Tag: Barack Obama

Turkey’s Distinctive Brew

Soner Cagaptay

Also available in العربية

The Atlantic

December 11, 2012

Don’t look to Ankara to be a model for the new Islamist governments of the Arab Spring.

It is 5 a.m. in Istanbul, and I am looking for coffee. Having arrived in Istanbul’s old city the night before and seriously jetlagged, I decided to walk into the Eyup quarter, which hosts Istanbul’s most sacred mosque, Eyup Sultan. I hoped the revered shrine, which attracts early morning worshippers, would have an open coffee shop nearby, and I was right. As prayers ended, I watched Eyup’s worshipers flow from the mosque, sipping a bland cup of instant coffee, unaware I was about to be treated to an experience of cultural flavor unique to Turkey.

A large group of Salafists, with their trademark trimmed beards and kaftans, walked out of the mosque, heading to my coffee shop. What happened next is a lesson in Turkey’s distinctive direction compared to its Muslim neighbors: The Salafist men ordered coffee and Turkish bagels (simit) from the barista, a young woman sporting a tattoo and sleeveless shirt. Neither the exchange between the barista and the Salafists, laden with polite honorifics and formal Turkish speech, nor their body language, suggested tensions between the two opposing visions of Turkey brought into close encounter for me to witness.

As this encounter so succinctly encapsulates, Turkey’s two halves are like oil and water; though they may not blend, neither will disappear. Turkey’s Islamization is a fact, but so is secular and Westernized Turkey. But the historical roots and current manifestations of this synthesis indicate that it is a model that will be difficult to replicate elsewhere in the region, as Islamist governments rise to power after the Arab Spring.

Starting with the late 18th century, Turkey went through two centuries of societal and structural Westernization under the Ottoman sultans, a unique experience among Muslim societies to this day. The Ottomans considered their state a European one, and borrowed European institutions, setting up women’s colleges and building secular schools and courts, to catch up with the continent. Enter young Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who imbibed the secular mindset in such Ottoman schools. The sultans’ rule was followed by eight decades of constitutional secularism installed by Ataturk during the 20th century. This campaign, unique among Muslim-majority Middle East societies, mandated strict separation of religion, government, and education.

Since coming to power in 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, rooted in Islamism, has challenged these premises, and the firewall between religion, politics, and education has collapsed. The result has been a rising tide of Islamization in Turkey. Take for example, a recent law that mandates the teaching of religion in public schools for nine-year-old children. What is more, Turkey now has a different identity. It considers itself Middle Eastern, rather than European, and views other Muslim countries as brother nations. This is a far cry from Ataturk’s vision that viewed Turkey as a European country, only accidentally placed in the Middle East.

Turkey’s Islamization is old news. But what is new — as demonstrated by my encounter at the coffee shop — is that such Islamization is taking place within the constraints of pre-existing and institutionalized Westernization, a feature unique to Turkey among its Muslim neighbors in the Middle East. The country is so thoroughly westernized that even the AKP and its Islamist elites cannot escape trappings of their Western mold. From the role of women in society, to the country’s membership in the NATO alliance, Turkey’s western legacy is an insurmountable fact. Perhaps most importantly, it is Turkey’s embrace of liberal economics that has driven the AKP to the top in the first place.

Regardless of how Islamicized Turkey becomes, it will be impossible to take women out of the public space. Women’s participation in public life, so deeply engrained in secularist Turkey, is also a trademark of the new Turkey. Consider Turkey’s first lady Hayrunnisa Gul, the wife of President Abdullah Gul. The Turkish first lady has a very public presence, runs her own policy initiatives, and her website appears to be a mirror image of the White House website set up for Michelle Obama.

When it comes to the country’s foreign policy orientation, Turkey’s Islamization is meeting its match as well. To be sure, the new Turkey does not consider itself a de facto member of the Western world, but neither does it consider itself antithetical to the West, as it did until a few years ago. This point was underlined during Turkey’s recent debate on deploying NATO Patriot missiles on Turkish territory against Syria. This happened without significant domestic opposition: The Turks have lived with NATO too long to think outside of its box.

