Tag: Ataturk

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic and itsfirst President, stands as a towering figure of the 20th Century. Among the great leadersof history, few have achieved so much in so short period, transformed the life of a nationas decisively, and given such profound inspiration to the world at large. The Greatest Leader of ALL Time: ATATURK Soldier, Diplomat, Statesman, Orator, Teacher, Scholar, Genius Proactive Ataturk Community

  • Obama says Turkey’s leadership is vital in Middle East

    Obama says Turkey’s leadership is vital in Middle East

    US president praised Turkey’s role in its region during telephone conversation with Tukish PM Erdogan and President Gul.

    Tuesday, 17 February 2009 09:24

    U.S. President Barack Obama told Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a telephone conversation on Monday that Turkey played an important role for peace in its region.

    Obama’s recent praises came only few days after Israeli commender accused Turkey of 1915 incidents and tensions rose between Turkey and Israel.

    “I would like to say that your leadership is vital in the Middle East peace process and America always understands Turkey’s sensitivities,” Erdogan’s press office quoted Obama as telling the Turkish premier.

    Obama also expressed willingness to work with Turkey in many issues such as maintaining peace in the Middle East, ending PKK terrorism and relations with Armenia.

    Erdogan in return highlighted Turkey’s sensitivities regarding Armenia and the Middle East, expressing the importance of fair and impartial stance of the United States to secure that the relations between the two countries were not damaged, said AA.

    Obama has also telephoned Turkish President Abdullah Gul, said a statement from Gul’s press office on Monday.

    “During the telephone conversation, President Obama underlined the importance that he attaches to Turkish-U.S. relations, saying he appreciated the leadership Turkey has taken in regional issues,” the statement said.

    Top on the agenda of telephone conversation was Caucasus. They discussed also developments in Afghanistan, Middle East and EU.

    President Gul paid a visit Russia last week and met with Russian counterpart and PM. They discussed energy, trade and developments in the region. Turkey and Russia also signed a trade deal. They also agreed on using Turkish Liras and ruble in bilateral trade, instead of US dolar.

    The two leaders also “re-affirmed the will to work together, reviewing regional as well as international issues.”

    “In both calls, the leaders discussed a number of current issues, including U.S. support for the growing Turkish-Iraqi relationship, the importance of cooperation in Middle East peace efforts, and the U.S. review on Afghanistan and Pakistan policy,” the White House said in a statement.

    Agencies

    Source:  www.worldbulletin.net, 17 February 2009

    Turkey’s growing influence in the Middle East

    Published: Tuesday 17 February 2009
    Sinan Űlgen, Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies
    Turkey’s growing stature in the Middle East has “the potential to make it more attractive to the European Union,” argues Sinan Űlgen, chairman of the Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, in the spring 2009 edition of Europe’s World.

    Turkey has become increasingly “influential in the Middle East” given its diplomatic success in the region, the commentary claims.

    Űlgen points to the number of progressive goals that the country has achieved, such as ending “factional strife in Lebanon” and “engineering the start of direct talks between Syria and Israel” over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

    On top of this, the article praises Turkey’s diplomatic efforts in helping to “ease the nuclear stand-off between Iran and the West”.

    Űlgen notes that Turkey’s progress in the Middle East is the result of a “growing lack of US legitimacy and lack of EU influence”. As a result, the country has been “able to leverage both its regional ties and its standing in the transatlantic community to play a more instrumental role vis-à-vis its southern neighbours,” the author asserts.

    This has “without a doubt” enhanced Turkey’s role and influence in the Middle East, Űlgen declares.

    However, the author wonders whether this comes “at the expense of the country’s EU ambitions”. Indeed, “with so much of the country’s diplomatic and political energy now focused on regional issues, it seems to leave little room for advancing its EU membership ambitions,” the paper observes.

    Nevertheless, Űlgen insists that Turkey’s growing influence in the Middle East can be a “sure way of enhancing its asset value for the EU” and facilitating “Turkey’s European bid”.

    On the other hand, the author admits this claim is “predicated on the assumption that Europe has the capacity and the willingness to benefit from what Turkey has to offer”.

    Indeed, this “strategy can only pay off if the EU is able to strengthen its own capacity for concerted action on foreign policy,” the paper asserts.

    In light of Turkey’s diplomatic progress in the Middle East, Űlgen concludes that Turkish EU membership would “make Europe a more influential and capable world power”.

    Turkey’s route to the EU may be via the Middle East

    Spring 2009
    par Sinan Ülgen
    With western influence in the Middle East faltering in the wake of America’s misadventure in Iraq and Europe’s general indecision, Sinan Ülgen argues that Turkish diplomatic successes in Syria and Iran and its growing stature throughout the Middle East have the potential to make it more attractive to the European Union

    Just a few years ago, Europe headed Turkey’s agenda. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s newly-elected government had embarked on a series of ambitious reforms to meet the EU’s political criteria for joining the common area. At the end of 2004 the EU decided in return to initiate accession talks with Ankara.

    The ensuing pro-European euphoria was to be short lived, and for all practical purposes the accession negotiations have now reached deadlock. Turkey started EU membership talks at the same time as Croatia, but while Croatia is now in the final stages of the process, Turkey is struggling to proceed with the negotiations. These difficulties have had a detrimental impact on both Turkish politicians and on public opinion.

    Not surprisingly, the Turkish government has also lost its appetite for EU-related reforms. For more than two years now, the European Commission has been hard pressed to find anything positive to say in its annual progress reports on political reform developments. In short, Turkey’s European future is today as clouded as at any point in its contemporary history.Yet just as Europe is looking more distant, the Middle East is looming larger on Ankara’s radar screen. Turkey is shifting its attention from west to south, from Brussels to Beirut and beyond. The question is whether this turnround is a structural phenomenon – a sign of a fundamental shift in Turkey’s – or just a temporary and transitional phase.

    Turkey has traditionally remained a bystander in Middle Eastern politics. It was thought the country had little to contribute to or gain from getting involved in the problems that beset Middle Eastern countries. The Ottoman legacy was often used to justify this stance, with the argument being that as long as the legacy endures Turkey will be viewed by its Arab neighbours with suspicion. Developments in recent years have seriously challenged this perception, with Turkey becoming a much more active and visible player in the Middle East.

    Turkish diplomacy has scored a number of successes in the region. Ankara played an instrumental role in bringing about an end to the factional strife in Lebanon and its policy on Syria also produced tangible results. Turkish overtures to Syria, undertaken in spite of warnings from Washington, have paid off handsomely. Turkey was able not only to defuse the international tensions surrounding its Arab neighbour, but also to engineer the start of direct talks between Syria and Israel, a crucial contribution to the elusive Middle East peace process. Ankara obtained this result by investing in its relationship with Damascus and eventually gaining the trust of the Assad regime. Turkey’s strong relations with Israel then enabled Ankara to bring the two rivals to the table.

    On Iran, Turkish activism has been even more pronounced. In recent months, Turkey has multiplied its diplomatic efforts to help ease the nuclear stand-off between Iran and the west. Ankara went as far as hosting a visit from Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad in August of last year. Turkey does not want to see a nuclear Iran, but that’s chiefly because Turks are more afraid of the regional repercussions of such a development than of the threat it would pose to their own country.

    Turkey’s growing activism in the Middle East is now being underpinned by a confluence of regional factors and geopolitical shifts. Turkey has been able to make headway in the turbulent waters of the Middle East because of the growing lack of U.S. legitimacy and lack of EU influence. In other words, as a rising regional power, Turkey has benefited from the handicaps of the global powers.

    The U.S. lost its ability to play a more constructive role in the Middle East following its ill-fated intervention in Iraq. With anti-American sentiments reaching new heights, the ability of many Arab governments to collaborate with the U.S. has been severely impaired. The Bush Administration’s neo-conservative agenda of bringing democracy to the Arab world has also backfired. The U.S. first distanced itself from the more autocratic Arab leaders in a bid to support home-grown democratic alternatives, only to find that the only realistic political alternative to these regimes was to be found in the territory of political Islam. Given the lack of appetite in a U.S. administration conditioned by the “war on terror” for such an option, a return to the traditional policy of supporting the status quo was inevitable.

    The EU has faced a different dilemma. Unlike the U.S., the EU’s difficulty stems not from a perceived lack of legitimacy or crude attempts at promoting democracy, but a real lack of unity and, therefore, influence. The quest for a common denominator between the positions of different EU governments has hardly been conducive to the emergence of the sort of cogent and reliable diplomacy needed to address the deep problems of the Middle East. Individual EU countries continue to maintain high national profiles in the region than the sum of countries that the EU purports to be.

    In light of these serious deficiencies on the part of the main western powers, Turkey has been able to leverage both its regional ties and its standing in the transatlantic community to play a more instrumental role vis-à-vis its southern neighbours. And Turkey’s potential for influence has been further enhanced by opportune demand and supply conditions. On the demand side, the main structural barrier that traditionally prevented Turkish involvement in the Middle East has been eroding. Arab nationalists are fast becoming an endangered species, replaced by a rising political class more influenced by religion – a supranational ideology. As a result, the Ottoman legacy of a working state structure, tolerant of religion, was beginning to be viewed in a more favourable light. The Turkish model, whose particularity for many Middle Eastern observers was its ability to nurture a democracy-friendly political Islam, was suddenly in demand. And too is Turkey.

    On the supply side, Turkey has been more prepared than ever to take advantage of these fundamental shifts. The ruling AKP party traces its roots to political Islam, and many of its leaders have their social networks in Islamic countries – in stark contrast to the secular style of Turkey’s previous leaders, who had proudly displayed their western identity. The result is that formal and informal links between the new Turkish political élite and the Arab world have been considerably easier. Decades-old trust and confidence deficits between Turkey and Middle Eastern countries are thus gradually being overcome.

    The frustrations of dealing with an undecided Europe have led Turkish policy-makers to focus their efforts on an area where the expected return on their investment was more immediate and more concrete. Prime Minister Erdoğan has recently visited many countries in the Middle East – Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq – but has not been to Brussels since 2005.

    There can be no doubt that Ankara’s growing activism in its foreign policy, especially in relation to the Middle East, has begun to enhance the role and influence of Turkey in its own region. Turkey is now firmly set to become a regional power, with its recent election to the UN Security Council a further testimony to Ankara’s diplomatic prowess.

    The question is whether this shift of focus towards the south and towards Turkey’s status as a regional power comes at the expense of the country’s EU ambitions. With so much of the country’s diplomatic and political energy now focused on regional issues, that seems to leave little room for advancing its EU membership ambitions. It is no coincidence that Turkey’s failure to implement a long-term communications strategy with Brussels comes in the face of ever-falling public support in EU countries for enlargement of the common area to include Turkey.

    For optimists, Turkey’s growing regional influence is seen as a sure way of enhancing its asset value for the EU. The multi-faceted diplomacy of Ankara and the strengthening of Turkey’s status as a soft power in the region are not necessarily at odds with its EU membership objective. On the contrary, it should facilitate Turkey’s European bid.

