Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic and itsfirst President, stands as a towering figure of the 20th Century. Among the great leadersof history, few have achieved so much in so short period, transformed the life of a nationas decisively, and given such profound inspiration to the world at large. The Greatest Leader of ALL Time: ATATURK Soldier, Diplomat, Statesman, Orator, Teacher, Scholar, Genius Proactive Ataturk Community
Turkey’s highest court has made a sensible decision in rejecting a suit, brought by the country’s chief prosecutor, to ban the ruling Justice and Development Party. Outlawing the party would have meant banning dozens of politicians including – preposterously – Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul.
Turkey is a volatile political stew, including a large Muslim majority, a secular constitution, and a secular, intervention-prone military. Sustaining the democratic rule of law in such an environment is a complicated legal and political challenge. This decision, although it came in a narrow split decision of the Constitutional Court, helps.
Turkey’s 70 million people spoke clearly last year, when the Justice and Development Party, which is frankly a religious Islamic party, won a sweeping parliamentary majority with 47 per cent of the popular vote in multi-party elections. But in Turkey, as elsewhere, ambiguity runs in the arteries of political parties, especially once they take power, and Justice and Development has governed with less religious zeal than its foes had feared.
That’s good, because the stakes are high in Turkey, which has been called the most important political project in the world today. Bridging as it does east and west, Turkey is a model of a democratic country whose population is majority Muslim and which has achieved real political, social and economic advances.
Turkey stands as a genuine example to the rest of the world that democracy, far from being Islam’s enemy, can in fact be perfectly compatible with it.
The legal move against the ruling party was spurred by what we might call secular fundamentalists, who saw danger in a government initiative to allow women to wear headscarves on university campuses. Ever since the days of fiercely secular and still widely beloved reformer Kemal Ataturk, who died in 1938, such symbols of religion have been carefully constrained in Turkey.
But the courts had already struck down the headscarf law. For the judges to have legitimized the outlawing of a popular – and apparently competent – administration could have plunged the country directly into dangerous political tumult.
And for what? Erdogan’s party has not undermined the principles of secular democracy in any serious way we can see, and has in fact liberalized a number of economic and social policies. The PM, eager to get Turkey into the European Union, has repeatedly disappointed his harder-line religious followers.
At least some of the existing tension between the secular and the religious in Turkey comes, we think, from misplaced fears. Many experts say the shift into positions of power of more observant Turks from Anatolia is plausibly more the result of a social and economic movement than a religious impulse. But the country’s entrenched elite – in the military and the secular ruling class – is unhappy with the political success of the new, more religious middle class. The old establishment remains convinced that Erdogan’s party intends to subvert the the secular constitution.
The military needs to acknowledge that the courts should be the legitimate and primary guardian of the constitution. With this week’s ruling, the courts have strengthened their own position as arbiters of common sense.
Turkey has faced a constitutional crisis, and survived, intact. This is good news, and not only for the people of Turkey.
By ANDREW HIGGINS and FARNAZ FASSIHI August 6, 2008; Page A1
ANTALYA, Turkey — When an Islamist-leaning political party took charge of Turkey six years ago, this vibrant Mediterranean resort town feared a bumpy ride for a local economy driven in part by booze and bikinis.
Today, says Ahmet Barut, a hotel magnate here, the only real question is whether the town can sustain an unprecedented economic boom. He’s not keen on the teetotaling habits of the governing party’s leaders, nor the headscarves worn by their wives, but he applauds a key part of their record: “They are good at economics.”
From tourism and tomato growing to car making, Turkey has prospered far more under an Islam-tinged government than it did under some previous, ardently secular administrations more in tune with the often decidedly un-Islamic ways of many Turkish businesspeople.
By nearly every measure, Turkey’s economy is now much stronger than it was when the Justice and Development Party, or AK Party, won elections in 2002. Annual growth since then has averaged around 6.5%, up from an annual average of roughly 2.5% over the previous six-year period.
Turkey still faces various headwinds. Economic momentum has been slowed by the global credit crunch, and the country is running a sizable current-account deficit. A spasm of political uncertainty this year over headscarves didn’t help matters. The AK Party set off the turbulence with an effort to let female college students wear headscarves on campus — a potent symbol of conservative Islam, and a touchstone issue in Turkey, which is constitutionally secular. Opponents used the headscarf flap to try (unsuccessfully) to outlaw the AK Party, saying it harbors a hidden agenda to turn Turkey into an Islamic state resembling Iran.
