Tag: Azerbaijani Turks in Iran

  • The Balkanization of Iran

    The Balkanization of Iran

    Iran ethnic groups mapIran has always presented a thorn in the eye of Western policy makers since the Pahlavi dynasty and its resurgent nationalism. Being strategically located in a position that affords it to patrol and play a significant part in monitoring and controlling the flux of forty percent of the world’s oil flows, the foreign policies of superpower governments teetered between soliciting Iranian support and stability through backing and the focused undermining of Iranian regional power. Throughout modern history, we have seen both policy aims carried out with effect. The crux of the issue is Iran’s power to blockade the Strait of Hormuz and its military capability to do so. Looming over this immediate outcome is Iran’s power as a multiethnic nation state with vast oil, mineral, and gas resources. Its large coastline with the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea also affords it power that it is able to project within the spheres of the Gulf States, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. One of the aims of Iran’s nuclear program is to solidify its hold on regional power and prevent any foreign intrigue from upsetting this influence.

    This is why the response to Iran’s nuclear program won’t just be surgical strikes. In the short term, a surgical strike or any other military action aimed at destabilizing Iran and setting back its atomic aims will do exactly that, but it will not curb Iran’s two main resources- human capital in the form of knowledge and raw material wealth. This is where separatism comes into play. The majority of Iran’s oil and gas resources are located in the Khuzestan and Hormozgan provinces, home to many ethnic Arabs. Another large chunk of oil and gas is located near and within the Caspian Sea; areas inhabited by ethnic Azeris. Any policy of providing a mortal blow to Iran will factor in ethnic tensions and the creation of new nation-states from the mammoth corpse of what used to be known as Iran. The establishment of a Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was one of the efforts put into separatism, and while unsuccessful, it demonstrated that with enough foreign funding and support, an independent republic carved out of one of Iran’s minority-held provinces is feasible and beneficial for multiple parties. A resourceless Iran poses no threat to Arab states, the increasing regional power of Azerbaijan, nor the struggling states of Pakistan and Afghanistan. And without such resources, Iran doesn’t stand a chance at mobilizing its human capital in nation-strengthening efforts that could potentially pose a threat.

    The policy does, however, pose some risks. For one, a Kurdistan carved out of Iran will destabilize and effectively plunge Turkey into ethnic war. Already, an autonomous Kurdish republic is in effect in the state of Iraq, and has also gone into effect in Syria. The next steps are Iran and Turkey- Iran being the weaker and more unstable holder of Kurd-inhabited territories. A war with Iran will provide the instability and resource sapping necessary for the formation of an autonomous Kurdistan in western Iran. The trouble starts when the Kurds of Turkey begin to demand their own autonomy. Perhaps it is a worthwhile deal for Turkish inclusion into Europe, and for the promotion of stability in a region haunted by war and sectarianism. What remains to be seen is whether the Kurds, given autonomy in Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Turkey, will opt to secede and form a resource-rich nation-state. However, it seems the Kurdistan dilemma is an inevitability; preventing 45 million people from forming a nation-state is an uphill battle for all parties involved.

    Any formation of an Arab state from Southwestern Iran would serve the goal of limiting Iran’s coastline in the Gulf and resource wealth. It would be eagerly supported by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Kingdoms, and with enough repression from Iran, will evoke international support. This will effectively cripple Iran as a nation and plunge it into Afghanistan-grade poverty within several generations. The question of Azerbaijan remains. While separatists and pan-Turkists declare that Iranian Azeris suffer discrimination, facts on the ground hold otherwise. Azeris serve high positions in Iranian society and politics, and enjoy lifestyles similar to ethnic Persians. Furthermore, the historical link of the land of Azerbaijan (northern and southern) is part and parcel of Iranian history. The Land of Fire was the hub of Zoroastrianism and Persian culture for eons. It is unclear whether separatism will take hold as a popular sentiment in Iranian Azerbaijan. It is greatly dependent on how well the Republic of Azerbaijan in the north does in the coming years, as it fosters greater relations with the United States and Europe. If standard of living and economic mobility in the country rise simultaneously as quality of life, political and social repression, and economic rot plague Iran, the desire to join their brothers in the north will increase.

    And why would international players be apprehensive about this option in the long run? The momentary instability that will rise from carving new states out of Iranian territory is a tradeoff that pales in comparison the the benefits of stronger trading partners in the area, the goodwill of neighboring countries, and the loss of the threat to oil flow in the Gulf and the Caucasus. An Iran without Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, and Khuzestan will be an immobile and poverty-stricken land. The secession of barren Baluchistan will also rob Iran of its rich mineral resources. The goal is to ensure Iran will never pose a threat to international interests in the Middle East- without the resources and strategic advantages it holds, it will never be able to pose such a threat again. Minority groups may be apprehensive- they may hold the belief that they have greater opportunities as Iranians in socioeconomic mobility, yet a concerted support and funding effort from the international community can dissolve such apprehension at the prospect of separation.