    Yet this claim is predicated on the assumption that Europe has the capacity and the willingness to benefit from what Turkey has to offer. In other words, this strategy can only pay off if the EU is able to strengthen its own capacity for concerted action on foreign policy. So Turkish accession would not, as European federalists like to argue, lead to a weaker Europe. On the contrary, Turkey’s membership would make Europe a more influential and capable world power.

    Source:  www.euractiv.com

    Turkey’s route to the EU may be via the Middle East

    INTERNATIONAL
    par Sinan Ülgen

    With western influence in the Middle East faltering in the wake of America’s misadventure in Iraq and Europe’s general indecision, Sinan Ülgen argues that Turkish diplomatic successes in Syria and Iran and its growing stature throughout the Middle East have the potential to make it more attractive to the European Union

    RELATED ARTICLES:


    par Güven Sak
    par Cemal Karakas
    par Joachim Fritz-Vannahme
    par George Vassiliou
    par David Tonge

    Just a few years ago, Europe headed Turkey’s agenda. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s newly-elected government had embarked on a series of ambitious reforms to meet the EU’s political criteria for joining the common area. At the end of 2004 the EU decided in return to initiate accession talks with Ankara.

    The ensuing pro-European euphoria was to be short lived, and for all practical purposes the accession negotiations have now reached deadlock. Turkey started EU membership talks at the same time as Croatia, but while Croatia is now in the final stages of the process, Turkey is struggling to proceed with the negotiations. These difficulties have had a detrimental impact on both Turkish politicians and on public opinion.

    Euro-scepticism is now at an all-time high in Turkey, and continues to be fuelled by the rhetoric of some European political leaders who voice their opposition to Turkey’s accession. The EU’s own failure to dissipate doubts about the feasibility of Turkey’s eventual membership is leading ever-larger constituencies in Turkey to lose faith in Europe and in the likelihood of accession. Domestic support for EU membership had reached 70% at the start of the negotiations, but now that figure is closer to 40%.

    Not surprisingly, the Turkish government has also lost its appetite for EU-related reforms. For more than two years now, the European Commission has been hard pressed to find anything positive to say in its annual progress reports on political reform developments. In short, Turkey’s European future is today as clouded as at any point in its contemporary history.

    Yet just as Europe is looking more distant, the Middle East is looming larger on Ankara’s radar screen. Turkey is shifting its attention from west to south, from Brussels to Beirut and beyond. The question is whether this turnround is a structural phenomenon – a sign of a fundamental shift in Turkey’s – or just a temporary and transitional phase.

    Turkey has traditionally remained a bystander in Middle Eastern politics. It was thought the country had little to contribute to or gain from getting involved in the problems that beset Middle Eastern countries. The Ottoman legacy was often used to justify this stance, with the argument being that as long as the legacy endures Turkey will be viewed by its Arab neighbours with suspicion. Developments in recent years have seriously challenged this perception, with Turkey becoming a much more active and visible player in the Middle East.

    Turkish diplomacy has scored a number of successes in the region. Ankara played an instrumental role in bringing about an end to the factional strife in Lebanon and its policy on Syria also produced tangible results. Turkish overtures to Syria, undertaken in spite of warnings from Washington, have paid off handsomely. Turkey was able not only to defuse the international tensions surrounding its Arab neighbour, but also to engineer the start of direct talks between Syria and Israel, a crucial contribution to the elusive Middle East peace process. Ankara obtained this result by investing in its relationship with Damascus and eventually gaining the trust of the Assad regime. Turkey’s strong relations with Israel then enabled Ankara to bring the two rivals to the table.

    On Iran, Turkish activism has been even more pronounced. In recent months, Turkey has multiplied its diplomatic efforts to help ease the nuclear stand-off between Iran and the west. Ankara went as far as hosting a visit from Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad in August of last year. Turkey does not want to see a nuclear Iran, but that’s chiefly because Turks are more afraid of the regional repercussions of such a development than of the threat it would pose to their own country.

    Turkey’s growing activism in the Middle East is now being underpinned by a confluence of regional factors and geopolitical shifts. Turkey has been able to make headway in the turbulent waters of the Middle East because of the growing lack of U.S. legitimacy and lack of EU influence. In other words, as a rising regional power, Turkey has benefited from the handicaps of the global powers.

    The U.S. lost its ability to play a more constructive role in the Middle East following its ill-fated intervention in Iraq. With anti-American sentiments reaching new heights, the ability of many Arab governments to collaborate with the U.S. has been severely impaired. The Bush Administration’s neo-conservative agenda of bringing democracy to the Arab world has also backfired. The U.S. first distanced itself from the more autocratic Arab leaders in a bid to support home-grown democratic alternatives, only to find that the only realistic political alternative to these regimes was to be found in the territory of political Islam. Given the lack of appetite in a U.S. administration conditioned by the “war on terror” for such an option, a return to the traditional policy of supporting the status quo was inevitable.

    The EU has faced a different dilemma. Unlike the U.S., the EU’s difficulty stems not from a perceived lack of legitimacy or crude attempts at promoting democracy, but a real lack of unity and, therefore, influence. The quest for a common denominator between the positions of different EU governments has hardly been conducive to the emergence of the sort of cogent and reliable diplomacy needed to address the deep problems of the Middle East. Individual EU countries continue to maintain high national profiles in the region than the sum of countries that the EU purports to be.

    In light of these serious deficiencies on the part of the main western powers, Turkey has been able to leverage both its regional ties and its standing in the transatlantic community to play a more instrumental role vis-à-vis its southern neighbours. And Turkey’s potential for influence has been further enhanced by opportune demand and supply conditions. On the demand side, the main structural barrier that traditionally prevented Turkish involvement in the Middle East has been eroding. Arab nationalists are fast becoming an endangered species, replaced by a rising political class more influenced by religion – a supranational ideology. As a result, the Ottoman legacy of a working state structure, tolerant of religion, was beginning to be viewed in a more favourable light. The Turkish model, whose particularity for many Middle Eastern observers was its ability to nurture a democracy-friendly political Islam, was suddenly in demand. And too is Turkey.

    On the supply side, Turkey has been more prepared than ever to take advantage of these fundamental shifts. The ruling AKP party traces its roots to political Islam, and many of its leaders have their social networks in Islamic countries – in stark contrast to the secular style of Turkey’s previous leaders, who had proudly displayed their western identity. The result is that formal and informal links between the new Turkish political élite and the Arab world have been considerably easier. Decades-old trust and confidence deficits between Turkey and Middle Eastern countries are thus gradually being overcome.

    The frustrations of dealing with an undecided Europe have led Turkish policy-makers to focus their efforts on an area where the expected return on their investment was more immediate and more concrete. Prime Minister Erdoğan has recently visited many countries in the Middle East – Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq – but has not been to Brussels since 2005.

    There can be no doubt that Ankara’s growing activism in its foreign policy, especially in relation to the Middle East, has begun to enhance the role and influence of Turkey in its own region. Turkey is now firmly set to become a regional power, with its recent election to the UN Security Council a further testimony to Ankara’s diplomatic prowess.

    The question is whether this shift of focus towards the south and towards Turkey’s status as a regional power comes at the expense of the country’s EU ambitions. With so much of the country’s diplomatic and political energy now focused on regional issues, that seems to leave little room for advancing its EU membership ambitions. It is no coincidence that Turkey’s failure to implement a long-term communications strategy with Brussels comes in the face of ever-falling public support in EU countries for enlargement of the common area to include Turkey.

    For optimists, Turkey’s growing regional influence is seen as a sure way of enhancing its asset value for the EU. The multi-faceted diplomacy of Ankara and the strengthening of Turkey’s status as a soft power in the region are not necessarily at odds with its EU membership objective. On the contrary, it should facilitate Turkey’s European bid.

    Yet this claim is predicated on the assumption that Europe has the capacity and the willingness to benefit from what Turkey has to offer. In other words, this strategy can only pay off if the EU is able to strengthen its own capacity for concerted action on foreign policy. So Turkish accession would not, as European federalists like to argue, lead to a weaker Europe. On the contrary, Turkey’s membership would make Europe a more influential and capable world power.

    > Email à Sinan Ülgen
  • Turkey, Armenian allegations and the West

    Turkey, Armenian allegations and the West

    “soykırım” karaçalmasına karşı hazırladığım incelemenin  İngilizcesini
    sunuyorum.

    Saygıyla.    Prof.
    Dr. Özer Ozankaya


    Human angle


    by Prof. Dr. Özer OZANKAYA

    Over the past 40 years, many Western
    governments have held the Turkish nation and the Turkish
    Republic responsible for the bloody
    Armenian-Turkish conflicts which were incited, particularly by Russia, Britain,
    France and America, in the East and South Anatolian regions
    during the final years of the Ottoman
    State. Further, they have
    concurred in the presentation of these events as a “genocide carried out by the
    Turks against the Armenians”. Ignoring the requirements of objectivity and
    consistency, they have approved parliamentary resolutions to this effect, and
    even enacted laws punishing those who do not defend this position! Together
    with the Armenian government, these Western states close their ears to Turkey’s
    appeals for proposals to examine the issue in a scientific atmosphere according
    to objective criteria.

    Objectivity is the leading
    requirement of international peace and democracy. It is also one of the foundations
    of the Turkish Republic. As Atatürk warned, “Writing
    history is just as important as making history. If the writer is not loyal to
    the history-maker, then the unchangeable truth turns into something surprising
    for humanity.” With respect to the Armenian genocide allegations, a significant
    number of French scientists last month stressed that it was wrong for the
    French Parliament to convert its political views on historical issues into laws
    and resolutions, and argued that writing history should be left to researchers.
    This statement is pleasing. As a sociologist, I would like to add my own
    observations and remarks on the issue – not as rigid assertions, but as
    suggestions which are open to criticism.

    History written and rewritten

    The destruction of the Ottoman State was accompanied by much suffering
    on the part of Ottoman nationals as a result of conflicts of interest among the
    industrialised Western states in their search for natural resources and
    markets. The greatest anguish was experienced by the Turkish section of
    society, which had borne most of the burden of the Ottoman State,
    but been left out of all progress.

    As America’s
    Professor Justin McCarthy sets out in his research on migration in the region,
    Ottomans of Turkish origin were cast out of homes which they had occupied in
    Rumelia (Southeast Europe) for 500 years.
    Similarly, an attempt was made to form a region deprived of Turkish population
    in the East, in order artificially to create an Armenia. Armenian gangs, set up and
    armed with the support of the British, Russians and French, launched an
    initiative to massacre Turks, including women, the elderly and children, and to
    force them to flee the region. The majority of the Armenian population could
    not or did not rebel against these murders. However, although attacks on Turks
    were successful in the western provinces of the Ottoman State,
    they did not succeed in the East. The Ottoman
    State obliged the population of
    Armenian origin in this region – and this region only – to migrate southward, in
    order to protect the Turkish population and prevent them from being stabbed in
    the back while fighting against Russia.

