Tag: Barack Obama

  • TRUTHS HAVE REACHED PRESIDENT OBAMA AND DECISION

    TRUTHS HAVE REACHED PRESIDENT OBAMA AND DECISION

    (Translated from Turkish) – (Letter to Members of Turkish Forum) Feb.23, 2009

    TRUTHS HAVE REACHED PRESIDENT OBAMA AND DECISION:

    Dear Friends,

    From the very beginning, we all maintained our mutual belief that “CONVEYING OF TRUTHS TO PRESIDENT OBAMA, ONLY” will stop the Armenian claims. For this reason, we have given priority in establishing a contact with President Obama, and since December, we have conveyed information to his consultants.

    First request of information came from a consultant in the first week of April, who was friendly with one of our members. The name of this friend is Mr. Kenan Sarı. He and his wife Sevi have created the Turkish Radio of Florida from zero, with their own efforts and finance. All of us are thankful to Kenan – Sevi couple, for their outstanding activities. Through Kenan bey, we have related our studies on the Armenian Genocide Allegations, together with a pocket guidebook developed in Britain to President Obama. In this respect, we also consulted our New York Consulate; they gave us all supports for which we are thankful.

    We were aware as Turkish Forum, of President Obama’s preference to use respectable civic organizations, instead of official channels or biased specialists for obtaining information, and for this reason we started a detailed study based on American and Armenian based archival documents.

    Respectable and all valued members of our consulting committee, and starting with Mr. Sukru Server Aya, researcher and writer, and thereafter Dr. Orhan Cekic from Maltepe University, Mr. Refik Mor from Germany as member of Neumunster Board, and also Mr. Ergun Kirlikovali and Dr. Robert B. MacKay from USA have devoted valuable assistance. For names of committee members see: https://www.turkishnews.com/tr/content/turkish-forum/

    We have hastily prepared the necessary documents based on American Archives, and submitted with a covering letter to the USA Ankara Embassy for presentation to President Obama. See:

    https://www.turkishnews.com/en/content/2009/02/08/turkish-forums-letter-of-facts-to-president-barrack-huseyin-obama-special-anouncment-to-members/ or https://www.turkishnews.com/tr/content/2009/02/08/abdde-ermeni-tasarisi-ve-turkish-forumdan-obamaya-yonlendirici-bir-mektup-ve-metubun-metni-ozel-bir-duyuru/

    If you refer to the above, you will see the scope of the contradiction between their consultant reports and the historical resolutions that they themselves had adopted. Each annexed document we have submitted is capable of scraping the roots of the Genocide allegation, by itself. We have started to distribute these annexes to the members of Turkish Forum, who have granted financial and other services to our activities.

    According to news which reached us through our members, Obama will not acknowledge the Armenian genocide in the manner demanded by the Armenian lobby. Realities have not only reached the President, but also impressed him. President Obama, does not want to lose (because of an Armenian genocide allegation that never happened), a country such as Turkey, which presents a historical dualism with the USA interests.

    You may observe some evidence from the press news. For example, the messages sent by Obama to Ankara… The sudden visit of the Turkish-friends group, of senators to Ankara! The fact that when Obama visited Canada, he went to a Turkish grocery store for chatting… Please observe the press news…you will clearly notice that Obama is getting close to Turkey… Think of the investigation against the Armenian lobby, which gave financial and electoral support to Obama… Please follow the press and Turkish Forum…you will see Obama’s getting nearer. Above news, have been report to you, our esteemed members, in the quickest way and posted in our web sites in Turkish or English https://www.turkishnews.com/

    This result has been achieved by you… Turkish Forum has acted within the scope of your wishes and put a strong mark in the American Political life. Truths, have reached President Obama. The honor of applying this stamp is due to the Turkish Forum Management and the Members of the Consulting Committee, who have become a storehouse of knowledge. To continue our struggle against anti-Turkish lobbies, we require your financial and moral support, as a sacred service.

    I wish that my friends will live their happy tomorrows in the spirit of righteousness, and that our next generations will not carry the stain of genocide in their future life.

    Dr. Kayaalp Buyukataman, President Turkish Forum – World Turkish Coalition

    (Translated by Sukru S. Aya!)

     

    +++++++++++++

     

    https://www.turkishnews.com/tr/content/2009/02/23/1915-olaylari-baskan-obamaya-hakiketler-ulasdi-ve-karar/

    Sozde soykırım konusunda başından beri muhafaza ettiğimiz müşterek düşünce BAŞKAN OBAMAYI SÖZDE SOYKIRIMI TANIMAYA SADECE HAKİKATLERİN DURDURACAGI İDİ. Bu bağlamda başkan Obama ile temasa Turkish Forum olarak öncelik verdik ve Aralık ayından beri Danışmanlarına doğru bilgi pompaladık.

    İlk Bilgi istegi sayın Obamanın bir forum üyemize yakın danışmanından geldi. Nisan ayının ilk haftasında. Bu arkadaşımızın adı Kenan Sarı beydir. Kenan bey değerli eşi Sevı hanım ile birlikde Florida Turk Radyosunu, Amerikada en en başarılı ilk Türk radyosunu sahsi gayret ve finansmanları ile sıfırdan yaratmışdır.

    Kenan ve Sevi çiftine bu üstün çalışmalarından dolayı hepimiz teşekkür borçluyuz. Kenan bey vasıtası ile Sözde Soykırım hakkında özet çalısmalarımızı ve İngilterede geliştirmis oldugumuz el kitapcıklarımızı Başkan Obamaya ilettik. Bu konuda ayrıca Newyork başkonsoloslugumuzada danışdık ve bize her türlü desteği verdiler, minnetarız.

