|
|
||||
|
||||
|
Tag: coup
-
FCTA strongly condemns the first fatality of international terrorism on Canadian soil.
-
The Paranoid Style in Turkish Politics
Demirtas Bayar
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
REVIEW & OUTLOOK Updated August 6, 2013, 7:25 p.m. ET
Erdogan punishes his opponents on dubious conspiracy charges.
Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan put his repressive side on display in June, when he denounced peaceful demonstrators in Istanbul’s Taksim Square as “provocateurs and terrorists” and turned water cannons and rubber bullets on them. Now Mr. Ergodan’s government is venting its paranoid side, sentencing dozens of opponents to lengthy prison terms as part of a conspiracy case unworthy of a democratic state.
The name of the alleged conspiracy is Ergenekon, the mythical birthplace of the Turks and the supposed name of an underground ultranationalist organization bent on destabilizing the country and overthrowing Mr. Erdogan’s Islamist government. The evidence for the existence of Ergenekon is thin, yet Mr. Erdogan has blamed it for nearly every terrorist act carried out on Turkish soil in recent years.
The government has imprisoned hundreds of people it claims are part of the plot, many of them senior military officers but also journalists, lawyers and members of parliament. On Monday, a court handed out more than 250 sentences, ranging from time served (five years in some cases) to life in prison. Among those getting the maximum were Ilker Basbug, formerly the Turkish military’s chief of staff, and Dogu Perincek, head of the left-wing Workers’ Party.
Mr. Erdogan’s supporters point out that, however fantastical Ergenekon might seem, the Turkish military has staged three coups, most recently in 1997 when it overthrew the short-lived Islamist government of Necmettin Erbakan. And there’s no question that the old Turkish political order contained a “deep state” of senior judges, military officers and bureaucrats who were secular in their orientation but frequently autocratic, self-dealing and venal in their methods.
That was one reason why Mr. Erdogan’s rise to power raised hopes that Turkey might become a more mature and representative democracy. Instead, the Prime Minister has used his decade in office to replace one deep state with another. The man who in 1999 spent four months in prison for reciting a militant Islamist poem is returning the favor in spades. The hundreds of verdicts may have been designed to create the impression of a vast conspiracy, but a mass trial is a poor way to give individual defendants their legal due.
Such vindictiveness won’t serve the long-term political interests of Mr. Erdogan and his political party. Until recently many Turkish secularists have supported Mr. Erdogan because he delivered economic prosperity while reducing the political influence of the military. But his brutal approach to the Taksim protesters and now these verdicts have persuaded many of those erstwhile supporters to turn against him. The last thing Turks want is their own Vladimir Putin.
For years, Turkey was a model of a Muslim country that could separate mosque from state. Under Mr. Erdogan, it might have also become a model of an Islamic democracy, hostile neither to religion nor modernity. With Monday’s verdicts, it looks like something more depressingly familiar to the Middle East: a state where the fate of its citizens depends on the whims of the strongman.
A version of this article appeared August 7, 2013, on page A12 in the U.S. edition of The Wall Street Journal, with the headline: The Paranoid Style in Turkish Politics.
-
Turkey: Between Atatürk’s Secularism and Fundamentalist Islam
Harold Rhode, May 9, 2010Filed Under: Radical Islam, TurkeyVol. 9, No. 24 May 9, 2010
- From the remnants of the Ottoman Empire, Atatürk founded a modern democratic state by forging the entirely unprecedented notion in the Islamic world of a secular Turkish identity. Moreover, this identity was to be based on the Western notion of loyalty to a geographic entity rather than religious solidarity.
- Today there is an internal battle among Turkish Muslims between forces that want to be part of the Western world and those that want to return Turkey’s political identity to be based primarily on Islamic solidarity. But it isn’t Ottoman Islam that these Islamist Turks seek to revive. Their Islam is more in tune with the fanatically anti-Western principles of Saudi Wahhabi Islam.
- It is not clear whether the present government of Turkey really cares to be part of the EU. Thus, when European leaders insist that Turkey has no place in Europe, they may be playing into the hands of the Islamist forces in Turkey who can say, in effect, “The EU is a Christian club which will never accept us, so we need to look elsewhere, to our Muslim brothers.”
- In addition, American involvement has not always proven helpful. The U.S. attempted to reach out to radical leaders in a mistaken belief that they were forces of moderate Islam, thus inadvertently granting them legitimacy.
- If a moderate form of Turkish Islam is to be revived, it must stand up to the onslaught of Wahhabism and the temptations of Islamism.
Inventing the Modern Turkish Identity
In the nineteenth century, Ottoman Turks borrowed the Arabic word watan, to signify loyalty to the geographic entity called the Ottoman Empire. Until that time, the word at most conjured in people’s minds the very local place where someone was born. The definition of identify defined by place and language is a European concept – not an Islamic or Middle Eastern one. In the Middle East, identity is defined by religion and then by genealogy, which can become ethnicity. The Ottomans were attempting to instill the Western concept of loyalty to a geographic entity into the minds of the people under Ottoman rule. It was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, who created a Turkish identity – a loyalty to a land – from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. It is he and his associates who set Turkey on the road to democracy.