Despite hiccups like these, the economy shows scant sign of slipping back into its earlier doldrums. “Numbers don’t lie,” says Antalya’s mayor, Menderes Turel, an AK Party member. He boasts of new investment, new sewage pipes and a new airport terminal, but also hails a phenomenon not generally esteemed in Muslim lands: Alcohol sales — turbocharged by tourists, restaurants and a raucous club scene — are up.
Nearly all Turks are Muslim. But Islam and its symbols have been banished from spheres of state here since 1923, when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk founded the modern Turkish republic on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Ataturk regarded religion as an obstacle to his vision for Turkey as a modern, Western power.
The AK Party’s economic record highlights an intriguing evolution in relations between political Islam and capitalism. Islamists in the Arab world tend to look askance at the secular ways of their Turkish brethren, but Turkey’s experiment with modern-minded Islam is closely watched in big parts of the Muslim world.
Islam itself has nothing against business. The Islamic prophet Muhammad started out as a merchant, and his first wife was a successful businesswoman. Asked to fix prices in the bazaar by followers who wanted to buy goods more cheaply, Muhammad is said to have refused: “Only Allah governs the market.”
Over the past century, however, Islam has often served as a vehicle for anticapitalist revolt. Egypt’s Sayyid Qutb, an influential Islamist thinker, crystallized this trend with a 1951 book, “The Battle Between Islam and Capitalism.” Across much of the Muslim world, Islamists denounced the market, not out of deeply held economic convictions, but mostly in response to corrupt crony capitalism in countries such as Egypt, Algeria and Indonesia before the fall of Suharto in 1998.
Turkey’s AK Party, however, has gone in the opposite direction. It insists it has no desire to challenge Turkey’s secular order. Instead, it sees the solution to many of Turkey’s ills in the free-market — both to open up and vivify an economy long dominated by a state-coddled elite and also to modernize a political system forged in the 1930s and still tinged with authoritarianism.
“We favor more competition, productivity and innovation,” says Mehmet Simsek, Turkey’s minister of state for economic affairs. “Those with 1930s mind-sets — statist and inward-looking — cannot understand this.”
An observant Muslim married to an American from Wisconsin, Mr. Simsek embodies the AK Party’s efforts to bridge different but, it believes, compatible worlds. Mr. Simsek used to work as an economist for Merrill Lynch in London and before that at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara. Faith, says the minister, is a personal affair, not a matter of state.
The success of the AK Party’s economic policy, he says, is easily measured: “People are making money.” Private-car sales, he notes, have jumped during his party’s tenure from 90,000 a year to around 400,000. Per-capita gross domestic product has soared from $3,300 in 2002 to more than $10,000.
Turkey’s rebound from financial disaster in 2001 — when the currency went into free fall and the economy contracted by 6% — “has surpassed expectations,” the International Monetary Fund said in its most recent detailed review of Turkey’s economy, prepared last year before the headscarf ruckus. It credited “sound macroeconomic policies, a conducive global environment and political stability.”
Since the AK Party took over at the end of 2002, exports have more than tripled, foreign investment has jumped from under $1 billion a year to more than $20 billion, and the number of tourists has more than doubled. Inflation, out of control for three decades, remains a problem but has fallen sharply to around 10%. Growth in GDP this year is expected to be around 4.5%, way down from over 9% in 2004, but still robust.
Guided by the IMF, the AK Party has imposed fiscal discipline that eluded its predecessors, accelerated privatization and trimmed bureaucracy. Recently abolished, for example, was a requirement that any company with 50 or more employees must hire an ex-convict and a terrorism victim, among various others.
The AK Party has also reactivated a long-stalled drive to join the European Union, pushing through regulatory and other changes designed to bring Turkey more into line with European norms.
Unconventional Alignments
The AK Party’s mix of free-market zeal and emphasis on conservative, faith-rooted personal values has scrambled conventional alignments. In many countries, politicians who back free-market economics are supported most enthusiastically by the wealthy. Poorer folk tend to be more skeptical.
In Turkey, it has been the other way round. The AK Party’s biggest traditional base of support is among poorer and generally more devout citizens. Many wealthy businesspeople, on the other hand, started out viewing the party with deep suspicion — and still do on issues such as headscarves.
Foreign investors were also dubious. The AK Party’s Islamic background raised some eyebrows, but one key worry was that the victors might turn their back on an agreement with the IMF negotiated by the previous government. Backtracking would likely stoke inflation and derail economic recovery.