This is where Turkey’s structural Westernization — its institutional connections to the West and its adoptions of Western ways — makes a difference compared to other Muslim-majority societies in the region. It is hard to imagine that NATO presence would be so welcome in other Muslim majority countries. Even the most diehard Islamists in Turkey had reason to support the NATO alliance because it is what protected Turkey against “godless” communism.

As a Muslim country that takes NATO seriously, the new Turkey’s foreign policy falls somewhere between Ataturk’s Turkey and the AKP’s vision. Regional instability has made Turkey’s access to NATO a valuable asset, hence Ankara’s pivot towards Washington and away from the lofty notion of Muslim solidarity. This has been most significantly demonstrated by Turkey’s 2010 decision to join NATO’s missile defense project that aims to protect alliance members against missiles coming from Iran, hardly an expression of solidarity with a Muslim nation. The civil war in Syria has accelerated Ankara’s run for cover under NATO’s embrace: when Damascus shot down a Turkish place in June, Turkey swiftly asked the Western alliance to come to its assistance. Further unrest in the Middle East and competition against Iran in Iraq and Syria will only increase Ankara’s pivot towards the United States and NATO.

All this suggests that Turkey’s Islamization is bound by the country’s deep-rooted and institutional traditions of Westernization, as well as continued regional instability. Accordingly, Turkey and its Muslim neighbors in the Middle East may be heading in different directions. Countries such as Egypt lack Turkey’s institutional westernization experience and constitutionally-mandated secular heritage, and are therefore more susceptible to thorough Islamization. In Turkey, Islamization will be tempered by the unique heritage of institutional and structural westernization. This has ushered in a blend of Western ways and Islamist politics — a first anywhere in the world.

Sheer numbers require this culture of co-existence, if not tolerance, to take root. In the most recent 2011 elections, the AKP received nearly 50 percent of the vote. Excluding the 15 percent of the voters that supported other Islamist and conservative parties, 35 percent of the population, totaling twenty-five million people, did not vote for the AKP. These voters stand for secularism, and they will never buy into the religious movement in Turkey. This block will constitute the domestic limitation of Turkey’s Islamization. After ten years in power, and likely to run the country for another term with a humming economy boosting its support, the AKP is making Turkey in its own image. But the new Turkey will have a uniquely distinct flavor: a bit Islamist, a bit secularist, a bit conservative, and a bit Western.

Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute.

March 16, 2013
The Geopolitical Significance, Or Lack Thereof, Of Turkey’s NATO Radar

by Joshua Kucera

Turkey’s decision in 2011 to host a radar for NATO’s missile defense system has been widely interpreted as a reaffirmation of Turkey’s commitment to NATO, and more generally to a western geopolitical orientation, at a time when a number of analysts and policymakers have worried that Turkey is “drifting eastward.” As analyst Ömer Taşpınar put it last year, “That decision, in my opinion, was almost a make-or-break move for the Obama administration in terms of testing Turkey’s commitment to NATO, testing Turkey’s commitment to the trans-Atlantic partnership.” More recently, on the occasion of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Ankara, as EurasiaNet’s Yigal Schleiffer pointed out, Turkish commentators again noted the significance of the decision to host the radar:

In Washington, Turkey’s realignment with the U.S. particularly after the employment of the missile radar system and Ankara’s decision to side with the Syrian opposition despite Iranian and Russian objections appeared as good news.

But that may not be a correct interpretation of Ankara’s decisionmaking, notes Aaron Stein, an Istanbul-based researcher at the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies who studies Turkish defense issues. Turkey’s reluctance to host the radars originally — and then its decision, ultimately, to accept them — both had more to do with Turkey’s calculations of its own security rather than about geopolitics, he said in a brief email interview with The Bug Pit.

The Bug Pit: Turkey’s decision to host the radars has been described as a “make or break decision” from the White House’s perspective, on testing Turkey’s commitment to NATO and a geopolitical orientation to the West. Was that an accurate reading of Ankara’s decision? How much of the decision was based on a desire to reaffirm its commitment to NATO and the US?