After the Turkish war of independence, which ended in 1923, arguments ensued about what to call the new country. By choosing to call the country “Turkey” and its citizens “Turks,” who were clearly the most numerous ethnic group in this country, Atatürk and his followers unwittingly created a problem for non-ethnic Turks – the most numerous of whom were the Kurds – in that new country. Atatürk and his colleagues wanted the word “Turk” to mean a citizen of that country irrespective of ethnicity or religion. But the word “Turk” was also used to describe an ethnic identity which made other non-ethnic Turks unsure of their position in the state. Since they were not ethnic Turks, the confusing and double meaning of the word “Turk” – now to mean both ethnic and national identities – made some non-ethnic Turks wonder whether they could be full citizens of this new republic.
Had Atatürk named this new country “Anatolia,” the geographic/non-ethnic name for that area, this problem would probably not have arisen.(A similar problem existed in the UK. The British solved this by separating political from ethnic identity. They use the word British to connote the political identity of the country, and the terms “English,” “Scottish,” “Welsh,” and “Irish” for ethnic identity.)
The Role of the Military in Turkey
Unlike other Western countries, the military has a unique role in Turkish society. Its job is to protect the secular and democratic republic created by Atatürk. That means that when the principles of secularism are threatened or when the country descends into chaos, it is the role of the military to step in and restore order. This has been enshrined in every Turkish constitution since the founding of the republic. So it should not be surprising that every time the secular republic came under threat, the military stepped in. There have been three military coups in Turkey, but, unlike other countries, after the military acted to restore order – as required by Turkey’s constitution – it then returned to its barracks. Curiously, when Turkey’s Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan went too far in the late 1990s, the Turkish National Security Council military issued a 17-point ultimatum – in essence demanding that he stop Islamicizing the country. This may be the world’s first “post-modern” coup. Erbakan refused and resigned. In short, the military sees its role as to protect the republic, not to rule.
The Struggle Between Political Islam and the State
Changing the way the people of Anatolia understood themselves was truly earth-shattering. It is therefore not surprising that tensions developed between the country’s Islamic identity and the Turkish national identity. This is a battle among Turkey’s Muslims, between people who want to be part of the Western world – i.e., emphasizing their Turkish nationalist identity, and the Islamists who want to emphasize their Islamic identity as their most important political identity.
But their Islam is not the Ottoman Islam that the Islamists seek to revive. It is a version of Islam based on the principles of Wahhabism and the ideas of the fount of Wahhabism – the fanatical medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyya.
To understand the difference between the relatively tolerant Ottoman Islam and Wahhabism, imagine that the Ku Klux Klan took over Texas and harnessed the state’s oil wealth to promote its radical brand of Christianity. That’s what Wahhabism is to traditional Islam. But it’s precisely that brand of Islam which is being promoted throughout the Muslim world, and which is increasingly evident in Turkey. Islam isn’t the problem; Islamism is the problem.
In the 1980s, before I was the Turkish desk officer in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, I served as an advisor on Turkish affairs to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Richard Perle. We would visit Turkey and I would go to the bookstores of the Ministry of Religion where I would marvel at the beautifully produced, cheaply-priced books on sale there. These books were in Turkish, but many were viciously anti-Western, anti-American, and anti-Israeli. The government didn’t have the money to produce such books, so it is clear that the money came from elsewhere. With time, it became clear that the funding was largely Wahhabi. But since they were in Turkish, a language few Westerners could read, Western diplomats either had no clue about what was being sold in these government bookstores or, if they did, chose to ignore the problem.
When the present Turkish government took power in November 2002, some of its advisors, when dealing with Americans, would tell us what we wanted to hear, and in our obsession with finding moderates, we allowed them to do so. One of the prime minister’s advisors insisted, “We have no Wahhabi money coming into this country.” So I asked him, “Why are all these gorgeous mosques being built all over the country in very poor areas?” He replied that local communal organizations had built them. I responded, “In the Muslim world, Wahhabi money is absolutely everywhere. You say that Turkey is one of the most important countries in the Muslim world. Isn’t it curious that Turkey is the one country that is not awash with that money?”
Political Islamification
The troubling political Islamification of Turkey has several dimensions. First, there is the matter of religious discrimination. To take but one example, between a quarter and a third of Turkey’s citizens are not Sunni Muslims but Alevis. (The term “Alevi” derives from the name “Ali,” the Muslim prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, whom the Shiites and other Middle Eastern groups revere.) Alevis worship in assembly houses they call cemevis, not in mosques. The Turkish Ministry of Religion funds mosques but not cemevis, even though the Alevis use cemevis to pray. Why is the government discriminating against a quarter to a third of its citizens? When asked, senior government officials have argued that cemevis are not religious centers and therefore are not funded. Is the Sunni government trying to “de-Alevify” the Alevis and turn them into Sunnis? These same officials also claimed that Alevis engage in immoral acts. Interestingly, this is exactly what the Ottoman Sultans said about the Iranians, to whom Turkey’s present government is trying to cozy up.
