position is that since the most feasible export routes necessitate Turkey’s cooperation, the RoC will have little choice but to eventually give in. Similarly, Greek Cypriots likely calculate that their Turkish counterparts will be inclined to compromise, if they want to receive any share of the energy bounty at all. The RoC is also aware that there are limits to Turkey’s aggressive posture. Despite all the military muscle flexing by Ankara, an open military confrontation between Turkey and the RoC would indeed be all but inconceivable, assuming Turkey prefers to retain its bid for EU membership. This strategic predicament reinforces the current deadlock by reducing the incentives for either side to assume a more cooperative stance.

    Is there a way to break the deadlock? The short answer is a qualified ‘yes.’ A pathway out of this situation can be drawn if the disputing parties manage to provisionally delink the settlement of political issues from the prospect of energy cooperation.

    Theoretically speaking, there are two alternative approaches to developing natural resources under conditions of political conflict: grand consensus and limited bargaining.[3] The grand consensus scenario postulates that parties must settle all political conflicts before they can move onto the development of natural resources (O’Sullivan, 2012). This scenario is based on the premise that political stability is a requirement for economic cooperation. In the absence of political stability it would be difficult to attract sufficient investment into the major energy projects or guarantee the security of critical energy infrastructure. Grand consensus thus requires that the actors settle their legal and political disputes before they can realistically consider an energy partnership.

    This is indeed the very scenario that has so far been played out in Cyprus, albeit with no success. The RoC insists that gas revenues are to be shared by the two communities only within the framework of a federal government, i.e. after a grand political consensus is achieved. The position of Turkey and the TRNC, while it differs from that of the RoC, also requires a political settlement before the resources can be developed. In the absence of an initial political consensus in Cyprus, this scenario has collapsed into a tug-of-war between Turkish and Greek Cypriot administrations. The RoC pushes for unilateral resource development while arguing the revenue sharing will be contingent on a final political settlement, whereas Turkey/TRNC keeps the tensions high through diplomatic pressure and military muscle flexing in order to force the RoC’s hand to accept more amenable terms of resolution.

    An alternative scenario would involve striking a limited bargain where disputing parties jointly undertake resource development instead of requiring that complex legal and political disputes be settled first. As O’Sullivan puts it, actors would “agree to disagree” (O’Sullivan, 2012) in this scenario.  This does not mean that they renounce any of their legal claims or completely drop their political agenda. Rather, they temporarily set aside or freeze any outstanding issues and set up a basic regulatory framework for limited, targeted cooperation. Such a framework would contain the necessary guidelines and guarantees under which resource exploration, development and monetization as well as revenue sharing would take place. Under the limited bargaining scenario, the final resolution of political issues remains pending until economic cooperation generates stronger incentives for the disputing parties to switch to more cooperative political strategies.

    The argument that the disputing parties should prioritise resource development over the settlement of political issues may appear infeasible at first glance. There are, however, some historical precedents where parties with outstanding political conflicts managed to cooperate. In 1979, Thailand and Malaysia struck an agreement to exploit the natural resources of the Gulf of Thailand by postponing the settlement of their outstanding disputes over the delimitation of maritime borders (O’Sullivan, 2012; Thao, 1999).  In the 1970s, Germany and the Soviet Union decided to set aside their various disputes including unresolved border issues, to establish a long-lasting gas partnership (Stern, 2005). Even in Cyprus, there have been elementary forms of ad hoc energy cooperation. Following the major explosion in the Vasilikos power station in 2011, which supplied electricity to half of the Greek Cypriot population, the Turkish Cypriot administration decided to supply electricity to the south, even in the absence of recognition (Çalık, 2014).