Aaron Stein: Turkey, unfortunately, has a very difficult time articulating its foreign policy strategy to western audiences. For some reason, Ankara has yet to fully grasp the two page bullet point memo culture that permeates Washington. Ankara still likes to talk in long winded platitude, which, in my opinion, often leads to misunderstandings. Thus, it often runs into trouble when it takes positions that, on the surface, appear at odds with its western allies. The negotiations for the deployment of the radar took place during Turkey’s attempt to broker a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The pre-Syria AKP believed that the best way to engage with Iran was to diplomatically engage with the regime’s leadership, in order to appeal to the moderates and isolate the hardliners. Ankara believed that threatening language and sanctions undermined the Iranian pragmatists and strengthened the hardliners. In turn, a coercive approach would raise the likelihood of a military strike, which would severely hurt Turkey’s economic and security interests.

Thus, during the negotiations for NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept, Ankara objected to the inclusion of Iran and Syria as specific threats to the Alliance. Ankara, therefore, was not objecting to the concept of missile defense – far from it actually. Instead, the regime was keen on painting the NATO missile shield as a defensive measure, designed solely to protect members from the threat of ballistic missiles in the abstract. Therefore, Ankara’s objections were to the proposed wording in the Strategic Concept and not to the proposed missile shield.

During the first Gulf War, Ankara lacked the tools to protects its territory from Iraqi ballistic missile attack. Ankara, therefore, asked the NATO alliance to provide it with Patriots. However, the deployment was delayed, due to internal NATO disputes about sending the missiles to Turkey. Turkey, therefore, was rightly upset about what they perceived to be as NATO’s dithering on the deployment of a system that its saw as critical for the defense of Turkish territory. However, Ankara’s anger also shows just how seriously Ankara believes in the concept of missile defense. Through out the 1990s, Turkey consistently identified the dual threat of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as one of its top security threats. Thus, in the late 1990s, the Turkish military began to negotiate with Israel for the sale of the Arrow missile system. The negotiations, however, were halted after the 2001 financial crisis.

Turkey, therefore, was a big supporter of the US plan to deploy a NATO missile shield. Turkey, along with the other NATO allies, supported the U.S. backed proposal to deploy a European missile shield in 2008. However, in 2010, it was not prepared to accept the French backed proposal to identify Iran and Syria as specific threats to the Alliance. Moreover, Ankara also sought to wrangle guarantees from the Alliance so that the system would be capable of covering all of Turkish territory. In addition, the Turkish military wanted to have some operational control of the missile system, in order to ensure that it would be used to protect Turkish territory, should Iran or Syria launch a surprise missile attack. Again, the issue was not the radar, but the NATO security guarantee. This approach, once again, shows that Turkey is supportive of ballistic missile defense as concept. However, they are keen on ensuring that they receive the appropriate guarantees to ensure that they will be protected by the Alliance.

TBP: What are the most significant benefits, from Ankara’s perspective, from allowing the radars to be placed there? How did they weigh the defensive and geostrategic elements of this issue?

AS: The most significant benefit is the deployment of a ballistic missile system ostensibly aimed at protecting Turkish citizens from the threat of ballistic missile attack. The radar augments Turkish air defenses, particularly against the threats that Turkey is most vulnerable. However, scant attention is paid in Turkey to limits of the system and the problems with the SM-3 interceptor. As I explained, Turkey is for missile defense as a concept. However, their criticisms are political, rather than based on a sober assessment of the effectiveness of missile defense as a concept. In any case, Turkey hopes to augment the proposed NATO missile system with its own missile defense system. Originally, Ankara had sought to purchase a system – albeit with substantial offsets – from a foreign supplier. However, recently, Ankara has dropped its previous approach, in favor of a co-production deal with one of the proposed suppliers.

That latter missile defense system that Stein referred to also has been heavily scrutinized as ageopolitical bellwether, given that Turkey was choosing between American, European, Russian, and Chinese systems. In a recent post on his blog, Turkey Wonk, Stein wrote:

While never stated outright, Turkey appears to have wanted to purchase the Patriot, but was determined to have access to the design information. Raytheon and Lockheed refused, which prompted Turkey to kick the can down the road.