    During the War of Independence,
    Armenians in French military uniform were used to attack Turks in Adana, Maraş and Gaziantep.
    This made it even more impossible for the Armenians who had been subject to
    deportation to return to their homelands upon the foundation of the Republic.
    In short, the Armenian people in Eastern Anatolia
    lost their opportunity to live in peace together with their Turkish neighbors
    because they could not or did not refuse to serve as a vehicle for the
    interests of the Western states. They had been present in the region for over a
    thousand years. They ended their existence in the region by their own hands.

    As of the 1990s, Armenian
    politicians backed by the political West began to turn the incidents upside
    down. Making no mention of the attacks on the Turks, they let it be known that
    the Ottoman State and Turkish nation had carried out
    a genocide against the Armenians, just as others had sought to annihilate the
    Jews. The Republic
    of Turkey had attached
    great importance to preventing the past from poisoning the present, and chosen
    not to put the responsibility of the political West for the painful incidents
    mentioned above onto the international agenda. But this noble policy was
    regarded as an indication of weakness and used against Turkey as a
    weapon.

    Points to consider

    Slandering a nation is itself a
    kind of genocide attempt. The inaccuracy of the propaganda has been proven many
    times. Some of the convincing arguments used to debunk the smear campaign are
    as follows:

    1. The Ottoman State drifted into
    World War I as a result of the efforts of Enver Pasha and similar state
    administrators under the control of Germany. The whole Ottoman Army was
    under the direct command of the German generals who constituted the “German
    Military Training Council”. Liman von Sanders and Falkenhein are the best-known
    examples. If the Ottoman
    State were to commit
    genocide against Armenian nationals, the German government would have ample
    opportunity to document it. But no such document has been found in the German
    archives.

    2. The Ottoman State, which signed the Mondros Ceasefire
    Agreement, surrendered the entire administration to the British, French and
    Italian occupiers. The war criminals were delivered to the courts and exiled to
    Malta.
    However, although the states which had won the war seized all the archives of
    the Ottoman state, they found no proof to indicate that genocide had been
    implemented against the Armenians, and they were able to make no such
    allegation. If any proof had been found in the British, French, Russian and
    Italian archives up until now, it would have been declared to the whole world
    many times over.

    3. During the period of the Ceasefire and the Turkish War
    of Independence, the American administration assigned General Mosley and
    General Harbord to research the Armenian allegations. They stated that there
    had been no genocide – only “mutual killings” – and noted that Turks had
    suffered the greater losses during the clashes. They did not pass judgement as
    to who started the killings: had it been the Turks, one doubts whether they
    would have remained silent.

    4. Prior to the 1877 Ottoman-Russian War, Britain, on account of its own colonialist
    interests, was opposed to any attack to be launched by Russia on the Ottoman State
    on the pretext of protecting the Armenians from oppression. Britain
    assigned a Royalty captain to observe the situation on the spot. According to
    Captain Peebody’s report, ‘Five Hundred Miles on Horseback in Asia
    Minor’, the Armenians were not subject to pressure. Indeed, he
    found them to be the most prosperous and richest section of society. However he
    noted that they might not be entirely loyal to the Ottoman State.

    5. We know that the Armenians
    attacked their Turkish neighbors in French uniforms in the Adana-Maraş region.
    Subsequently, French Prime Minister Clemenceau did not refrain from arguing
    that the Armenians had nobody to blame but themselves.

    6. The allegations of Armenian
    genocide were never voiced during the time of Atatürk. Turkey received a special invitation to join the
    League of Nations, and not a word was said
    about the allegations.

    7. Had the Armenians been
    subjected to genocide in Turkey, the hundreds of Jews who escaped from Nazi
    Germany, like the German scientists, artists and intellectuals who revolted
    against the regime, would not have wanted to live in Atatürk’s Turkey rather
    than the US, Switzerland or Canada. They would not have felt that they could
    live in a fully free atmosphere in Turkey.

    8. The Ottoman state had regarded
    the Armenians as its ‘Teb’a-i sadıka’ – or most loyal citizens. For many
    generations, the palace architects (such as the Balyan family) had been chosen
    from among the Armenians, and Armenians had been appointed to the highest
    official positions. The Armenians had become very close to the Turks in every
    aspect of culture. They printed books in Turkish using the Armenian alphabet
    and widely spoke Turkish even in their homes.

    9. Even today, Armenians living
    in many countries throughout the world frequently speak Turkish in their homes
    and among themselves. If they had been obliged to emigrate due to genocide in Anatolia, which was their homeland for thousands of
    years, they would scarcely want to continue speaking Turkish.

    Turkish “encouragement”?

    The best strategy which any
    nation can follow is to possess a contemporary culture. A democratic
    administration, freedom in philosophy, science and arts, an economy based on
    advanced industry and technology, and a developed written language provide a
    nation with the greatest possible security. However, following World War II,
    Turkish politicians failed to pursue the enlightening revolutions which Atatürk
    had begun. They sought easy ways of staying in power and served selfish
    interests, leaving the vast rural population largely uneducated, and weakening
    the Republic. In these circumstances, the political West, which has yet to
    condemn colonialism, renewed its attacks on the Turkish
    Republic and the Turkish nation, so as
    to prevent the Atatürk model from becoming an example for the Islamic world and
    the exploited nations, and to reduce Turkey to the level of a colony
    once again. This was done sometimes under the guide of assistance; sometimes
    with the aid of ignorant and/or self-seeking writers and academics, Turkish or
    foreign. The Armenian genocide allegations have to be seen in this context.

    In order to end the Armenian
    slanders and prevent their use as blackmail for the achievement of political
    and economic goals vis-a-vis Turkey, Turkish governments must express the
    above-mentioned facts with a loud voice, and make quite clear that the behaviour
    of governments which put this issue before their parliaments, raise it on
    international platforms or enact laws infringing the freedom of thought and
    forbidding any questioning of the genocide allegations will be regarded as
    hostile and will meet with an appropriate response.

    At the same time, it follows from
    the above observation that Turkey
    needs strong, democratic  governments conscious of their accountability to
    the nation. Officials outside and inside the country should be appointed not on
    partisan lines but among people who are capable of safeguarding the nation’s
    interests. And academics and intellectuals should lend their support within an
    understanding of democratic citizenship.

    (DIPLOMAT-  February 2006  –  Ankara)

    Prof. Dr. Özer Ozankaya Kimdir?

    1937 Kulp / Diyarbakır doğumlu olan Prof. Dr. Özer Ozankaya, 1959’da Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi’ni bitirerek aynı fakültede Sosyoloji Asistanı oldu. ABD’de Syracuse Üniversitesi’nde “Türk ve Japon Çağdaşlaşma Deneyimlerinin Karşılaştırması” teziyle Sosyoloji Master Derecesi alan Ozankaya, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi’nde sırasıyla 1966 yılında “Üniversite Öğrencilerinin Siyasal Yönelimleri” konulu teziyle doktor, 1970 yılında “Köyde Toplumsal Yapı ve Siyasal Kültür” konulu araştırmasıyla doçent ve 1978 yılında da “Türk Devrimi ve Yüksek Öğretim Gençliği” konulu araştırmasıyla profesör oldu.

    Çeşitli üniversitelerde ders veren Profesör Ozankaya, 1990 yılında kendi isteği ile kadrolu öğretim üyeliğinden ayrıldı. Şu anda Orta-Doğu Teknik ve Bilkent Üniversitelerinde öğretim çalışmalarını sürdürüyor.

    Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği’nin kurucu üyesi olan 4. Genel Başkanlığını ve Genel Yönetim Kurulu Üyeliğini yapmış olan, Cumhuriyetçi Demokrasi Partisi’nin kurucu üyesi ve Gen. Bşk. Yrd. olan Prof. Ozankaya’nın yukarda belirtilenler dışında yayınlanan bazı yapıtları şunlar:

    1) Toplumbilim, 10. Basım, CEM Yayınevi, 1999 (Türk Dil Kurumu 1976 Bilim Dili Ödülünü almıştır.)
    2) Türkiye’de Laiklik, 7. Basım, CEM Yayınevi, 2000.
    4) Cumhuriyet Çınarı
    5) Sosyalizmin Çöküşü kapitalizmin Zaferi Değildir
    6) Dünya Düşünürleri Gözüyle Atatürk ve Cumhuriyeti
    7) Atatürk’s Legacy – Views by World-Famous Intellectuals,
    8) NUTUK’tan Seçmeler, CEM Yayınevi, 2000.

    Prof. Ozankaya, İngilizce, Fransızca, Almanca ve Osmanlıca’dan birçok temel yapıtı da dilimize çevirerek yayınladı. Emile Durkheim‘in İntihar, (3. Bsm, CEM Yayınevi, 2002), Max Weber’in Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Örgütlenme Kuramı (İMGE Yayınevi, 1994), E. H. Carr‘in Tarih Yazımında Nesnellik ve Yanlılık (İMGE Yayınevi, 1992), George Sabine‘in Yakın Çağ Siyasal Düşünceler Tarihi (4. Bsm. CEM Yayınevi, 2001), Şemseddin Sami, Kadın (Basın-Yayın Yüksek Okulu Yıllığı, 1981), Celal Nuri, Kadınlarımız (Kültür Bakanlığı Yayını, 1993) ve Celal Nuri, Türk Devrimi (Kültür Bakanlığı Yayını, 2002) bunlar arasındadır.

    Prof. Ozankaya, Türk Sosyal Bilimler Derneği, Türk Sosyoloji Derneği, Mülkiyeliler Birliği, Türk Japon Kültürünü Araştırma ve Dayanışma Derneği gibi derneklerin de üyesidir.

  • Temper tantrums

    Temper tantrums

    Temper tantrums

    Feb 5th 2009 | ANKARA
    From The Economist print edition

    A dramatic Davos walkout raises new questions about Recep Tayyip Erdogan

    WAS it premeditated? Or did Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, lose control? Mr Erdogan’s walkout from a debate with Israel’s president, Shimon Peres, in Davos has made him the most talked about Turkish leader since Kemal Ataturk. His audience of financiers and policy wonks was stunned. But Muslims worldwide cheered as Mr Erdogan scolded Mr Peres over Israel’s war in Gaza. “When it comes to killing, you know very well how to kill. I know well how you hit and kill children on beaches,” thundered a crimson-faced Mr Erdogan.

    The incident has led to new debate over Turkey’s strategic alliance with Israel, whether an increasingly erratic Mr Erdogan is fit to lead Turkey at all and, if so, in what direction: east or west? There is no question of Turkey walking away from NATO or the European Union, or scrapping military ties with Israel and America. Mr Erdogan’s critics say his outburst was a ploy to please voters. If so, it worked: his approval ratings have shot up. Polls suggest that 80% of Turks support Mr Erdogan’s actions. His mildly Islamist Justice and Development party will reap dividends in municipal elections on March 29th.

    Mr Erdogan’s defiance has also helped to assuage his people’s long-running feelings of humiliation and inferiority, which date back as far as the Ottoman defeat in the first world war. Many insist that Mr Erdogan’s reaction was spontaneous and utterly sincere. Turkey has assumed “moral leadership” based on Western values, opined Cengiz Candar, a liberal commentator. Mindful of the public mood, Turkey’s secular opposition leader, Deniz Baykal, grudgingly declared that his rival had done the right thing.