    Domestic Politics, Global Markets and Regional Geopolitics

    The limited bargaining scenario is eminently more preferable than the grand consensus model but one must nonetheless carefully consider the obstacles to implementing a limited bargaining strategy in Cyprus. First, the limited bargaining scenario will require a minimum level of mutual trust. In the aftermath of the collapse of the peace talks in October 2014, the basic requirements of a productive dialogue are lacking in Cyprus. Both sides will need to undertake significant confidence-building measures, if they are to start working on the terms of a limited cooperation scheme. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s visit to Greece in early December 2014 amidst the gas-dispute could be construed as an encouraging step in this direction but the lack of progress since then indicates that resetting the dialogue will require substantial political capital. In this regard, one obstacle to peace would be the political actors in both camps who may be risk-averse, unwilling to shoulder the political risks that a strategy of setting aside –even if temporarily– the deep-seated political divides could bring about. For instance, given the upcoming elections in Turkey, decision-makers will likely be risk averse and unwilling to appear as if they are making concessions on the Cyprus issue. Similarly, to some Greek Cypriot politicians the expected economic benefits from an energy partnership may be dwarfed by the potential political costs of cooperation with Turkey.

    Second, discovery of any new gas reserves in Cyprus –exploration continues in blocks adjacent to Aphrodite– would possibly impact the strategic calculations in both camps, albeit in complex ways. If Cyprus had more gas to sell to Turkey than it is currently estimated, this would likely incentivise Turkish policy makers to place a higher premium on absolute economic gains from cooperation, which would in turn reinforce the feasibility of the limited bargaining scenario. However, larger gas reserves would also strengthen the RoC’s hand. In this case the RoC would find it easier to finance costlier export options that do not require Turkey’s cooperation, which would in turn allow Nicosia to insist more strongly on political preconditions.

    Third, the availability of alternative markets and suppliers will shape the decision making of both Turkey and Cyprus. Ankara recently struck and agreement with Moscow to build the so-called ‘Turkish Stream,’ which will carry up to 63 bcm of Russian gas, 13 bcm of which will be retained for Turkey for domestic consumption. As part of the deal to build the Turkish Stream, Ankara is renegotiating gas prices with Moscow. The availability of larger Russian gas at a lower cost will likely dampen Turkey’s interest in Eastern Mediterranean gas for domestic consumption –even though Turkey will likely remain interested in transit opportunities. RoC, too, seems to be in search for regional alternatives to divert its gas to. On February 16th 2015 RoC signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Egypt. Egypt not only has a growing demand for natural gas but also the necessary LNG infrastructure that the RoC can use to export its gas.

    Fourth, the structural and cyclical changes in global energy markets will have critical regional repercussions. If oil prices continue to fall, then the feasibility of expensive energy projects like the East Mediterranean Gas Pipeline and the Vasilikos LNG plant will likely decline, incentivising the RoC to reconsider the pipeline to Turkey option. On the other hand, as oil remains relatively cheap, the attractiveness of the Eastern Mediterranean gas reserves could decline for investors as well as customers.

    Lastly, the geopolitical dynamics of the Eastern Mediterranean region will directly shape how the Cyprus conflict will unfold. On the one hand, new regional alliances are in the making, including the much-debated rapprochement among the RoC, Greece and Israel, where energy provides a bonding agent. How Turkey perceives of and responds to the realignment of regional interests will shape Ankara’s regional energy strategy. On the other hand, the preferences and strategies of major outside powers will be decisive for the Cyprus issue. The growing military and economic presence of Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean,[4] and the Kremlin’s unwavering support for the RoC’s right to develop the island’s natural resources, is a critical factor. The US, which is already involved in both regional energy projects and the Cyprus peace talks, can shape the strategic thinking of both Turkey/TRNC and the RoC by offering selective benefits for cooperation. The EU, which has so far been the least effective actor in the Eastern Mediterranean even though it has the largest stakes in the region, appears unlikely to play a larger role as a mediator.