This decision sheds light on how the Turkish leadership views its current security status. Turkey has opted to turn to NATO for its defense from ballistic missile attack… It also indicates that Ankara is committed to using foreign supplied technologies to jump-start its own domestic defense industry. These two approaches, indirectly, reveal that NATO remains the centerpiece of Turkey’s defense planning. However, Turkey’s growing assertiveness and desire to have a more flexible foreign policy is evident in the way it has pursued the missile defense tender.

Last month, Turkey announced that it would no longer be looking for an off-the-shelf missile defense system, but will try to contract with a foreign company to jointly develop its own system. Stein writes that the likely winner of that bid will be the European consortium:

I still believe that Eurosam’s AMP/T Aster 30 has the best chance of winning the tender because the consortium has indicated that it is willing to transfer the system’s technology to Turkey. The Russian and Chinese missile systems are not compatible with NATO radar and the proposed Alliance missile shield, which is likely to preclude them from being chosen. Finally, U.S. companies have traditionally balked at Turkey’s aggressive tech transfer demands. For example, U.S. firms lost the bid to upgrade Turkey’s F-4 aircraft and the M-60 tank because they were not as willing as the Israelis to share the technology with Turkey. Moreover, Ankara has a history of engaging European firms for the co-production of big-ticket military systems. Agusta-Westland beat out the U.S. based Sikorsky for Turkey’s attack helicopter tender because the European firm offered to co-produce the system and even allows for Turkey to export the helicopter. The U.S. company was not willing to offer such generous terms. While I do no expect the decision to happen any time soon, I do believe that the European company has the best shot at winning the new tender.

It’s often the case that what might seem from a distance to be a geopolitical move may be in fact driven by more local concerns. And that may be what’s going on here.

March 8, 2013
Obama eyes ‘real progress’ in Turkey peace talks

US President Barack Obama speaks at the Armed Forces Farewell Tribute in honor of Defense Secretary Leon Panetta at Joint Base Myer-Henderson in Washington February 8, 2013. – Reuters

US President Barack Obama said he believes Turkey’s efforts to try to resolve the three-decade conflict with Kurdish rebels will lead to “real progress,” according to remarks published in a Turkish newspaper on Sunday.

“I applaud Prime Minister (Recep Tayyip) Erdogan’s efforts to seek a peaceful resolution to a struggle that has caused so much pain and sorrow,” he told the Milliyet newspaper, referring to negotiations launched last year between Ankara and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

“I believe that the proactive measures that the Turkish government is undertaking can lead to real progress,” he said, according to a copy of Obama’s comments in English provided by the newspaper.

Turkish secret services resumed peace talks with jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan late last year, aiming to disarm the rebels who use bases in Iraq as a springboard to launch attacks on government security forces in the Kurdish majority southeast.

The PKK, which took up arms in its campaign for autonomy in the southeast in 1984, is branded a terrorist group by Turkey and its Western allies. More than 40,000 people, mostly Kurds, have died since the conflict began.

“A peaceful resolution will not only improve the lives of millions of citizens living in the violence-torn regions of southeast Turkey it will mean more security and prosperity for people across Turkey for generations to come,” Obama wrote in response to questions from Milliyet.

He said the United States will continue to support Turkey in its “desire to close this terrible chapter and begin a new chapter of peace and security”.

Both countries are members of NATO and the United States has for several years supported Ankara in its fight against the PKK on Iraqi soil.

Local media reports say the rebels could lay down their arms in the first half of this year, but this has been denied by some PKK officials.

The PKK has declared several ceasefires in the past but they collapsed amid clashes between Turkish security forces and rebels.

via Obama eyes ‘real progress’ in Turkey peace talks – Khaleej Times.

