Tag: Armenia-Turkey protocols

Armenia Should Exploit Rifts Between Azerbaijan and Turkey

Countries must have various tools in their arsenal to counter or weaken their enemies. The most obvious one is the use of force. However, Armenia is unable to do that successfully because of its weak military.

Another possible tool is destabilizing enemy states by creating internal turmoil and inciting their oppressed minorities.

The third tool is to cause a rift between a hostile nation and its allies using the well-known method of divide and conquer. Armenia is surrounded by Azerbaijan and Turkey, two hostile neighbors that call themselves “one nation, two states.” Therefore, Armenia should try to drive a wedge between them by deepening their disagreements when such opportunities arise.

In the last 30 years, there have been at least three occasions when Armenia’s two enemies were at odds with each other.

The first opportunity was in March 1995, when members of Azerbaijan’s military, supported by some factions in Turkey, attempted to carry out a coup d’état against Pres. Heydar Aliyev. They wanted to return to power former Pres. Abulfaz Elchibey who was toppled by Aliyev in 1993.

Prime Minister of Turkey Tansu Ciller, whose top aides were involved in the coup, gave the green light to get rid of Pres. Aliyev. The coup was foiled when Turkish President Suleyman Demirel became aware of the plot and alerted Pres. Aliyev. According to Wikipedia, the attempted coup “provoked a diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Azerbaijan.”

This was a missed opportunity for the Armenian government in 1995 to take advantage of the attempted coup and the consequent chaos in Azerbaijan to further alienate the two enemies from each other by publicizing and accentuating the rift.

The second crisis between Azerbaijan and Turkey happened in 2009 in the midst of signing the Armenia and Turkey Protocols, which envisioned normalizing relations between the two countries, including the establishment of formal diplomatic relations, opening of the Armenian-Turkish border and forming a joint historical commission to study the Armenian Genocide issue. These Protocols were brokered by the United States, Russia and France.

Azerbaijan opposed the Protocols, fearing that if Turkey normalized relations with Armenia, it would weaken Azerbaijan’s pressure on Armenia in the Artsakh conflict.

Turkey was caught in the middle of several conflicting interests:

1) Turkey wanted to pursue its self-interest which was the softening of its antagonistic relations with Armenia to eliminate long-standing Armenian demands for the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide;

2) Turkey was being pressured by the United States, Russia, and France to ratify these Protocols;

3) Azerbaijan, Turkey’s junior partner, initially applied diplomatic pressure on Turkey and subsequently threatened to cut off the export of gas or increase its price. When that didn’t have the desired effect, Azerbaijan closed down several Turkish-funded mosques in Baku and took down Turkish flags. Azerbaijan’s foreign ministry declared that improving Armenia-Azerbaijan relations “directly contradicts the national interests of Azerbaijan and overshadows the spirit of brotherly relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey built on deep historical roots.”

Once again, Armenia was merely a spectator in this conflict. Eventually, Turkey succumbed to the Azeri pressures and refused to ratify the Protocols.

The third dispute between Ankara and Baku is happening at the moment after Pres. Erdogan embarrassed Azerbaijan by declaring on July 28: “Just as we entered Karabagh, just as we entered Libya, we should do the same with Israel. There is nothing stopping us. We just need to be strong to take this step.”

Azerbaijan’s officials vehemently objected to Erdogan’s statement because it was exposing the Azeri myth that they won the Artsakh War without any outside help. The fact is that Azerbaijan was supported in the 2020 War by the Turkish military and commanders as well as the thousands of Jihadist mercenaries that Turkey brought to Azerbaijan from Syria to fight against Armenians.

Despite the Azeri denials, Erdogan continued to repeat his statement about Turkish military’s involvement in the Artsakh conflict. On August 1, he said: “In Azerbaijan’s Karabagh, together with our Azerbaijani brothers, we completely eliminated the enemy forces.”

Azerbaijan’s official Gazette responded in an editorial: “Our people, army and commander view with disappointment and deep sorrow the attempts to claim and take ownership of our rightful victory. Azerbaijan’s victory is for the entire Turkic world, but Turkey is not its architect. The Architects of the Karabagh victory are Commander-in-Chief Aliyev and the Azerbaijani Army.” The Azerbaijani Gazette described Erdogan’s words as “a heavy moral blow.”

Baku pursued its disagreement with Turkey through diplomatic channels. On July 29, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Turkey, Rashad Mammadov, met with Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Mehmet Kemal Bozay to complain about Erdogan’s statement. Amb. Mammadov then paid a visit to Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Berris Ekinci the following day to complain for the second time about Erdogan’s statement.