    Conclusion

    After decades of constant conflict, punctuated by a few failed attempts at reconciliation, the peoples of Cyprus certainly deserve peace and prosperity. Following a mostly stagnant peace process since the failure of the Annan Plan in 2004, the discovery of natural resources had revitalised the hopes for peace in Cyprus. Indeed, the Aphrodite field, and the prospect for more energy wealth to be harvested from the region, could have very well been the push that the Cyprus peace process needed. The past few years, however, have shown that it is not a foregone conclusion that the prospect of energy wealth would inevitably incentivise the feuding parties to transcend their long-standing political quarrels in search for profits. Even the most optimistic observers would agree that energy has so far brought more conflict to Cyprus, not less.

    Yet all is not lost. While insisting on a grand political consensus as a precondition for energy cooperation has contributed to the collapse of the peace talks in Cyprus, a less ambitious but more practicable strategy of limited bargaining could help reset the peace process. If the Turkish and Greek communities find a way to provisionally and conditionally set aside their political and legal disputes for the sake of establishing a targeted, limited cooperation to develop the natural resources of the island, then it might be conceivable for the resulting economic interdependence to produce positive political externalities.

    The success of the limited bargaining strategy however depends on a number of factors, including the establishment of a minimum level of mutual trust and the political will on both parties to assume any domestic political costs associated with a more accommodating policy towards the other.  In addition, market conditions like the discovery of additional reserves in the region, the fluctuation of global energy prices as well as the availability of new regional markets and suppliers will change the costs and benefits of alternative export options. Lastly, geopolitical factors like the new regional alliances and the involvement of major extra-regional powers are among the key factors that will determine how the Cyprus peace process will unfold.

    Assistant Professor Tolga Demiryol, İstanbul Kemerburgaz University

  • The Record-holder Swimmer in the Mediterranean Sea for Peace and Brotherhood

    The Record-holder Swimmer in the Mediterranean Sea for Peace and Brotherhood

    Alper SunacogluAlper Sunaçoğlu who is known for his records in swimming and performance sports will swim in Mediterranean on 30th of August 2013 and will start swimming from Samandağ Hatay for the respect to the basic fundamental rights, freedoms and to say no to  war, death and captivity.

    In the past Alper SUNAÇOĞLU swam the distance of 78 km from Mersin to Cyprus without using safety cage and  broke the world record with a whopping short limit of time 26 hours 15 minutes.

    Alper Sunacoglu

    On 23th of April 2011 Mr. Sunaçoğlu swam across Istanbul Bosphorus at full length in 2 hours 25 minutes and after that on 29th of October 2012 and last year, the marathon swimmer again broke a new world record  in Dardenelles in 7 hours 12 minutes .

    Furthermore our sportsman greeted the Mavi Marmara at the offshores of Marmara Sea and escorted the Mavi Marmara flotilla until it reached the offshores of Sarayburnu in order to protest the brutality of Israel and to call for attention to the inhumanities that take place in Gazze, Palestine.Alper Sunacoglu

    After all Alper wanted to swim from Port Said of Egypt to Gazze but this was cancelled with the official written order of Ministry of  Foreign Affairs for security reasons due to  the civil riots in Egypt that erupted at the time.

     Alper Sunacoglu

    On 30 th of August 2013 the activist sportsman Mr. Sunaçoğlu and his friend Bedirhan Karabağ will start swimming from the coast of Antakya to the Syria where there is a war and deaths. .  Sunaçoğlu will swim to Syria in order to give peace message and  will say no to the cruelty, death, captivity, torture and to call for attention for the peace and for the respect to basic fundamental rights and freedoms at Mediterranean Sea which is a sea of Muslims.

     

    Lets pay attention to what Alper Sunaçoğlu has to say about this extraordinary project.

    Tolga: Firstly I would to thank you that you that you have kindly spared your time to us in your busy schedule.

    When did you start swimming and become a long-distance swimmer?  When you swim don’t you ever get bored or scared?

    SUNAÇOĞLU:  I have been swimming since I have known myself.  I feel that I am a part of the sea while swimming and it’s like a kind of worship.

    You are on your own  and with the God in an unguarded environment and the only option you have is to trust God who will arrange things for the best.

