Stratfor.com
September 15, 2009
Summary
The Russian maritime border patrol chief said Sept. 15 that Russia will detain any ships illegally entering the waters of Georgia’s breakaway republic of Abkhazia. Moscow’s warning is aimed at Georgia, which has used its navy to detain several vessels heading for Abkhazia. Now that Russia has officially threatened to capture ships, Georgia has lost another way to contain Abkhazia and will likely think twice before it detains a ship sailing to Abkhazia, as the Georgians are well aware that their navy is no match for the Russian navy.
Analysis
The head of Russia’s coastal division of the border guards service, otherwise known as the FSB coast guard, issued a warning Sept. 15 that it will detain any ships entering the maritime territory of the Georgian breakaway region of Abkhazia without permission. The statement was directed specifically at Georgia, whose navy and coast guard have carried out numerous detainments of cargo ships traveling to Abkhazia via the Black Sea. The latest such interception occurred Aug. 15, when the Georgian coast guard detained a ship, with a Turkish captain and a crew of Azerbaijanis and Turks, carrying $2.4 million worth of fuel heading toward the Abkhazian port of Sukhumi. The crew was released on bail, but the Turkish captain was not released until Turkey’s foreign minister traveled to Georgia to appeal the decision personally. The governments of Turkey and Azerbaijan clearly were not happy about the detainment.
In addition to irking the ship’s crew and their respective governments, the uptick in such naval detainments off the coast of the Black Sea has particularly angered Abkhazia and by extension its security guarantor in Moscow. Such hostilities have been common ever since the Russo-Georgia war broke out in August 2008, when Moscow wrestled control over the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia. Russia has since established a significant military presence in these regions, and tensions have been high both on land and sea between Tbilisi and its breakaway republics. Following the incident on Aug. 15, Abkhazian President Sergei Bagapsh threatened to open fire on Georgian ships if Georgia continued such detainments. Georgia’s leadership dismissed these claims, saying that Abkhazia lacked the military capability to carry out such attacks, referring to the Abkhazian leader’s threats as a “bluff”.
Georgia did acknowledge, however, that if someone did have the means to respond aggressively to such detainments, it would be Russia. Until this point, Moscow had been relatively quiet about the detainments, simply issuing statements for Georgia to stop intercepting ships. But this could have been Russia’s strategy of allowing the Georgians to dig themselves in a deeper hole before making a decisive threat. Now that Russia has officially threatened to seize ships, Georgia has lost another lever for containing the Abkhazians, as the Georgians are well aware that their navy is no match for the Russian navy.
Most of the larger warships in Georgia’s small navy were lost during the war with Russia. What remains of an already hollow naval force are mostly gunboats, including some five patrol boats fitted with old Soviet 23mm anti-aircraft artillery pieces (possibly for use as naval guns). It is these gunboats and patrol vessels that likely would be involved in any security or interdiction effort off the coast.
Just north of Abkhazia, the Russian FSB has provided coastal security forces of its own to the breakaway republic now recognized by two countries in addition to Russia. The size and disposition of these forces are unknown; Russia has simply stated that its forces patrolling the area will seize ships and “do everything to ensure the security of the Russian state, the Abkhaz state.” While it is possible that the FSB contingent is somewhat smaller than the remaining Georgian navy, it may have the overall capacity to be more active; especially considering that Russia has significant ports in the Black Sea in Novorossiysk and Sochi, it likely has better overall access to spare parts and support from Moscow.
The bottom line is that the difference between the two forces is not so great that the finer points of a hypothetical tactical engagement could not push the outcome in either direction. But unlike Georgia, the FSB contingent has access to reinforcements in its much larger and more powerful Black Sea Fleet that could be quickly deployed to the waters off Abkhazia (the very ones used in the August 2008 war). The issue, however, is speed. Deploying a warship to sea unexpectedly can take as much as a day on the optimistic end of the spectrum, and transit to the Georgian coast would be the better part of another day. The amount of trouble Georgia could get itself into in the intervening time also merits consideration. Ultimately, Russia has a keen interest in keeping decisive military control over the situation. And in the end, without assistance from NATO assistance clearly not coming the Russian Black Sea Fleet, for all its challenges from maintenance to morale, is the dominant naval reality for Tbilisi.
As such, these new developments may suggest that Georgia will now think twice before it detains a ship heading to Abkhazia. If it does not, there very well may be a much higher price to pay the next time.
