Declaration regarding the questions that were posed to us based on Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay’s statement, indicating: “Jewish Diaspora is behind Gezi protest”
Following closely from the media, we are trying to obtain information about the meaning, the scope and details on Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay’s statement about “Jewish Diaspora being behind Gezi protest”.
But in any case, based on the fact that Turkish Jewish citizens as well as other Jewish people living all around the globe may be affected and pointed as a target of such a generalization, we wish to express our concerns, and share our apprehension and worry of the consequences that such perceptions can cause.
Chief Rabbinate of Turkey – Turkish Jewish Community
Main Turkish opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kılıcdaroglu claimed that Deputy Prime Minister Besir Atalay warned members of the German-based religious Turkish charity fund Deniz Feneri(Lighthouse) and its affiliated television channel Kanal 7 prior to a police operation to arrest members who were implicated in charity fraud.
CHP head Kılıcdaroglu: AKP deputy PM Atalay is ''Mole''
CHP leader stated during his party’s parliamentary group meeting that deputy prime minister is providing insider information to suspects in a high-profile charity fraud investigation in a long-awaited revelation. Besir Atalay, who was the interior minister at a former administration, was the person who had warned them of a possible police search of their offices prior to the raid that took place on July 6. He reiterated his claims that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has links to the alleged corruption within (Deniz Feneri) Lighthouse Charity Fund and accused the ruling party of trying to cover up an ongoing investigation into the allegations of fraud
Former Turkish Interior Minister : Suspect in Islamic Charity Fraud ?
“Who did the interior minister learn from that there would be a police search [of the offices of Deniz Feneri suspects]? He possibly learned about it from the police officers at the National Police Department. When he left his post as interior minister, his private security manager left the ministry but his official security manager is still with him. Atalay fears he the official security manager will reveal all the facts and get him into trouble,” alleged CHP Head Kılıcdaroglu.
“These documents prove that the suspects were informed about the raid,” said Kılıçdaroğlu, giving information on telephone calls made on Sept. 14, 2009. The raid took place on Oct. 16, 2009.
CHP head Kılıcdaroglu: AKP deputy PM Atalay is ”Mole”
“This is the dossier of the mole,” Kılıçdaroğlu said, lifting up the dossier in his hand to a cheering audience. “The mole is Beşir Atalay.”
The ruling AKP denied immediately any links with the charity and recently called on the CHP leader to prove his claims. Releasing a written statement on Tuesday, Atalay said Kılıçdaroğlu’s claims were all lies and slander aimed at him. Atalay rejected Kılıçdaroğlu’s accusations in a written statement released late yesterday. Atalay’s statement said Kılıçdaroğlu should “look into those who betray their professions and leak secret documents” if he is looking for a mole.
The Deniz Feneri (Lighthouse) administration is accused of funneling money collected for charity from pious workers in Germany into various companies and businesses in Turkey. In September 2008 a German court convicted three Turkish men of funneling $26 million in charitable contributions raised by Deniz Feneri to companies run by conservative individuals in Turkey. The Lighthouse probe was launched in Turkey after a Frankfurt court in 2008 convicted three managers of the Lighthouse e.V. charity in Germany for embezzling 40 million euros. Most of the money is believed to have ended up in Turkey in the coffers of the pro-government and conservative islamist Kanal 7 television channel and a business group whose owners are close to the AKP government.
Nearly a dozen people have been arrested as part of the investigation thus far. Former Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) head Zahit Akman, Kanal 7 Deputy General Manager İsmail Karahan, News Editor Mustafa Çelik, CFO Erdoğan Kara and Kanal 7 CEO Zekeriya Karaman are also among the suspects arrested. Ali Solak, who is suspected of acting as the “bank” for the suspected charity fraud ring, was also arrested as part of the investigation into the charity’s Turkish links.
Lighthouse charity fraud : on EU agenda
The Lighthouse case was high on the agenda of a meeting between Kılıçdaroğlu and the co-chair of the Germany’s Greens, Claudia Roth, late on Oct. 9.
Roth denounced the removal of the three original prosecutors from the case as an open intervention into the judiciary, CHP sources said. In a pointed response, Kılıçdaroğlu said the EU was also responsible for the incident because of the support it gave to last year’s constitutional amendments that changed the structure of the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK).
“Europe did not hear our voice and backed the AKP [Justice and Development Party] in the referendum,” Kılıcdaroglu was quoted as stating. Claudia Roth voiced “serious concern” over freedom of press in Turkey, the sources said, adding that she also suggested that the CHP seek dialogue with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as part of efforts to resolve the Kurdish conflict.
via CHP leader: Turkey Deputy PM Atalay is ‘mole’ in charity fraud probe.
The conservative VVD, senior partner in the Dutch coalition government, has launched a fierce attack on Turkey in the European Parliament. The leader of the VVD delegation, Hans van Baalen, said Turkey had disqualified itself as a potential EU member state with remarks made on Sunday by its deputy prime minister, Besir Atalay. He warned that Turkey would freeze its ties with the European Union if Cyprus occupied the rotating presidency of the EU in the second half of 2012 as planned.
MEP Van Baalen pointed out that Turkey has been illegally occupying northern Cyprus since 1974 and has blocked every attempt at reconciliation between the Greek and Turkish communities. Turkey also refuses to normalise relations with the Greek part of the island.
The VVD wants the European Commission to ask the Turkish government to explain this behaviour. (…)
via Dutch euro-parliamentarians blast Turkey | EuropeNews.