    Not everybody agrees, however. Mr Erdogan’s behaviour makes it less likely that Turkey can successfully mediate between Israel and Syria. His call to Barack Obama to “redefine” what terrorist means has been seen as an appeal to remove the label from Hamas. Although European and American reaction has been muted, in private officials are unhappy. “What [the Davos spat] does leave in Europe is the feeling that Mr Erdogan is unpredictable,” says a European diplomat. Mr Obama is highly unlikely now to pay Turkey an early visit.

    Mr Erdogan’s temper tantrums are not new. But they used to be reserved for his critics at home. The Davos affair, says another foreign diplomat, is further evidence of “Mr Erdogan’s conviction that the West needs Turkey more than Turkey needs it.” It is of a piece with Mr Erdogan’s threat to back out of the much-touted Nabucco pipeline to carry gas from the Caspian Sea to Europe via Turkey. In Brussels recently Mr Erdogan said that, if there were no progress on the energy chapter of Turkey’s EU accession talks then “we would of course review our position”. Meanwhile, Turkey sided with Saudi Arabia and the Vatican in opposing a UN statement suggested by the EU to call for the global decriminalisation of homosexuality.

    Mr Erdogan’s supporters argue that EU foot-dragging on Turkey’s membership bid explains why Turkey is now seeking new friends in the Middle East and beyond. Its growing regional clout is another reason why the EU should embrace Turkey. But the reverse is also true. It is because it is the sole Muslim country that is at once secular, democratic and allied with the West that Turkey commands such respect in the rest of the world. Growing numbers of Arab investors have flocked to Turkey, “because we see it as part of Europe, not the Middle East,” says an Arab banker in Istanbul.

    To retain its allure, Turkey will need to swallow its pride and make further concessions on Cyprus. The EU may suspend membership talks altogether unless Turkey meets a December 2009 deadline to open its ports to Greek-Cypriots. The hope is that Egemen Bagis, who was chosen as Turkey’s official EU negotiator in January, will remind Mr Erdogan that, at least in these talks, it is Turkey that is the supplicant not the other way round.

    Source:  Economist, Feb 5th 2009

  • INTRODUCING THE AMBASSADOR James F. Jeffrey

    INTRODUCING THE AMBASSADOR James F. Jeffrey

    AMBASSADOR

    Ambassador James F. Jeffrey

    James F. Jeffrey
    American Ambassador to Turkey

    Ambassador James F. Jeffrey was nominated to be Ambassador to Turkey by President Bush in June 2008.  He was confirmed by the Senate in October.

    Ambassador Jeffrey, a career member of the Foreign Service, previously served on detail to the National Security Council as the Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor.  Prior to this, he served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the Department of State.  His responsibilities included leading the Iran Policy Team and coordinating public diplomacy.

    Ambassador Jeffrey served as Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State for Iraq from August 2005 to August 2006.  Previously, he served as U.S. Charge d’affairs to Iraq from March 2005 to June 2005 and as Deputy Chief of Mission in Baghdad from June 2004 through March 2005.

    Earlier in his career, Ambassador Jeffrey served as Ambassador to Albania from October 2002 to May 2004.  Other assignments have included three tours in Turkey, including Deputy Chief of Mission from 1999-2002, as well as Deputy Chief of Mission in Kuwait and Deputy Special Representative for Bosnian Implementation.

    Ambassador Jeffrey received his bachelor’s degree from Northeastern University and his master’s degree from Boston University. He served in the U.S. Army in Germany and Vietnam from 1969 to 1976.

    Ambassador Jeffrey is accompanied by his wife, Gudrun.  They have two grown children, Jahn and Julia.

    Ambassador’s Remarks and Public events

    U.S. Ambassador James Jeffrey’s Written Statement in the Book of Honor at Anıtkabir

    December 3, 2008

    Ataturk’s legacy remains undiminished.  As a soldier who confronted foreign armies, a diplomat who stood toe-to-toe with the Great Powers, and a statesman who molded a modern country, Ataturk is a heroic figure whose vision for Turkey was both sweeping and farsighted.   He remains an inspiration for those who cherish peace, freedom and democracy, and his ideals serve as a beacon for everyone who dreams of a brighter tomorrow.

    As the U.S. Ambassador, it is only fitting that I return to Anitkabir.   I too draw inspiration from these columns, and from the memory of this extraordinary leader.  As Turkey and the United States work together on the challenges that lie ahead, we can be guided by the principles which Ataturk so eloquently championed.

    In the words of the great Turkish hero and President:  “Peace at Home and Peace in the World.”

    James Jeffrey

    Ambassador Jeffrey’s Remarks at Esenboga Airport

    November 30, 2008
    Ankara, Turkey

    Hello, I would like to say a couple of things.  I’m very very happy to be back in Turkey.  Throughout my 31 year career, I have worked on a number of occasions in Turkey, or worked with Turkey.  First in Adana, then Ankara and the last time in Ankara was in 1999-2002 as Deputy Chief of Mission.

    Turkey and the United States of America have been friends since 1923 and they have also been allies in Korea and then in NATO for 58 years.  We have a special alliance which is important for Ankara and Washington. I am very very glad to be back in Ankara and Turkey.  Thank you.

    Barack Obama:  America’s 44th President *

    James F. Jeffrey
    U.S. Ambassador

    America will mark an historical transition on January 20 when Barack Obama places his hand on Abraham Lincoln’s bible and takes the oath of office as America’s 44th President. The significance of this transition was best described by Barack Obama himself on election night in Chicago:  “If there is anyone out there who still doubts that America is a place where all things are possible, who still wonders if the dream of our founders is alive in our time, who still questions the power of our democracy, tonight is your answer.”

    In that same speech Barack Obama drew attention to the challenges ahead, saying: “For even as we celebrate tonight, we know the challenges that tomorrow will bring are the greatest of our lifetime — two wars, a planet in peril, the worst financial crisis in a century.”  These challenges that we face are not America’s alone, and America cannot overcome them alone. Turkey and the United States are already working together to respond to the global economic crisis.  No one knows how long or severe this crisis will be, but our countries will confront it with a shared interest in maintaining the free flow of goods and credit.

    The Turkish economy has come a long way since I last served here in 2001.  Turkey is now on the path to EU accession and one of the 20 largest economies in the world.  It has successfully completed an IMF program, attracted billions in foreign investment, and undertaken extensive structural reforms, including a major banking reform that created one of the soundest banking sectors among emerging market countries.  This dynamism and commitment to reform has made Turkey immensely attractive to U.S. businesses and investors.

    U.S.-Turkish trade is still relatively modest at $16.2 billion in 2008, but growing.  My government encourages American companies to look at business opportunities in Turkey.  One sector where there are many such opportunities is energy.  Several U.S. companies have successful energy investments in Turkey and already are contributing to meeting Turkey’s growing energy needs.  In addition to electricity generation investments, U.S. companies are involved in exploration.  Toreador is conducting exploration activities in the Black Sea, and Exxon Mobil recently signed a deal with TPAO for exploration in the same area.

    We want to find ways to do more.  The U.S. is committed to helping Turkey strengthen its energy security and meet its needs by diversifying its energy mix with a particular focus on renewable energy sources.  We want to establish more efficient and productive financing mechanisms to support Turkish energy projects, especially in light of the global financial crisis.  The U.S. Export-Import Bank has financed $1.6 billion in projects in Turkey and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation has supported $500 million worth of projects here.

    American companies are bullish about doing business in Turkey.  76% of U.S. companies responding to an American Business Forum in Turkey (ABFT) survey said their company’s initial decision to invest in Turkey was a good one.  73% said they would recommend investing in Turkey to others.  67% said they plan to invest further in Turkey. Those numbers represent a very strong vote of confidence in Turkish workers and the Turkish economy.

    There are, however, areas of concern for U.S. companies and these are reflective, I believe, of the concerns of foreign investors in Turkey in general.  Among the problems most often cited are the level of taxation and the compliance burden, and the inefficiency and lack of predictability in the legal system, particularly with regard to intellectual property rights (IPR).  Turkey passed some significant tax and IPR reforms in 2008, but more remains to be done.

    Barack Obama made change the hallmark of his campaign, but he also reaffirmed America’s long-standing commitment to open markets, saying:  “… we must build on the wealth that open markets have created, and share its benefits more equitably. Trade has been a cornerstone of our growth and global development. But we will not be able to sustain this growth if it favors the few, and not the many.”  I am confident that America’s commitment to its long-standing economic partnership with Turkey will endure.

    *Published in Businessweek Turkey – January 18, 2009

  • A Firebell in the Night: The Prospect of Turkey’s Membership Sounds the Knell for the European Union

    A Firebell in the Night: The Prospect of Turkey’s Membership Sounds the Knell for the European Union

    This column first appeared at PoliGazette.

    A Firebell in the Night: The Prospect of Turkey’s Membership Sounds the Knell for the European Union
    By Robert Ellis

    Thomas Jefferson, in a memorable letter written in 1820, considered the issue of slavery “a firebell in the night” which would toll the knell of the Union. It is with the same sense of foreboding that some of us today consider the issue of Turkey’s membership of the European Union.

    In the winter issue of the Middle East Quarterly, which deals with Turkey’s Islamist danger, Bassam Tibi concludes: “Western politicians, scholars, and opinion makers barely understand what is going on inTurkey”. This view is borne out by, for example, Condoleeza Rice’s statement in May 2007 that the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government is “a government dedicated to pulling Turkey west towardEurope” and last March the Swedish foreign minister, Carl Bildt, declared: “The AKP government is made up of profound European reformers”.

    Turkey’s long road towards EU membership began with associate status in 1963 and it was not until the EU summit in Helsinki in 1999 that its candidacy was recognized. Beginning in 2001 under the premiership ofBülent Ecevit, Turkey embarked on a series of reforms to get the green light from the EU to start accession negotiations. These reforms included a revision of the civil and penal codes, a dilution of the role of the military and greater freedom to use Kurdish in the public sphere.

    Despite the fact that these reforms for the most part existed on paper, in October 2004 the EU Commission found that Turkey had “sufficiently” fulfilled the political crtiteria for membership and recommended that negotiations be opened. In October 2005 negotiations were formally opened, after a great deal of wrangling over the recognition of (Greek) Cyprus, which became a member together with nine other states in May 2004.

    However, in starting negotiations the EU left the back door open, concluding that “if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership, it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond.” Since then, the enthusiasm forTurkey’s membership has waned considerably on both sides.

    The UK, which played a major role in brokering the start of entry talks, has under US tutelage always been an active proponent of Turkish membership. So much so that when Turkey’s Constitutional Court last July decided not to ban the AKP, the British foreign secretary, David Miliband, declared it was “a cause for celebration”.

    It is the same Miliband, who in´a keynote speech in Bruges in November 2007 outlined his vision forEurope in 2030. He is clearly delusional when he speaks of a European Union that would ultimately include the countries of the Mahgreb, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. In his own words: “The goal must be a multi-lateral free-trade zone around our periphery …. not as an alternative to membership but potentially as as step toward it.”