    Başkan Obamanın resmi kanalları veya taraflı uzmanları kullanmadan halkın saydığı kuruluşlardan bilgi edinme istekleri hakkında Turkish Forum olarak ilk el bilgimiz olduğundan, kendilerine daha organize şekilde Amerikan ve Ermeni temelli, arşiv bilgilerini ulaştırmak için detaylı bir calışmaya başladık.

    Danişma kurulumuzun Tüm Değerli üyeleri. Başda Araştırmacı yazar Sayın Şükrü Server Aya, Şükrü beyi takiben Maltepe Üniversitesinden Sayın Doç. Dr. Orhan Çekic ve Almanyadan Neumünster -Meclis üyesi Refik Mor ve Amerikadan Sayın Ergun Kırlıkovalı ile Dr. Robert B. MacKay bahis etmeden devam edemiyecegim cok değerli katkılarda bulundular. Kurulumuzun tam listesini aşağıdaki linkde bulursunuz. https://www.turkishnews.com/tr/content/turkish-forum/

    Gerekli dökümanları hızlı bir çalışma ile ve Amerikan Arşivlerine dayanarak hazırladık, ve bir ön mektup ile Ankaradaki Amerikan Büyük elçiliği vasıtası ile Başkan Obamaya ulaştırdık. https://www.turkishnews.com/en/content/2009/02/08/turkish-forums-letter-of-facts-to-president-barrack-huseyin-obama-special-anouncment-to-members/ ( çok girişler sebebi ile yukarıdaki linki çalıstırmakda güçlük çekerseniz asagıdaki linki kullanınız  ..https://www.turkishnews.com/tr/content/2009/02/08/abdde-ermeni-tasarisi-ve-turkish-forumdan-obamaya-yonlendirici-bir-mektup-ve-metubun-metni-ozel-bir-duyuru/ ) lütfen eklere bakınız ve Amerikanın sözde soykırımı tanımasının kendi almış oldugu Tarihi kararlara ve kendi uzman raporlarına ne kadar aykırı düşeceğini görmüş olacaksınız. Her bir ek başlı başına sözde soykırımın kökünü kazıyacak nitelikdedir. Bu ekler Turkish Forumun yaşamasına maddi bağışları ve çalışmaları ile destek vermiş olan üyelerimize ulaştırılmaya başlamışdır.

    Son günlerde bize üye çevremizden ulaşan haberler Obamanın sözde soykırımı Ermeni lobisinin istedigi şekilde tanımıyacağıdır. Hakikatlar Başkan Obamaya ulaşmakla kalmamış, onuda etkisine almışdır. Başkan Obama, Türkiye gibi menfaatleri şu anda Amerikaya Tarihi bir paralelik arz eden bir ülkeyi, olmamış bir soykırım iddiası yüzünden kayıp etmek istememektedir.

    Bunların açık delillerini basında bulabilirsiniz.. Mesela Obamanın Ankaraya olan mesajları.. Amerikan senatosundan Türkiye taraflı senatorlerin aniden Ankaraya ziyaretleri.. Obamanın Kanadaya gittiginde bir Türk bakkaliyesini ziyaret edip sohbet etmesi.. başkan Obamanın seçim kampanyasına para ve oy yağdırmış olan Amerikan Ermeni lobisinin, kanunsuz işlemlerini sebebi ile Amerikada mahkemeye verilmesi… Lütfen basını ve Turkish Forumu takip edin Obamanın Türkiyeye yanaşdıgını açıkca göreceksiniz. Yukarıda bahis edilen haberlerin her biri siz üyelerimize en hızlı bir şekilde ulaştırılmışdır ve web sitelerimize Türkce ve/veya İngilizce olarak asılmışdır. https://www.turkishnews.com/

    Bu neticeye ulaşan sizlersiniz, sizin kurduğunuz ve desteklediğiniz Turkish Forum sizin istekleriniz dahilinde hareket ederek kalıcı bir damgayı Amerikan Siyasi hayatına vurmuşdur. Başkan Obamaya hakikatler ulaşmışdır. Bu kalıcı damgaya sizin için aracı olmak şerefi Turkish Forum Yönetimine ve bu konu hakkında en büyük bilgi deposu haline erişmiş olan Turkish Forum Danışma Kuruluna aiddir. Bu kalıcı damgayı silmek isteyen Türkiye karşıtı lobilerle mücadele ise hepimizden maddi ve manevi katkı isteyen kutsal bir görev olarak devam etmektedir.

    Arkadaşlarım mutlu yarınların haklı ile olmaya devam etmesi, ve nesillerimizin alınlarında bir soykırım lekesi ile yaşamamaları dileklerimle

    Şen ve esen kalınız.

    Dr. Kayaalp Büyükataman, Başkan
    Turkish Forum- World Turkish Coalition

    Turkish Forum
    Turkish Forum Duyuru

     

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  • Obama will not use the term ‘genocide’

    Obama will not use the term ‘genocide’

    Ankara trying to enhance its reputation

    21.02.2009 14:53 GMT+04:00

    /PanARMENIAN.Net/ There are several geopolitical factors which will affect the Armenian-Turkish relations, according to an Armenian professor.

    “The U.S. key dimension is Afghanistan, which sidelined Iran and Iraq,” director of the Institute of Oriental Studies at the RA National Academy of Sciences, professor Ruben Safrastyan told a news conference today.