Having received unequivocal backing from voters in the constitutional referendum, the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) has moved to address Turkey’s structural problems, most notably the Kurdish question, through a combination of domestic measures, as well as regional and international diplomacy.
The resolution of the Kurdish issue has been one of the main targets of the AKP government. The AKP first sought to address this issue through domestic political reforms in the early 2000’s, also benefiting from the relative calm prevailing in southeastern Anatolia, thanks to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) suspending its operations. However, granting greater cultural rights to the Kurds as part of Turkey’s EU accession process or devising socio-economic policies proved to be ineffective. The threat posed by the PKK’s separatist terrorism lingered, as the organization managed to maintain its manpower in safe havens in Northern Iraq.
The PKK’s resumption of its campaign of violence in the second half the decade caught Ankara by surprise, triggering a heated debate. Faced with the PKK’s deadly attacks against Turkish military outposts from its bases in Northern Iraq, the AKP bowed to pressure and considered seriously pursuing stronger military measures to tackle this problem. Coordinating its policies with the US and the Northern Iraqi Kurdish authorities, the Turkish army undertook incursions into Northern Iraq in pursuit of PKK militants in the winter of 2007-2008. Greater security cooperation and intelligence sharing between Turkey, the US and Iraq, or the enhanced military operations inside Turkey could put an end to the PKK’s terrorist attacks.
Meanwhile, the AKP government launched an ambitious “Kurdish opening” in 2009, yet failed to garner popular and political support for the measure. The government’s mishandling of the opening, coupled with the PKK’s and pro-Kurdish parties’ uncooperative attitude turned the entire Kurdish initiative into a near fiasco (Terrorism Monitor, February 19). The government could change the terms of the debate only through its smart moves to table the constitutional amendment package in the first part of 2010, arguing that the Kurdish issue could also be addressed as part of a broader “democratization agenda” (EDM, May 5).
PKK violence, however, continued throughout the spring and summer, which exposed the failure of the Turkish security apparatus in fighting against the PKK formations inside and outside Turkey (Terrorism Monitor, July 8). The escalation of the conflict could be avoided only through the PKK’s declaration of a unilateral ceasefire prior to the referendum, which was partly facilitated by some civil society organizations. Following the referendum, the PKK sent signals that it would resume its campaign, unless Turkish security forces halted their operations by a self-declared deadline of September 20. A deadly mine explosion killing nine civilians on September 16 reignited the debate on terrorism (www.haber7.com, September 16). Though the PKK denied its involvement in the attack, it was a stark reminder that the PKK remained a potent force that could deal a serious blow to Turkey’s security. The PKK decided to extend the “non-action” period until this week as a goodwill gesture (Radikal, September 20).
Moreover, the success of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in boycotting the referendum in the Kurdish-speaking provinces reiterated once again that the ethnic Kurdish movement still enjoys substantial support in the region and continues to harbor ambitious demands for greater political rights. Indeed, the BDP representatives even went as far as demanding democratic autonomy (EDM, September 20).
Faced with this double-edged challenge, the AKP now seeks to address this issue through complex diplomatic traffic. There have been numerous visits undertaken by cabinet members and security bureaucrats. Turkish Interior Minister, Besir Atalay, was in Arbil over the weekend, where Kurdistan Regional Government sources expressed their support for Turkey’s fight against terrorism and the peaceful resolution to the problem (www.trt.net.tr, September 27). He is expected to soon meet his Syrian and Iraqi counterparts. The Head of the Turkish Intelligence Agency, Hakan Fidan, visited Washington last week, and might visit northern Iraq soon. On September 28, a US delegation led by Lloyd James Austin, commanding general of the American forces in Iraq, visited Turkey to discuss the joint efforts (Yeni Safak, September 29).
These contacts are undertaken within the framework of a joint “action plan” agreed in April to combat the PKK, as a result of the trilateral security mechanism between Turkey, the US and Iraq (IHA, April 11). Through closer cooperation with the US and the Iraqi Kurds, the action plan would have helped Turkey to take stronger military measures to eliminate the threat posed by the PKK, which to date has proved ineffective.
Although the recent initiatives also seek to address the security aspects of PKK terrorism, security cooperation through the trilateral mechanism might be secondary to the AKP government’s policy of exploring a non-military solution to the problem in a new political setting. The goal of the contacts is to somehow convince the PKK to extend its unilateral ceasefire, halt its operations inside Turkey, and turn its non-action into a permanent truce (Hurriyet Daily News, September 27). Once the guns fall silent, the government hopes to find a suitable environment within which it can address the Kurdish problem through domestic political reforms.
The crux of the issue is what will happen to the thousands of PKK militants. In this process, the PKK will possibly withdraw its forces from Turkey into Northern Iraq. In the most optimistic scenario, PKK militants might voluntarily turn themselves in and reintegrate themselves into civilian life, if the AKP’s democratic solution succeeds. Since this is highly unlikely, Turkey expects the Iraqi Kurds and the US to take steps towards the disarmament of these PKK militants and eventually end the PKK’s military presence.
However, given the uncertainty over the future of Iraq and the US military presence in the region, it might be unrealistic to expect either the US or the Iraqi Kurds to demilitarize the PKK. Turkey will still need to maintain its operational capability to carry out operations inside Iraq, as reflected by the government’s decision to table a motion for the extension of the Turkish army’s mandate to do so. It seems that there is no easy choice between the use of force and diplomacy.