Instead of rejecting the IMF package, the new government embraced it and carried out a long list of IMF-endorsed reforms. “In the market, there was a lot of skepticism,” Mr. Simsek said recently in his office in Ankara, the capital. Over his desk hangs a portrait of Ataturk, the father of modern Turkey.
When the IMF program reached its scheduled end earlier this summer, Lorenzo Giorgianni, the IMF’s Turkey mission chief, said it had contributed to “the most rapid period of economic growth in the recent history of the Republic.”
Meantime, an influential organization of Turkish industrialists, known as TUSIAD, has also shed much of its early skepticism, at least about Turkey’s economic direction. Haluk Tukel, its current secretary general, hails AK Party economic policy over the past six years as “perfect.” But, he adds, many TUSIAD members still worry that the AK Party has a hidden Islamic agenda.
Such worries grew sharply this year when the government moved to lift a ban on pious female students covering their hair in class. AK Party has also talked about making adultery a criminal offense.
The opposition, flummoxed by AK Party’s economic and electoral successes, has seized on issues like these to try to win back support. Onur Oymen, vice president of the staunchly secular CHP party, dismisses Mr. Simsek and other Westernized officials as window dressing. AK Party’s ultimate goal, he believes, is an Islamic theocracy.
“You cannot have a short version of the Quran,” he says. “They present themselves as representing modern life. It is just the opposite.”
Nonsense, says Cemil Ipekci, an openly gay Turkish fashion designer who wears gold earrings and assortments of flamboyant necklaces and bracelets. “They are not radical Islamists. They are conservative, yes, but not fanatics. Look at me, they socialize with me.” He says he and his boyfriend attend state dinners and parties organized by AK Party ministers. The government-owned airline, Turkish Airlines, hired him to re-design its décor.
Levent Kizil, a more mainstream business leader, is also a fan. “They turned our economy round,” says the Istanbul-based owner of a big soft-drinks company. He doesn’t want Islam interfering with his lifestyle but sees scant sign yet of this happening. “I enjoy my secular lifestyle. I like to drink alcohol and gamble and none of the women in my family wear headscarves,” he says, chomping on a Cuban cigar at an Italian seafood restaurant.
When AK Party took office, Mr. Kizil’s company exported just $3 million of soft drinks. The figure is now $12 million. Confident that his domestic and foreign markets will keep growing, Mr. Kizil has invested €25 million, or about $40 million, to renovate two plants.
Big Problems
Turkey’s economy still has big problems. One of the biggest is mushrooming current-account deficit, which stood at around $43 billion for the 12 months leading to May. The current account is the broadest measure of a nation’s trade balance — and deficits raise worrisome questions about how the country will finance the gap.
Mr. Simsek blames the deficit largely on energy costs. Others point to Turkey’s imports of machinery and other items needed to modernize the economy, and point out that Turkey’s current account has been positive only in times of economic malaise.
Nevertheless, the deficit has spooked the market. There are concerns that a global credit squeeze could hurt Turkey’s ability to borrow the funds it needs. Standard & Poor’s Corp., the credit-rating agency, in April revised its outlook for Turkey from “stable” to “negative.” It last week changed this back to “stable” after Turkey’s highest court struck down a request from the chief prosecutor that the ruling AK Party be disbanded for “antisecular” activities related largely to the headscarf spat.
Abrupt Swings
Turkey has a long history of abrupt swings in economic fortune. An earlier attempt to open up to the world economy — and mimic the success of Asia’s so-called “tiger economies” — got off to a promising start in the 1980s. But that export-driven effort petered out and was followed by an era of chronic inflation and budgetary indiscipline. A big constraint on economic performance has been political instability, caused in part by a Kurdish minority seeking greater autonomy, as well as the continuing debate over the very nature of the Turkish state.
Many investors are now waiting to see whether Turkey can reach a new agreement with the IMF. It doesn’t need money from the fund, says Mr. Simsek, and has paid back more than half of the $23.5 billion it owed in 2002. But a new accord would help calm market jitters. Mr. Simsek, who is handling negotiations, said technical discussions would be completed in a “month or so.”
On the Mediterranean coast, meanwhile, Antalya is in the middle of its busiest tourist season ever. It expects over nine million visitors this year, up from 7.3 million last year and roughly half that in 2002. It’s biggest worry is not Islam, but forest fires that raged this week through coastal regions.
Mr. Barut, the hotelier, says Turkey might get more conservative but sees no risk of it turning into anything like Iran. That, he says, would kill the tourism industry.