    “For the purpose, Washington will need Ankara’s support. Keep in mind that CIS chief arrived in Turkey immediately after Obama’s phone talks with President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan,” he said. “Leon Panetta was reported to discuss a possibility of deploying of a U.S. base in Turkey.”

    This scenario will inevitably affect the Armenian-Turkish relations, according to prof. Safrastyan.

    “Proceeding from national interests, Barack Obama will not use the term ‘genocide’ in his annual April 24 statement,” he said.

    He also emphasized that that after the Russian-Georgian clashes, Europe will work to launch Nabucco project, which will pump Azeri gas to European states through Turkey.

    “During his recent visit to Brussels, Erdogan did not rule out that Turkey will renounce its EU bid. This way, Ankara is trying to enhance its reputation,” prof. Safrastyan said

  • An Obama Policy toward Turkey: Continuity or Change?

    An Obama Policy toward Turkey: Continuity or Change?

    Contact:mailmaviboncuk(at)gmail.com

    February 19, 2009

    Mavi Boncuk |
    An Obama Policy toward Turkey: Continuity or Change?
    Featuring Soner Cagaptay, Mark Parris, and Ian Lesser
    February 18, 2009

    Listen to MP3 Audio files

    Soner Cagaptay | Mark Parris | Ian Lesser | Q&A

    The Obama administration faces a number of imminent decisions in developing U.S. policy toward Turkey. Should Washington choose sides in Turkey’s protracted struggle over secularism and democracy involving the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its opponents? Can the United States bring the reluctant AKP to support U.S. efforts on issues ranging from Iran’s nuclear program to Russian regional ambitions?

    To discuss these issues, The Washington Institute invited Soner Cagaptay, Mark Parris, and Ian Lesser to address a special Policy Forum on February 18, 2009.

    Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Institute’s Turkish Research Program. A visiting professor at Georgetown University, he recently spent four months in Turkey researching and writing on Turkish foreign and domestic policy.

    Mark Parris, former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, is counselor to the Turkey Project and visiting fellow for foreign policy at the Brookings Institution.

    Ian Lesser is a senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, focusing on Turkey and the U.S.-Turkey-EU triangle.

    Labels: PolicyWatch, politics

  • Turkey’s New Regional Role

    Turkey’s New Regional Role

    Two Calls, Many Scenarios: How Will Washington Readjust to Turkey’s New Regional Role?

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 33
    February 19, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    President Barack Obama telephoned President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip separately on Monday. In his first official contact with the Turkish leaders since his inauguration, Obama discussed cooperation between the two countries over a wide spectrum of issues of common concern. Earlier this month, Vice President Joe Biden met Foreign Minister Ali Babacan at the security conference in Munich. Obama might have a face-to-face meeting with Gul during the NATO summit in April, celebrating the Atlantic alliance’s 60th anniversary.

    The statement released by the White House said “President Obama had warm and productive phone conversations with Turkish President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan… The President emphasized the importance of the United States’ alliance with Turkey and said he looks forward to working with both President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan on a broad agenda of mutual strategic interest.” Obama stressed the need to strengthen the U.S.-Turkish relationship and work together toward meeting the challenges of the 21st century (www.whitehouse.gov, February 16).

    The Turkish President’s office also issued a statement saying that “President Obama emphasized the importance he attaches to Turkish-U.S. relations and expressed his appreciation for [Turkey’s] leadership role in regional issues.” It was noted that the two sides had reiterated their determination to work together (www.tcbb.gov.tr, February 16).

    In its report, the Turkish Prime Minister’s office highlighted President Obama’s positive remarks about the Turkish-American strategic partnership and Turkey’s role for regional peace. The statement said that Erdogan had “expressed [to Obama] Turkey’s sensitivities in Armenia and the Middle East and emphasized the importance of a fair and impartial American attitude in order not to hurt bilateral relations [between Turkey and the United States].” The statement also quoted Obama as saying, “I would like to affirm the vital role played by your leadership in the Middle East peace process. America has always appreciated Turkey’s sensitivities” (www.bbm.gov.tr, January 16).

    Figuring out the reasons behind the timing of Obama’s calls has been a guessing game. Most observers focus on the issues raised during the talks as a key to understanding the content of the conversations and how Turkish-American relations may evolve in the days to come. According to official statements and various news stories, the issues discussed during both conversations included cooperation in NATO, U.S. support for Turkish-Iraqi rapprochement, the need for collaboration in Middle-East peace efforts, developments in Turkish-Armenian relations, Turkish-EU relations, and the United States’ policies toward Afghanistan and Pakistan.

    Statements from the Turkish leaders preferred to highlight Obama’s praise of Turkey’s strategic role, especially its policies in the Middle East. Following Turkey’s vocal criticism of Israel during the Gaza invasion, concerns had arisen about the future of Turkish-American relations. Pro-AKP media outlets maintained that Obama’s expression of U.S. readiness to cooperate with Turkey was a positive sign that tension between Turkey and Israel would not undermine Turkey’s place in the United States’ Middle East policies. They go so far as to claim that despite the urging by some pro-Israel lobbyists for Washington to punish Ankara for the Davos incident, the warm phone conversations show that Ankara has successfully managed to keep its relations with Tel Aviv and Washington in separate baskets (Yeni Safak, February 18).

    Other reports claimed that Obama solicited Turkey’s contributions for his administration’s plans for a new peace initiative in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Turkish side was reportedly assured by Obama that legislation recognizing the Armenian claims of genocide would not be brought before Congress (Radikal, February 17; Ihlas Haber Ajansi, February 17). According to a Turkish expert evaluating the phone conversations, it is unlikely that Obama will use the word “genocide” in his Armenian Remembrance Day statement on April 24 (Zaman, February 18). Erdogan said that he had had a detailed conversation with Obama about the Armenian claims, but he declined to give any details (Milliyet, February 19).