    Iran is “The Land of the Aryans” much as Yugoslavia was the land of the Slavs. It does not have a consistent national identity that rests on three pillars- language, ethnicity, and religion. Thus far, religion is the tie that binds many Iranians, and to an extent, language. This is why Iran is adamant on excluding Azeri and Kurdish as national tongues, as such moves may dissolve Iranian national unity. A state without a national identity resting on the aforementioned pillars provides a tempting opportunity for more powerful players to play the ethnic tension card. In this sense, whatever Iranian government in power must learn to adeptly play at identity politics and mitigate the forces of separatism and ethnic division. Thus far, all of Iran’s governments have done poorly in mitigating these differences, often resulting in crises and near-losses for the nation state of Iran. As Iran’s tension with the international community grows, a dismembered Land of the Aryans continues to become a very real possibility in our lifetime.

    Source: iranian.com

  • Iran-Armenia Relations And The ‘Genocide’

    Iran-Armenia Relations And The ‘Genocide’

    iran armeniaIranian Vice President Hamid Baghaei’s remarks last week that the deportation of Armenians in 1915 amounted to genocide have understandably drawn ire in Turkey.

    The Iranian Embassy in Ankara soon after released a statement claiming that Baghaei’s position on the matter had not been accurately reflected by media outlets. Turkey, nevertheless, was obviously not satisfied with this explanation. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu was reported to have told his Iranian counterpart Manouchehr Mottaki that Turkey was awaiting a correction from Baghaei himself.

    I humbly think that the timing of this statement, which has the appearances of someone shooting themselves in the foot, is indeed quite interesting. But in order to understand the factors that might have motivated Baghaei, one should embrace the issue in question from a broader perspective and rather focus on Iran’s respective relations with both Azerbaijan and Armenia.

    An Islamic republic favoring an avowedly Christian state in a conflict with its predominantly Muslim neighbor would normally seem unlikely, but this is exactly what Tehran did during the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. Since then, Iran has indeed been predisposed toward supporting Yerevan over Baku on regional issues, but first and foremost the Karabakh dispute.

    There are a great variety of reasons behind this support, but I will list here only the three most crucial: At present, the number of ethnic Armenians living in Iran is estimated to be about only 100,000, constituting the country’s largest Christian minority. On the other hand, the number of ethnic Azeris (sic.) living in Iran is at least 20 million (sic.), though there is some dispute about this figure, which is affected by the differing perspectives and motivations that the issue is approached with. These people have been integrated into Iranian society and hold important positions in the higher echelons of the state like Seyyed Ali Khamanei, the supreme leader who succeeded Ayatollah Khomeni. Nonetheless, the Iranian establishment sees these people as a potential secessionist threat, actually one to be provoked by Azerbaijan should it regain its territories still under Armenian occupation. It is precisely for this reason that Tehran attempts to strategically balance Azerbaijan with its arch-enemy Armenia.

    What also disturbs Tehran is Azerbaijan’s close relations with Western countries, first and foremost the U.S. and Israel. Given its deeply antagonistic relationship with these two countries, Iran has in the past strongly opposed Western proposals for the deployment of international peacekeeping forces in Karabakh, fearing it might eventually result in its further encirclement by the U.S. (and thus Israel).

    This Iranian concern has also been underlined by circles close to the Turkish government and seems evident in what a figure in the entourage of Prime Minister Recep T. Erdoğan relates about nearly every occasion that the Iranians have been requested to use their leverage over Armenia to resolve the deadlock. “Yet each time we raise this issue,” says this official, “the Iranians respond by pointing out Baku’s strengthening relations with Israel.”

    The third reason is related to Iran’s economic considerations. Indeed, Iran is one of Armenia’s major trade partners. Not only do Iranian goods flood the Armenian market. More importantly, Tehran supplies Yerevan with significant volumes of natural gas. Recently, it has also helped to construct hydroelectric dams on the Araz River. Actually, the bilateral economic relations are so intense that Iranian businessmen, as well as local authorities of those regions bordering Armenia, are rumored to nowadays be occupying the streets of Yerevan as part of Iran’s preparations against the sanctions imposed by the United Nations.

    In comparison to the state of Tehran’s economic relations with Yerevan, however, those with Baku are highly problematic. This is well illustrated in the serious competition between Tehran and Baku over disputed Caspian oil and gas reserves.

    In such a milieu, the Turks hope that the addressee of the unambiguous message sent by Mr. Baghaei was not Turkey. Mr. Baghaei might be intent on making a gesture to Armenia, but he would do well to heed a Turkish proverb that I believe has relevance: While trying to pluck one’s eyebrows, one should not pluck out one’s eyes.

    The Turkish people indeed expect Mr. Bahgaei to provide a sincere correction!

    Cem Oğuz

    Hurriyet Daily News