Agriculture, another local mainstay, is also growing. Antalya now exports around 350,000 tons of tomatoes a year, nearly double the amount in 2002. Exports of flowers to Europe and Russia have soared, too.
A beneficiary of this is Ali Riza Akinci, who sells seeds for tomatoes, flowers and hotel lawns. He gets some of these from Israel, a supplier that is shunned in the rest of the Muslim world — but not here. Business, says Mr. Akinci, should trump politics.
Not everyone is upbeat. The head of the Antalya’s chamber of commerce, Kemal Ozgen, thinks the state is now too hands-off. He wants it to do more to protect small shop owners, who are losing business to newly opened shopping malls. Antalya, he says, had just one mall when the AK Party took power. It now has 28. Foreign retailers have fueled much of this expansion. Too much competition, says Mr. Ozgen, is unhealthy.
All the same, Mr. Ozgen is happy with the benefits that have accrued to his own business, a window-making factory. Thanks to a building blitz, he’s more than tripled output since the AK Party came to power.
Antalya’s growing integration in the world economy makes it highly vulnerable to any serious downturn on a global level. For example, a recession in Germany, now Antalya’s biggest tourist source, would hit local businesses hard.
Antalya’s AK Party mayor, Mr. Turel, can’t do much about that. But he does try to nip less serious problems in the bud — such as reports in the Russian media of a crackdown on booze. Mr. Turel swiftly set the record straight: Alcohol, he announced at a tourism conference, would never be restricted in Antalya on his watch. More than two million Russians are expected to visit the resort this year.
Pragmatism, says the mayor, is the AK Party’s guiding creed. “We allow praying, we allow bikinis, we allow discos,” the mayor says. “We allow everything.”
Write to Andrew Higgins at andrew.higgins@wsj.com and Farnaz Fassihi at farnaz.fassihi@wsj.com
As a result, Turks know the commander of the armed forces has the
fate of their nation in his hands every bit as much as any elected prime minister.
So the appointment of a new chief of the general staff is always a
closely monitored event. Seldom have Turks watched more closely than
at this moment.
The next chief of the armed forces is being chosen this weekend at
the end of a tumultuous week. Two terrorist bombs exploded last
Sunday night in Istanbul, killing 17 people, including five children
whose bodies were riddled with shrapnel.
Erdogan makes unity plea after bombings
Turkey managed to step back from the brink of political chaos last
Wednesday after the country’s highest court rejected an application
to close the governing party on the grounds that it was seeking to
introduce Islamic laws in violation of the secular constitution. Even
so, a majority of the judges found the party guilty of eroding
secularism.
Adding to the crisis, two senior retired generals are in jail pending
charges of involvement with a group dedicated to overthrowing the
government.
To choose a new armed forces supremo and make other senior military
appointments, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister, is chairing a
meeting of the supreme military board at army headquarters in Ankara,
the capital.
The meeting started on Friday and will last four days. The name of
the general who is to be promoted to the top job will be announced
when it ends tomorrow.
He is widely expected to be General Ilker Basbug, commander of the
army, who is called in military circles the “ice warrior” because he
has a reputation for being calm and pragmatic.
Sandhurst-trained Basbug, 65, will have the top job for the next two
years. He is a formidable military figure and an ideological
hardliner who will ensure that Erdogan’s government – which was
elected last year with 47% of the vote but is mistrusted by the
military, which sees itself as guardian of a secular society – walks
a narrow political line.
For these reasons Basbug is almost certainly not the general Erdogan
would choose to promote. The outgoing chief of the general staff,
General Mehmet Yasar Buyukanit, was also a hardliner but he was
impulsive and could be outmanoeuvred by the prime minister.
“Erdogan will find Basbug is a much more formidable opponent than his
predecessor. He is a lot more subtle,” said a military source.
The prime minister has the constitutional authority to oppose
Basbug’s appointment – this authority has been invoked in the past
but has almost always backfired – and Erdogan knows last week’s
dramatic events have left him politically vulnerable.
“Erdogan is wary of Basbug and would have preferred to have appointed
someone else, but I’d be very surprised if he would be stupid enough
to try to stop Basbug. This is no time to upset the armed forces’
hierarchy,” said the military source.
Last Wednesday Erdogan narrowly survived legal moves to ban him and
the president Abdullah Gul from politics and to close his governing
party on the grounds that they were steering the country towards
Islamic rule.
After three days of deliberations, the 11 judges of Turkey’s
constitutional court decided against an indictment accusing the
Justice and Development party (AKP) of pursuing an Islamic agenda and
undermining Turkey’s secular constitution.