    Turkish media outlets critical of the government, however, noted that the White House statement had departed from the issues highlighted by Ankara, instead putting emphasis on Turkey’s NATO membership and changes in the U.S. policies toward Pakistan and Afghanistan. They also pointed out that Obama’s office did not even mention the Armenian issue in the list of topics being discussed. According to these sources, some Washington-based analysts maintain that the reference to NATO was meant to remind Turkey of its responsibilities under the Atlantic alliance and warn Ankara about its “independent initiatives” (www.cnnturk.com, February 17; Cumhuriyet, February 17).

    Indeed, Turkey has opted to develop special missions for itself outside the alliance framework—its role as peace broker in the Middle East, for example—and has occasionally deviated from the transatlantic community on issues such as how to deal with Russia, Sudan, and Iran. In Ankara’s view, this new activism could be complementary to Western efforts to promote peace and stability in troubled regions; but according to critics of the government, Turkey’s attempts to carve an autonomous international profile might strain Turkish-American relations.

    Many Turkish analysts also agree that the mention of Afghanistan by the White House was significant in light of Washington’s recently announced plans to bolster U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan. About 800 Turkish troops are currently serving in Afghanistan under the NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), and Turkey has held the ISAF command for two terms in the past. Given the difficulties NATO has encountered in carrying out its mission in Afghanistan and the Obama administration’s determination to refocus its attention there, Ankara, along with other NATO allies, might be coming under pressure to increase its contributions to the ISAF and remove the obstacles it sets to EU-NATO coordination (Today’s Zaman, February 18, Hurriyet Daily News, February 18; EDM, February 9). When this issue was brought up in the past, Turkey declined to commit additional troops, but it remains to be seen how Ankara will respond to such requests in the run-up to the NATO Summit in April.

    Discussions following Obama’s two telephone calls show that Turkish-American relations in the Obama administration are still in uncharted waters. By calling Gul and Erdogan separately, Obama showed that he was aware of who wielded power in Ankara; but how Washington will readjust itself to Ankara’s more assertive role in regional politics is a question that still begs for an answer. Developments ahead of the NATO summit and Obama’s handling of the Armenian claims will give more concrete indications of whether and how the parties will find common ground beyond rhetoric.

    https://jamestown.org/program/two-calls-many-scenarios-how-will-washington-readjust-to-turkeys-new-regional-role/

  • Obama says Turkey’s leadership is vital in Middle East

    Obama says Turkey’s leadership is vital in Middle East

    US president praised Turkey’s role in its region during telephone conversation with Tukish PM Erdogan and President Gul.

    Tuesday, 17 February 2009 09:24

    U.S. President Barack Obama told Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a telephone conversation on Monday that Turkey played an important role for peace in its region.

    Obama’s recent praises came only few days after Israeli commender accused Turkey of 1915 incidents and tensions rose between Turkey and Israel.

    “I would like to say that your leadership is vital in the Middle East peace process and America always understands Turkey’s sensitivities,” Erdogan’s press office quoted Obama as telling the Turkish premier.

    Obama also expressed willingness to work with Turkey in many issues such as maintaining peace in the Middle East, ending PKK terrorism and relations with Armenia.

    Erdogan in return highlighted Turkey’s sensitivities regarding Armenia and the Middle East, expressing the importance of fair and impartial stance of the United States to secure that the relations between the two countries were not damaged, said AA.

    Obama has also telephoned Turkish President Abdullah Gul, said a statement from Gul’s press office on Monday.

    “During the telephone conversation, President Obama underlined the importance that he attaches to Turkish-U.S. relations, saying he appreciated the leadership Turkey has taken in regional issues,” the statement said.

    Top on the agenda of telephone conversation was Caucasus. They discussed also developments in Afghanistan, Middle East and EU.

    President Gul paid a visit Russia last week and met with Russian counterpart and PM. They discussed energy, trade and developments in the region. Turkey and Russia also signed a trade deal. They also agreed on using Turkish Liras and ruble in bilateral trade, instead of US dolar.

    The two leaders also “re-affirmed the will to work together, reviewing regional as well as international issues.”

    “In both calls, the leaders discussed a number of current issues, including U.S. support for the growing Turkish-Iraqi relationship, the importance of cooperation in Middle East peace efforts, and the U.S. review on Afghanistan and Pakistan policy,” the White House said in a statement.

    Agencies

    Source:  www.worldbulletin.net, 17 February 2009

    Turkey’s growing influence in the Middle East

    Published: Tuesday 17 February 2009
    Sinan Űlgen, Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies
    Turkey’s growing stature in the Middle East has “the potential to make it more attractive to the European Union,” argues Sinan Űlgen, chairman of the Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, in the spring 2009 edition of Europe’s World.

    Turkey has become increasingly “influential in the Middle East” given its diplomatic success in the region, the commentary claims.

    Űlgen points to the number of progressive goals that the country has achieved, such as ending “factional strife in Lebanon” and “engineering the start of direct talks between Syria and Israel” over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

    On top of this, the article praises Turkey’s diplomatic efforts in helping to “ease the nuclear stand-off between Iran and the West”.

    Űlgen notes that Turkey’s progress in the Middle East is the result of a “growing lack of US legitimacy and lack of EU influence”. As a result, the country has been “able to leverage both its regional ties and its standing in the transatlantic community to play a more instrumental role vis-à-vis its southern neighbours,” the author asserts.