February 11, 2013
Re-Betting on Turkey
By: Kemal Kirişci
During his second term, President Obama has the opportunity to re-invested in the U.S.-Turkish relationship, focusing on a long-time U.S. ally. Kemal Kirişci wrote this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.
- Why is Turkey an important cornerstone in establishing the liberal global order?
- Can Turkey set an example and help spread democratic values to neighboring countries?
- How can the Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) boost the U.S.-Turkish relationship?
Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Kemal Kirişci

Turkey is a country that has been a long time ally of the United States with a major stake in the liberal world order. During your first term, you rightly recognized the nation as a Big Bet—paying your first official visit in Europe to Turkey and becoming only the second U.S. president, after Bill Clinton, to address the Turkish Parliament. Turkey was offered a model partnership with the U.S., and great hopes were invested in the relationship. However, reality evolved somewhat differently and a number of Black Swans intervened. The 2010 Turkish vote at the United Nations Security Council against sanctions on Iran accompanied with deteriorating relations with Israel as well as the EU and persistent anti-Americanism among the Turkish public have all led to fears that Turkey is “shifting axis” and being “lost”. Yet, this is only part of the picture.

Your Big Bet on Turkey fostered the development of a close rapport with Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, and you made the most of this connection by frequently consulting with one another on world and regional affairs. Turkey cooperated closely with the U.S. on Afghanistan as well as in Iraq. Both countries adopted similar approaches towards the Arab Spring even if Erdogan expressed some virulent frustration with the U.S. for not supporting the opposition against the Assad regime in Syria more forcefully and decisively. There were also modest but important gains made in bi-lateral trade that had constantly been falling in relative terms since the end of the Cold War. This was coupled with field oriented pragmatic cooperation to assist reform in the Arab and Muslim world.

Recommendation:

Clearly, much more could have been achieved and highlighting a more ambitious agenda for U.S.-Turkish relations for your administration is critical. Turkey itself is still a Big Bet if the global liberal order in Turkey’s neighborhood and Turkey’s own membership to that order is going to be ensured. That would also help keep the multitude of Black Swansfrom getting in the way of realizing the grander Big Betsor for that matter Turkey itself becoming a Black Swan.

The time to double-down on Turkey is especially ripe, and a delay could be costly. As Turkish President Abdullah Gul reaffirmed in the January-February issue of Foreign Affairs, “from a values point of view we are with the West”. This opportunity coincides with a time when there are increasing signals from Turkey to reinvest into its relations with the West.

Background:

It is often forgotten that Turkey was a participant in the making of the global liberal order at the end of the Second World War, albeit of course a very junior one. Yet, it was this experience that set Turkey on the unusually long path of becoming a multi-party democracy with a liberal market economy. Indeed Turkey’s transformation was a slow and painfully one with lots of ups and downs. All U.S. administrations from Harry Truman onwards played a role in this process but the most critical one was probably the Clinton administrations. They played a particularly central role in nudging Turkish democracy and economy a little closer to European standards and helped Turkey first to sign a customs union with the EU in 1995 and then eventually become a candidate country for EU membership in 1999 followed by the beginning of accession negotiations. These policies were Big Betsthat handsomely paid off. Both President George W. Bush in 2004 like his successor in 2009 recognized Turkey’s economic and democratic success and hoped that Turkey could set an example for its neighborhood, particularly for the Arab and Muslim worlds.

Actually, some of their hopes can be said to be materializing. Turkey has both economically and politically become deeply integrated with its neighborhood. Turkey’s Gross Domestic Product in 2011 was greater than all of its surrounding eleven neighbors economies put together excluding Iran and Russia. This economy is increasingly becoming an engine of growth for these neighboring countries even if modestly. Turkey’s trade with these countries increased from 10 percent of Turkey’s overall foreign trade in 1991 to 22 percent in 2011 while its trade with the EU and the U.S. has dropped from 50 and 9 percent to 41 and 5 percent respectively. An ever growing number of Turkish companies are investing in most of these countries while Turkey is fast becoming an immigration country and a source of remittances for labor migrants of the region. This kind of economic engagement is having a transformative impact and helping to integrate this neighborhood into the global markets. Turkish government and civil society are also modestly involved in projects and programs assisting political transition and reform. However, Turkey’s both economic and democracy gains remain fragile. Turkey runs an important current accounts deficit and needs to raise its savings levels as well as research and development budgets. The Arab Spring has adversely affected its trade and economic relations with the Middle East. There are also growing concerns about an erosion of the democratic gains achieved in the recent past particularly with respect to freedom of expression and rule of law. The Kurdish question still constitutes a major challenge to long term domestic stability. The constitutional reform process appears to be stuck too.