    A community of values

    Quite apart from the formal criteria for EU membership, it has been repeatedly stressed that the Union is a community of values. After the start of entry talks the British foreign secretary, Jack Straw, rejoiced: “It means we have a Europe based on values, not history”, and earlier Olli Rehn, the EU’s enlargement commissioner, explained that Europe was defined by values, not borders. However, in the light of Turkey’s development since the AKP came to power in 2002, it can be argued Turkey is no longer eligible.

    A blueprint for dismantling the secular republic established by Mustafa Kemal in 1923 was put forward by Omer Dincer, Prime Minister Erdogan’s former undersecretary, at a symposium held in Sivas in 1995. Two years earlier 37 people, most of them participants in an Alevi cultural festival, were killed in a hotel fire, when the hotel was burned down by a raging mob of Islamic fundamentalists.

    At the symposium Omer stated: “I believe that the republican regime in Turkey should be replaced by a more participatory one, and the principle of secularism should be replaced with integration with Islam. Therefore I believe that it’s time, and absolutely necessary, to replace all the fundamental principles outlined at the start of the Turkish Republic, such as secularism, republicanism and nationalism, with a structure that is more participatory, more decentralized and more Muslim.”

    The same year Abdullah Gül, deputy leader of the Islamic Welfare Party (banned in 1998) and now Turkey’s president, was more succinct in an interview with The Guardian. “This is the end of the republican period,” he stated. “If 60 percent of Ankara’s´population is living in shacks, then the secular system has failed and we want to change it. “

    And this is precisely what these “reformed post-Islamists” (Olli Rehn’s term) have set out to do, despite the fact that the preamble to the Turkish constitution stipulates: “there shall be no interference whatsoever by sacred religious feelings in state affairs and politics”.

    Anti-secular activities

    Last July Turkey’s Constitutional Court found by 10 votes to one that the AKP was “a focal point of anti-secular activities” but instead of closing the party decided to halve its Treasury funding. In its indictment the Court paid close attention to controversial statements made by party members, but there is ample evidence of the reorientation of Turkish society in the last six years.

    Since coming to power, the AKP has made systematic and sustained efforts to replace the top echelons of the state administration, the education system and the judiciary with its own followers. Two years ago an attempt to appoint the general manager of  Albaraka Turk, an Islamic bank, as governor of the central bank, was vetoed by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a staunch secularist, as “inappropriate” but the AKP has otherwise placed its own candidates in key positions.

    The autonomy of independent administrative authorities such as the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK) and the Capital Markets Board (SPK) has also been eroded. For example, the EPDK awarded an oil refinery construction permit to the Calik Group, where Prime Minister Erdogan’s son-in-law is the general manager, and not a prior applicant, Petrol Ofisi. Petrol Ofisi is owned by Aydin Dogan, who is also the owner of the Dogan Media Group, the Prime Minister’s outspoken opponent.

    The sale of the Sabah-ATV media group, Turkey’s second largest, also to the Calik Group, was facilitated by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), which is staffed by AKP appointees, and was for the most part financed by a loan from two state banks, also managed by AKP appointees.

    The new head of the Higher Education Board (YÖK), Yusuf Ziya Özcan, was handpicked, which together with a pliable president makes it possible to overrule the universities’ own choice of candidate as rector.

    Furthermore, the president of the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTÜK), Zahid Akman, is embroiled in a scandal which could overwhelm the government. In September the three Turkish directors of a charitable foundation in Germany, Deniz Feneri (Lighthouse), were found guilty of siphoning off €14.5 million ($20.6 million) and transferring the funds to business associates in Turkey, including Kanal 7, the Islamist tv channel.

    The operation is believed to have been directed from Turkey and Zahid Akman was named as a courier. However, although four months have elapsed, no steps have been taken to require the documents fromGermany and to launch an investigation in Turkey. In addition, a recent law requires the prime minister’s consent into any investigation into an RTÜK president.

    The general elections of 2002 and 2007 provided for the establishment of the AKP’s political power but it was the Public Procurement Laws of 2003 and 2008 which have made possible a transfer of resources to the new elite. According to the first amendment energy, water, transportation and telecommunications contracts are exempt from the law and new amendments have made the awarding of public contracts even less opaque.

    There have been a number of land and tender scandals involving members of the AKP, but as acerbic columnist Burak Bekdil has pointed out: “Corruption is an ideology-free disease.” For example, almost 100 municipal employees, including two district mayors from the CHP, the opposition party, were recently detained in a corruption and bribery operation in Izmir province.

    Neighbourhood pressure

    Two years ago Professor Serif Mardin, the eminent Turkish sociologist, coined the phrase “neighbourhood pressure” to explain the social pressure to conform to conservative religious norms. Last month a controversial study, “Being different in Turkey”, published by the Open Society Institute and BosphorusUniversity, in fact confirms that the non-devout and secularists in Turkey feel under pressure to confirm to the social norms and standards promoted by the AKP.

    Among the examples given are pressure to attend Friday prayers and fast during Ramadan and to have their wives wear a headscarf in order to protect their businesses and their jobs. When Tayyip Erdogan was mayor of Istanbul 15 years ago alcohol was banned at municipal facilities but now in 56 of Turkey’s 81 provinces alcohol is not served in municipal or private restaurants or clubs. During Ramadan last September anAnkara shop owner was beaten by municipal police for selling alcohol.

    In November 2005 the European Court of Human Rights upheld the ban on the wearing of the Islamic headscarf at Turkish universities and underlined: “Pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are hallmarks of a democratic society.” Prime Minister Erdogan contested this view and stated that it was only Islamic scholars (‘ulema’) who had the right to speak on this issue.

    Egemen Bagis, AKP deputy for Istanbul and close associate of Tayyip Erdogan, has just been appointed chief EU negotiator in an attempt to revive Turkey’s flagging hopes of membership. It was this gentleman who in an op-ed piece in the LA Times, “My party is good for Turkey”, last March claimed: “We are only upgrading the country’s democratic standards.”

    Unfortunately there are a number of European and American politicians and opinion makers who are prepared to indulge this Alice in Wonderland fantasy. Therefore it would be prudent to heed Bassam Tibi’s warning: “Through its support for institutional Islamism in Turkey, the West loses its true friends: liberal Muslims.”

    Robert Ellis is a regular commentator on Turkish affairs in the Danish press and was also a frequent contributor to the Turkish Daily News.

  • Fethullah Gülen’s Grand Ambition –  Turkey’s Islamist Danger

    Fethullah Gülen’s Grand Ambition – Turkey’s Islamist Danger

    Middle East Forum
    January 12, 2009

    MEF Home |    Research & Writings |   Middle East Quarterly

    Related Articles

    • Will Turkey Have an Islamist President?
    • Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face
    • Turkey’s Leaders – Erbakan’s Goals

    Fethullah Gülen’s Grand Ambition
    Turkey’s Islamist Danger

    by Rachel Sharon-Krespin
    Middle East Quarterly
    Winter 2009, pp. 55-66

    https://www.meforum.org/2045/fethullah-gulens-grand-ambition

    TURKCESI      ….   https://www.turkishnews.com/tr/content/2009/04/06/fethullah-gulenin-buyuk-ihtirasi-turkiyedeki-islamcilik-tehlikesi/

    As Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) begins its seventh year in leadership, Turkey is no longer the secular and democratic country that it was when the party took over. The AKP has conquered the bureaucracy and changed Turkey’s fundamental identity. Prior to the AKP’s rise, Ankara oriented itself toward the United States and Europe. Today, despite the rhetoric of European Union accession, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has turned Turkey away from Europe and toward Russia and Iran and reoriented Turkish policy in the Middle East away from sympathy toward Israel and much more toward friendship with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria. Anti-American, anti-Christian, and anti-Semitic sentiments have increased. Behind Turkey’s transformation has been not only the impressive AKP political machine but also a shadowy Islamist sect led by the mysterious hocaefendi (master lord) Fethullah Gülen; the sect often bills itself as a proponent of tolerance and dialogue but works toward purposes quite the opposite. Today, Gülen and his backers (Fethullahcılar, Fethullahists) not only seek to influence government but also to become the government.

    In 1998, Fethullah Gülen left Turkey for the United States, reportedly to receive medical treatment for diabetes. Since his voluntary exile, Gülen has resided on a large, rural estate in eastern Pennsylvania, together with about 100 followers, who guard him and tend to his needs. It is from his U.S. base that Gülen has built his fame and his transnational empire.

    Today, Turkey has over 85,000 active mosques, one for every 350 citizens—compared to one hospital for every 60,000 citizens—the highest number per capita in the world and, with 90,000 imams, more imams than doctors or teachers. It has thousands of madrasa-like Imam-Hatip schools and about four thousand more official state-run Qur’an courses, not counting the unofficial Qur’an schools, which may expand the total number tenfold. Spending by the governmental Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Işleri Başkanlığı) has grown five fold, from 553 trillion Turkish lira in 2002 (approximately US$325 million) to 2.7 quadrillion lira during the first four-and-a-half years of the AKP government; it has a larger budget than eight other ministries combined.[1] The Friday prayer attendance rate in Turkey’s mosques exceeds that of Iran’s, and religion classes teaching Sunni Islam are compulsory in public schools despite rulings against the practice by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Turkish high court (Danıştay).[2] Both Prime Minister Erdoğan and the Diyanet head Ali Bardakoğlu criticized the rulings for failing to consult Islamic scholars.

    Gülen now helps set the political agenda in Turkey using his followers in the AKP as well as the movement’s vast media empire, financial institutions and banks, business organizations, an international network of thousands of schools, universities, student residences (ışıkevis), and many associations and foundations. He is a financial heavyweight, controlling an unregulated and opaque budget estimated at $25 billion.[3] It is not clear whether the Fethullahist cemaat(community) supports the AKP or is the ruling force behind AKP. Either way, however, the effect is the same.

    Gülen’s Background

    Born in Erzurum, Turkey, in 1942, Fethullah Gülen is an imam who considers himself a prophet.[4] An enigmatic figure, many in the West applaud him as a reformist and advocate for tolerance,[5] a catalyst of “moderate Islam” for Turkey and beyond. He is praised in the West, especially in the United States, as an intellectual, scholar, and educator[6] even though his formal education is limited to five years of elementary school. After receiving an imam-preacher certificate, he served as an imam, first in Erdirne and later in Izmir. In 1971, the Turkish security service arrested him for clandestine religious activities, such as running illegal summer camps to indoctrinate youths, and was, from that time on, occasionally harassed by the staunchly secular military.[7] In 1981, he formally retired from his post as a local preacher.