    This has “without a doubt” enhanced Turkey’s role and influence in the Middle East, Űlgen declares.

    However, the author wonders whether this comes “at the expense of the country’s EU ambitions”. Indeed, “with so much of the country’s diplomatic and political energy now focused on regional issues, it seems to leave little room for advancing its EU membership ambitions,” the paper observes.

    Nevertheless, Űlgen insists that Turkey’s growing influence in the Middle East can be a “sure way of enhancing its asset value for the EU” and facilitating “Turkey’s European bid”.

    On the other hand, the author admits this claim is “predicated on the assumption that Europe has the capacity and the willingness to benefit from what Turkey has to offer”.

    Indeed, this “strategy can only pay off if the EU is able to strengthen its own capacity for concerted action on foreign policy,” the paper asserts.

    In light of Turkey’s diplomatic progress in the Middle East, Űlgen concludes that Turkish EU membership would “make Europe a more influential and capable world power”.

    Turkey’s route to the EU may be via the Middle East

    Spring 2009
    par Sinan Ülgen
    With western influence in the Middle East faltering in the wake of America’s misadventure in Iraq and Europe’s general indecision, Sinan Ülgen argues that Turkish diplomatic successes in Syria and Iran and its growing stature throughout the Middle East have the potential to make it more attractive to the European Union

    Just a few years ago, Europe headed Turkey’s agenda. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s newly-elected government had embarked on a series of ambitious reforms to meet the EU’s political criteria for joining the common area. At the end of 2004 the EU decided in return to initiate accession talks with Ankara.

    The ensuing pro-European euphoria was to be short lived, and for all practical purposes the accession negotiations have now reached deadlock. Turkey started EU membership talks at the same time as Croatia, but while Croatia is now in the final stages of the process, Turkey is struggling to proceed with the negotiations. These difficulties have had a detrimental impact on both Turkish politicians and on public opinion.

    Not surprisingly, the Turkish government has also lost its appetite for EU-related reforms. For more than two years now, the European Commission has been hard pressed to find anything positive to say in its annual progress reports on political reform developments. In short, Turkey’s European future is today as clouded as at any point in its contemporary history.Yet just as Europe is looking more distant, the Middle East is looming larger on Ankara’s radar screen. Turkey is shifting its attention from west to south, from Brussels to Beirut and beyond. The question is whether this turnround is a structural phenomenon – a sign of a fundamental shift in Turkey’s – or just a temporary and transitional phase.

    Turkey has traditionally remained a bystander in Middle Eastern politics. It was thought the country had little to contribute to or gain from getting involved in the problems that beset Middle Eastern countries. The Ottoman legacy was often used to justify this stance, with the argument being that as long as the legacy endures Turkey will be viewed by its Arab neighbours with suspicion. Developments in recent years have seriously challenged this perception, with Turkey becoming a much more active and visible player in the Middle East.

    Turkish diplomacy has scored a number of successes in the region. Ankara played an instrumental role in bringing about an end to the factional strife in Lebanon and its policy on Syria also produced tangible results. Turkish overtures to Syria, undertaken in spite of warnings from Washington, have paid off handsomely. Turkey was able not only to defuse the international tensions surrounding its Arab neighbour, but also to engineer the start of direct talks between Syria and Israel, a crucial contribution to the elusive Middle East peace process. Ankara obtained this result by investing in its relationship with Damascus and eventually gaining the trust of the Assad regime. Turkey’s strong relations with Israel then enabled Ankara to bring the two rivals to the table.

    On Iran, Turkish activism has been even more pronounced. In recent months, Turkey has multiplied its diplomatic efforts to help ease the nuclear stand-off between Iran and the west. Ankara went as far as hosting a visit from Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad in August of last year. Turkey does not want to see a nuclear Iran, but that’s chiefly because Turks are more afraid of the regional repercussions of such a development than of the threat it would pose to their own country.

    Turkey’s growing activism in the Middle East is now being underpinned by a confluence of regional factors and geopolitical shifts. Turkey has been able to make headway in the turbulent waters of the Middle East because of the growing lack of U.S. legitimacy and lack of EU influence. In other words, as a rising regional power, Turkey has benefited from the handicaps of the global powers.

    The U.S. lost its ability to play a more constructive role in the Middle East following its ill-fated intervention in Iraq. With anti-American sentiments reaching new heights, the ability of many Arab governments to collaborate with the U.S. has been severely impaired. The Bush Administration’s neo-conservative agenda of bringing democracy to the Arab world has also backfired. The U.S. first distanced itself from the more autocratic Arab leaders in a bid to support home-grown democratic alternatives, only to find that the only realistic political alternative to these regimes was to be found in the territory of political Islam. Given the lack of appetite in a U.S. administration conditioned by the “war on terror” for such an option, a return to the traditional policy of supporting the status quo was inevitable.

    The EU has faced a different dilemma. Unlike the U.S., the EU’s difficulty stems not from a perceived lack of legitimacy or crude attempts at promoting democracy, but a real lack of unity and, therefore, influence. The quest for a common denominator between the positions of different EU governments has hardly been conducive to the emergence of the sort of cogent and reliable diplomacy needed to address the deep problems of the Middle East. Individual EU countries continue to maintain high national profiles in the region than the sum of countries that the EU purports to be.