The court punished Erdogan’s party for its Islamic tilt by cutting in
half its public funding for next year, but a verdict against the AKP
had been widely expected.
The court had already overturned AKP efforts to lift a 1989 law that
banned women from wearing Islamic headscarves in universities.
Erdogan’s secularist opponents, who dominate the military and
judiciary, claim his policies mask plans to make Turkey more like Iran or Saudi Arabia.
In Turkey, the military has traditionally had multiple pressure
points on the civilian government, through the chief of the general
staff’s weekly meetings with the prime minister and president, and
through the twice-monthly meetings of the national security council.
Manipulating the civilian government, sometimes through thinly veiled
threats, is a subtle art that Buyukanit was not good at.
However, Basbug is expected to be more effective in influencing
Erdogan’s government without giving the prime minister the excuse to
complain he has come under undemocratic pressure. Basbug is known for
well-crafted public statements that do not alienate the government.
The decision of the constitutional court not to ban Erdogan and his
party clears the way for the prime minister to pursue democratic
reforms and his goal of European Union membership. As a prerequisite
for membership, the EU has demanded a reduction in the military’s
influence in Turkish politics.
Erdogan is expected to start work on a new constitution, but the
court’s verdict has served notice that it and the military will be
watching his party closely for any signs of Islamic activity and he
will have to be careful how he goes about constitutional reform.
If he tries to go too far there is no doubt, regardless of the EU’s
disapproval, that Basbug and the military will come down hard, just
as the armed forces have in the past.
Turkey calls itself a democracy but the military has always hovered
in the wings. Military coups have removed elected governments from
power three times in the past 50 years.
On July 31 Turkish President Abdullah Gul formally ratified the appointment of Professor Ali Birinci (born in 1947) as head of the state-run Turkish Historical Association (TTK) to replace the incumbent Professor Yusuf Halacoglu (born 1949), who had held the position from 1993 until his dismissal on July 23.
In recent years, the long-running struggle between the government of the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Turkey’s secular establishment has tended only to attract international attention when there has been a major public confrontation, such as the AKP’s ultimately successful attempt to appoint Gul to the presidency in 2007 and, more recently, the closure case against the AKP itself (see EDM, July 31).
Such major confrontations are important indicators of a continuing shift in power in Turkey. In the long-run, however, the more decisive struggle is probably occurring on the margins of the political process, as the AKP gradually entrenches both its supporters and its ideology in the state apparatus, by means such as the appointment of its supporters to key positions in the bureaucracy.
The TTK was established by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938), who founded the modern Turkish Republic in 1923 from the rump of the Ottoman Empire following the latter’s defeat in World War I. Ataturk sought to create a Turkish nation state. At the time, outside the empire’s tiny educated elite, there was little sense, or even awareness, of a “national identity.” Under the Ottomans, the primary determinant of identity had been religion, which for the majority of the population meant Islam. Ataturk associated the Ottoman Empire with obscurantism and regarded Islam as one of the most important reasons for its failure to match the pace of technological and intellectual development in the West. The TTK’s main purpose was to create an historical pedigree for a new secular nation-state, which would be based on language and race. The TTK wrote a new history, in which the Turks’ origins were projected back beyond the Ottoman Empire to the nomads of Central Asia. Over the years that have followed, the TTK has remained the custodian of official Turkish history and one of the main ideological bastions of the secular state.
The attitude of the secular establishment to the Ottoman Empire can be seen clearly on the website of the Turkish military, which has always regarded itself as the guardian of Ataturk’s legacy, known as Kemalism. Although the Ottoman Empire lasted for 600 years, only one of the 13 “Important Days in Turkish History” listed on the website of the Turkish General Staff is from before World War One (for reasons that remain obscure, the day is the anniversary of the conquest of the island of Rhodes). The majority are associated with Ataturk’s life (Turkish General Staff website, www.tsk.mil.tr).
In contrast, Turkey’s Islamists have always been unabashed Ottoman nostalgists. Although it has not yet dared to confront the personality cult that grew up around Ataturk after his death, including the compulsory inculcation of his teachings at every level of the educational system, the AKP has certainly been less vigorous than previous administrations in terms of promoting it.
