Turkish Forum

Tag: China

  • China, Turkey: Ankara Takes an Economic Risk by Standing Up for Chinese Uighurs

    China, Turkey: Ankara Takes an Economic Risk by Standing Up for Chinese Uighurs

    The Big Picture
    Turkey considers itself a leader in the broader Muslim world, a part of its identity that has compelled it to speak out against China’s ongoing detention of Turkic Chinese Muslims. The current AKP-led government in Ankara is defending its cultural and religious credentials in upcoming local elections, and defending the Uighurs helps in that regard. But this is also a position that could threaten Turkey’s economic ties to China, which is intent on defending its security crackdowns against Uighurs in the name of national security.

    See Turkey’s Resurgence
    What Happened
    The Turkish Foreign Ministry released a statement Feb. 9, calling on Beijing to respect fundamental human rights and close its internment camps for China’s Uighurs, calling them a “great shame for humanity.” Foreign Ministry spokesman Hami Aksoy added that “it is no longer a secret that more than 1 million Uighur Turks incurring arbitrary arrests are subjected to torture and political brainwashing in internment camps and prisons.” The Chinese Embassy in Ankara responded Feb. 10, calling the Turkish allegations inaccurate and demanding that Turkey retract them.

    Why It Matters
    Turkey is the first major Muslim country to speak out against the ongoing internment of Chinese Uighurs, who share Turkic roots with most of Turkey’s population. The statement’s timing makes domestic political sense in light of the upcoming March 31 municipal elections in Turkey, in which the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is defending its turf in the Anatolian heartland against other nationalist and Islamist parties. The AKP has come under increasing criticism from other parties, including the nationalist Good Party, over the Turkish government’s silence in the face of fellow Muslims’ suffering.

    Even though the statement appears measured, it could damage Turkey’s economic ties with China just as the Turkish government has said it wants to increase them. Turkey has explored purchasing Chinese missile systems in the past, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has invited his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, for a state visit to Turkey in 2019, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China recently extended Turkey a multimillion-dollar loan.

    The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has come under increasing criticism from other parties over the Turkish government’s silence in the face of fellow Muslims’ suffering.

    The Uighur issue is particularly sensitive to China given that the Uighur homeland, China’s westernmost region of Xinjiang, is a vital part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. It affords the Chinese initiative with direct links to Central Asia and Pakistan that continue onward as far as Europe. Chinese fears of separatism, supply chain disruptions and the risk that Western countries could exploit the issue to China’s disadvantage will, in fact, compel Beijing to consolidate its security hold over Xinjiang. In pursuit of this objective, which has accelerated over the past three years, the Chinese government has engaged in a broad security crackdown in Xinjiang, detaining as many as 1 million ethnic Uighurs, Hui and Kazakhs and subjecting them to re-education.

    Background
    As part of its political identity under the AKP, Turkey has championed popular Islamism and political Islam. And, even if it were to face Chinese economic retaliation for its outspokenness on the Uighurs, Turkey isn’t as vulnerable as other leading Muslim states. The Arab Gulf states have deeper economic ties with China, while Iran needs its relationship with China — especially as Western sanctions pressure builds up on it. Each has received some heat regarding its relative silence on the issue, increasing the significance of the Turkish statement.

    In the broader Muslim world, Indonesia is another country to watch. With national elections approaching April 17, the campaign of candidate Prabowo Subianto has criticized incumbent President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo for neglecting the Uighur issue, alleging that he is beholden to China. But while Jokowi’s foreign minister has reportedly expressed concerns to China in private about the Uighur crackdown, the president is focused on pursuing billions of dollars in Chinese support to remedy Indonesia’s deep infrastructure deficits. At the same time, he is likely trying to avoid inflaming sentiment against his country’s ethnic Chinese minority.

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  • Uzbekistan’s energy pathways: at a crossroads between East and West

    Uzbekistan’s energy pathways: at a crossroads between East and West

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    The new Russia-Uzbekistan nuclear plant agreement on cooperation in the construction of generation nuclear power plant (NPP) VVER-1200 reactor of 3+ generation in Uzbekistan seems to pose far more opportunities than it might seem. With the Tashkent’s critical need of non-costly energy resources, the project aims not only to foster Uzbekistan’s self-sufficiency and persistence in the energy sector, but also to launch national production and export of its own energy resources. Despite the plant is claimed to be of the ex-soviet prototype, the new industry will be equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and facilities by State Atomic Energy Corporation ROSATOM, a global technological leader.

