Tag: BDP

Council of Europe Criticizes Turkey’s Judiciary

The criticism comes as two of the main opposition parties claim the government is using the judiciary to silence opposition in the country.

In a detailed report, the Council of Europe’s commissioner on human rights, Thomas Hammerberg, has raised serious concerns that Turkey’s judiciary is threatening fundamental human rights.

“There are real problems in the way the system of justice function, including the judicial system, and that has an impact on human rights,” said Hammerberg. “[That’s] obvious, you don’t have justice in all cases being brought into the system.”

One of the main concerns raised in the report is the growing number of arrests of political party members. The ongoing investigation into the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) is cited as a particular concern. Turkish authorities believe the KCK is the political wing of the Kurdish rebel group, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK.

According to local human-rights groups, more than 4,000 people have been detained since 2009, most of them members of the country’s pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). BDP parliament member Ertugral Kurkcu says the detentions have little to do with fighting terrorism and more to do with undermining the political party.

“These people are kidnapped. They have no guilt. Many of them elected people,” said Kurkcu. “Many of them trade union leaders. All influential politicians, middle men in Kurdish politics. They have no relation with violence. They have not even been accused of being affiliated with any kind of violent action.”

Hammerberg echoed such concerns, saying he believes in many cases there appeared to be little evidence to justify the detentions. Many of those detained in the probe have been held for years without trial. The Council of Europe report also raised pretrial detention as an area of serious concern.

Hammerberg claims his interviews with members of the judiciary suggest pretrial detention is being used as a punishment.

“I was discussing with a prosecutor in Diyarbakir and spelling out there should be reasons to detain someone before the final trial, and he said at least they will learn a lesson. But why does the penitentiary system take on, teach lessons to people who perhaps may be innocent?” Asked Hammerberg. “There have been cases up to 10 years. That [is] absolutely outrageous. No one should be held before [being] proven guilty for such long periods.”

Supporters of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) march with posters of their leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu during a protest against the government in central Istanbul, January 10, 2012

Reuters

Supporters of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) march with posters of their leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu during a protest against the government in central Istanbul, January 10, 2012

The leader of the main opposition People’s Republican Party, or CHP, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, strongly attacked pretrial detention earlier this month, and claimed that Turkey is becoming “an open prison.” Two of his parliamentary deputies have been held in jail for more than three years, as part an investigation into an alleged plot to overthrow the government.

The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly ruled against Turkey on the issue of pretrial detention. Facing mounting criticism, Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin announced a package of reforms that include addressing pre-trial detention.

He said decisions pertaining to arrest, or the refusal of a request for release on bail, will now have to be clearly written out. He said the courts will have to justify with concrete facts any strong suspicion that a defendant will commit a crime. He said they will have to make clear the purpose behind a detention and ensure that it is reasonable.

Riza Turmen, a deputy for the main opposition and a former judge for the European Court of Human Rights, says the reforms are cosmetic, and that the reform does not apply to anyone held in connection with anti-terror laws. He adds that controversial portions of those laws have resulted in the detention of nearly 100 journalists – another area of concern raised by the Council of Europe report.

But Turmen argues a more fundamental threat is facing Turkey. “The problem today in Turkey [is], there is enormous concentration of power in the hands of one party,” he said. “The government controls the judiciary. The government controls all the independent institutions. Turkey has never seen such a big concentration of power, and such a concentration of power is detrimental to any democracy.”

In his report, Hammerberg expresses concern about the government’s influence on Turkey’s judiciary. He acknowledges that Turkey faces a serious problem of terrorism and says the government’s commitment to reform appears to be genuine, but now is the time for action.

“We are still waiting for implementation of signals we have received from the government,” said Hammerberg. “It’s a question of real implementation, not only talks and statements, when it comes to reforms and genuine changes.”

In the early years of its decade-long rule, the AK Party won praise in combating torture and ending extra-judicial killings. But observers warn that good will is fast running out with the main opposition parties, along with a growing body of evidence – of which the Council of Europe report is the latest – that raises concerns about increasing authoritarian tendencies.

via Council of Europe Criticizes Turkey’s Judiciary | Europe | English.