In recent years, there has also been a noticeable shift in the historical reference points in official statements, ceremonies and speeches. Before the AKP came to power, the reference point was invariably a quotation from Ataturk or an event from his life. Now it is increasingly the Ottoman Empire. The change has been most marked at the local level. For example, ever since pro-Islamic political parties first took control of the Istanbul Municipality in 1994, the Ottoman conquest of the city in 1453 has been celebrated with increasing enthusiasm each year. Conferences and symposia on Ottoman themes have proliferated, and large budgets been assigned to the preservation and restoration of the city’s Ottoman, particularly religious, architectural heritage. Tulip festivals, including the planting of three million bulbs across the city, are now held each spring to commemorate the “Tulip Era” of the early 18th century. The municipality has even begun to use Ottoman vocabulary and grammatical constructions on billboards.
This Ottoman nostalgia has always been extremely strong among followers of the Islamic preacher Fethullah Gulen (born in 1941), who is currently in exile in the United States. Gulen has long portrayed the Ottoman Empire as a paradigm of religious tolerance and social harmony, although the historical record would appear to indicate otherwise. Over the last decade, the Gulen movement has grown rapidly to become the most powerful non-governmental network in Turkey, which includes media outlets, schools, universities, businesses and charitable foundations. It has also established increasingly close ties with the AKP. Several ministers and many AKP parliamentary deputies are known to be Gulen sympathizers.
Although he had often courted controversy through his aggressive denial that the treatment of the Armenians in the late Ottoman Empire constituted genocide, Halacoglu was undoubtedly committed to Ataturk’s ideological legacy. In contrast, Ali Birinci is known to be very close to the Gulen movement and has played an active role in several of its NGOs. He first came to prominence in 2006 when he publicly supported another pro-AKP academic, Professor Atilla Yayla, who described Kemalism as taking Turkey “much further backward than forward” and, in a reference to the Ataturk personality cult, asked “why are there pictures of this man everywhere?” (Vatan, July 25).
As a result, the replacement of Halacoglu with Birinci will undoubtedly be regarded by many secularists in Turkey not merely as a bureaucratic appointment but as another indication of creeping regime change.
From Turkey to Germany to the States, religious people are intent on taking us back to the middle ages
I enjoyed the subtlety of the Guardian’s page 13 layout yesterday. It was the first page of the international section, and it contained two stories, the first about legal moves in Turkey’s constitutional court to disband the country’s ruling AKP party on the grounds that it is threatening Turkey’s secularist constitution, the second about complaints by Polish holidaymakers who find the nudity on German “free body culture” beaches disgusting.
To the alert eye the connection is direct. Admirers of the Catholic culture of Poland will assuredly be delighted by its success in making the unclothed human frame an object of disgust. Admirers of Islamic culture will be delighted to find that Turkish Islamists are encouraging more women to hide that automatic trigger of unbridled male lust, the tresses on the female head.
These are tips of icebergs. In fact the influence of religious attitudes in distorting and limiting aspects of human life, even to the extent of perverting, imprisoning and poisoning them at the extremes, is too well known to require rehearsal. It was against the domination of life by religion that Mustapha Kemal Atatürk acted, founding a secular republic which sought to move religion from “the realm of the state to the realm of belief” – which is how Turkey’s current deputy prosecutor, Omer Faruk Eminagaoglu, puts it in explaining the basis of the case against the AKP, which has – even by the admission of some of its own MPs – been conducting a non-too-subtle yet hypocritically disavowed campaign of re-Islamicisation.
The worshippers of Brian’s sandal everywhere are tireless and persistent in their efforts to recapture the world for dogma. In America the creationists and so-called “intelligent design” votaries expend vast sums and energy on trying to drag us back into medieval times. Islamists have never left them – except of course in freely using today’s technology to further their aims. Cherry-pickers all, the Brian-sandalistas want it all: they want the rest of us to think and act as they prescribe, and to make us do it by the means that infidel thinking has produced: for example, religious freakery is all over the internet like a rash.
If the Brian-sandalistas cannot succeed by direct assault, they will do it by constant nibbling and encroachments: prayers in American publicly-funded schools, headscarves in Turkish publicly-funded universities, a little bit of anti-evolutionary biology there, a little alcohol ban there – and if that doesn’t work, they try more robust means. So it goes: creep creep, whisper, soothe, murmur a prayer with the kids in assembly, ecumenicalise, interfaith-schmooze, infiltrate, subvert, complain, campaign, scream, threaten, explode.
The asymmetry is stark. Secularists say, “believe whatever nonsense you want, but keep it to yourself and act responsibly”. The Brian-sandalistas say, “believe what we want you to believe and act as we say”. The psychopaths among them say, “believe what we want you to believe and act as we say or we will kill you”. Meanwhile the residue of attitudes and practices once foisted on everyone by the zealous still dog and bedevil us, as witness the poor benighted Catholic Poles suffering at the sight of what – you have to larf – they presumably believe God created.