    However, while Russia is likely to become a major energy partner for Uzbekistan, Tashkent will also continue developing energy construction projects along with the US and China. Earlier this year Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Miromonovich Mirziyoyev visited the White House where President J. Trump proposed a plan for strategic partnership with Uzbekistan in various spheres. But while Uzbekistan-US cooperation in social, economic and educational development does not require industrial waste management and recycling, the cooperation in the nuclear and energy sector with the use of nuclear elements of the US origin and a lack of US recycling technologies may pose an ecological threat for the country.

    China, for its part, willing to contribute to the modernization of the Uzbekistan’s energy sector bears more global motives rather than selling technologies to its geographical neighbors. Should Beijing become a nuclear partner of Tashkent it will obviously take over the control of the Uzbekistan’s energy infrastructure.

    Certainly, the agreement between Uzbekistan and Russia is not going to meet the country’s entire demand for energy resources. However, with the current US-China trade confrontation and blur industrial management prospects both from Beijing and Washington, collaboration with Moscow seems to be a win-win opportunity for Uzbekistan at the moment.

  • China, U.S.: The Trade Fight Escalates With New Rounds of Tariffs

    China, U.S.: The Trade Fight Escalates With New Rounds of Tariffs

    Sep 19, 2018 | 14:44 GMT

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    The Big Picture

    Trade frictions between the United States and China have intensified during the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. As Stratfor’s 2018 Fourth-Quarter Forecast indicated, Trump added to a series of tariffs, which, along with other pressure tactics, are part of the broader U.S. strategic competition with China. But despite its slowing economy, China has proved willing to respond with tariffs and non-tariff measures alike. Although both sides have indicated their willingness to negotiate, neither has backed away from the fight.

    What Happened

    The trade war between China and the United States has escalated yet again. Just hours after U.S. President Donald Trump said he was following through on his threat to slap new tariffs on $200 billion worth of Chinese goods, China responded by announcing tariffs on $60 billion in U.S. products. The U.S. tariffs, 10 percent on a range of goods including electronic and machinery products that are part of the Made-in-China 2025 program targeted by Trump, as well as some consumer products such as furniture and household appliances, would take effect Sept. 24 and would increase to 25 percent on Jan. 1, 2019. As he announced the latest round of tariffs on Sept. 17, Trump added that if China responded in kind, he would begin the process of authorizing tariffs on a further $267 billion in Chinese imports. Thus, with China’s announcement the next day, it appears that their battle over trade is likely only to intensify.

    Since the White House first proposed this round of U.S. tariffs in July, the list of goods it would affect has been adjusted to exclude some more sensitive consumer goods such as smartwatches and Bluetooth devices, sensitive consumer safety items like car seats, and critical raw materials like rare earth metals. China, meanwhile, lowered its own threatened tariff rates from an original 5 to 25 percent, to 5 to 10 percent. But those tariffs still will affect agricultural and chemical products, metals and other exports designed to inflict pain on U.S. farmers, and they will still target the industrial and pharmaceutical sectors. China is also pursuing non-tariff methods to retaliate against U.S. trade pressure, including imposing lengthy cargo inspections for U.S. imports, slowing customs clearance times and undertaking cumbersome regulatory approvals of U.S. businesses hoping to operate in China. Chinese officials have also proposed adding export restrictions on certain metals critical to U.S. industries.

    Why It Matters

    With both the United States and China upping the ante, and with the United States pursuing a long-term strategic economic competition to balance against China, their trade battle is unlikely to end anytime soon. Two rounds of negotiations since May aimed at settling their differences have failed. Last week, the U.S. Treasury Department proposed holding another round of talks, and the Chinese government was reportedly considering the plan. But the latest tariff round could take those talks off the table. Both the White House and Beijing have said they remain open to negotiations, but their positions on trade remain far apart.

    The Trump administration has calculated that as trade tensions escalate, China’s cooling economy would make Beijing more willing to consider concessions and agree to structural economic reforms. After all, in earlier talks, Beijing offered to take steps to reduce the U.S.-China trade deficit and to loosen market access restrictions, allowing U.S. companies to compete in such sectors as banking, security and insurance. But Beijing has steadfastly refused to budge on Washington’s core demands for structural economic reforms. Instead, in a bid to strengthen its negotiating position as the trade tension escalates, Beijing instead has chosen to impose greater costs on U.S. companies operating in China and to further restrict their access. More importantly, Beijing increasingly is taking the view that the trade war is just one part of the overall U.S. strategy to contain China’s rise and prevent it from gaining the upper hand in technology.