January 25, 2012
TAHA ÖZHAN – New Turkey, the PKK and jet lag

TAHA ÖZHAN

Saturday,January 7 2012, Your time is 14:44:37

New Turkey, the PKK and jet lag

Recently, Turkey has made considerable efforts to overcome its historical jet lag. On one side Turkey lives in “Western time,” while on the other it lives in “Eastern time.” While some live in the post-millennium world, others live in the Cold War era; while some live in the 21st century, others are stuck at the end of 20th century, or even at the late 19th century. Political actors of different social, political and economic backgrounds often find themselves grouped along a similar political line. The main reason for this is these actors, in their social and political approaches, attempt to reconcile incommensurable socio-political temporalities.

The aerial bombing of the Iraqi border region, resulting in 35 deaths, is one of the most tragic moments of this period. The questionable killing of civilians had a direct impact on the reactions of political actors. As expected, the government declared the incident a disastrous mistake and initiated an investigation. The main opposition party, leaving behind the equivocating discourses it adopted just a few weeks ago after Prime Minister Erdoğan’s apology for the Dersim massacre, demanded a thorough investigation into the incident.

For the first time in the recent history of Turkish Republic, we have witnessed the state breaking away from old habits in the face of harm done to its own citizens. In contrast to the indifferent attitude of the past, the Turkish Armed Forces accepted blame and announced they had initiated an investigation into the incident. Although this new attitude does not meet adequate levels of democratization, it demonstrates a concept of accountability is gradually taking root in the country.

The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and PKK’s reactions condoning violence were among the most provocative after the bombing tragedy. It demonstrated, once again, the difficulty in overcoming the historical jet lag syndrome completely. It is clear the incident is a tragic mistake on the part of the state.

At the end of the investigation, it may even prove to be a conspiracy. Nevertheless, it is also clear the state’s reaction to the incident differs from its attitudes in the 1990s in the face of such events. The BDP/PKK’s adoption of a political discourse based on incorrect analogies and short-sighted political interpretations is an indication of their insistence of the habits and discourses of the ’90s.

In Turkey today, legal political channels are wide open. As long as violence and illegal actions are not rendered viable, Turkey promotes a productive democratic environment incomparable to its old patterns. In fact, no one can claim Turkey has completed its process of democratization. As numerous scientific researches and trials evince, the most problematic institutional structure in Turkey, the judiciary, still suffers from growing democratization pains. BDP/PKK may be the only other institution that shares the judiciary’s political path. The Kurdish political movement and PKK maintain discourses and activities similar to the ones they exhibited in old Turkey.

Political science fails to offer an adequate explanation for the PKK’s isolation from current developments in Turkey, the Middle East and the world. In the context of new political structures in Turkey and the Middle East, those who condone violence fail to see it is this attitude that leads to bloodshed. They fail to see “the demand for accountability” is the unquestionable right of citizens within the boundaries of law. For the PKK/BDP to detach itself from the previous century and reach the social, political and economic world of 2012, it must first acknowledge the historical jet lag syndrome from which it suffers.

January/06/2012

via TAHA ÖZHAN – New Turkey, the PKK and jet lag.

January 7, 2012
arrests and violence threaten to radicalise a generation

Kurds in Turkey: arrests and violence threaten to radicalise a generation

Constanze Letsch reports on the Turkish crackdown on the country’s Kurds and the cultural oppression that goes with it

Constanze Letsch in Diyarbakir
guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 28 December 2011 18.20 GMT

Children enjoy a motorbike ride in Diyarbakir, a mainly Kurdish city in south-eastern Turkey where a courtroom has been built for the mass trial of more than 150 Kurdish politicians and activists. Photograph: Bulent Kilic/AFP

Since the beginning of the Arab uprising Turkey has been held up as a blueprint for the emerging Middle Eastern democracies to copy. But many observers question whether its treatment of its Kurdish minority gives it the right to be treated as a role model.

This year more than 4,000 people have been arrested under arbitrary terrorism charges, including dozens of journalists arrested last week, military operations against Kurdish separatists have intensified, with at least 27 killed in December alone, and guerrillas have stepped up violent attacks on security forces and civilians.

Mass trials of Kurds, including local deputies, mayors, academics and human rights activists, have inched forwards. In the biggest case, more than 150 politicians and activists are being tried in a specially built courtroom in Diyarbakir. More than 100 of the defendants have been in pre-trial detention, some of them for many months.

Abdullah Demirbas, the mayor of a district in the mainly Kurdish city of Diyarbakir in eastern Turkey, is among the defendants on trial for “membership in the KCK”, an illegal pan-Kurdish umbrella organisation that includes the armed Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK).

If convicted, he faces 35 years in jail on these charges alone.

“They have not even found a pocket knife in my house,” Demirbas said. Human rights groups have repeatedly expressed their concern about the arbitrary use of terrorism laws in Turkey.