Second, the EU has acted as a vehicle for the present Turkish government to advance the process of Turkey’s political Islamification. As long as Turkey retains a hope that it could be part of the EU, the military and the secular establishment are restrained from taking any action to protect the republic from the Islamists, knowing that Europe will condemn them for doing so. However, it is not clear whether the present government of Turkey, whatever it says overtly, really wants to be part of the EU. Thus, when European leaders declare that Turkey has no place in Europe, they may be unwittingly playing into the hands of the Islamist forces in Turkey who can say, in effect, “The EU is a Christian club which will never accept us, so we need to look elsewhere, to our Muslim brothers.”
Third, American involvement, well intentioned though it is, has not always proven helpful. For example, in the early 1990s, the leader of the Islamic fundamentalist party, Necmettin Erbakan, was overtly and viciously anti-Western, and very closely allied with some of the more radical forces in the Middle East. In our eternal quest to identify “moderate Muslims,” the American ambassador at the time decided to publicly meet this man, inadvertently signaling that America considered Erbakan a legitimate, moderate Muslim. That is because in Turkish culture, the fact of the meeting matters more than what is discussed at the meeting. Like it or not, the meeting was understood by the Turks to mean that the U.S. conveyed legitimacy upon Erbakan. The secular establishment in Turkey and the military were livid. That is why so many passionate secularists in Turkey felt betrayed by the West, by Europe, and by the United States. Unfortunately, our attempts to reach out to what we in the West mistakenly believe are forces of moderate Islam have alienated those most committed to Western values.
Erbakan eventually became prime minister, though with tremendous restraints. His blatant attempts to politically Islamicize Turkish society failed and his party was banned on the grounds that it sought to overthrow the secular republic that Atatürk had established. The current prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a then-protégé of Erbakan, learned from that experience that only a gradualist approach had any chance of success.
Islamist Governmental Tyranny in Turkey
The present Turkish government is methodically taking over every aspect of society, including every branch of government, businesses, schools and newspapers. How has this affected the citizens of Turkey? Natan Sharansky has posed what he calls the village square test. Can a person go out in the village square and say he does not like the government? Can you talk freely? I’ve been visiting Turkey regularly since 1968. People were always prepared to talk about politics – but no longer. Today, the Turks are obviously afraid of something. It saddens me to see this taking place in an industrious country that was in the vanguard of moving Islam into the modern world.
The battle for Turkey’s identity is far from over. The forces of secularism are waiting right below the surface. There are a lot of passionate, if disorganized, secularists. Yet if a moderate form of Ottoman Turkish Islam is to be revived, it must stand up to the onslaught of Wahhabism and the temptations of Islamism.
If matters continue as they are, both in Turkey and Iran, then one plausible outcome might eventually be that Turkey and Iran switch places. Iran, after its Islamist experience, may rejoin the community of nations, while Turkey may turn toward Islamism and become a driving anti-Western force throughout the Islamic world. How sad for Turkey; how sad for one of the most interesting and industrious peoples in the Islamic world; how dangerous for the world.
* * *
Dr. Harold Rhode joined the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense in the Pentagon in 1982 as an advisor on Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Since then he has served as the Turkish desk officer in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as advisor on Islamic affairs on the Pentagon’s policy planning staff. From 1994 until his recent retirement, Dr. Rhode served in the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment. He is now a Senior Advisor at the Hudson Institute, New York. This Jerusalem Issue Brief is based on his presentation at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs in Jerusalem on March 4, 2010.
Publication: Jerusalem Issue BriefsFiled Under: Radical Islam, TurkeyTags: ataturk, ottoman empire, political islam, Turkey– See more at: https://jcpa.org/article/turkey-between-ataturk%e2%80%99s-secularism-and-fundamentalist-islam/#sthash.H27bhrCE.dpuf
-
Living in Turkey
- Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Living in Turkey
How to prepare for an earthquake in Turkey and guidance on Turkish healthcare and driving.
Overview
Turkey is an EU candidate member state. To fulfil candidacy requirements Turkey is aiming to comply with EU laws but there are still some laws that are dissimilar.
This guide sets out essential information for British nationals visiting or residing in Turkey, including visa and residency requirements, healthcare, earthquake preparedness, and vehicle and driving licence laws.
Entry and residency requirements in Turkey
Visas for Turkey
British nationals need a visa to enter Turkey, except for cruise ship passengers entering the country for a day trip and returning to the ship the same day.
British citizens can get a multiple entry visitor visa, valid for 90 days, on arrival at any port of entry on payment of £10 in cash (Scottish currency is not accepted). You can also get a visa in advance from the Turkish Consulate in London.
Turkish visit visas issued on arrival are valid for multiple stays up to a maximum of 90 days in a 180-day period.
If you plan to remain in Turkey for a period of more than 90 days, you should either apply for a longer stay visa before you travel, or get a residence permit from the local authorities in Turkey before your 90-day stay has elapsed. If you exceed the 90 day limit, you may be fined, deported and banned from re-entering the country.
Residency permits in Turkey
Residency permits are obtained after arrival in Turkey.