    Political pressure is mounting on Chinese President Xi Jinping to hold firm against making significant concessions to the United States. China is likely hoping that the pinch of higher prices for U.S. consumers and industries as midterm U.S. elections near will compel the White House to change tactics. But given Trump’s ideological opposition to trade deficits and the internal divisions within his administration in dealing with China, Beijing’s approach may instead only complicate potential talks down the road.

    What To Look for Next

    • China has yet to publicly decline the Treasury Department’s proposal for a third round of trade talks, to which Beijing had considered sending Vice Minister of Commerce Wang Shouwen. The timing and nature of China’s response to the U.S. invitation and who, exactly, would be chosen to represent the U.S. side will determine whether the talks offer any chance to de-escalate the trade dispute.
    • It will be important to note whether China pursues even more aggressive non-tariff measures against U.S. companies operating there and to watch for signs that U.S. and foreign companies are rethinking their supply chain strategy.
    • U.S. business groups could pursue possible legal challenges to the White House’s approach to tariffs, saying that additional tariffs would violate the administration’s statute authority under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The administration has used that law to justify tariffs on China on national security grounds. Instead, the groups argue, any further rounds of tariffs would first require an entirely new Section 301 investigation to have legal authority.
  • Central Asia Faces New Future: between Turkey, Iran, China and Russia

    Central Asia Faces New Future: between Turkey, Iran, China and Russia

    Central Asian leaders are known for their absolute power and life-long immunity from prosecution. The tradition that was started by the late Turkmen president Saparmurat Niyazov who held the title Turkmenbashi (The Leader of All Turkmen) until his death in 2006, later followed by his successor, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, 77 and finally the Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, 64, has been well enjoyed by its followers for over 20 years by now.

    However, the leaders are getting old and the region just might be on the threshold of the new era. The recent death of the Uzbek President Islam Karimov has marked the beginning of inevitable changes and has made the issue a public debate. The Central Asia is of great interest of its strong neighbors: Turkey, Iran, Russia and, finally, China. Each of the country is eagerly waiting to gain its own geopolitical goals and ambitions there. It’s only a matter of time now. In the long-term scenario, as seen by political analysts, China will most likely strengthen its political and economic development, while Turkey will likely become more stable economically. Finally, Iran might recover its power due to its nuclear program agreement.

    The key factor might be played by migrant workers. Though China is the huge labor pool that offers low-cost migrant workers it still cannot compete with Russia when it comes to the Central Asia: most of the people’s income in this region is coming from Russia as there are more jobs to Central Asian migrant workers than in any other country. Nevertheless, the competition between Turkey and Iran will most likely continue to grow. Considering the fact that some Central Asian countries such as Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are highly vulnerable due to terrorism threats and geographic proximity with Afghanistan, Turkey, if it keeps its stable economic growth, has all chances to confront terrorism by taking the leading control in the region in the long run.

    Meanwhile, the current Central Asian leaders keeping in mind all the dangers coming to them struggle to extend their authoritarian leadership as longer as possible by empowering their children and by filling all the important government positions with their family members. One of the brightest examples of such practice may be found in Tajikistan. Earlier last year Emomali Rahmon’s daughter, Ozoda Rahmon has been appointed as his chief of staff while her husband, Jamoliddin Nuraliev, the First Deputy Chairman of the National Bank of Tajikistan is one of the strongest candidates for the President elections in 2020 along with the President’s son, Rustam Rahmon. But due to the recent scandal that put Jamoliddin Nuraliev in the spotlight as he has been regularly seen in public together with Takhmina Bagirova in Austria (where Bagirova lives) and other countries during the holiday season, Nuraliev might soon be off the game leaving Rustam Rahmon the only real candidate for the President.  But whether the current leaders’ successors be able to be as powerful as their fathers or their presidency will mark the end of the authoritarian power in the region the Central Asia’s new wave of development is inevitable. As the pro-Moscow leaders will go, the region this will most likely be the platform of disputes between Iran, Turkey and China.