There is nothing trivial about the problem in Turkey; and the problem in Turkey is the problem for the world at large. It is about boundaries, about the place of religious belief in the public domain, its effects on individual lives, and its effect on public policy. The history of “the west” is in essence a history of secularisation, and most even of those who decry what they see as its imperfections would not willingly be without the huge advances it has wrought in scientific, social and political respects. Think: if the clocks could be turned back as the Brians want, the English would be ruled by two people: The Queen and Rowan Williams.
You might be tempted to think that would be an improvement on Gordon Brown and Ed Balls, and preferable to Cameron and his friends from his house at Eton. But what if, say, Hizb ut-Tahrir got its way – it wants the Caliphate back, and by the logic of its outlook, a worldwide one. The ambition of the faiths – once they have finished warring with us and each other – is, remember, infinite by definition: and even one mile in the direction of any of their various paradises-on-earth would be a hell for all but those running the journey.
ANKARA, Turkey — The Ataturk Thought Association, zealous guardian of the secular creed that guides Turkey, never thought it would come to this.
Its chairman, a retired four-star general, is in jail. Its offices — plastered with portraits of modern Turkey’s founding father, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk — have been raided by police. Several of its computer hard drives have been seized by investigators. They’re hunting for evidence of plots by hard-line secularists to topple Turkey’s mildly Islamic government.
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Associated Press
Pro-secular demonstrators, one of them holding a portrait of Ataturk, left, chanted slogans during a protest in Istanbul earlier this month.
The assault, declares Suay Karaman, a land surveyer now filling in for the Thought Association’s imprisoned chairman, shows that “there is no such thing as moderate Islam.” Raids in Ankara and Istanbul came in the weeks before the country’s Constitutional Court on Monday began considering the secularists’ own offensive: a suit to outlaw the governing party for violating secular mandates Ataturk enshrined in 1923. (Please see related article on Page A10.)
A final battle looms to decide whether Turkey remains a secular republic faithful to Ataturk, says Mr. Karaman, or instead “becomes like Saudi Arabia.”
Warnings of the demise of Ataturk’s legacy have been around almost since he died 70 years ago. A relentless modernizer, hearty drinker and fan of the fox trot, the founder of the Turkish Republic — his name means “father of the Turks” — had issues with Islam. He shut down Islamic schools, banned Islamic garb and opened a German brewery in his new capital, Ankara. His was hardly the path of least resistance in a land that is 99% Muslim, once ruled Mecca and was for centuries home to the Caliph, Islam’s supreme leader. Yet Ataturk’s way prevailed for decades.
Now, says Mr. Karaman, it faces grave peril. In February, Turkey’s elected government — led by observant Muslims whose wives mostly wear headscarves — moved to let pious female students cover their hair on university campuses, something that had been banned for years as an affront to secular traditions.
The Constitutional Court quickly put a stop to that, and the chief prosecutor, an ardent secularist, filed suit in March, asserting that the governing party poses a “clear and present” danger and must be stopped before it imposes Islamic law. Outlawing the Justice and Development, or AK, Party could rock its leaders — and the country — politically, though they likely could reorganize under another banner without giving up power. Tensions were stoked late Sunday, on the eve of the court taking up the case, by two bombs in Istanbul that killed 17 people. There was no immediate claim of responsibility.
The headscarf effort, says Mr. Karaman, along with the arrest of his boss and scores of others, has exposed what he calls the governing party’s hidden agenda — a plan to turn Turkey into an Islamic theocracy. Chanting “Turkey will not be Iran,” activists in the Ataturk Thought Association held a noisy protest on July 19 in Istanbul, waving portraits of their jailed chairman, Sener Eruygur, and of Ataturk. A few days later, more than two dozen people were arrested as part of a sprawling search for antigovernment plotters. Mr. Eruygur hasn’t been charged; his lawyer has said he is innocent of wrongdoing.
Many, including foreign diplomats, scoff at the notion that Turkey now is governed by a cabal of closet fundamentalists. The AK Party generally is friendly to the West — friendlier than many secular activists, in fact. Party officials deny harboring anti-Ataturk tendencies.