“The Turkish laws make no distinction between political activity and terrorism. It is never examined in what kind of activities people are actually involved and whether these qualify them for prosecution. Very many of these cases are based on guilt by association,” said Emma Sinclair-Webb, the Turkey researcher for Human Rights Watch.

“People have a right to association. You may not like what people are associating with, but it is illegitimate to just jail, suppress and silence critics.”

Demirbas fears that the massive repression of politicians and human rights activists will decrease confidence in politics and lead to more violence: “A state that wants to end violence should widen the political sphere as much as possible, so that people who used to feel compelled to use armed force will turn to dialogue instead.

“But [Turkey] does exactly the opposite: they arrest more than 4,000 people that have never held a weapon, so people will think: ‘If we enter politics, we will end up like that.’”

Demirbas does not need to look far for examples: he was given a prison sentence of two years and six months after saying, in May 2009, that “a soldier’s and a guerrilla’s mother’s tears are the same colour. This war needs to end”.

Three weeks later his then 16-year-old son joined the PKK.

“He told me: ‘Dad, see this is what happens when you try to do politics. This state does not understand politics, it only understands weapons.’”

Demirbas said that he tried in vain to persuade his son to stay.

“That is the psychology of thousands of Kurds. I know of at least 2,000 young Kurdish people who have [joined the PKK] since then.”

Mehmet Emin Aktar, president of the Diyarbakir Bar Association, said that Turkey had become “a republic of fear”.

He says: “A democratic state needs to provide a trustworthy judiciary. People need to know that they can expect justice if they step in front of a judge. But this is no longer the case.”

Like many of his colleagues, he is very worried that the situation will reach a breaking point: “If fear and threats continue to be the main method of the government, the younger generation of Kurds will become more radical.”

In the cafeteria of the Dicle Firat cultural centre, a group of men were discussing the latest KCK arrests. “We all have our bags packed,” Kazim Öz said. “We now live on the assumption that each and every one of us could be arrested at any minute.”

Another man nodded. “Where is this supposed to end? They can’t arrest all of us! This morning I counted 36 grandchildren. They can’t finish us Kurds like this.”

With tensions turning violent again, investment and business development in Diyarbakir has stalled, making unemployment and poverty, for decades a major problem in the predominantly Kurdish south-east, ever more acute.

With prejudice fuelled by the Turkish media, discrimination against Kurds continues.

“Those who conduct business outside Diyarbakir province will not register their car here,” said one local Turkish Kurdish politician from the ruling AKP party. “The ’21’ on your licence plate is often enough to get randomly pulled over and fined. It’s just not worth the trouble.”

Most people agree dialogue must be reopened and that the Democratic Opening, an ill-fated attempt at rapprochement launched at the end of 2008, was on the right lines.

Recent reports have indicated the AKP may be on the verge of a new peace overture.

“The AKP is wrong when they think they can destroy the PKK through military force,” said Vahap Coskun, assistant professor at the Diyarbakir Dicle University. “The PKK’s strength does not stem from the approximately 5,000 fighters in the mountains, but from its widespread legitimacy among an important part of the population. For every fighter that they kill, another will go to join them.”

Coskun said that the PKK, too, was making a mistake in escalating attacks and violence. “People here are tired of fighting. The PKK’s attempts to use the momentum of the Arab spring to incite people to revolt have failed.”

He believes that the Kurdish-aligned Peace and Democracy BDP party should encourage peaceful civil disobedience campaigns again, and keep young Kurds from taking up arms.

“There is a massive potential: they have a party, civilian organisations, media, and a very young and mobile mass of people,” he said. “If they manage to gather 10,000 people in the streets of Diyarbakir, peacefully demanding mother tongue education, the government would have to acknowledge their request.”

This would also put in question the AKP government’s use of the “terrorist” label. “The unsuccessful civil disobedience campaign [after the 2011 elections] scared the government, because you cannot label civil disobedience as terrorism,” says Coskun.

In his butcher shop in the Diyarbakir city centre, Metin Özsanli, who is a member of the peace committee that has been arbitrating blood feuds, says: “My father has ended 250 blood feuds, and I have ended 65. It is incredible to see that capacity for forgiveness in people.”

He added: “We have to talk to both families many, many times, visit them both many times – when only one person has been killed. But over 40,000 people have died in this conflict.

“Prime minister [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan should not give up this easily. It will take many more talks with both sides to end this feud, but I am hopeful that it will end one day.”