  • CHINA FILES : China Enters the Middle Eastern Theater

    CHINA FILES : China Enters the Middle Eastern Theater

    China Enters the Middle Eastern Theater

    As the regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran reached ever new heights with a potential escalation following Riyadh’s execution of prominent Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr, the entrance of a new major actor to the troubled waters of Middle Eastern politics was taking place. So far, President of China Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang have visited almost every region in the world in the context of their multidimensional foreign policy approach, but not the conflict-ridden Middle East. Therefore, when Xi embarked on a major diplomatic tour into the region comprising Saudi Arabia, Iran and Egypt there were plenty of remarks in global media outlets concerning the critical decision of the "Middle Kingdom" to finally come out from the sidelines and take a step forward to become a global player.Not least because the Middle East represents the most difficult regional geopolitical realm in which China’s non-interference into other countries’ domestic affairs policy and staunch neutrality could be maintained due to endless conflicts among regional neighbors. As a pretext to the historic visit, Xi was trying to gradually inject China into the complicated Middle Eastern political seen by inviting representatives of Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime and the opposition in Syria to Beijing to promote a peaceful resolution. He also dispatched his deputy foreign minister to Riyadh and Tehran at the peak of the crisis to mediate between the sides and to recommend calm. More importantly, Xi made a last minute alteration in his long-planned visit itinerary and decided to visit Tehran instead of the previously planned United Arab Emirates (UAE). This significantly raised the profile of his historic tour at a time when the spotlights of global investors are all focused on Iran, striving for economic opportunities in the post-sanctions era.

    As one of the major global importers of energy, China’s main interest in Saudi Arabia and Iran is expectedly economic, based on the maintenance of cheap and reliable supply of oil. Currently, Saudi Arabia is China’s biggest supplier of crude oil and bilateral trade stands around $69 billion. During Xi’s visit, he and King Salman inaugurated an energy research center and opened the Yasref Oil Refinery, a major joint venture between Saudi Aramco and China’s Sinopec. They also signed a memorandum of understanding for the construction of a high-energy nuclear reactor.

    But China’s diplomatic hyperactivity in the Middle East cannot be confined to pure economic opportunism based on maintaining cordial relations with all economic partners. On the contrary, Beijing seems to have realized a diplomatic opportunity space created by the lack of interest in Middle Eastern politics on the part of U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration and the fully fledged engagement of Russia in the Syrian civil war, allying itself clearly with the Shiite camp. Therefore, neither Washington nor Moscow are in a position to act as an honest broker in the tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which presented a perfect moment for China’s entry onto the Middle Eastern stage as a global power.

    Therefore, Xi wanted to become the first global leader to visit Tehran following the lifting of international sanctions to which China has contributed. Commercially, Iran is the favorite trading partner and logistical hub for China in the region, a status that was confirmed with 17 new agreements of cooperation in the areas of energy, trade and industry and a comprehensive strategic partnership document. The plan is to raise bilateral trade to $600 billion in 10 years, and the key to that vision is China’s One Belt One Road initiative, which includes ambitious rail, road and port projects, including a high-speed rail network connecting Xinjiang in western China with Tehran via Almaty, Bishkek and Ashkhabad. Iran is geo-strategically important in this vision as it stands at a crossroads at the edge of Asia before the route of the ancient Silk Road reaches Turkey and Europe. Given the deeply skeptical approach of Iran’s Shiite establishment toward the U.S. and Europe despite the recent rapprochement, China’s autonomous stance in the world system provides comfort for long-term collaboration. While China has long maintained a policy of non-interference in other countries’ domestic politics, harmony and economic cooperation, this might be just about to go through a radical change as far as the Middle East is concerned. China is becoming a superpower and will act like one.

    [Daily Sabah, January 30, 2016]
  • Turkey Inches Closer to Nuclear Cooperation with China

    Turkey Inches Closer to Nuclear Cooperation with China

    Turkey Inches Closer to Nuclear Cooperation with China

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 77
    April 18, 2012
    By: Saban Kardas
    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, accompanied by members of his cabinet, paid an official visit to China on April 8-11. The first by a Turkish PM in 27 years, the trip was remarkable in many ways and underlined the parties’ continued determination to deepen their cooperation, despite political differences on some regional issues.

    The most spectacular part of the trip was Erdogan’s stopover in Urumchi, the capital of China’s Xinjiang autonomous region (Anadolu Ajansi, April 9). Since Erdogan’s vocal criticism of China over its brutal crackdown of the Uyghur demonstrations in the summer of 2009, Sino-Turkish relations have been transformed significantly. Turkey ceased to advocate the Uyghur issue in public forums, while the Chinese officials also allowed increasing interactions between Xinjiang and Turkey. In particular, China enables such interactions in order to give the message to Turkish public opinion that it respects the rights of the Uyghur people. Overall, the parties are careful to turn the Uyghur factor into an element of cooperation rather than a factor of tension in the bilateral relationship.

    Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping’s visit to Turkey earlier this year underscored this mutual understanding to focus on areas of common interest (EDM, March 1). During his trip to Beijing and Shanghai, Erdogan held fruitful discussions with Chinese leaders to further cooperation in the economic and political realm, while also signing several agreements to enhance cultural exchanges. Granted, the relationship remains driven by economic interests.

    In previous conversations, the parties indicated their determination to improve economic ties. Especially the Turkish side is keen to have a serious discussion on this issue, as Ankara currently incurs a major foreign trade deficit to Beijing. As the parties aim to increase the current bilateral trade volume from $25 billion to $100 billion by 2020, it will be important for Turkey to manage this process in a healthy manner so that its domestic market is not flooded with Chinese consumer goods (haberturk.com, April 10).

    The two countries rank as the fastest growing economies in the world, further raising expectations that the parties should cooperate in the economic realm. In order to compensate for the liability caused by the trade imbalance, Turkey hopes to see a greater volume of Chinese investments flowing into its economy. During its trip to Shanghai, the Turkish delegation met with executives of Chinese investment companies to discuss the details of furthering economic cooperation (Anadolu Ajansi, April 11).

    Erdogan went to great lengths to explain the “success” of the Turkish economy in the midst of the global financial crisis and how Ankara introduced structural reforms to turn the country into a safe destination for investments. He also underlined Turkey’s proximity and access to the European markets as an additional incentive to lure Chinese investments. Reportedly, the cabinet ministers and businessmen accompanying Erdogan signed several agreements with their Chinese counterparts, especially investments in Turkey’s energy sector and infrastructure projects. The government has reportedly received positive news about Chinese interest in its major infrastructure projects. Especially, Turkey wants to see greater Chinese investment – both in terms of financing and undertaking construction work – as it seeks to construct a high-speed train railway throughout the country (Aksam, April 13).

    Indeed, the two countries also have been recognized as leading players in the worldwide construction sector. While China owns the largest number of international contracting firms, Turkey comes in second on the same list (Sabah, April 6). With the growing visibility of China in this field, concerns have been raised about competition between the two countries. Given China’s advantages, especially in terms of credit opportunities, Turkey is careful to avoid competition and instead works to woo China into cooperation.

    A tangible outcome of the trip was the signing of a declaration on cooperation in peaceful nuclear technology (Anadolu Ajansi, April 9). This agreement follows Turkey’s earlier cooperation efforts with Russia, Japan and South Korea in this field. Such an agreement usually is a segue into negotiations on the construction of a nuclear power plant. So far, Turkey granted a tender for its first-ever nuclear power plant to be built in the Mediterranean coastal town of Mersin-Akkuyu to Russia. The second plant is planned to be constructed in the Black Sea province of Sinop. Earlier, the talks Turkey launched with South Korea pertaining to the second plant failed, partly because Seoul was reluctant to give the state guarantees for the investments. As Turkey initiated negotiations with Japan on the same project, the Fukushima disaster again led to the interruption, with the Japanese side giving unclear signals as to their willingness to resume the talks.

    Following Erdogan’s trip, Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz announced that Turkey would soon hold talks with Japan, South Korea and China on the construction of the country’s second nuclear power plant (Anadolu Ajansi, April 13). Ankara’s approach in nuclear talks is significant in many ways. On the one hand, it seems that Turkey might be hoping to benefit from competition between the three Asian powers and receive a better deal for the second plant. In his remarks, Yildiz clearly underlined that Ankara would pick up the best offer between the three countries. On the other hand, this development also indicates Turkey’s anxiousness to conclude a deal, after having invested political capital in the idea of constructing a second plant. Given its soaring energy needs in recent years, which are met largely by imported hydrocarbons, Turkey has attached a major value to nuclear power plants in its energy strategy.

    However, this rather hasty and pragmatic approach also raises questions. The first plant was contracted to Russia, although Moscow has a mixed international reputation. Now, the pursuit of an agreement with China, which has not established itself as a major international player in this field, makes one wonder about the coherence, sustainability and reliability of Turkey’s nuclear energy plans. Occasionally, the government comes under criticism over the safety of the plants to be constructed with this strategy (www.turkey.setimes.com, November 11, 2011). In an obvious attempt to allay such questions, Yildiz also maintained that the plants will be built in line with robust standards, set by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the EU. Even if this will be the case, it remains to be seen if Turkey can genuinely develop peaceful nuclear technology by building partnerships with different players.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-inches-closer-to-nuclear-cooperation-with-china/