    In order to understand what I really mean you have to try what I do.  Just swim 500 metres from the coast and wait.. No one can see and hear you.. You are alone.. There is only God, you and sea..  Moreover the host of the sea and the living creatures of course.

     

    Tolga: One day I will definately try 🙂

    On the recent headlines you were about to swim the English Channel.  Why is this cancelled?  It is heard that you refused the sponsorship of the Governorship fo Istanbul.  Could you give us more detailed information relating to this event to enlighten your followers and our readers?

     

    SUNAÇOĞLU:  My project was to swim across the English Channel which is 36 km course and known for its extreme currents and freezing water temperatures in less than 7 hours to break the world record however I have postponed this due to the problems that the Turkey face as well as private private reasons.  Now my aim is to break the world record in 2014.  As part of the sponsorship we agreed in principle with governorship however after the Gezi Park protests I thougt that it will make sense, more logical and better to postpone this to the next year.

     

    Tolga:  Don’t you ever get afraid of sharks in the sea?  Have you ever seen them before?  Especially Mediterranean Sea seems to be very risky. What do you think?

     

    SUNAÇOĞLU: I can’t say I am not afraid but I know how to control my fear.  I have seen them before and I  know I will see them in the future. But there were no threat or attack so far and I certainly hope there won’t 🙂

     

    Tolga:  Recently you made a protest under  the name of  Yüzen Adam.  You and Bedirhan Karadağ swam across 30 km sourroundings of Büyük Ada together with the support of Gürsel Tekin and some members of parliament. And now the last stop of the protest is Antakya, is there any speacial reason to end this protest up in Antakya?  What is the rela reason behind the attempt of swimming across from Antakya to Syria? What is the real aim of this protest?

     

    SUNAÇOĞLU: I would like a world which shows respect to fundamental rights and freedoms.  I accept mankind as it is no matter for me what  language, religion and ethnic origin they have.  I do not want a war, blood, death, violence and empire of fear.  As the prime minister Tayyip Erdoğan said, ” There might be foreign powers influences or some monkey business” but once for all there is unrest, war, fear in Middle East and Muslim Sea of Mediterranean Sea.  I protest the Muslims’ killing of each other.  I am not the man of someone, some power or serve anyone. I am not the supporter of any political party and I don’t earn any money, on the contrary I have faced many loses materially and spiritually.  I only use my individusl democratic rights for action.  I hope that this works and I can contribute and lead to form common sense in this region of the world.  This is my unique aim. In short they say”A good deed is its own reward”.

    My aim is to support peace and brotherhood of mankind.  And if the conditions are convenient I would like to go the place where Turkish aircraft crashed and stand at attention in order to show respect by raising the Turkish flag.  I hope that God allows me for this so that I can achieve this and return home to Turkey safe and sound.

     

    Tolga:  Who will you meet you at Syria ashore? What is your message to Syria?

     

    SUNAÇOĞLU: There is nothing clear about it and it is not important who will meet me however it is sufficient enough for me that this someone is a human being as I will be there as an activist  with a peace message to declare to the whole world. My message is unifier not seperatist “I want respect to right to life.  As a member of Turkish Republic and as a part od nation which destroyed many of its enemies in wars along in its long history, I will make a cross-border marathon swimming without guns and defence.  I believe that my message will be effective enough against foreign powers or some monkey business in World. My message and philosophy is this “Turks are neither afraid of war nor peace”

     

    Tolga:  As we can see and understand you are determined exactly just  like before you swam to Cyprus, I can see the same courage and determination in your eyes.  I hope that everything you wish will happen and you raise full awareness on behalf of peace and brotherhood. Good luck YÜZEN ADAM…

     

    SUNAÇOĞLU: I would to kindly thank you for giving me a chance to share my protest with public opinion and thank you for your sensitivity.  Let’s hope for the best for Turkey and World.  I would like to take this opportunity to say happy Eid to Turkish People and local communities by hoping that this leads to brotherhood, peace, prosperity and unity wordwide.

     Alper Sunacoglu