Formal application must be made to the police authorities in the province where you reside, or to the Aliens department of the Police in Ankara, if no fixed abode in Turkey is intended. HOWEVER, well BEFORE your departure from the UK, you should contact the Turkish Consulate in London for information about residency requirements and for information about importation of your personal effects, household goods or car.
A residence permit is an absolute necessity before you can clear any personal goods/car from Turkish Customs. Therefore an application for a residence permit must be made within one month from the date of your arrival in Turkey.
Failure to do so will result in additional daily storage costs for your goods/car by the Turkish customs authorities, which can be expensive.
On first application, residence permits may be issued for a two-year period, thereafter for a maximum of five years at any one time.
How residence permit fees are calculated
Residency permit fees for British nationals are 60 Euros/$80/year. Fees will be charged at $25 for one month and $5/month for each subsequent month. Residency permit book costs 198 TL(in year 2013). The fees will be converted to TL at the day of payment using official exchange rate. Further information is available from the Alien’s Department in your local area.
Work permits in Turkey
A work permit is required for employment in Turkey. Permits are issued by the Ministry of the Interior in Ankara. Contact the Turkish Embassy in London and/or your prospective employer in Turkey before travelling. Special arrangements for tour operators exist. You should contact your employer for full details.
Turkish healthcare for British visitors and residents
Visitors
The European Health Insurance Card is not valid in Turkey. Make sure you have adequate travel health insurance and accessible funds to cover the cost of any medical treatment abroad and repatriation.
If you need emergency medical assistance during your trip, dial 112 and ask for an ambulance. You should contact your insurance/medical assistance company promptly if you are referred to a medical facility for treatment.
Turkish Universal Healthcare Scheme
Anyone resident outside of the UK for more than 6 months is no longer eligible to receive medical treatment under the NHS. Some residents take private health insurance or join the Turkish Social Security Universal Healthcare Scheme. Others prefer to pay as they go or to return to the UK when they need treatment.
We can only give general information on the SGK (Social Security Institution) healthcare scheme. If you have specific questions, please speak to your local SGK office. We can give following general information:
- the scheme is compulsory for all foreign residents who have resided in Turkey for one year or more. However, we secured an exemption for British nationals which means that you don’t need to join but you can if you want to
- if you want to join, you should apply within one month of completing one year’s residency. If you don’t apply within one month but decide to apply at a later date, you have to pay a fine equivalent to a monthly minimum wage and you will have to pay arrears for each month that you missed.
- the premium for all foreigners is TL234.86 per month (between 01/01/2013 to 30/06/2013).
Prepare for earthquakes in Turkey
Many parts of Turkey lie on a major seismic fault line and are subject to earthquakes and tremors. In August 1999 an earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter Scale resulted in over 17,000 deaths when it struck Izmit, a town 55 miles south of Istanbul.
The Turkish government will be responsible for assisting foreigners immediately after a major earthquake or serious natural disaster. It is important to co-operate with these authorities. The British Embassy in Ankara the Consulate-General in Istanbul and our other consulates in Turkey will try to find out where British nationals affected by the disaster are, checking on their condition. We will pass information about your welfare back to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, or to your relatives.
Before you travel
- prepare a small personal earthquake kit to take with you (below).
- find out where the British Embassy/Consulate is located relative to where you intend to visit/stay and the relevant contact details (you can do this online).
- familiarise yourself with the advice on what to do in an earthquake (below).
- ensure you have adequate travel insurance.
- ensure you have emergency contact details of your next of kin and your GP with you.
- make several copies of your passport photo page. If you are able to, make a colour scan of the photo page and laminate it and keep a copy in your earthquake kit, in your briefcase/handbag, and in your jacket (plus a couple of spares). This helps if you need to show who you are and, if you do not have your passport with you, can be used for identification purposes.
Earthquake Kit
Prepare a small personal earthquake survival kit per person in a small backpack, comprising (as appropriate):
- first Aid kit
- whistle and key-ring torch
- water purification tablets
- packets of high-energy foods (enough to last 24 hours)
- wet wipes
- a small wash bag containing (as appropriate): spare toothbrush, toothpaste, flannel, soap, feminine hygiene items, toilet paper, tissues, condoms (can be used as a water container)
- spare prescription medication
- spare spectacles/contact lens kit
- pen and small pad of paper
- small pair of scissors and/or multi-tool penknife
- collapsible umbrella
- emergency money (small denominations)
All of these items can be packed into a small space and do not take up much weight. Pack things like toilet paper in re-sealable plastic bag to keep it dry. Pack all these items in your check-in luggage, if flying. If travelling with children add items appropriate for their age, and especially for babies and infants.
The whistle and key-ring torch are essential and are probably the most important items in this list. Ensure that you keep these on your person throughout the day and within reach on your bedside table at night. If you become trapped after an earthquake either can be used to make your presence known; the whistle, even if weakly blown, is likely to be heard by rescuers/rescue dogs.
If you are staying with relatives or with private individuals, they should already have an earthquake kit for their residence, sufficient and suitable for the number of people staying, including guests. Check with them before you travel that they have such a kit and related supplies. Expect that it is unusual for people to be so well prepared, so when they tell you that they are, it will be a comforting surprise.
