By Ferruh Demirmen
The Turkey-Armenia normalization process, due to take effect soon, in its present form carry imponderables that raise serious questions as to its merits for Turkey.
Three major Turkish-American umbrella organizations, the Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA), Turkish Coalition of America (TCA), and the Federation of Turkish American Associations (FTAA), regrettably issued statements recently in support of the normalization process.
In their endorsement, ATAA and TCA stressed, as has the Turkish government, the importance of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia in pursuit of regional peace, while FTAA, being more prophetic, argued that the process would be a blow to the Armenian diaspora, making it ineffective in its lobbying efforts against Turkey.
There is, however, fierce opposition to the normalization process both in Turkey and Armenia.
No pre-conditions
The normalization process, in its present form, is ill-founded, ill-advised, and cannot be supported from the Turkish point of view. The arguments advanced for normalization, while sounding reasonable, and in principle commendable, represent to a large extent wishful thinking for the Turkish side, not backed by the two diplomatic protocols announced by Turkey and Armenia. The protocols, initialed on August 31 and due to be signed on October 10, form the blueprint for the normalization process.
Reading through the protocols, the one thing that is striking is the generality of the language and the lack of concrete steps to be taken to resolve the outstanding issues between Turkey and Armenia. No caveat or pre-conditions are attached to normalization and the opening of the common border.
Given that the opening of the border will overwhelmingly benefit Armenia, the protocols call for no concessions from Armenia.
Genocide allegations and the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict are the chief thorny issues between the two countries; but for Turkey, Armenia’s hitherto hostile behavior is also a cause for deep resentment.
Genocide issue
On the genocide issue, the protocols call for the establishment of a bilateral commission to study “the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including … an examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations.” There is no mention to specifically address the genocide issue, whether it happened or not.
Nor is there any commitment to open Armenian archives for examination. Turkish archives are already open.
Likewise, the time frame for the completion of the commission’s work is left open. This work may continue for years, during which time the border will remain open.
Swiss and other international experts will be joining Armenian and Turkish experts, and herein lies a potential trap for Turkey – considering how the West is already biased against the Turkish position. Switzerland is one country where denial of “Armenian genocide” is punishable by law. France is another one.
Furthermore, assuming that the commission will reach a well-defined conclusion, there is no commitment on the part of Armenia that it would abide by this conclusion, or that it would try to dissuade the diaspora Armenians from continuing the genocide rhetoric.
In its August 23, 1990 Declaration of Independence, Armenia stated that it will continue supporting international recognition of “the 1915 genocide,” and has done so ever since.
It is probable that the Armenian diaspora will press for genocide recognition with undiminished fervor, with implicit if not explicit support of Armenia, regardless of the conclusions reached by the historical commission. The Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), the chief lobbying arm of the diaspora in America, is firmly against the Turkish-Armenian protocols. The Armenian-American community, in general, is also opposed.
With the diaspora’s anti-Turkish lobbying efforts continuing in full force, Armenia can, as a last resort, “wash its hands off,” arguing that it has no “control” on the diaspora.
There are also reports from Armenian sources that the Armenian government will insist that the historical commission should focus not on whether “genocide” occurred – because this is a given “fact” – but rather, how it occurred.
In a recent interview with the Armenian Reporter in New York, Armenian President Serge Sargsian noted that Armenia and the diaspora are “one family,” and that recognition of “genocide” is a “long-awaited victory for justice.”
A clear message, but not a helpful one for normalizing relations.
So, how is the establishment of the historical commission as foreseen in the protocols really make a difference as far as genocide allegations? A check of reality is in order here.
Nagorno-Karabagh conflict
The language in the protocols on the Nagorno-Karabagh issue is even fuzzier. Other than a “commitment to the peaceful settlement of regional and international disputes,” the protocols contain no concrete reference to the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict. There is no mention of ending the illegal occupation of the Azeri territory by Armenia – notwithstanding the UN resolutions – of the innocent Azeri civilians that fell victim to ethnic cleansing by Armenian forces, and of the plight of one million Azeri refugees.
On a recent visit to Moscow, the Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian stated that the Nagorno-Karabagh issue never entered into negotiations with Turkey, and never will.