    To build an image as a proponent of interfaith dialogue, Gülen met Pope John Paul II, other Christian clergy, and Jewish rabbis[8] and emphasizes the commonalities unifying Abrahamic religions. He presents himself and his movement as the modern-day version of tolerant, liberal Anatolian Sufism and has used the literature of great Sufi thinkers such as Jalal ad-Din Rumi and Yunus Emre, pretending to share their moderate teachings.[9]Quotes from their teachings adorn Fethullah’s Gülen’s propaganda material. The movement, its proxy organizations, and universities—including Georgetown, to which it donates money—hold conferences in the United States and Europe to discuss Gülen. In October 2007, the British House of Lords feted Gülen with a conference in his honor.

    Gülen was a student and follower of Sheikh Sa’id-i Kurdi (1878-1960), also known as Sa’id-i Nursi, the founder of the Islamist Nur (light) movement.[10] After Turkey’s war of independence, Kurdi demanded, in an address to the new parliament, that the new republic be based on Islamic principles. He turned against Atatürk and his reforms and against the new modern, secular, Western republic.

    In 1998, Gülen departed for the United States, reportedly to receive medical treatment for diabetes. However, his absence also enabled Gülen to escape questioning on his indictment in 2000 for allegedly promoting insurrection in Turkey in a series of secretly-recorded sermons. Since his voluntary exile, Gülen has resided on a large, rural estate in eastern Pennsylvania, together with about 100 followers, who guard him and tend to his needs. These servants are educated men who wear suits and ties and do not look like traditional Islamists in cloaks and turbans. They follow their hocaefendi‘s orders and even refrain from marrying until age fifty per his instructions. When they do marry, their spouses are expected to dress in the Islamic manner, as dictated by Gülen himself.[11] It is from his U.S. base that Gülen has built his fame and his transnational empire.

    Gülen’s Education Network

    The core of Gülen’s network is his educational institutions. His school network is impressive. Nurettin Veren, Gülen’s right-hand man for thirty-five years, estimated that some 75 percent of Turkey’s two million preparatory school students are enrolled in Gülen institutions.[12] He controls thousands of top-tier secondary schools, colleges, and student dormitories throughout Turkey, as well as private universities, the largest being Fatih University in Istanbul. Outside Turkey, his movement runs hundreds of secondary schools and dozens of universities in 110 countries worldwide. Gülen’s aim is not altruistic: His followers target youth in the eighth through twelfth grades, mentor and indoctrinate them in the ışıkevi, educate them in the Fethullah schools, and prepare them for future careers in legal, political, and educational professions in order to create the ruling classes of the future Islamist, Turkish state. Taking their orders from Fethullah Gülen, wealthy followers continue to open schools and ışıkevi in what Sabah columnist Emre Aköz called “the education jihad.”[13]

    The overt network of schools is only one part of a larger strategy. In a 2006 interview, Veren said, “These schools are like shop windows. Recruitment and Islamization activities are carried out through night classes … Children whom we educated in Turkey are now in the highest positions. There are governors, judges, military officers. There are ministers in the government. They consult Gülen before doing anything.”[14]

    The AKP’s controversial education policies, coupled with the Islamist indoctrination in Fethullahist schools, have accelerated the Islamization of Turkish society. During AKP’s first term in government, the Erdoğan government has changed textbooks, emphasized religion courses, and transferred thousands of certified imams from their positions in the Directorate of Religious Affairs to positions as teachers and administrators in Turkey’s public schools.[15] Abdullah Gül, Turkey’s first Islamist president and a Gülen sympathizer, appointed a Gülen-affiliated professor, Yusuf Ziya Özcan, to head Turkey’s Council of Higher Education (Yükseköğretim Kurulu, YÖK). He has also used his presidential prerogative to appoint Gülen sympathizers to university presidencies.

    Beyond Turkey, the Fethullahist schools also serve as fertile recruiting grounds. In his Institut d’Etudes Politiques doctoral thesis on Gülen schools in Central Asia, Bayram Balcı, a French scholar of Turkish origin, wrote, “Fethullah’s aim is the Islamization of Turkish nationality and the Turcification of Islam in foreign countries. Dozens of Fethullah’s ‘Turkish schools’ abroad—most of which are for boys—are used to covertly ‘convert,’ not so much ‘in school,’ but through direct proselytism ‘outside school.’” Balcı explained, “He wants to revive the link between state, religion, and society.”[16] The schools of Gülen’s Nur movement in Central Asia have worked to reestablish Islam in a region largely secularized by decades of Soviet control. Balcı explained, “The aim of thecemaat is to educate and influence future national elites, who will speak English and Turkish and who will one day prove their good intentions towards Fethullahists and towards Turkey.” Several countries in the region have taken steps against Gülen’s educational institutions because of such suspicions. Uzbekistan has banned the schools for encouraging Islamic law,[17] and the Russian government, weary of the movement’s activities in majority Muslim regions of the federation, has banned not only the Gülen schools but all activities of the entire Nur sect in the country.[18]

    Neither Uzbekistan nor Russia are known for their pluralism, but suspicion about Gülen indoctrination has spread even to more permissive societies such as that of the Netherlands. In 2008, members of the Netherland’s Christian Democrat, Labor, and Conservative parties agreed to cut several million euros in government funding for organizations affiliated with “the Turkish imam Fethullah Gülen” and to thoroughly investigate the activities of the Gülen group after Erik Jan Zürcher, director of the Amsterdam-based International Institute for Social History, and five former Gülen followers who had worked in Gülen’s ışıkevi told Dutch television that the Gülen community was moving step-by-step to topple the secular order.[19] While the organizations in question denied any ties to the Gülen movement, Zürcher said that taqiya, religiously-sanctioned dissimulation, was typical in the movement’s interactions with the West. An unnamed former Gülen follower who also once worked in Gülen schools and ışıkevi reported that Fethullahists called the Dutch “filthy, blasphemous infidels” and that they said “the best Dutchman is one who has converted to Islam. All the Dutch must be made Muslims.”[20] Indeed, of the thousands of Fethullahist schools in more than one hundred countries that allegedly teach moderation, none are located in countries such as Saudi Arabia or Iran that exist under domineering strains of official Islam, and most appear instead geared to radicalize students in secular Muslim and non-Muslim societies.

    Eviscerating Checks and Balances

    Fethullahists have also made inroads into Turkey’s 200,000-strong police force. Their infiltration has had a compounding effect, as Fethullahist officials have purged officials more loyal to the republic than the hocaefendi. According to Veren, “There are imam security directors; imams wearing police uniforms. Many police commissioners get their orders from imams.”[21] Adil Serdar Saçan, former director of the organized crimes unit within the Istanbul Directorate of Security, confirmed these statements in reports he prepared on the Fethullahist organization within the security apparatus. In a 2006 interview, he said,

    Fethullahists began organizing inside the security apparatus in the 1970s. In police academies, students were being taken to ışıkevi by class commissioners. One of those commissioners is now the director of intelligence at the Turkish Directorate of Security. During my time at the [police] academy, those in the directorate who did not have ties to the [Gülen] organization were all pensioned off or fired in 2002 when the AKP came to power. … I was at the top of my class when I graduated from the police academy, and throughout the twenty-four years of my career, I maintained and was honored for my stellar record. After 2002, the AKP blocked my promotions. They promoted only those officers whose files were tainted with allegations that they were engaged in reactionary Islamist activities. … Belonging to a certain cemaat has become a prerequisite for advancement in the force. At present, over 80 percent of the officers at supervisory level in the general security organization are members of the [Gülen] cemaat.[22]

    Such statements, however, may have consequences.[23] In October 2008, Turkish police arrested Saçan on suspicion of involvement in the so-called Ergenekon plot to overthrow the Turkish state.[24] Most Turkish analysts believe that the Ergenekon conspiracy, short of any evidence of unconstitutional activities, is more a mechanism by which the Turkish government can harass critics.[25]

    Writer and journalist Merdan Yanardağ provided statistics to illuminate the Islamist penetration of the Ankara Directorate of Security. He explained,

    Prior to Ramadan, personnel at the Directorate of Security in Ankara were asked whether they would be fasting during Ramadan, in order to establish the number of meals that would be needed during that period. Of the 4,200 employees, only seventeen indicated that they would not be fasting. Considering that some of the seventeen might have been sick or taking medications, the numbers speak for themselves. [26]

    Wiretapping scandals in spring 2008 also highlighted Gülenist penetration of the security service’s most important units. After the Turkish Security Directorate obtained a blanket court permit in April 2007 to monitor and record all the communications in Turkey including mobile and land-line telephones, SMS text messaging, e-mail, fax, and Internet communications,[27] Turks have grown uneasy about having telephone conversations fearing intrusion into their privacy. Recent leaks to pro-AKP media of recordings of military personnel meetings, lectures, top secret military documents, strategic antiterrorism plans, private medical files of commanders, and contents of personal conversations between state prosecutors have shocked the nation as has the appearance on the Internet video site YouTube of some of those recordings.

    The alleged network of Fethullah followers in the security system has an impact on domestic affairs as they use restricted technology or privileged information to further their political agenda. In February 2008, for example, several websites posted the voice recording of a secret speech delivered by Brig. Gen. Münir Erten announcing the timing of an upcoming Turkish military operation into Iraqi Kurdistan, details of a private discussion with the chief of the General Staff, and private information concerning Gen. Ergin Saygun’s health.[28] The following month, several websites including YouTube posted a secretly recorded conversation between prosecutor Salim Demirci and a colleague regarding Erdoğan and Efkan Ala, then governor of Diyarbakir and subsequently a counselor of Erdoğan’s office. Erdoğan responded by ordering a criminal investigation against Demirci.[29] In June 2008, the Islamist Vakit published Saygun’s entire medical file, disclosing information about his diabetes as well as the treatments and medications he had received in the Gülhane military hospital.[30] Others whose tapped conversations appeared on Islamist websites and in Gülen’s newspaper network included Erdoğan Teziç, the former head of Turkey’s Higher Education Council, and prominent members of the center-left opposition Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP). Many Turkish journalists believe that Fethullahist-dominated police tap their communications, and according to reports, the head of the wiretapping unit, who was appointed by Erdoğan in August 2005, is a Fethullah follower.[31] Islamist newspapers including Vakit, Yeni Şafak, Zaman, and the pro-AKP Taraf published leaks from private conversations held inside government offices and military headquarters. The Islamist, pro-AKP media has reported alleged confidential evidence relating to the police investigation of the so-called Ergenekon plot that posits a secularist cabal of military officers, journalists, and professors sought to overthrow the AKP government.[32] The net effect of such leaks is to tar the reputations of or intimidate AKP’s political opponents and the Turkish military.