Earthquake preparedness in Turkey
As soon as possible after arrival at your destination and on unpacking your suitcase:
- familiarise everyone with earthquake emergency procedures and develop a plan of action, such as arrange where to meet. Parents may wish to consult with their child’s school about its emergency plans
- find out where your designated evacuation area is (your landlord or ward office will be able to help you)
- know your route home from work/school on foot- in the event of a major earthquake, public transportation and roads will not be accessible
- check the emergency escape routes from your room, important also in case of fire and know where the assembly points are located
- put a bottle of water (minimum 0.5 litres) per person (more if in a hot climate) in your backpack
- prepare your personal earthquake bag and place it where you can easily reach it as you leave your room
- ensure that you have easily accessible a jacket suitable for the time of year and weather conditions. If in winter, ensure you have hat, gloves, and waterproof jacket (supplemented by your umbrella to help keep you dry); in summer, sunglasses, sunhat and sun screen cream; an umbrella can be used to provide shade as a parasol
- at night, place your whistle and torch beside your bed. Try to ensure that there is no picture with glass front above your bed. Place footwear upside down or under cover so that in the event that glass from such a picture is shattered, fragments do not go into your footwear and cause lacerations when you put the footwear on
The idea behind this personal earthquake kit is that, immediately after surviving a major earthquake, you can grab your earthquake bag, evacuate safely and without undue delay from the premises where you are staying, with enough personal supplies to survive for 24 hours without needing help from anyone else.
General behaviour
Earthquake preparedness is mostly common sense and there is no reason to be paranoid about the potential risks. However, in a seismically active region it is best to be aware of your surroundings and take some simple precautions so you do not put yourself at unnecessary risk. Just as you need to be aware of traffic movements and regulations about crossing the road in a place with which you are not familiar, so you should also be sensible in relation not only to earthquakes but also to fire.
What to expect when a major earthquake occurs
If a major earthquake (magnitude 6 or more) occurs, it is possible that the following might happen:
- there may be a very loud noise like a passing train
- buildings and the ground may shake violently for between 15 and 90 seconds, sometimes even longer
- weak building facades may collapse into the streets, glass windows and panels may shatter, roof tiles may fly off, chimneys may collapse, etc
- it may be hard to stand up, let alone walk due to the ground shaking; in severe cases the movement may be sufficient to throw you to the ground
- electricity, water and gas may fail or be switched off
- sprinkler systems and fire alarms may be triggered
- telephone systems (landlines and mobile) may shut down for significant periods after an earthquake
- a tsunami may occur in coastal areas or in areas bordering large lakes. Take note of any tsunami warnings issued following an earthquake
- be prepared for aftershocks; these may be almost as strong as the main event, may start to occur within minutes of the main ‘quake, and may occur for days to months after a strong earthquake
What to do during a major earthquake
If you’re indoors:
- stay there; drop to the ground, duck under a sturdy desk or table to take cover or get into a corner of a room, NOT in a doorway, and hold on to whatever you are hiding beneath. Use the ‘Duck, cover and hold’ actions
- if you are in bed, stay there until the shaking has stopped.
- if in a high-rise building, stay away from windows and outside walls. Do not use lifts or staircases during the shaking.
If you’re outdoors, stay there; move into an open area away from trees, buildings, walls and power lines.
If you’re in a vehicle:
- stay in the vehicle until the shaking has stopped
- pull over to the side of the road and stop but away from buildings, overpasses, underpasses, trees and overhead cables, if possible
- only proceed, and with great caution, once the shaking has stopped but avoid bridges and structures that might have been damaged by the earthquake
If you’re in a crowded place crouch in the duck, cover and hold posture and DO NOT rush for the nearest exit. Wait until the shaking has stopped then evacuate the building once you know the exit is clear.
If you’re trapped under debris:
- do not move about or kick up dust
- cover your mouth with a handkerchief or clothing
- do not light a match (in gas of gas leaks)
- use a whistle if you have one available. Tap on a pipe or wall so rescuers can locate you. Shout only as a last resort. Shouting can cause you to inhale dangerous amounts of dust
What to do immediately after a major earthquake
Your options will be dictated by your circumstances immediately after a major earthquake, the extent of damage to the local infrastructure and the level of preparedness of the authorities. The severity of damage and the number of fatalities and casualties can be worse in poorly-prepared countries than in those where precautions have been long established, even for a moderate earthquake. Be prepared for a general state of chaos and confusion and do not be surprised if telephones (landline and/or mobile) do not function for many hours after a major earthquake.
Assuming that there has been a significant amount of damage and disruption to local infrastructure, you are advised to seek advice from your nearest British Embassy or Consulate, which should have an Earthquake Contingency Plan. When they are able, they will provide assistance in communicating with your relations in the UK and will advise as to what they are able to provide in the way of further support. Do NOT assume that they will automatically provide you with food and shelter or emergency evacuation. In the most severe disasters, it may take several days to provide assistance. Furthermore, you may be a long way away from the nearest embassy/consulate making it impractical to try to reach the embassy/consulate in person.