December 29, 2011
Turkey’s Kurdish conundrum

Posted By Mohammed Ayoob Wednesday, November 9, 2011 – 4:52 PM Share

Any time spent in Turkey and one cannot help but be taken in by the country’s economic dynamism and political vibrancy that is unique in the region it inhabits. With a 9 percent growth rate in its GDP in 2010, Turkey has become the fastest growing economy in the OECD and is projected to remain so until 2017. Its commitment to democratic governance was demonstrated in the elections earlier this year that kept the ruling AKP in power with almost 50 percent of the votes. That the Turkish democratic process has become irreversible was confirmed soon thereafter by the fact that the resignation of Turkey’s top four generals in an effort to unnerve and destabilize the civilian government hardly created a stir in the country. Even a couple of years ago such a deliberately contrived crisis could have provided the military brass with an excuse for staging a coup.

In the context of this upbeat picture, which has turned Turkey into a model for Arab democrats next door, the festering Kurdish issue has gained greater saliency both because of increased acts of terrorism by the PKK and, more importantly, because it strikes a highly discordant note in an otherwise bright scenario. The recent escalation of terrorist activity by the PKK can in part be attributed to its declining political appeal among Turkey’s Kurdish citizens who now enjoy cultural and linguistic rights that had been denied to them by the hyper-nationalist Kemalist elite in the first 80 years of the Republic’s existence. The PKK leadership feels that it is in danger of becoming politically irrelevant and has, therefore, escalated terrorist activity to prove that no solution to the Kurdish problem is possible without its participation.

Turkey’s economic buoyancy has also ensured that large segments of the Kurdish population both in the predominantly Kurdish areas in the east and southeast, as well as in the huge Kurdish diaspora in western and central Turkey (Istanbul is the largest Kurdish city with a reported Kurdish population of 2 million), now have a major stake in the well-being of the Republic. Finally, the rise in PKK’s terrorist activities can be attributed also to the ultra-nationalist backlash amongst a section of Turkish opinion that has put the AKP government on the defensive and forced it to slow down the reform process that could ensure further rights for the Kurdish minority extending beyond the cultural and linguistic spheres. The AKP’s foot-dragging on the issue has led to Kurdish disappointment and in some cases increased sympathy for the PKK fighters after an initial period of rising expectations bordering on euphoria.

Above all, it seems that the PKK’s recent activities are related to the accelerating process of constitutional reform set in motion by the AKP government after the recent elections. A Preparatory Constitution Commission of 12 members — three each from the four parties represented in parliament including the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) — has been set up to produce a draft constitution to replace the military supervised and crafted 1982 constitution that can be debated in parliament and among the general public. The issue of Kurdish identity (or rather how the identity of Turkish citizens is to be defined in the new constitution) will be one of the main subjects to be discussed by the commission. If, despite the differences on this issue, progress is made toward greater acceptance of a multi-ethnic definition of the Turkish identity, it would take the wind out of the PKK sails.

The pro-Kurdish BDP, which has 36 members in the 550-member parliament (although six of them are currently in jail allegedly for supporting the PKK), was expected to be a major player in the constitution drafting process. However, it seems to have become hamstrung by its refusal to distance itself from the PKK and its leader Abdullah Ocalan, who is currently imprisoned in Turkey. In conversations BDP leaders repeat ad infinitum that no solution can be found without the concurrence of Ocalan and the PKK fighters who they refer to as “the young men in the mountains”. However, this formula is unacceptable to the other Turkish parties who consider PKK to be a terrorist organization. The BDP, which was beginning to be increasingly perceived as the legitimate face of Kurdish sub-nationalism in Turkey, has drastically reduced its effectiveness as the Kurdish interlocutor in constitutional talks by surrendering its autonomy to the PKK and appearing to many to be nothing more than the latter’s political arm.

Moreover, BDP leaders constantly repeat the formula that no solution to the Kurdish problem can be found except on the basis of “democratic autonomy”, which they stubbornly refuse to define. When pressed they say that this must be negotiated by the government with Ocalan. While the Turkish government may not be totally averse to such negotiations, as recent reports of talks between MIT, Turkey’s intelligence agency, and PKK leaders have revealed, it would be impossible for any Turkish government to publicly admit that it has been negotiating with what it terms a terrorist organization and its leader. The BDP could have adopted the role of acting as the primary Kurdish interlocutor and negotiating an end to the conflict if it had had the political courage to distance itself from PKK. Unfortunately, it has not been able to grasp this opportunity.