    Islamization within police ranks also contributes to police brutality against anti-AKP demonstrators. On May 1, 2008, the police used gas bombs, pepper gas, water cannons, and clubs against workers who wanted to celebrate May Day peacefully in Istanbul’s Taksim Square, the traditional site of demonstrations in Turkey’s largest city; scores were injured.[33] Labor unions and opposition parties condemned the police brutality and accused Erdoğan of using police to silence opposition voices.[34] Police also suppressed labor protests in Tuzla (Istanbul) shipyards.[35] Similarly, police have harassed individual citizens after they criticized Erdoğan’s policies. Erdoğan’s own security guards abducted a 46-year-old man from Antalya for speaking out in public against his social security policies, taking the man to a deserted location where the guards beat and threatened him. The victim alleged that his attackers said they could easily plant guns or drugs on him and kill him.[36]

    While Turkey’s military is guarantor of the constitution, Veren alleged that Fethullahists had also entrenched themselves within the military, police, and other professions:

    The Fethullahist military officers were once our students, who we financially supported, educated, and assisted. When these grateful children graduated and reached influential positions, they put themselves and their positions at the service of Fethullah Gülen … [Gülen] directs and instructs, and, through them, maintains power within the state … When Gülen’s students graduate from the police or military academies—as do the new doctors and lawyers—they present their first salaries to Fethullah Gülen as a gesture of their gratitude. Newly graduated officers even bring him the swords that they receive during the graduation ceremony.[37]

    According to Veren, Gülen has argued that the military expels no more than one in forty Islamist officers; the rest remain in undercover cells. While such allegations may seem the stuff of conspiracy theory, recent leaks to pro-AKP media suggest a number of Islamist sources within the military ranks, creating speculation that followers of Gülen now populate the senior infrastructure of the Turkish General Staff. Such speculation gained additional credence after the August 2008 Supreme Military Council (Yüksek Askeri Şura, YAŞ), which, for the first time, declined to expel suspected Islamists from military ranks.

    The AKP government has also aided the Gülen movement with its reorientation of the judiciary. Over the first five years of his rule, Erdoğan replaced thousands of judges and prosecutors with AKP appointees. Now that the president is Islamist, it is unlikely that he would veto the appointment of Islamists to the bench, as did his predecessor Ahmet Necdet Sezer. Indeed, it now appears that the government intends to appoint thousands more to judicial positions.[38] The AKP has also enacted a law that would require applicants for judgeships to first interview with AKP bureaucrats in order better to gauge and adjudicate applicants’ adherence to Islam. The results of the AKP’s targeting of the judicial system are already apparent as anti-secular, pro-AKP officials have been at the forefront of some controversial trials, such as the case against Van University president Yücel Aşkın,[39] the Şemdinli investigation in which the prosecutor tried to implicate Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt before he became chief of the General Staff, and, most recently, the Ergenekon probe.

    Indeed, it is such overtly political and vindictive prosecutions that have led some former Gülen sympathizers, such as University of Utah political scientist Hakan Yavuz, to a change of heart. In one interview, Yavuz toldodatv.com that four important legal cases had changed his thinking: the case against Aşkın; the Semdinli case; the Atabeyler operation, uncovered in 2005, involving an organized crime group with alleged plans to assassinate Prime Minister Erdoğan;[40] and the Ergenekon probe. Yavuz explained, “The cemaat has attempted to steer all four cases. Look at the slanderous reports in archives of the cemaat‘s newspapers, how they defamed Yucel Aşkın. And now it’s Ergenekon. Keeping [prominent] personalities in jail for over a year without indictment is inexplicable.” Yavuz also suggested Gülen’s cemaat spoke differently to its members than to outsiders and that it was pursuing a political agenda that conflicted with the founding philosophy of the modern Turkish republic. He accused Fethullahists of “co-optation” and said that they were recruiting people and paying them money—without any formal receipts or records—to write and speak favorably about the movement while criticizing the secular Turkish state.[41]

    The Fifth Estate

    If the police, military, and courts might normally protect rule-of-law from within official Turkish government structures, there might still be an external check to abuse of power in the Turkish media. The Turkish media has traditionally been relentless in its reporting of abuses of power and corruption. Soon after assuming office, however, Erdoğan proved intolerant of the concept of a free press. The AKP government has systematically sought to create a media monopoly to speak with one voice and on behalf of the government. Erdoğan lashes out at media organs that he does not control. In his first term, Erdoğan brought more than a hundred lawsuits against sixty-three journalists in sixteen publications, against many writers, as well as the leaders and members of parliament of all opposition parties. The number of lawsuits may be far greater. In 2008, Erdoğan declined to answer a parliamentary inquiry by a Democratic Left Party deputy demanding information on how many lawsuits Erdoğan had initiated against journalists—claiming that such information was in the realm of his private life.”[42]Most of Erdoğan’s lawsuits against journalists involve criticism that any other democracy would consider legitimate. In 2005, for example, he sued Cumhuriyet cartoonist Musa Kart for depicting him as a cat entangled in a ball of string. Last year, he sued the LeMan weekly humor magazine for ridiculing him in its January 30, 2008 cover.[43]

    Erdoğan lost some of his lawsuits, and courts threw out others, but the effect has nonetheless been chilling. Journalists know that not only does the prime minister seek to make them financially liable for any criticism, but that the AKP might even seek to assume control of their publications. During AKP’s 6-year rule, the government has seized control of several media outlets and subsequently sold them to pro-AKP holdings affiliated with the Gülen community. In April 2007, for example, the governmental Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu, TMSF) seized Sabah-ATV, Turkey’s second largest media group in a predawn raid. The TMSF, staffed by Erdoğan appointees, then sold the group to Çalık Holding, the CEO of which is Erdoğan’s son-in-law. Çalık financed the purchase with public funds taken as loans from two state-owned banks and by partnering with a newly-founded, Qatar-based media company that bought 25 percent of Sabah shares. It was Abdullah Gül who introduced Ahmet Çalık to Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa during his January 2008 visit in Syria; Çalık also accompanied Gül in February and Erdoğan in April when they visited Qatar. Media reports indicated that other consortiums that had initially shown interest in purchasing Sabah-ATV with their own money pulled out of the tender shortly before the bid after Erdoğan contacted them, leaving Çalik the sole bidder.[44] Sabah has since become a strong advocate of the AKP government. In September 2008, Erdoğan demanded all party members and aides boycott newspapers owned by the Doğan Media Group after it reported on laundering of money to Islamist charities.[45]

    Excluding the Islamist television and radio stations, newspapers such as Zaman, Sabah, Yeni Şafak, Türkiye,Star, Bugün, Vakit, and Taraf all have AKP and/or Gülen-affiliated ownership. By circulation, such papers represent at least 40 percent of all newspaper sales in Turkey.[46]

    What Are Gülen’s Intentions?

    Conglomerates have long had a dominant position in Turkish society. Secular businessmen such as Aydın Doğan and Mehmet Emin Karamehmet have interests not only in industry but also in media, the banking sector, and even education. Never before, though, has a single individual started a movement that seeks to transform Turkish society so fundamentally. Gülen now wields a vocal partisan media; a vast network of loyal bureaucrats; partisan universities and academia; partisan prosecutors and judges; partisan security and intelligence agencies; partisan capitalists, business associations, NGOs, and labor unions; and partisan teachers, doctors, and hospitals. What makes Gülen so dangerous? Gülen’s own teaching and sermons provide the best answers.

    In 1999, Turkish television aired footage of Gülen delivering sermons to a crowd of followers in which he revealed his aspirations for an Islamist Turkey ruled by Shari’a (Islamic law) as well as the methods that should be used to attain that goal. In the sermons, he said:

    You must move in the arteries of the system without anyone noticing your existence until you reach all the power centers … until the conditions are ripe, they [the followers] must continue like this. If they do something prematurely, the world will crush our heads, and Muslims will suffer everywhere, like in the tragedies in Algeria, like in 1982 [in] Syria … like in the yearly disasters and tragedies in Egypt. The time is not yet right. You must wait for the time when you are complete and conditions are ripe, until we can shoulder the entire world and carry it … You must wait until such time as you have gotten all the state power, until you have brought to your side all the power of the constitutional institutions in Turkey … Until that time, any step taken would be too early—like breaking an egg without waiting the full forty days for it to hatch. It would be like killing the chick inside. The work to be done is [in] confronting the world. Now, I have expressed my feelings and thoughts to you all—in confidence … trusting your loyalty and secrecy. I know that when you leave here—[just] as you discard your empty juice boxes, you must discard the thoughts and the feelings that I expressed here.

    He continued,

    When everything was closed and all doors were locked, our houses of isik [light] assumed a mission greater than that of older times. In the past, some of the duties of these houses were carried out by madrasas [Islamic schools], some by schools, some by tekkes [Islamist lodges] … These isik homes had to be the schools, had to be madrasas, [had to be] tekkes all at the same time. The permission did not come from the state, or the state’s laws, or the people who govern us. The permission was given by God … who wanted His name learned and talked about, studied, and discussed in those houses, as it used to be in the mosques.[47]

    In another sermon, Gülen said,

    Now it is a painful spring that we live in. A nation is being born again. A nation of millions [is] being born—one that will live for long centuries, God willing … It is being born with its own culture, its own civilization. If giving birth to one person is so painful, the birth of millions cannot be pain-free. Naturally we will suffer pain. It won’t be easy for a nation that has accepted atheism, has accepted materialism, a nation accustomed to running away from itself, to come back riding on its horse. It will not be easy, but it is worth all our suffering and the sacrifices.[48]

    And, in yet another sermon, he declared,

    The philosophy of our service is that we open a house somewhere and, with the patience of a spider, we lay our web to wait for people to get caught in the web; and we teach those who do. We don’t lay the web to eat or consume them but to show them the way to their resurrection, to blow life into their dead bodies and souls, to give them a life.[49]

    Many Gülen supporters and members of the Islamist media affiliated with the cemaat suggested the sermons were somehow forged[50] but the denials are unconvincing given the video footage and reports by Gülen movement defectors.

    U.S. Government Support for Gülen?

    Many Turkish analysts believe that, prior to Erdoğan’s election, Gülen and his supporters in the U.S. government helped obtain an invitation to the White House for him at a time when Erdoğan was banned from politics in Turkey due to his Islamist activities—an event viewed as a U.S. endorsement ahead of the 2002 Turkish elections. That the U.S. government and, specifically, the Central Intelligence Agency support the Gülen movement is conventional wisdom among Turkey’s secular elite even though no hard evidence exists to support such allegations.

    When Turkish secularists are asked to defend the view that Gülen enjoys U.S. support, they often point to his almost 20-year residence in eastern Pennsylvania. After the Supreme Court of Appeals in Turkey (Yargıtay) confirmed on June 24, 2008, a lower court’s ruling to acquit Gülen on charges that he organized an illegal terrorist organization to overthrow the secular government in Turkey, Gülen won another legal battle, this time in the United States. A federal court reversed U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service decisions that would have denied Gülen’s application for permanent residency in the United States on the basis that Gülen did not fit the criteria as someone with “extraordinary ability in the field of education.” The Department of Homeland Security characterized Gülen as neither an expert in the field of education nor an educator but rather as “the leader of a large and influential religious and political movement with immense commercial holdings.”[51]

    While the court ruling that allowed Gülen to remain in the United States may provide fodder for Turkish analysts who suggest U.S. support for Gülen, the process is actually more revealing. Indeed, the U.S. government noted that much of the acclaim Gülen touts is sponsored or financed by his own movement. Gülen attached twenty-nine letters of reference to his June 18, 2008 motion, mostly from theologians or Turkish political figures close to or affiliated with his organization. John Esposito, founding director of the Saudi-financed Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, who, after receiving donations from the Gülen movement sponsored a conference in his honor, also supplied a reference. Two former CIA officials, George Fidas and Graham Fuller, and former U.S. ambassador to Turkey Morton Abramowitz also supplied references.