    In light of these serious deficiencies on the part of the main western powers, Turkey has been able to leverage both its regional ties and its standing in the transatlantic community to play a more instrumental role vis-à-vis its southern neighbours. And Turkey’s potential for influence has been further enhanced by opportune demand and supply conditions. On the demand side, the main structural barrier that traditionally prevented Turkish involvement in the Middle East has been eroding. Arab nationalists are fast becoming an endangered species, replaced by a rising political class more influenced by religion – a supranational ideology. As a result, the Ottoman legacy of a working state structure, tolerant of religion, was beginning to be viewed in a more favourable light. The Turkish model, whose particularity for many Middle Eastern observers was its ability to nurture a democracy-friendly political Islam, was suddenly in demand. And too is Turkey.

    On the supply side, Turkey has been more prepared than ever to take advantage of these fundamental shifts. The ruling AKP party traces its roots to political Islam, and many of its leaders have their social networks in Islamic countries – in stark contrast to the secular style of Turkey’s previous leaders, who had proudly displayed their western identity. The result is that formal and informal links between the new Turkish political élite and the Arab world have been considerably easier. Decades-old trust and confidence deficits between Turkey and Middle Eastern countries are thus gradually being overcome.

    The frustrations of dealing with an undecided Europe have led Turkish policy-makers to focus their efforts on an area where the expected return on their investment was more immediate and more concrete. Prime Minister Erdoğan has recently visited many countries in the Middle East – Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq – but has not been to Brussels since 2005.

    There can be no doubt that Ankara’s growing activism in its foreign policy, especially in relation to the Middle East, has begun to enhance the role and influence of Turkey in its own region. Turkey is now firmly set to become a regional power, with its recent election to the UN Security Council a further testimony to Ankara’s diplomatic prowess.

    The question is whether this shift of focus towards the south and towards Turkey’s status as a regional power comes at the expense of the country’s EU ambitions. With so much of the country’s diplomatic and political energy now focused on regional issues, that seems to leave little room for advancing its EU membership ambitions. It is no coincidence that Turkey’s failure to implement a long-term communications strategy with Brussels comes in the face of ever-falling public support in EU countries for enlargement of the common area to include Turkey.

    For optimists, Turkey’s growing regional influence is seen as a sure way of enhancing its asset value for the EU. The multi-faceted diplomacy of Ankara and the strengthening of Turkey’s status as a soft power in the region are not necessarily at odds with its EU membership objective. On the contrary, it should facilitate Turkey’s European bid.

    Yet this claim is predicated on the assumption that Europe has the capacity and the willingness to benefit from what Turkey has to offer. In other words, this strategy can only pay off if the EU is able to strengthen its own capacity for concerted action on foreign policy. So Turkish accession would not, as European federalists like to argue, lead to a weaker Europe. On the contrary, Turkey’s membership would make Europe a more influential and capable world power.

    Source:  www.euractiv.com

    Turkey’s route to the EU may be via the Middle East

    INTERNATIONAL
    par Sinan Ülgen

    With western influence in the Middle East faltering in the wake of America’s misadventure in Iraq and Europe’s general indecision, Sinan Ülgen argues that Turkish diplomatic successes in Syria and Iran and its growing stature throughout the Middle East have the potential to make it more attractive to the European Union

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    Just a few years ago, Europe headed Turkey’s agenda. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s newly-elected government had embarked on a series of ambitious reforms to meet the EU’s political criteria for joining the common area. At the end of 2004 the EU decided in return to initiate accession talks with Ankara.

    The ensuing pro-European euphoria was to be short lived, and for all practical purposes the accession negotiations have now reached deadlock. Turkey started EU membership talks at the same time as Croatia, but while Croatia is now in the final stages of the process, Turkey is struggling to proceed with the negotiations. These difficulties have had a detrimental impact on both Turkish politicians and on public opinion.

    Euro-scepticism is now at an all-time high in Turkey, and continues to be fuelled by the rhetoric of some European political leaders who voice their opposition to Turkey’s accession. The EU’s own failure to dissipate doubts about the feasibility of Turkey’s eventual membership is leading ever-larger constituencies in Turkey to lose faith in Europe and in the likelihood of accession. Domestic support for EU membership had reached 70% at the start of the negotiations, but now that figure is closer to 40%.

    Not surprisingly, the Turkish government has also lost its appetite for EU-related reforms. For more than two years now, the European Commission has been hard pressed to find anything positive to say in its annual progress reports on political reform developments. In short, Turkey’s European future is today as clouded as at any point in its contemporary history.

    Yet just as Europe is looking more distant, the Middle East is looming larger on Ankara’s radar screen. Turkey is shifting its attention from west to south, from Brussels to Beirut and beyond. The question is whether this turnround is a structural phenomenon – a sign of a fundamental shift in Turkey’s – or just a temporary and transitional phase.

    Turkey has traditionally remained a bystander in Middle Eastern politics. It was thought the country had little to contribute to or gain from getting involved in the problems that beset Middle Eastern countries. The Ottoman legacy was often used to justify this stance, with the argument being that as long as the legacy endures Turkey will be viewed by its Arab neighbours with suspicion. Developments in recent years have seriously challenged this perception, with Turkey becoming a much more active and visible player in the Middle East.

    Turkish diplomacy has scored a number of successes in the region. Ankara played an instrumental role in bringing about an end to the factional strife in Lebanon and its policy on Syria also produced tangible results. Turkish overtures to Syria, undertaken in spite of warnings from Washington, have paid off handsomely. Turkey was able not only to defuse the international tensions surrounding its Arab neighbour, but also to engineer the start of direct talks between Syria and Israel, a crucial contribution to the elusive Middle East peace process. Ankara obtained this result by investing in its relationship with Damascus and eventually gaining the trust of the Assad regime. Turkey’s strong relations with Israel then enabled Ankara to bring the two rivals to the table.