The BDP’s refusal to define “democratic autonomy” is mirrored by large segments of the Turkish elite, including many in the ruling AKP, who refuse to countenance any derogation from the model of the unitary state and the myth of a monolithic Turkish identity imposed by the Kemalist elite since the early years of the Republic, in defiance of the multi-ethnic nature of Turkish society. It is time that the AKP, as well as the main opposition party, the CHP, which is the standard bearer of Kemalism, seriously reconsider their stance on the issue of a unitary mono-ethnic state. Federalism or quasi-federalism is usually the best antidote to separatism. Imposing a contrived mono-ethnic identity and a unitary state remote from the concerns of peripheral areas and populations normally aggravates, rather than resolves, separatist problems.

A federal system is not necessarily antithetical to a strong center and need not come at the latter’s expense. In fact, as the experience of successful federations from the United States to India demonstrate, a federal system bolsters the legitimacy of the central government in the long run and aids in the process of nation-building, rather than hindering that process. As these examples demonstrate, trappings of autonomy are often more important than its content. Furthermore, they also reveal that federalism need not have an economic rationale for it to be successful. A federal system is basically a political tool utilized to respond to ethnic and geographic diversity even if it means that more prosperous regions must continue to subsidize the poorer parts of the country. In the final analysis, this is a small sacrifice to maintain national unity.

The solution to Turkey’s Kurdish conundrum may, therefore, lie in some form of devolution of powers to regional entities. It will help both in the consolidation of democracy in the country as well as give greater legitimacy to a central government whose political and economic record under the AKP is in other ways extremely impressive. However, in order to achieve this goal the Turkish elite and the AKP government must break decisively from the outmoded thinking of the Kemalist past and show a degree of political flexibility that has unfortunately been in short supply thus far. Furthermore, they will have to do so even as PKK terrorism increases in the short-term, more as an act of desperation rather than of carefully thought political strategy. Prime Minister Erdogan has the stature, legitimacy, and charisma to make this decisive break from the Kemalist past. If he does so, it will demonstrate that he is a real statesman and not merely an extraordinarily skillful politician.

Mohammed Ayoob is the university distinguished professor of international relations at Michigan State University and adjunct scholar at the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding.

November 10, 2011
1915 events were Genocide – Turkish MP

ISTANBUL. – Turkish MP from Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party, Altan Tan restated his words recently said in the international scientific conference in Artuklu University in Mardin, Turkey in the interview with Agos Armenian newspaper published in Istanbul.

Altan insisted that Kurds and Muslims also played a role in the 1915 Genocide implemented against Armenians.

“Not all Kurds though took a sword. However, Kurds do have their serious share of blame in the Genocide,” Altan stated criticizing also the attitude of the Muslims in rejecting the Genocide.

Altan Tan had earlier stated that as a political figure he calls the 1915 events Genocide implemented against Armenians. No matter what the conditions were, those people were killed. The proof is the territory and the demographic situation. At that time 13 million people lived in Turkey and Armenians made 10% of the population. Currently the population is 75 million, while Armenians are only 40,000, MP had stated.

via 1915 events were Genocide – Turkish MP | Armenia News – NEWS.am.

October 19, 2011
TARLABASI, THE HIDDEN ISTANBUL

Text : Fadime Deli
Pictures : Guillaume Poli

Tarlabasi, Istanbul – July 2011. Kurdistan litterally means “the country of the Kurds” and the effigy of Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK Leader, shows the desire of independence of the Kurds from Tarlabasi.

The Tarlabasi quarter is located in the heart of Beyoglu, the city center of Istanbul. A stone’s throw away, Istiklal Avenue whose expensive buildings, trendy shops and a million of visitors each week earned it the nickname of the “Champs Elysées” of Istanbul.

Muslim graveyards originally stood in the Tarlabasi quarter. The setting up of new embassies as well as the building of houses with gardens nearby required domestic staff and favoured its expansion. Up to the 1850s, the lodgings were destined to the Armenian personnel employed by the Levantines. This « dormitory » area transformed itself in a residential neighbourhood with its shops and stores.

From 1960, Tarlabasi became one of the various settling places for the poor migrants from inner Turkey, searching for cheap lodgings. The degrading neighbourhood became heavily stigmatized by the authorities.

Tarlabasi transformed itself with the massive influx of Kurdish migrants coming from the South East of Turkey at the beginning of the 1990s.