Conclusion:

At a time when Turkey’s neighborhood is filled with vital challenges, it is of paramount importance that your second administration recognizes the importance of securing Turkey’s commitment to the global liberal order and its potential bearing on the America’s capacity to realize regional foreign policy objectives. There are many ways in which this could be achieved, but the most effective one may well arise from associating Turkey with negotiating a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA). This is critical because the free trade agreements that the EU signs with third parties have long been a major source of resentment and grievances for Turkey. This is because the customs union requires that Turkey take on all the obligations associated with such agreements without binding third parties to extend any trade privileges to Turkey. So far the EU has not been very responsive to Turkish calls to rectify this situation.

The U.S. is uniquely positioned to help. Seating Turkey at the negotiating table for TAFTA would be unrealistic. However, the U.S. could convince the EU to at least involve Turkey in a consultation process and ensure that as Turkey opens up its markets to the U.S. Turkish businesses can also enjoy better access to U.S. markets. The logic behind why this would be an effective Big Bet is quite straight forward. The more Turkey can participate in TAFTA, the more its economy would grow. The more it grows, the more it can import U.S. as well as EU goods and services. Furthermore, the more Turkey’s liberal market grows, the greater the demands for the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law in Turkey. In turn, with an economy equaling the 6^th largest in the EU and 15^th largest in the world, Turkey’s economic force would benefit the neighborhood as well. In this way not only would Turkey be tied to the liberal global order, but it would also become an even more effective conduit for disseminating liberal economic and democratic values to a neighborhood still struggling to transition from the legacy of command economies and authoritarian political systems.
February 9, 2013
The problem with Islamist Turkey’s ‘zero problems’ policy

The problem with Islamist Turkey’s ‘zero problems’ policy

Special to WorldTribune.com

By Gerald Robbins

The culprit in last week’s suicide bombing at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara was not, as expected, an Islamic terror group bent on attacking American interests. Rather, a Marxist organization known as the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party Front claimed responsibility.

The group’s communiqué explained the assault as a response to “imperialist ventures” in Egypt, Libya and Syria. The growing consensus is the bombing was a warning to Turkey’s Middle East ambitions.

Turkish police secure the area after an explosion at the security entrance at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara on Feb. 1. /EPA/BGNES

Nowadays it’s popular to see Turkey as a necessary regional overseer, a strategically important nation bridging Christian and Muslim environments. Its location, Islamic legacy and decades of Western political adaptation seemingly make it a natural interlocutor that can correctly discern how to deal with the Arab Spring. Yet what has transpired indicates otherwise.

Ankara’s once solidly pro-Western orientation is now offset by its growing involvement in Middle Eastern affairs. This is primarily due to the Islamist ideology of the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP). Economic overtures towards the Gulf region and neighboring Arab states, coupled with a belief in Muslim solidarity (a retort to the European Union’s lukewarm reaction to Turkish membership) underscore what has transpired.

Turkey’s shift isn’t an ad hoc retort to the EU’s recalcitrance nor the post-Cold War’s geopolitical vacuum however. Since the AKP came to power nearly a decade ago, Turkish foreign policy has followed what’s been called a “zero problems” doctrine.

Conceived by Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, “zero problems” essentially establishes friendly, non-confrontational relations with surrounding neighbors while overlooking their objectionable aspects. Ankara’s rationale assumes that acting as an understanding, non-judgmental fellow Muslim can eventually enlighten wayward regimes. It’s an endeavor which theoretically provides Turkey with a sense of regional prominence. It also complements the Obama administration’s “lead from behind” philosophy, signifying Ankara is better tasked for promoting democratic values in the Muslim world than Washington.