    On Iran, Turkish activism has been even more pronounced. In recent months, Turkey has multiplied its diplomatic efforts to help ease the nuclear stand-off between Iran and the west. Ankara went as far as hosting a visit from Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad in August of last year. Turkey does not want to see a nuclear Iran, but that’s chiefly because Turks are more afraid of the regional repercussions of such a development than of the threat it would pose to their own country.

    Turkey’s growing activism in the Middle East is now being underpinned by a confluence of regional factors and geopolitical shifts. Turkey has been able to make headway in the turbulent waters of the Middle East because of the growing lack of U.S. legitimacy and lack of EU influence. In other words, as a rising regional power, Turkey has benefited from the handicaps of the global powers.

    The U.S. lost its ability to play a more constructive role in the Middle East following its ill-fated intervention in Iraq. With anti-American sentiments reaching new heights, the ability of many Arab governments to collaborate with the U.S. has been severely impaired. The Bush Administration’s neo-conservative agenda of bringing democracy to the Arab world has also backfired. The U.S. first distanced itself from the more autocratic Arab leaders in a bid to support home-grown democratic alternatives, only to find that the only realistic political alternative to these regimes was to be found in the territory of political Islam. Given the lack of appetite in a U.S. administration conditioned by the “war on terror” for such an option, a return to the traditional policy of supporting the status quo was inevitable.

    The EU has faced a different dilemma. Unlike the U.S., the EU’s difficulty stems not from a perceived lack of legitimacy or crude attempts at promoting democracy, but a real lack of unity and, therefore, influence. The quest for a common denominator between the positions of different EU governments has hardly been conducive to the emergence of the sort of cogent and reliable diplomacy needed to address the deep problems of the Middle East. Individual EU countries continue to maintain high national profiles in the region than the sum of countries that the EU purports to be.

    In light of these serious deficiencies on the part of the main western powers, Turkey has been able to leverage both its regional ties and its standing in the transatlantic community to play a more instrumental role vis-à-vis its southern neighbours. And Turkey’s potential for influence has been further enhanced by opportune demand and supply conditions. On the demand side, the main structural barrier that traditionally prevented Turkish involvement in the Middle East has been eroding. Arab nationalists are fast becoming an endangered species, replaced by a rising political class more influenced by religion – a supranational ideology. As a result, the Ottoman legacy of a working state structure, tolerant of religion, was beginning to be viewed in a more favourable light. The Turkish model, whose particularity for many Middle Eastern observers was its ability to nurture a democracy-friendly political Islam, was suddenly in demand. And too is Turkey.

    On the supply side, Turkey has been more prepared than ever to take advantage of these fundamental shifts. The ruling AKP party traces its roots to political Islam, and many of its leaders have their social networks in Islamic countries – in stark contrast to the secular style of Turkey’s previous leaders, who had proudly displayed their western identity. The result is that formal and informal links between the new Turkish political élite and the Arab world have been considerably easier. Decades-old trust and confidence deficits between Turkey and Middle Eastern countries are thus gradually being overcome.

    The frustrations of dealing with an undecided Europe have led Turkish policy-makers to focus their efforts on an area where the expected return on their investment was more immediate and more concrete. Prime Minister Erdoğan has recently visited many countries in the Middle East – Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq – but has not been to Brussels since 2005.

    There can be no doubt that Ankara’s growing activism in its foreign policy, especially in relation to the Middle East, has begun to enhance the role and influence of Turkey in its own region. Turkey is now firmly set to become a regional power, with its recent election to the UN Security Council a further testimony to Ankara’s diplomatic prowess.

    The question is whether this shift of focus towards the south and towards Turkey’s status as a regional power comes at the expense of the country’s EU ambitions. With so much of the country’s diplomatic and political energy now focused on regional issues, that seems to leave little room for advancing its EU membership ambitions. It is no coincidence that Turkey’s failure to implement a long-term communications strategy with Brussels comes in the face of ever-falling public support in EU countries for enlargement of the common area to include Turkey.

    For optimists, Turkey’s growing regional influence is seen as a sure way of enhancing its asset value for the EU. The multi-faceted diplomacy of Ankara and the strengthening of Turkey’s status as a soft power in the region are not necessarily at odds with its EU membership objective. On the contrary, it should facilitate Turkey’s European bid.

    Yet this claim is predicated on the assumption that Europe has the capacity and the willingness to benefit from what Turkey has to offer. In other words, this strategy can only pay off if the EU is able to strengthen its own capacity for concerted action on foreign policy. So Turkish accession would not, as European federalists like to argue, lead to a weaker Europe. On the contrary, Turkey’s membership would make Europe a more influential and capable world power.