Still, as part of the normalization process, Armenia may implement a cosmetic withdrawal from the occupied territory, but this will fall well short of the UN demands, and will not in any way satisfy Azerbaijan. The Minsk Group has been ineffective to date.
In any case, while the Nagorno-Karabagh issue drags on in negotiations, the Turkey-Armenia border will remain open.
Occupation of Nagorno-Karabagh by Armenian forces was the reason Turkey closed the Turkey-Armenia border in 1993.
Normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations without the solution of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict will be a “sellout” by Turkey of brotherly Azerbaijan, and a betrayal of Azeri nation’s trust in Turkey.
Other than trust, the chief fallout from a rift in Azeri-Turkish relations will be energy projects – including Shah Deniz II gas supply for the Nabucco project. Throughput to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) crude pipeline may also be curtailed, and the Kazakh oil reaching Baku (due to increase following recent agreement between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan) across the Caspian Sea, instead of the BTC outlet, will likely be exported from the Black Sea ports of Supsa (Georgia) or Novorossiysk (Russia).
Economics aside, that will increase oil tanker traffic through the Bosporus.
Should these eventualities materialize, Turkish politicians, or rather the AKP leaders, will have a lot in their hands to “explain.”
Other issues
Other thorny issues between Turkey and Armenia include refusal of Armenia to recognize the 1921 Kars Agreement (signed between Turkey and the three neighboring Soviet Republics defining the borders), reference to Mount Ararat as a national symbol in Armenia’s Constitution, inclusion of the Mount Ararat insignia on Armenia’s national flag, and reference to eastern Turkey as “Western Armenia” in the Armenian Declaration of Independence.
Such stance on the part of Armenia is an antithesis of good intentions towards a neighbor. Yet, apart from a veiled reference to the Kars Agreement, the issue is largely ignored in the Turkish-Armenian protocols.
How could a country like Turkey normalize relations with a neighbor when the latter signals territorial claims on its neighbor – and does not want to alter its mind-set?
Could the U.S. have a normal diplomatic relation with Mexico if the latter claimed in its Constitution that the southwest U.S. is part of a larger Mexico?
Lingering in the background, of course, is the nefarious ASALA terror that caused the death of more than 40 Turkish diplomats in various countries in the 1970’s and ‘80’s.
Armenia cannot be directly blamed for ASALA’s terror, but the Armenian officials have not publically condemned the dastardly acts of ASALA.
Memories are still fresh on Armenian president Andranik Makarian’s warm welcome extended to the ASALA terrorist Varadian Garabedian when the latter was released from French prison in 2001. The Yerevan mayor Rober Nazarian gave the terrorist assurance that he would be given food, shelter and a job in Yerevan. In fact, Garabedian received a hero’s welcome when he stepped into Armenian soil. He had been convicted in France of the 1983 bombing of the Turkish Airlines bureau at the Paris-Orly airport, killing 8 people and wounding 61.
Call for judgment
The notion of normalizing relations between Turkey and Armenia is applaudable. Peace and political stability in the region require such normalization, and no reasonable person can oppose this process. Normalization, however, should be predicated on the ending of all hostile elements in the relations between the two countries.
Other than closing the border in 1993, Turkey has not nurtured any adversarial notions towards Armenia. Countless Turkish citizens of Armenian origin, with their churches, hospitals, charities, etc. live peacefully in Turkey, enjoying the full rights of any Turkish citizen, including the right to vote, while at the same time the presence of some 70,000 illegal Armenian workers in Turkey is tolerated.
No Armenian flags are publically burned or trampled upon on national holidays in Turkey, and children are not indoctrinated with anti-Armenian sentiments – in families, schools or mosques – from day one of reaching their consciousness.
The despicable murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink – by unknown forces still under investigation – in January 2007 in Istanbul was widely condemned in Turkey, many Turks taking to the streets chanting “We are all Armenians,” or “We are all Hrant Dink.”
Compare these realities with those in Armenia, and the Armenian diaspora, and what a stark, depressing contrast emerges! One would be hard put, for example, to find a single functioning mosque in Armenia.
And no president of a Turkish-American organization was charged with and convicted of terror activities, like the ex-ANCA president Murat Topalian, who received, in 2001, a 3-year prison sentence in Ohio court for his involvement in a bomb attack against the Turkish House in New York in 1981.