However Turkey’s outreach towards its Arab neighbors has been disappointing. Ankara believed there was a critical gap in the Arab Spring’s regional ferment that it could capably fill. Initially pro-Turkish sentiment was on display. Arab demonstrators were televised holding placards of Turkey’s fiery Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whom commentators compared to a latter day version of Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Impromptu polls throughout the Muslim world commonly found Turkey to be the most admired if not inspiring society. The idea that a Turkish-led “neo-Ottoman” commonwealth would result from these revolutions was advocated throughout academic and think tank institutions.

The events afflicting Syria noticeably altered matters.

The Syrian Spring reflects how the region’s once hopeful promise quickly devolved into disappointment and uncertainty. Almost two years of civil war have killed over 60,000 people.

Considering that Turkey’s longest border is with Syria, the ongoing struggle to unseat the Assad regime unnerves Ankara. An estimated 200,000 Syrians fleeing the bloodshed currently reside in Turkish refugee camps, straining resources and goodwill. The fighting has occasionally spilled over to Turkey’s side of the border, inflicting sometimes fatal casualties. Coping with these hardships is part of Ankara’s dilemma, since it’s uncertain who exactly controls the Syria’s frontier.

Damascus relinquished its border presence several months ago to concentrate its forces around the capital and major cities. A medley of anti-Assad factions with varying agendas and ideologies have filled the void. The Syrian border land is also primarily inhabited by the Kurds.

In light of the fact that Turkey’s quarter century insurrection with its own Kurdish population has cost over 35,000 lives, Ankara’s neo-Ottoman expectations have been chastened by next-door anxieties.

Syria is the cornerstone of Turkey’s Eastwards outreach. Prior to the Arab Spring, civilizing Bashar Assad’s errant ways was the marketing tool the Erdogan government used to convince Western officialdom of its vital role as a sociopolitical go-between. Defanging Damascus would also greatly benefit Turkey’s campaign to become a full member of the European Union.

Instead of Washington-led belligerence, Ankara endeavored to gently goad Syria with trade and treaties. Prime Minister Erdogan lauded his “brotherly” relations with President Assad, noting a shared Ottoman legacy as the key to success.

Evoking this common history is a flawed concept. Several centuries of Ottoman rule over Syria and other Arab domains was far from nostalgic. Governance was essentially harsh if not inefficient and rife with corruption. Save for a shared religion, noticeable variances appear. There is a colonizer versus colonized perspective to consider. The Ottomans were foreign rulers within the Arab homelands, a history that has more in common with British, French and Dutch annals than fellow Muslims. Even the idea of religious solidarity is suspect. Turkey’s early Twentieth Century decision to cast its lot with Western secularism gave it a suspect reputation among Muslim brethren. Arab protestors admire Erdogan’s character, but it’s a different system and historical legacy from which he hails.

As Syria continues bleeding, the perception of being a regional savior decreases. Détente with Damascus has become a diplomatic embarrassment for the Turks, blemishing credibility.

“Zero problems” has metastasized into multiple problems, ranging from diplomatic overreach to festering crossborder tensions that can quickly turn viral. Unfortunately the U.S. Embassy bombing in Ankara might be a harbinger of things to come.

February 9, 2013
Obama Calls For Citizenship For Illegals

Immigration Reform Could Raise Cost Of ObamaCare By Hundreds Of Billions

Posted on January 30, 2013

In the wake of the U.S. Senate’s “Gang of Eight” announcement on immigration reform yesterday, President Barack Obama traveled to Las Vegas today to deliver his proposals on immigration reform.

“I am here because most Americans agree that it is time to fix a system that has been broken for way too long,” he said. He added it is time to tackle immigration reform, for immigration strengthens “our economy and our country’s future.”

Placing emphasis on bipartisanship, Obama said, “The differences are dwindling and a consensus is growing.”

Despite the years of partisanship, the president today said he felt the time has arrived to where Republicans and Democrats can “finally work together.”

Using the Kennedy-Bush amnesty plan of 2007 as a model, Obama said the infrastructure for “consensus is already in place” and he wants Congress to work immediately and take a vote on the measures “right away.”

While Obama admits those he’s helping have broken the law, he said, “They are not looking for any trouble” and “they are members of the community.”