Fortunately, Armenia’s Prime Minister reacted to this latest Azerbaijan-Turkey dispute when answering a reporter’s question during his August 31 press conference: “During the 44-day War [in 2020], in many locations, our military, our explorers saw Turkish flags, Turkish soldiers, Turkish Special Squadrons and Turkish high-ranking officers. Let’s not forget that prior to the 44-day War, there were large-scale military exercises between Azerbaijan and Turkey. And during the entire war, F-16 jets belonging to Turkey were literally in the air and drones belonging to Turkey were maintained by Turkish personnel.”

Modern wars are not fought just with weapons. Nations also use psychological warfare, spread disinformation, instigate internal turmoil in hostile countries, and engage in divide and conquer tactics. Armenia needs to use all of these tools to undermine its enemies and defend its national interests.

If Armenia lacks the expertise in such specialized operations, there are consulting firms that Armenia can hire, for a fraction of the millions spent on weapons, to weaken the enemy from within.

September 10, 2024
Armenia-Turkey: the end of rapprochement

A diplomatic process designed to normalise relations between Armenia and Turkey led to the signing of two protocols in 2009. Its failure is rooted in the miscalculations of both sides, says Vicken Cheterian.

About the author

Vicken Cheterian is a journalist and political analyst who works for the non-profit governance organisation CIMERA, based in Geneva. He is the author of War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia’s Troubled Frontier (C Hurst, 2009; Columbia University Press, 2009), and From Perestroika to Rainbow Revolutions: Reform and Revolution After Socialism (C Hurst, fortcoming, 2012)

The genocide museum in Yerevan lies north of the Armenian capital at the top of a hill called Tsitsernakapert. The physical effort of walking to the summit is an appropriate spur to the visitor to reflect on the hardship of hundreds of thousands of Ottoman citizens of Armenian origin, who in 1915 and subsequent years were forced by their state to walk to the Syrian desert, there or on the way to die of hunger, exhaustion or by an act of murder. Today, the end-point is the sight of a sober, forty-four-metre high stele pointing skywards, as if claiming justice; and beside it, a circular monument of twelve basalt slabs that both open to and protect the eternal flame.

On 24 April each year, the day of commemoration of the Armenian genocide, thousands of people gather at Tsitsernakapert to place a flower at the monument – and then walk down the other side of the hill where, on a clear day, there is a magnificent view of Mount Ararat, with its white glaciers as if hanging from heaven. It is a poignant sight, for Ararat is both the visible totem of the Armenians yet remains unreachable to them, since it lies on the other side of the border that divides Armenia from Turkey. The two countries’ 300-kilometre-long frontier, which runs only 40 kilometres from the centre of Yerevan, is closed: the last closed border of the cold war.

I went to Tsitsernakapert to visit Hayk Demoyan, the director of the genocide museum which is part of the cluster of monuments on the site. “This museum tells the history of not only the Armenian people, but also that of the Turkish people”, Demoyan tells me. He refers to the the diplomatic exchanges since 2008 that sought to normalise Armenian-Turkish relations, saying that he expected these to prompt “a flow of Turkish visitors”. It has proved a vain hope. “The international community, especially the Americans, did not exert enough sustained pressure on Turkey to open up the border”, Demoyan says. “Now the process is at a dead-end”.

From blockade to diplomacy

The complicated relationship between Armenia and Turkey is rooted in the events of the great war of 1914-18, when the Ottoman administration deported en masse its Armenian citizens from their towns and villages in Anatolia, the prelude to the anihilation of almost the entire Armenian population of the empire. The legacy of this bitter history was such that only in the early 1990s, amid the break-up of the Soviet Union and Armenia’s attempts to secure its independence, did a chance arise for Armenia and Turkey to move beyond deep antagonism and create normal relations.

At the time, Armenia’s new political leadership was trying to escape Moscow’s influence and prepared to establish diplomatic relations with Turkey without preconditions. But the escalation of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave inside the new state of Azerbaijan with a majority Armenian population, posed a major obstacle to this course. Turkey’s then leadership supported Azerbaijan in this conflict, refused to open diplomatic links, and (in 1993) joined Azerbaijan in imposing an economic blockade on land-locked Armenia in an effort to force it to end its backing for the Karabakh Armenians’ quest for self-determination.

A frozen conflict ensued, until the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 overturned the region’s geopolitical map. Ankara saw a chance to address this anomaly of its Caucasus policy. On 8 September 2008, Turkey’s head of state Abdüllah Gül visited Yerevan during a football world-cup qualifying match between the two national teams, and this was followed by a series of diplomatic meetings where practical steps were discussed.