    The letters may have worked. On July 16, 2008, U.S. district judge Stewart Dalzell issued a memorandum and order granting Gülen’s motion for partial summary judgment and ordering the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service to approve his petition for alien worker status as an alien of extraordinary ability by August 1, 2008. The court found that the immigration examiner improperly concluded that the field of education was the only statutory category in which Gülen’s accomplishments could fit and that Gülen’s accomplishments in such fields as theology, political science, and Islamic studies should also be considered. The court further determined that the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service Administrative Appeals Office erred in concluding that Gülen’s work was not “scholarly” by applying an unduly narrow definition of the term. Finally, with regard to the statutory requirement that the applicant show that his or her entry into the United States would substantially benefit the United States, the court found that Gülen had met the requirement.[52]

    Regardless of the legal rationale behind his current stay, the U.S. decision to grant Gülen residency will enable his movement to continue to imply Washington’s endorsement as the AKP and its Fethullahist supporters seek to push Turkey further away from the secularism upon which it was built.

    Conclusions

    Gülen enjoys the support of many friends, ideological fellow-travelers, and co-opted journalists and academics. Too often, concern over Gülen’s activities is dismissed in the Turkish, U.S., and European media as mere paranoia. When Turkey’s chief prosecutor indicted the AKP for attempting to undermine the secular constitution, the pro-Islamist media in Turkey along with Western diplomats and journalists dismissed the case as an “undemocratic judicial coup.”[53] Yet at the same time, many of the same outlets and officials have hailed the Ergenekon indictment, assuming a dichotomy between Islamism and democracy on one hand, and secularism and fascism on the other.[54] The repeated branding in Islamist outlets of Turkey’s Islamists as “reformist democrats” and of modern, secular Turks as “fundamentalists” has to be one of the most offensive but sadly effective lies in modern politics.

    Indeed, Turkey has never seen a single incident of attacks on pious Muslims for fasting during Ramadan, whereas in recent years there have been many incidents of attacks on less-observant Turks for drinking alcohol or not fasting.[55] While women who cover their heads in the Islamic manner can move freely in any area of the country, uncovered women are increasingly unwelcome in certain regions and are often attacked.[56]

    Contrary to the impression prevalent in the West—that the conflict is between religious Muslims and “anti-religion, secular Kemalists”—the fact remains that the majority of Turks, secular included, are traditional and observant Muslims many of whom define themselves primarily as “Muslims first.”[57] While the Turkish constitution recognizes all Turkish citizens as “Turks,” the dominant sentiment in the country has always been that in order to be considered a Turk, one must be Muslim. The complete absence of any non-Muslim governor, ambassador, or military or police officer attests to the prevalence of Islam’s dominance in the Turkish establishment. Therefore, it appears Gülen is not fighting for more individual freedoms but to free Islam from the confines of the mosque and the private domain of individuals and to bring it to the public arena, to govern every aspect of life in the country.[58] AKP leaders, including Gül and Erdoğan, have repeatedly expressed their opposition to the “imprisonment of Islam in the mosque,” demanding that it be present everywhere as a lifestyle. Most Turks vividly remember statements by AKP leaders not long ago rejecting the definition of secularism as “separation of mosque and state.” Gül has slammed “secularism” on many occasions, including during a November 27, 1995 interview with The Guardian. What Turkey’s Islamists really want is to remove the founding principles of the Turkish Republic. So long as U.S. and Western officials fail to recognize that Gülen’s rhetoric of tolerance is only skin-deep, they may be setting the stage for a dialogue, albeit not of religious tolerance, but rather to find an answer to the question, “Who lost Turkey?”

    Rachel Sharon-Krespin is the director of the Turkish Media Project at the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Washington D.C.

    [1] Can Dündar, Milliyet (Istanbul), June 21, 2007; Reha Muhtar, Vatan (Istanbul), June 22, 2007.
    [2] Milliyet, Mar. 10, 2008; Hürriyet (Istanbul), Mar. 10, 2008.
    [3] Helen Rose Ebaugh and Dogan Koc, “Funding Gülen-Inspired Good Works: Demonstrating and Generating Commitment to the Movement,” fgulen.com, Oct. 27, 2007.
    [4] Merdan Yanardağ, Fethullah Gülen Hareketinin Perde Arkasi, Turkiye Nasil Kusatildi? (Istanbul: yah Beyaz Yayın, 2006), based on interviews with Nurettin Veren on Kanaltürk television, June 26, July 3, 2006.
    [5] “Fethullah Gülen Is an Islamic Scholar and Peace Activist,” International Conference on Fethullah Gülen, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands, Nov. 2007; J. J. Rogers, “Giants of Light: Fethullah Gülen and Meister Eckhart in Dialogue,” The University of Texas, San Antonio, Tex., Nov. 3, 2007.
    [6] See for example, Rogers, “Giants of Light”; USA Today, July 18, 2008.
    [7] Bülent Aras, “Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face,” Middle East Quarterly, Sept. 1998, pp. 23-9.
    [8] Anadolu Ajansı (Ankara), Feb. 10, 1998.
    [9] Booklets on Anatolian Sufism with citations from Mevlana Celleddin Rumi distributed at the “Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gulen Movement” conference, London, Oct. 25 – 27, 2007.
    [10] Aland Mizell, “Clash of Civilizations versus Interfaith Dialogue: The Theories of Huntington and Gulen,” KurdishMedia.com, Dec. 31, 2007; idem, “Are Islam and Kemalism Compatible? How Two Systems Have Impacted the Kurdish Question?” Iraq Updates, Nov. 28, 2007.
    [11] Interview with Nurettin Veren, Kanaltürk television, June 26, 2006.
    [12] Ibid.
    [13] Sabah (Istanbul), Dec. 30, 2004.
    [14] Veren interview, Kanaltürk, June 26, 2006.
    [15] Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), Dec. 23, 2007.
    [16] Bayram Balcı, “Central Asia: Fethullah Gulen’s Missionary Schools,” Oct. 2001.
    [17] Interview with Merdan Yanardağ, Gerçek Gündem (Istanbul), Nov. 20, 2006.
    [18] Hürriyet, Apr. 11, 2008.
    [19] Erik-Jan Zürcher, “Kamermeerderheid Eist Onderzoek Naar Turkse Beweging,” NOVA documentary, July 4, 2008.
    [20] Cumhuriyet, July 9, 2008; Netherlands Information Services, July 11, 2008.
    [21] Yanardağ, Fethullah Gülen Hareketinin Perde Arkasi, Turkiye Nasil Kusatildi?
    [22] Adil Serdar Saçan, interview, Kanaltürk, July 3, 2006.
    [23] Ibid.
    [24] Samanyolu television, Oct. 13, 2008.
    [25] See, for example, Michael Rubin, “Erdogan, Ergenekon, and the Struggle for Turkey,” Mideast Monitor, Aug. 2008.
    [26] Yanardağ interview, Gerçek Gündem, Nov. 20, 2006.
    [27] Vatan, June 2, 2008; Hürriyet, June 2, 2008.
    [28] SOK! Tuggeneral Munir Erten den SOK aciklamalar!” accessed Oct. 27, 2008.
    [29] “Sok Video! Cumhuriyet Savcisi Salim Demirci,” accessed Oct. 27, 2008.
    [30] Vakit (Istanbul), June 14, 2008.
    [31] Vatan, June 2, 2008; Hürriyet, June 2, 2008.
    [32] BBC News, Feb. 4, 2008; Frank Hyland, “Investigation of Turkey’s ‘Deep State’ Ergenekon Plot Spreads to Military,” Global Terrorism Analysis, Jamestown Foundation, July 16, 2008.
    [33] Reuters, May 1, 2008; Sendika.org, Labornet Turkey, May 1, 2008; Vatan, May 1, 2, 2008; Milliyet, May 1, 2, 2008; Hürriyet, May 1, 2, 2008
    [34] Vatan, May 2, 2008; Milliyet, May 2, 2008; Hürriyet, May 2, 8, 2008.
    [35] Hürriyet, Feb. 28, 2008.
    [36] Milliyet, May 14, 2008.
    [37] Yanardağ, Fethullah Gülen Hareketinin Perde Arkasi, Turkiye Nasil Kusatildi?
    [38] Turkish Judiciary at War with AKP Government to Defend Its Independence,” MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 1520, Mar. 27, 2007.
    [39] “The AKP Government’s Attempt to Move Turkey from Secularism to Islamism (Part I): The Clash with Turkey’s Universities,” MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 1014, Nov. 1, 2005; “Professor from Van University in Turkey Commits Suicide after Five Months in Jail without Trial,” MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 1025, Nov. 18, 2005.
    [40] Zaman (Istanbul), Apr. 18, 2008.
    [41] Odatv.com, May 30, 2008; Hürriyet, June 13, 2008; Akşam (Istanbul), June 16, 2008.
    [42] Radikal (Istanbul), Apr. 7, 2008.
    [43] Hürriyet, Oct. 21, 2008.
    [44] Hürriyet, May 14, 2008.
    [45] Hürriyet, Sept. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 2008.
    [46] Milliyet, July 14, 2008; Cumhuriyet, July 15, 2008
    [47] Turkish channel ATV, June 18, 1999.
    [48] Ibid.
    [49] Ibid.; “The Upcoming Elections in Turkey (2): The AKP’s Political Power Base,” MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 375, July 19, 2007.
    [50] Sabah, Jan. 2, 3, 2005.
    [51] “Fethullah Gulen v. Michael Chertoff, Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, et al,” Case 2:07-cv-02148-SD, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
    [52] Ibid.
    [53] Turkish Daily News (Ankara), Mar. 16, 2008; Vakit, June 7, 9, 2008; Yeni Şafak (Istanbul), June 9, 2008.
    [54] Mustafa Akyol, “The Threat Is Secular Fundamentalism,” International Herald Tribune, May 4, 2007; “Islam Will Modernize—If Secular Fundamentalists Allow,” Turkish Daily News, May 15, 2007; “Mr. Logoglu Is Wrong, Considerably Wrong about Turkey,”Turkish Daily News, May 24, 2007.
    [55] Vatan, Aug. 21, 2008; Turkish Daily News, Sept. 23, 2008.
    [56] Hürriyet, Feb. 14, 2008; Milliyet, Feb. 14, 2008; Vatan, Feb. 14, 2008, Cumhuriyet, Feb. 14, 2008.
    [57] Yeni Şafak, July 7, 2006.
    [58] “Turkish PM Erdogan in Speech during Term as Istanbul Mayor Attacks Turkey’s Constitution, Describing It as ‘A Huge Lie’: ‘Sovereignty Belongs Unconditionally and Always To Allah’; ‘One Cannot Be a Muslim and Secular,’” MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 1596, May 23, 2007.

    Related Topics: Radical Islam, Turkey | Winter 2009 MEQ