He said the U.S. needs to make certain everyone is playing “by the rules,” but he insists “in order for immigration reform to work,” there must be a pathway to citizenship.

The president’s reasoning is that to lose these immigrants would be “bad for the economy.” He said many illegal aliens currently are studying for high tech positions but upon their graduation, they will leave America and travel to other countries with their skills.

Additionally, the president elaborated on other requirements needed for comprehensive immigration reform – elements almost identical to the proposals of the Gang of Eight from the U.S. Senate.

He said requirements for amnesty would include passing a background check, paying taxes, “going to the back of the line” and learning to speak English so that “they can earn their way to a green card and eventually citizenship.”

He also adds the nation needs to keep up enforcement and create a national system to figure out who is eligible to work and who is not.

Though the president promised to enact comprehensive immigration reform and never did, he still said in his first administration he worked to “patch up the worst cracks in the immigration system.”

The push for “comprehensive immigration reform” has not been without opposition. U.S. Rep. Steve King, R-Iowa, said yesterday, “The president has demonstrated he will only enforce the laws that he likes.”

Additionally, Congressman Steve Stockman, R-Texas, said, “I will not be supporting the Senate’s proposed ‘immigration reform’ should it reach the House. I cannot and will not support any immigration reform proposal that institutes an amnesty program or does not begin with a comprehensive plan to secure the borders.”

He continued, “It rewards law breaking and encourages a new flood of illegals, perpetuating the very problems it claims to solve.”

He also echoed the point of many other anti-illegal immigration activists by saying, “Our nation’s failed experiments with amnesty have proven it only encourages more illegals willing to wait it out for their turn at free citizenship.”

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Immigration Reform Could Raise Cost Of ObamaCare By Hundreds Of Billions

Posted on January 30, 2013

Earlier today, I posted on why I thought it was unlikely that immigration reform would actually pass this year. But there’s another reason why it will be difficult for Republicans to back legislation as currently outlined – immigration reform could represent a massive expansion of Obamacare, potentially costing hundreds of billions of dollars over the next decade.

As the Washington Post’s Sarah Kliff details, legalizing immigrants who are currently in the country illegally could make millions of them eligible for Obamacare. Though the exact number is difficult to pin down for a number of reasons, and we don’t know how many immigrants would obtain legal status as a result of any reform package, one Congressional Budget Office report estimated that 7 million to 8 million illegal immigrants would be uninsured after Obamacare because they won’t qualify for benefits. If this population were legalized and became eligible, it would mean increasing the number of Obamacare beneficiaries by over 20 percent. (The CBO has estimated that Obamacare would cover 36 million people either through the Medicaid expansion or the exchanges.)

My very rough estimate based on existing CBO analysis is that an expansion of Obamacare on that scale could easily cost several hundred billion dollars over a decade – maybe more than a half trillion. The reason why it’s difficult to make a projection is that it’s hard to say who would qualify for Medicaid and who would qualify for subsidies. Also, given that the subsidies vary by income level, it’s hard to say (beyond educated guessing) where on the scale this newly eligible population would fall and thus how generous their subsidies would be. Also, it’s hard to say how many of them would have incomes low enough to qualify for existing Medicaid benefits anyway, which they would have been able to claim with or without Obamacare.

Having made these caveats, here are some ways of looking at what it could cost to insure newly eligible immigrants under various assumptions. After the Supreme Court’s Obamacare decision, the CBO estimated that the law would cover an additional 11 million people on Medicaid (at a cost of $643 billion from 2013 through 2022) and 25 million through the exchanges (at a cost of just over $1 trillion over the same period). So, for every additional 1 million people on Medicaid, the federal government will be spending about $58 billion over the next decade and for every 1 million people on the exchange, taxpayers would be spending about $41 billion. Projecting this out for 8 million new beneficiaries would give a range of $328 billion to $464 billion. This would be conservative, however, because the current 10-year CBO estimate includes fiscal year 2013, though the law isn’t going to be implemented until 2014 – thus the actual 10-year cost is understated. Also, this method understates the per capita cost, because I’m dividing for the decade as a whole, even though the population covered by Obamacare grows over time.

January 30, 2013