Notwithstanding some gross exaggerations, e.g., 1.5 million purported deaths, Armenians have a genuine sorrowful history to tell going back to World War I, and they want Turkey to account for the sad history. But Turks also have a painful, traumatic history, with 2.5 million Moslems (Turks and Kurds) contemporaneously perished in Anatolia, some half a million at the hands of renegade Armenian bands that joined the invading Russian and French forces, hitting the Ottoman forces from behind.
Wartime tragedies are like the two sides of a coin, and if Armenia insists on accounting of history, it must also show empathy for the other side and face the excesses of its own history.
That is why, it is essential that the historical commission that is envisioned in the protocols have access to all archival documents, Armenian and Turkish included, and the commission’s purview should be making a comprehensive review of the World War I events in their entirety.
Turkey is prepared to face its history. Is Armenia prepared to face its own?
Christian sympathies for the Armenian claims should not ignore or overlook tragedies visited on the Moslems.
Wrap-up
Wrapping up, reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia in principle is commendable, and in fact, long overdue. But such a process must first remove hostile attitudes that exist between the two countries. Because the animus, or an attitude of hostility, has been very largely on the Armenian side, Armenia must first change its attitude toward Turkey, e.g., by revising its Constitution.
An expression of sorrow on the ASALA terror would be also helpful.
The two Turkish-Armenian protocols, however, give no assurance or confidence that Armenia will take these steps. Based on ambiguous, noncommittal language in the protocols, one can only hope for a positive change on the Armenian side.
But hope is not sufficient. There should be greater certitude in the protocols as to how Armenia will alter its conduct.
The only certain clause in the protocols is the one that calls for the opening of the Turkey-Armenia border within 2 months after the protocols take force. There is little doubt that the land-locked Armenia, with most of its population living in poverty, will reap major economic gains from the free-trade opportunities afforded by a re-opened border.
Once the border is opened, it will be virtually impossible to reverse the process regardless of how Armenia behaves. Closure of the border would draw harsh criticism from the U.S. and the EU.
The Turkish-Armenian protocols, devoid of any pre-conditions, are being pushed by Turkey’s AKP government at the strong urging of the U.S., in particular President Obama in person. The EU is also pressuring Turkey. By signing these protocols, the government hopes to earn “brownie points” from the U.S. and the EU in an effort to further advance its Islamic political agenda.
This is regrettable. While the issue is one of political convenience for the AKP government, it is essentially a matter of national dignity for Turkey.
A fundamental question that the government must explain is, other than “brownie points,” what it will actually gain from the signing of the two protocols. If the purpose is to deflect the Obama administration from recognizing Armenian “genocide” – as President Obama said he would during the election campaign – it is a black mark for the Turkish foreign policy. It would be caving in to what is effectively a blackmail.
When he visited Turkey in April, Obama inveighed that he had not changed his “thinking” on genocide allegations. The implication – a veiled threat – was not lost on Turks.
Another key question is, if the protocols are ratified by the Turkish Parliament and they become binding, how the government will handle the Azeris’ certain displeasure. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly assured the Azeris that he will not disappoint them. Yet, the protocols give little hope of a diplomatic breakthrough in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict.
Perhaps the government is hoping secretly that the Parliament will decline to ratify the protocols, letting the PM effectively “off the hook.” That eventuality, of course, will trigger another headache. Parliamentary ratification is a Constitutional requirement in Turkey. The Parliament, however, cannot make any alterations to the protocols. It can only ratify or reject them.
The indications are that the Turkish government has forced itself into a predicament, possibly even a trap, of its own making.
In this context, it is particularly disconcerting that, according to Nalbandian, the text of the Turkish-Armenian protocols was prepared entirely by the Armenian side, with Turkey suggesting only minor revisions. Why such passivity on the part of Turkish foreign ministry?
There is a perception that the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s vision of “strategic depth” and “zero problems with neighbors” is turning the country into a weakling of a country lacking resolve and respectability.
It is also regrettable that ATAA, TCA and FTAA have lent support to the normalization process in its present form. Apparently they (at least ATAA and TCA) have chosen to toe the line with the official Turkish government policy. Living on a day-to-day basis with the realities of the Armenian propaganda perpetrated across America, these organizations should have known better. At the very least, they should have stayed neutral on the issue.