You should check your insurance policy before you travel to ensure that you are aware of what support is available in the event of a natural disaster and what you should do and who you should contact should such an event occur.
Earthquake contact information
- AKUT Search & Rescue Association
- KIZILAY(Turkish Red Crescent)
- Bogaziçi University Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Research Institute
- AKA Search Rescue Research Association
Driving in Turkey
Bringing your car as a visitor
If you are travelling through Turkey to another country or just visiting, you need to get a visa/permit for your vehicle on entry and you must ensure that you have all the documentation for your car including registration papers, full insurance, a carnet de passage and your driving licence. You can only keep your car in Turkey for 180 days in one year. You will be fined and even your car can be confiscated if you fail to do so.
Bringing your car as a resident
You may temporarily import your car to Turkey if you fulfil some requirements. You can find detailed information on Turkish Touring & Automobile Association website.
Driving licenses
If you drive in Turkey, you must have either an International Driving Permit or a notarised copy (in Turkish) of your UK driving licence. Provisional driving licences are not recognised.
You will need an ‘A’ category standard motorcycle licence to hire a motorcycle over 50cc in Turkey. An ‘A1’ category ‘light motorcycle’ driving licence is only suitable for motorcycles below 50cc. By law you must wear a helmet. Failure to do so could result in a heavy fine.
Traffic accidents in Turkey
The following is a step-by-step guide on what to do if you are involved in a traffic accident in Turkey.
From 1 April 2008 it is no longer necessary to call the police to the scene of an accident in the following circumstances:
- when the accident involves two or more vehicles
- where there is only material damage to vehicles
- when no one is injured or killed
- where all concerned parties AGREE to the cause and who is liable for the accident and providing each driver completes the correct form Kaza Tutanagi(Traffic Accident Form) and all parties involved sign each form, including witnesses if any
- guidance to complete traffic accident form (Tutanak örneği)
- you should then submit the form to your insurance company who will use the form in conjunction with the other insurance companies concerned to settle liability. How to access the form and instructions how to complete the form are in English at the foot of this document)
In the event of a serious accident or if an agreement cannot be reached in a minor accident, you should immediately call 155 for Traffic Police assistance and follow these steps:
- do not move your vehicle from the point of impact unless invited to do so by the traffic police or gendarme
- it is not advisable to accept an offer of financial settlement from the other parties involved. Wait for the police to arrive
- once the police arrive you will be breathalysed and asked to produce your driving license and logbook. A preliminary report of the accident will be compiled by the police at the scene of the accident. Only when this report has been made should you move your vehicle. The police can take several hours to arrive at the scene of an accident. Do not move your vehicle
- it is essential to obtain the result of the breathalyser test and the official police report in order to make a successful insurance claim. You will be asked to collect this within three days from the District Police Station
- the Turkish Motor Insurers’ Bureau has information on what to do in the event of an accident involving a foreign car
Mobile phone use in Turkey
Shorte-trm visitors
You can use your UK mobile in Turkey during short stays if you have set up international roaming before you arrive using one of the network operators;:Avea, Turkcell, Vodafone.
Residents and long-term visitors
Foreign residents are entitled to bring one mobile phone into Turkey within two calendar years for use during their stay in Turkey. The phone must be registered within one month of arrival to Turkey. You will pay some taxes when registering your mobile phone.
It is necessary to register the mobile phones in order to use them with SIM card bought from a Turkish network operator. (In order to use such a mobile phone with a SIM card bought in Turkey from a Turkish network operator, the mobile phone number assigned to the SIM card needs to be correlated with the IMEI number of the mobile phone. The handset can only be registered with one line. Phones not registered in this way will be blocked and unable to receive or make calls.)
No customs documents are required for the registration of mobile phones.
Mobile phones to be brought into Turkey are to be registered with the Telecommunication Institution or with the mobile phone shops of Turkish Network Operators (Avea, Turkcell or Vodafone).
Documents required for the registration of mobile phones are:
- passport (Identity details indicated on the passport)
- residency permit
- copies of all Turkish entry/exit stamps in the passport
No more than one mobile phone per person can be registered in two calendar years.
Disclaimer
The information contained in these notes is intended for your general guidance only. While care has been taken in compiling these notes, the accuracy of the information cannot be guaranteed and, of course, law and procedures may change from time to time. For these reasons, neither Her Majesty’s Government nor any member of the British consular staff can accept liability for any costs, damage or expenses which you might incur as a result of relying on these notes
-
Crisis of Turkey’s Editorially Crippled Media Deepens Further
With the exception of a few semi-democracies in Balkans and Eastern Europe, nowhere in the world is the self-destructive role of media proprietors is more visible, more irrational, more aggressive than in Turkey.
Greedy owners of the big media groups – some ideologically close, some distant to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) – with huge economic interests in business other than media, strictly power-dependent of the government and bureaucracy, offer their ‘services’ through their media outlets for the political executive, as well abuse their ownership extensively to advance their influences.