These Kurdish families who have been evicted from their villages for “safety reasons” and to stop conflicts between the Kurdish activists and the Turkish military, have come to settle in Tarlabasi out of necessity and in great emergency. Since then, they have been living in extremely precarious conditions : the adults may only have access to the lowest jobs. The children participate into the family’s revenue by selling stuffed mussles, handkerchieves, water, roses….These latter suffer from a double severing through forced migration and their being outside the school system.

These migrants from the inside who are still hoping to go back to their lands, end up by investing Tarlabasi, which has become today the poor population from the countryside’s area. Nevertheless, a rehabilitation project is threatening them of a planned eviction.

Dondu was born in 1941 in Sivas in the North East of Turkey. Because of the armed conflict between the Kurds and the Turks, she was forced to leave her hometown with her family and joined Istanbul in 1984. Out of her seven children, her daughter Dilek and her son Yusuf joined the guerilla in 1994. Dilek was killed a year later and Yusuf lost his life in 2000. Despite all this, Dondu wants to believe in a peaceful Kurdistan.

Tarlabasi, Istanbul – July 2011. Meeting of the legal kurdish party (BDP) . Some demonstrators are waving flags with the effigy of the illegal kurdish party (PKK) forbidden since 1993.

Tarlabasi, Istanbul – July 2011. Office of the legal kurdish party (BDP). The portrait of Abdullah Ocalan conveys a proximity with the Illegal Kurdish party.

Tarlabasi, Istanbul – July 2011. A majority of the Kurds have only access to the lowest jobs. Many men work in building sites and are notwithstanding themselves the actors of a rehabilitation that will lead to their own eviction from the area.

Tarlabasi, Istanbul – july 2011. Hamdullah’s family comes from Mardin, a small town in South East Turkey. After his job as a truck driver became no longer financially viable, he decided to leave for Istanbul and settled there in 2008. Since then, he has been a taxi driver and dreams of going back to Mardin. But the lack of safety in Kurdistan doesn’t allow it.

Tarlabasi, Istanbul – July 2011.

Tarlabasi, Istanbul – July 2011. The Kurdish workers face discrimination as they are paid less than the Turks for the same jobs.

Tarlabasi, Istanbul – July 2011. The newspaper « Democratic Society » is issued by the legal Kurdish party (BDP). The back cover relates the story of Evrim Demir’s death, a young Kurdish woman who immolated herself because she could not bear the anti-Kurdish policy carried out in Eastern Turkey.

Tarlabasi, Istanbul – July 2011. Meeting of the legal Kurdish party (BDP). The inhabitants of the area are playing Kurdish songs. On the wall, the inscription “long life to the uncle” is dedicated to Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the illegal Kurdish party who has been in jail since 1999 on Imrali island.

Tarlabasi, Istanbul – July 2011. Meeting of the legal Kurdish party (BDP). The posters are about Evrim Demir’s suicide. They read « Through this deed, I want to be the voice of peace. »

In 1994, the illegal Kurdish party (PKK) broke off the truce and went back to armed struggle. Since then, 37 000 people have died and more than 2 million have been displaced following the destruction of many Kurdish villages by the Turkish armed forces.

Tarlabasi, Istanbul – July 2011. The current inhabitants are undergoing the “gentrification” of the quarter. It will become the new area in vogue for rich families and for the ever growing number of tourists.

Tarlabasi, Istanbul – July 2011. Popular phrases and political posters calling for the celebration of the Kurdish new year “Newroz” mingle on the walls of the neighbourhood.

Tarlabasi, Istanbul – July 2011. After recurring insecurity problems in the East of Turkey, Ômer decided to leave Mardin in 2002 for Istanbul, then he bought this little local where the Kurdish gather to play cards and watch the news.

Tarlabasi, Istanbul – July 2011.

Tarlabasi, Istanbul – July 2011. Ilhan (on the left) has been attacked by Turkish nationalists in front of the Tarlabasi legal party’s office. But this incident hasn’t impact his will to push forward the rights of kurdish people.

Tarlabasi, Istanbul – July 2011.

Tarlabasi, Istanbul – July 2011. Members and supporters of the legal Kurdish party (BDP). In the background signs call for the cessation of the Turkish military operations.

Tarlabasi, Istanbul – July 2011. Harun (on the right) and his family are from Mardin in the South East of Turkey. In 2007, the Turkish military gave him the choice : either stay and fight the Kurdish activists or leave. He could not resolve to fight his peers and left Mardin for Istanbul.

October 17, 2011