One thing is clear: Ataturk worship, the world’s most enduring personality cult, still holds this increasingly prosperous nation of more than 70 million people in its thrall. Ataturk shows scant sign of going the way of his contemporaries. Vladimir Lenin lies in Red Square but is barely mentioned in Russia now, except as a butt of jokes. Even Mao Zedong, embalmed in Tiananmen Square, has slipped from his pedestal: The Chinese Communist Party’s official view of him is 70% good, 30% bad.
Untouchable Ataturk
Ataturk, revered for defeating invading British, French and Greek forces, is untouchable. His mausoleum in Ankara drew more than 12 million visitors last year, up by four million from 2006. The constitution bans all deviation from the “reforms and principles” of “the immortal leader and the unrivalled hero.” It is illegal in Turkey to publicly curse him. Virtually nobody, including members of the AK Party, disses him, at least not in public. One young, headscarf-wearing woman recently said on TV, “I do not like him.” She is being investigated by prosecutors.
Politicians invoke Ataturk’s name to justify starkly different agendas. Even Ataturk’s long-deceased wife, whom he divorced, has been dragged into furor: Did she or didn’t she observe Islamic custom and cover her head? An AK Party legislator has contended that she did. That question is among the issues to be mulled by the Constitutional Court.
Just as Muslim activists mine the Quran for verses to boost their cause, Turkey’s hard-line secularists and their foes delve into Ataturk’s voluminous writings and speeches — Turkey’s secular scripture. The sheer volume of Ataturk’s words gives plenty of scope for argument: a single speech he gave in 1927 lasted 36 hours, spread over six days.
For Mr. Karaman of the Ataturk Thought Association, a bastion of Turkey’s secular establishment, the key text is one of Ataturk’s shorter works, a 230-word address to Turkish youth. It warns against “malevolent people at home and abroad,” and urges ceaseless struggle against any “traitors” who worm themselves into power. That dark fear, says Mr. Karaman, has taken shape in the form of the AK Party. Among signs of this, he says, are the woes of his group.
The governing party’s own claim of allegiance to Ataturk only demonstrates its deviousness, says Mr. Karaman. When Recep Tayyip Erdogan, now Turkey’s prime minister, launched the AK Party in 2001, he did so in a hall bedecked with a giant portrait of Ataturk. The event began with a minute’s silence in Ataturk’s memory. “All fake,” huffs Mr. Karaman.
Suat Kiniklioglu, an AK Party legislator, says he has “no problems at all” with “Ataturk’s principles” but the key issue is “how we interpret them.” Ataturk’s “true genius,” he says, was his “ability to adapt to change.” Clinging to details from the 1920s, he says, “will not work.”
Secularism a la Ataturk is not a simple formula. Unlike America’s founding fathers, who separated church and state, Ataturk did not so much split Islam from the state as subordinate it to the state. He abolished the post of Caliph and placed all mosques and Muslim clerics under a government department. At the same time, he purged religion from other state agencies.
Ataturk, a very stylish dresser himself, clearly didn’t like traditional Islamic garb, viewing it as an emblem of backwardness. His best-known comments on the dress question came in 1925 when he declared “international” — that is, Western — dress as “very important and appropriate for our nation. We shall wear it.”
Legislation he introduced, known as the Hat Law, did not explicitly prohibit veils or headscarves and focused instead on banning fezzes and turbans for men. The ban on headscarves in colleges dates not from Ataturk, say its opponents, but from a 1980 coup by the military, which also tried, in vain, to crack down on miniskirts. Mr. Karaman says the spirit, if not the letter of the 1925 law, requires modern dress for both sexes.
A Furious Row
During a discussion of the 2006 budget by legislators, a furious row erupted over Islam, Ataturk and headwear, when AK Party legislator Musa Uzunkaya asserted that Ataturk’s wife, Latife Hanim, attended meetings at the presidential mansion in the 1920s with her hair covered. Was she a “reactionary?” he asked. The question enraged ardent secularists, who saw it as defiling Ataturk’s memory.
Ipek Calislar, the author of a biography of Turkey’s first first lady, says she sometimes hid her hair only so conservatives could not push Ataturk “into a corner because of her dress.” It wasn’t an endorsement of Islamic norms, says Ms. Calislar: “People are arguing about this in a very stupid way.”
Next to his desk, Mr. Karaman keeps a big photograph of Ataturk in military uniform. Ataturk, he predicts, will ultimately triumph. His hero, he says, would be in no doubt about how to confront any assaults on Turkish secularism were he still alive today: “He would put his army boots back on and start fighting.”
–Farnaz Fassihi contributed to this article.
Write to Andrew Higgins at andrew.higgins@wsj.com2
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