Along with legal restrictions which squeeze the freedom of press, it is this arrogant, ‘unholy alliance’ between the government and media proprietors which set an example before the world how a vastly diverse media landscape like the one in Turkey, can turn into an ‘open air editorial prison’.
The proprietors often without any external pressures impose self-censorship on the government policies, block investigative journalism. They stand for non-coverage of corruption; black-out of stories and comment that contain criticism about issues that may damage their relations with the prime minister, deadly keen on their own economic interests.
Turkish media’s case is therefore rather unique in its complications.
Globally, there are three criteria to judge the health of any media in any country: Freedom, independence and pluralism/diversity.
There is not a problem with the latter: with 40 national dailies, 2500 local papers, 250 private TV channels, 1300 radio stations and more than 150 news sites and online portals, Turkey has a big, competitive sector.
It is the first two that present problems.
While mainly Kurdish dissent is subjected to legal punishment, and tiny, partisan Turkish press and a few independent papers operate freely and largely undisturbed by law, the media moguls are busy suffocating the freedom, and strangling editorial independence of the big groups.
The recent, spectacular case of daily Milliyet illustrate the pattern more clearly than ever. It has all the ingredients of how the ‘unholy alliance’ works: a scoop, a prominent columnist being fired, an editor who ended up in his post with zero credibility and a historic Turkish paper as a lame duck. Plus a proprietor asking the prime minister who he should appoint as editor-in-chief.
Let us first have a quick glance at the background of the case:
Minutes of the meeting on İmralı Island between the jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and the pro-Kurdish [Peace and Democracy Party] BDP delegation was published on Thursday, Feb. 28. Next day, Prime Minister Erdoğan furiously targeted Milliyet in public, saying ‘if this is journalism, down with it!’
He quoted also a line – to make his case – by the veteran chief columnist of the paper, Hasan Cemal. The day after, Editor of Milliyet timidly explained he stood behind the story. But, a couple of days after, Hasan Cemal’s column was absent.
It was censored by the direct orders of the proprietor – Demirören family.
Further more, ‘father’ Demirören demanded the Editor a to halt “such coverage” and Cemal be fired. The trauma spread to rival mass daily, Hürriyet, whose proprietor, Aydın Doğan, imposed a ban on coverage of Milliyet incident. Hürriyet’s columnists were asked for days not to comment at all.
Last Tuesday, upon his return after a two week ‘ban’, Cemal filed again article, fiercely defending the role of journalism, criticizing the media proprietors and Erdoğan. When it was once more refused, he resigned from Milliyet.
The ‘victim’ this time was a internationally known, powerful liberal voice, author of several taboo-breaking books – on Kurds and Armenians. He was also known for his staunch, consistent support for the elected government for its EU reforms and at times it was threatened by military memorandum in 2007 and with a closure case in 2008.
Milliyet sufficed with a brief note about the departure, while its columnists preferred to ignore it. His colleagues looked the other way because they feared losing their jobs or because they are hostile to Cemal’s liberal views. The indifference tells even more about the miserable state of the journalism here.
But, within hours, the article was posted on-line.
It is also published in English at the IPI’s website.
Who is the real culprit here? For many the way out is to put the entire blame on Erdoğan. But it is there thing get complicated.
Two days ago, in his usual blunt manners, he was on the record, telling that the proprietor of Milliyet had (after he purchased the daily last autumn) visited him and asked whom he should hire as editor in chief. He also told that he in response had given a name, but the recruitment had failed.
Erdoğan has little respect for rich media proprietors. Two years ago, he had complained that they were constantly knocking on his door to ask advice and expect favors. ‘I tell them, do not come to me, it is your business’ he said.
He vilified them also later, by calling them ‘shopkeepers’. Not a single proprietor of big groups came out and protested in the name of media freedom.
The other side of the coin is, Erdoğan weighs very heavily with his emotional outbursts. He may not have been imposing decisions in media himself, but whatever he says has consequences.
Yet, at the end of the day it is up to the proprietor, also, to rise up and defend media freedom as much as the journalists do. It is also up to the proprietor, too, to grant his staff editorial independence.
The problem is systemic. In a fresh Turkey Report passed by the European Parliament, it is recommended that ownership pressures must be by laws be prevented. It said that EP ‘..notes with concern that most media are owned by and concentrated in large conglomerates with a wide range of business interests, reiterates its call for the adoption of a new media law addressing, inter alia, the issues of independence, ownership and administrative control.’
It is a welcome acknowledgment, finally, of the root cause of the problem.
As long as the proprietors with other economic interests than only media stand begging before the political powers, with their eyes only fixed on winning public tenders, there will be no editorial independence, thus no freedom, in the ‘mainstream’.
Yavuz Baydar
Columnist, ‘Today’s Zaman’; Ombudsman, ‘Sabah’
-
Turkey: Is Orthodox Denomination Connected to Coup Case?
The priest’s voice echoed off the crumbling plasterwork of the sanctuary, as only two worshippers took part in a recent Sunday service in Istanbul’s Meryem Ana Church. The low turnout is typical these days. The Turkish Orthodox Church is possibly the country’s smallest Christian denomination, and certainly its most controversial.