    > Email à Sinan Ülgen
  • Engaging Syria? U.S. Constraints and Opportunities

    Engaging Syria? U.S. Constraints and Opportunities

    Middle East Report N°83
    11 February 2009

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    Candidate Obama pledged that his Middle East policy would include re-engagement with Syria; President Obama will find that the past is not easily overcome. The reasons behind his vow remain pertinent. Syria holds important cards in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine, is Iran’s most important Arab ally and has substantial influence over Hamas and Hizbollah. There are indications of potential common ground on which to build, from resuming Israeli-Syrian negotiations, to consolidating progress in Iraq to blunting the rise of jihadi militancy and sectarianism. But significant obstacles to healthy, mutually beneficial relations remain, along with a legacy of estrangement and distrust. They dictate the need for a prudent approach that seeks first to rebuild ties and restore confidence. It will be critical to reassure Damascus that the U.S. is interested in improving relations and resolving the Israeli-Arab conflict, not in regime change. It is also equally critical not to compromise on core principles such as Lebanon’s sovereignty or the integrity of the international tribunal investigating the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

    President Bush’s policy was premised on the belief that isolation and pressure would lead to substantial changes in Syrian behaviour. It failed on both counts. The policy crumbled, and the sought-after behavioural changes never truly materialised. Awareness of this outcome, coupled with Senator Obama’s own conviction that engagement – far from being a sign of weakness – was the mark of diplomatic strength, formed the backdrop to his campaign pledge and is likely to inform his presidential policy. The question no longer is whether to engage Syria but how.

    That is where the hard part begins, for engagement is easier said than done. Although the open hostility witnessed under the Bush administration was an anomaly in U.S.-Syrian relations, the ordinary state of affairs hardly has been the reverse. Even prior to the Bush presidency, whether under President Clinton or his predecessors, the relationship had been problematic, marked by disagreement as much as dialogue. From Washington’s perspective, Syria continued to support militant Palestinian and Lebanese groups; from Damascus’s, the U.S. continued to harbour a regional agenda inconsistent with its own aspirations and interests. In short, while breaking with the Bush legacy is part of the solution, simply reverting to what preceded it is not.

    Nor, even if it were advisable, would it be possible to rewind the tape. The last eight years have left their imprint in several, at times indelible ways. The legacy is threefold. First is the web of legal or administrative measures aimed at Syria. These include an array of binding UN Security Council resolutions related to Damascus’s role in Lebanon, the establishment of the international tribunal regarding the Hariri assassination and an assortment of U.S. economic sanctions. They undoubtedly will continue to shape U.S.-Syrian relations; for the most part, their relaxation will occur, if at all, as a by-product of improved relations rather than as a means of achieving them.

    Secondly, U.S. policy has deepened estrangement between the two countries. As Washington recalled its ambassador, downgraded its representation in Damascus and shunned routine encounters with Syrian representatives, Damascus responded by boycotting what remained of the U.S. embassy. Syria has undergone significant change since the U.S. last had sustained interaction. It will take time for policy-makers to come to terms with transformations in the regime’s governance style, power structure, threat perceptions, regional positioning and socio-economic constraints. A policy shift will be all the more difficult to undertake as these years coincided with a hardening of public and congressional attitudes toward Syria that inevitably will influence the new team. Most of the president’s advisers, although in favour of a policy of engagement, bore witness to Syrian action in Iraq and Lebanon, are sceptical about the nature of the regime, question prospects for a genuine shift in its regional posture and sense that Damascus is more likely to move when ignored than when courted.

    A third constraint stems from changes in the regional landscape. The Iraq invasion fuelled sectarian tensions and boosted Iran’s influence; neglect and mismanagement of the Arab-Israeli conflict bolstered Palestinian and other rejectionists; Lebanon’s polarisation and the 2006 war enhanced Hizbollah’s influence; attempts to isolate Syria strengthened its ties to Iran; jihadi militancy is on the rise; and the Arab world is as divided as ever. The net result will be to complicate any putative Syrian strategic repositioning.

    But there are promising signs, too. For several reasons – most having little or nothing to do with the U.S. – Damascus appears to be softening its posture on Iraq and Lebanon, undertaking at least some effort to control its border with the former while establishing diplomatic relations with the latter. Talks with Israel, although halted due to the war in Gaza and the elections in Israel, might well resume with U.S. participation. Relations with Turkey have become a central element of Syrian foreign policy, offsetting Iran’s exclusive influence and providing Ankara with real leverage. Signs of unease already can be detected in Syrian-Iranian relations; with patience and deft management, they might be substantially transformed.

    How the two sides first engage one another will be critical; mistakes, miscalculations or mismatched expectations could do significant damage. In this, the second of three companion reports, Crisis Group examines in greater depth the last eight years’ legacy, drawing lessons for the new administration’s Syria policy. It concludes that, in order to pave the way for a more fruitful relationship, the U.S. early on should take the following steps:

    • Clearly articulate a set of guiding core principles, including:

    ­– support for and participation in renewed peace negotiations on all tracks;

    – consistent with past Israeli-Syrian negotiations, any final agreement should entail full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, firm security arrangements and the establishment of normal, peaceful bilateral relations;

    – no arrangement or compromise over the international tribunal or Lebanon’s sovereignty;

    – respect for such international norms should not be read as a desire to destabilise or change Syria’s regime; and

    – open acknowledgment of positive Syrian measures.

    • Set in place effective channels of communication, by:

    – nominating an ambassador;

    – requesting that Syria treat U.S. diplomats respectfully and doing likewise with Syrian diplomats posted in the U.S.;

    – establishing a privileged, personal and direct channel between President Obama and President Assad, possible through Middle East Peace Envoy George Mitchell; and

    – conducting a relatively early visit by a high-level U.S. military official in order to establish U.S.-Syrian-Iraqi security cooperation.

    • Carefully rethink sanctions in line with clear policy objectives, streamline licensing procedures and loosen restrictions on humanitarian or public safety grounds, such as for medical items or civil aviation-related goods to help replace an ageing and dangerous national fleet.

    The initial briefing in this series described lessons from the French experience at re-engagement with Syria. The third and final report will consider evolutions on the Syrian side and propose broader policy recommendations for Washington and Damascus.

    Damascus/Washington/Brussels, 11 February 2009