In fact, secret diplomatic talks had been held in Bern since 2007, mediated by the Swiss foreign ministry. The chain of diplomatic contacts culminated in the signing in Zurich on 10 October 2009 of two “protocols”, dedicated to establishing diplomatic relations and on opening the borders. The ceremony, hosted by Swiss foreign minister Micheline Calmy-Rey, was attended by international dignitaries such as United States secretary of state Hillary Clinton and Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov.

“What is ironic is the fact that during the cold war this border was not so hermeticaly closed as it is now. At the time, trains travelled regularly between Kars and Leninakan [now Gumri]”, says Tatul Hakobyan, a Yerevan-based author who is finishing a book on Armenia-Turkey relations. Hakobyan’s interpretation of the failure of dialogue is interesting: “The expectations of the various sides were based on wrong calculations. The Armenian side thought that it was possible to change the status quo on Armenian-Turkish relations without changing the status quo on the Karabakh issue. Turkey thought that dialogue with Armenia will lead to Armenian concessions on Karabakh. And the international community did not pay enough attention to details.”

The protocol-signing process in Zurich was fraught: the Turkish side wanted a public declaration linking the protocols with the Karabakh negotiations process, leading the Armenian delegation to boycott the ceremony, meaning that in the end there was no declaration. “In Zurich, the sides showed that they were not ready to compormise. Turkey wanted Armenian concessions on Karabakh, not just on the question of genocide and fixing the current border”, says Hakobyan.

The results of failure

When the process began, both presidents took risks in the hope of bringing peace and stability to their countries. For Armenia’s Serge Sarkissian, entering a dialogue with Turkey was a particularly bold step; he was already challenged by a powerful domestic opposition that contested the legitimacy of his election, and the diplomatic move so angered the Tashnaktsutyun party (which has a large diaspora base) that it left the government coalition in protest. The signing of the protocols also created a schism between Yerevan and Armenian communities abroad, which Sarkissian experienced directly when, during a foreign tour of diaspora communities, he was faced by demonstrations in Paris, Los Angeles and Beirut.

For Turkey’s diplomacy, the policy of rapprochement with Armenia was part of a wider effort to ease tensions in the Caucasus’s several conflict-zones, especially that of Karabakh. They believed that ameliorating Ankara’s relations with Armenia would facilitate negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Instead, they were confronted by a vehement reaction from Azerbaijan that accused Turkey of betraying Baku’s interests. Baku threatened to suspend relations with Ankara and to cancel future hydrocarbon deals. As a result, the Turkish leadership insisted that Armenia made concessions over Karabakh on the grounds that this would enable the protocols to be ratified by the Turkish parliament. Ankara was here not just seeking measures additional to those foreseen in the protocols, but reverting to its earlier position that Armenian-Turkish relations can only move forward if Armenia complies with Azerbaijani demands on the Karabakh conflict.

Thus, both Armenia and Turkey entered the process of negotiations without anticipating all the moves they might be expected to make, and were surprised along the way. Yerevan’s diplomats proceeded to sign the protocols without consulting diaspora communities, amid protests by diaspora communities against the president of Armenia for the first time since independence. Ankara similarly misjudged its capacity to resist opposition from Baku, and even a reversal of its policy has not allayed Azerbaijani suspicions.

The failure of the protocols is so great that it will have long-term consequences. “The failure of Armenian-Turkish negotiations will harden the Armenian position on Karabakh negotiations”, according to Ara Tadevosyan, the director of the Media Max news agency in Yerevan. Even worse, what started as personal initiatives and cautious trust has turned into mistrust. Today, the Armenian leadership feels deceived by its Turkish equivalent: it signed two protocols for which it had already paid a political price back home, only to be asked to make further concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh.

This perceived deception will harden Yerevan’s position in relation to Turkey, only three years before the centenary commemoration of the Armenian genocide in 2015. Turkey’s official reaction to the proposed outlawing of the denial of genocide in France shows that attitudes on its side are becoming even more intransigent. The hopes of 2009 look ever more distant.

January 3, 2012
Armenia turned into puppet

News.Az interviews Alaeddin Yalchinkaya, head of international relations department of Turkish Sakarya University, professor.

Can political activeness of Turkey in Caucasus and Middle East cause negative reaction from Russia?
Reflecting the level of relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan the slogan “One nation, two states” should not bother anyone. The continuation of occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenia, with Russian support, is the result of a policy of hostility not only against Azerbaijan, but also other people of the region at the head of Armenia.

As a result, the biggest harm comes to Armenia itself which is in the situation of a puppet. Such policy of Russia poses a threat to the security of Turkey and Azerbaijan. In this regard, Turkey has to play a more active role in the light of historical, cultural and religious realities in the region.
What chances and opportunities does Turkey have to get further involved in processes of the South Caucasus including the settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?
No other country guarantees final decision or control of the problem. Every state, every leader must analyze the extent of the problem, and not to overestimate the strength of the country. Overestimation of real strength may pave the way to tragedies but at the same time, disuse of this power when there is an opportunity may become a beginning of loss.