Turkish prosecutors allege the church, which traces its roots to the upheaval surrounding the founding of the Turkish republic, is connected to an ultra-nationalist movement, known as Ergenekon, which reportedly plotted to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Church spokesperson Sevgi Erenerol, sister of the current patriarch, has been imprisoned since 2008 on charges that include establishing and directing an armed terrorist organization as part of the supposed Ergenekon conspiracy. A host of ultra-nationalist groups established in 2004 and 2005 had “the same” founders, and “they were all gathering at the Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate,” claimed Orhan Kemal Cengiz, a human rights lawyer.
Meanwhile, Vural Ergül, a lawyer for Erenerol, calls the government’s case “fake and imaginary.” Ergül acknowledged the church’s links to prominent ultra-nationalists, including Ergenekon co-defendant Veli Küçük, who has been linked to the 2007 murder of three Christian missionaries in the eastern town of Malatya, but maintained that both his client and the Turkish Orthodox Church are victims of government persecution.
“Members of the church are scared and anxious,” Ergül said. “It is impossible not to see … [Prime Minister Erdoğan’s] intolerance against the church.”
Beyond the possible Ergenekon connection, Cengiz, the rights lawyer who has worked extensively with Turkey’s non-Muslim minorities, contends that Turkish Orthodox Church members have routinely harassed members of other Christian denominations in Turkey. “It [the Turkish Orthodox Church] has a central role that has not been addressed adequately by the prosecutors,” Cengiz said.
How and why did a tiny Christian church gain a reputation for being antagonistic toward fellow Christians? The answer lies in its origins.
The Turkish Orthodox Church’s founder, Pavlos Karahisarithis was a Turkish-speaking, Greek Orthodox priest, who, in 1922, at the end of the Greco-Turkish War, broke with the pro-Greece Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, the supreme Orthodox patriarchate, and allied himself with victorious Turkish nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.
Atatürk took a personal interest in the Turkish Orthodox Church, and expressed his support. Karahisarithis, meanwhile, took the title Papa (“Pope” in Turkish) Eftim, and later changed his last name to the Turkish family name of Erenerol. “Atatürk may have had a pronounced secular view of the world, but he was going against a great trend in history in which religion marked you out as part of a particular group,” commented Anthony O’Mahony, director of the Centre for Eastern Christianity at the University of London’s Heythrop College.
But once Turkey’s 1924 population exchange with Greece took place, Eftim’s potential followers dwindled. The Turkish Orthodox Church’s “raison d’être disappeared” with the 1.2 million Christians who left Anatolia as part of the exchange, said O’Mahony. “History has left it behind.”
Other Orthodox patriarchates never recognized the church. Atatürk, however, did not forget it. Papa Eftim and his family were exempt from the population exchange and moved to Istanbul, where they were given the Meryem Ana Church, which the government expropriated from the Ecumenical Patriarchate. “It [the Turkish church] was conceived as a replacement for the Ecumenical Patriarch and the real Orthodox Church, and as a kind of proxy completely at the service of the state,” elaborated Cengiz Aktar, a political scientist at Istanbul’s Bahçeşehir University.
Over the ensuing decades, Eftim chastised Turkey’s other Christian minorities, twice occupying the Ecumenical Patriarchate building in Istanbul, and taking over two churches in the Turkish Orthodox Church’s neighborhood during the 1955 and 1956 anti-Greek riots. (Today, the Ecumenical Patriarchate is contesting those property seizures).
Together with his sons, Turgut and Selcuk, who, in turn, succeeded him as patriarch, Eftim continually railed against Christian groups, claiming that they were agents of foreign powers.
His grandson, the current patriarch Papa Eftim IV, has largely shunned publicity. Until her arrest, however, his granddaughter, Sevgi, continued to rally feelings against other Christian groups.
At a 2006 security conference hosted by the military, she described missionaries as “a pawn in political chess” whose “only goal is to invade this land.” She was also involved in harassment of the late Turkish-Armenian newspaper editor Hrant Dink, throwing coins and pencils at his lawyers during a court appearance. Dink was shot dead in a 2007 killing linked to Turkey’s ultra-nationalist movement.
“Sevgi Erenerol was one of the most prominent people waging a war against non-Muslims in Turkey,” commented Cengiz, who claimed that the number of attacks and threats against non-Muslims has decreased since Erenerol’s arrest and those of other prominent Ergenekon suspects.
“Although they themselves are supposed to be a minority, they hated other minorities, particularly Armenians,” added Aktar.
Prosecutors are expected to rest their case against Erenerol this month. Ceremonies at the Meryem Ana Church continue uninterrupted, although its future has never been more uncertain. “The number of members … is declining with each passing day,” said Ergül, the lawyer.
Meanwhile for the Erenerol family, which makes up the bulk of the church’s congregation, the charges in no way diminish their belief in the justness of their cause. “As long as we have belief in God,” said Sevgi Erenerol’s 84-year-old mother Claudia, one of the two worshippers at the recent service, “our problems will seem insignificant.”
Editor’s note:Alexander Christie-Miller is a freelance reporter based in Istanbul.