The main geopolitical activity of Turkey in the Middle East, the Balkans and Turkish world, as well as in Caucasus is a search of such opportunities. The historical lie is Turkey allegedly opened its airspace to occupational and slanderous Armenia. It should not expect any smallest steps from the Turkish side unless it stops spreading such lies. Such expectations that we gave to Armenians opened a way to the fact that problems have remained unsettled for many years. This will continue if we give Armenia such kind of expectation.
Does the fact that Armenian-Turkish protocols were removed from the agenda of Turkish Parliament mean that policy of Turkish government on ‘zero problems with neighbors’ failed?
Slogans that ‘we don’t want presence of any problems in the region’ and ‘we want to solve all problems by peaceful means’ continue to bring points to Turkey. But positioning itself in foreign policy as a country, wishing to settle all problems which were not settled by previous leaders of states, led to formation of an opinion in the world that Turkey pursues unfair and belligerent policy. In addition, in terms of Armenia’s aggressive, occupational and slanderous policy, Turkey in the past didn’t give strong statements which led to the loss of support from the opposition of the country and international community. However, I would like to know that Turkey needs to yield support from friendly and neutral countries.

Underestimating Armenian claims in Turkey is the result of a propaganda conducted in this sphere. Awareness of the delusiveness of “zero problems with neighbors” policy led to the fact that relations with Azerbaijan didn’t become victim of this policy.
How do you assess the importance of decision of the Turkish Parliament to return Armenian-Turkish protocols to the agenda?
The return of protocols to the agenda of the parliament is connected with procedures in the legislative body. They were brought back to the agenda along with 166 documents concerning international relations. However, it remains unknown whether they were brought back with the demand of the US. Along with this, the return of the protocols to the agenda may be a tactical step to neutralize Armenian diaspora which is activated each spring in connection with 1915 event. But anyway, it’s clear that Armenia will not ratify these protocols and Turkey will not take any action in this direction.

21 December 2011
F.H. News.Az

December 26, 2011
Turkey will sign protocols if Armenia surrenders 2 regions

Turkey-Armenia protocols can still be brought forward to the Turkish Parliament and be voted on, European Program Director at the International Crisis Group Sabine Freizer told Armenian News-NEWS.am.

In an e-mail letter she commented on recent statement by Turkish President Abdullah Gul that the protocols cannot be considered dead.

The expert considers Turkish parliament is unlikely to vote until there is some positive movement on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

In October 2009 Armenia and Turkey signed protocols in Zurich to normalize diplomatic relations between the states. The documents had to be ratified in both countries’ parliaments. However, in 2010 the Armenian president suspended the process due to Turkey’s non-constructive stance.

Ankara set preconditions and linked the reconciliation process to resolution of the Karabakh conflict.Turkey decided to remove the protocols from parliament’s agenda this August.

“Even though there is no legal link between the two issues, in practice and for political reasons Turkey has linked them. Ankara has not clearly defined what it means by ‘progress’ however, it could possibly mean the signature of an agreement on basic principles or the start of withdrawal by Armenian forces of one or two of the occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh,” she said.

According to Freizer, such a withdrawal would indeed change the whole dynamic in the region towards peace and development. “Neither Armenia nor Nagorno-Karabakh have ever claimed sovereignty over territories like Fizuli,” she said.

Commenting on the protocols, she stressed that even if they are not yet signed, “normalization between Armenia and Turkey is moving forward with regards to contacts in many fields.”

via Turkey will sign protocols if Armenia surrenders 2 regions – Sabine Freizer | Armenia News – NEWS.am.

December 4, 2011
Turkey must understand that Armenian-Turkish protocols are not infinite chances – Armenian president

YEREVAN. – Armenia’s initiative to start Armenian-Turkish reconciliation process raised international reputation of Armenia, as well as dispelled the illusions of our colleagues about new and modern Turkey, said the President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan to the meeting with Armenian MFA central staff and heads of diplomatic missions abroad.

“One might think that we should regret for initiating the process of Armenia-Turkey rapprochement, since Turkey toppled down its responsibilities and we spent huge political capital. I believe those present here understand that this initiative raised Armenia’s reputation on the international arena and dispelled the illusions of our colleagues about new and modern Turkey, herewith discovering modern manifestations of the policy Armenians learned from historic lessons.

We, nevertheless, remain committed to our cause of settlement of Armenian-Turkish relations without any preconditions. Turkey has to find the will to respect the undertaken obligations and not credit statements that do not bring honor to a modern regional state,’’ said the president.

According to him, Turkey must realize that the protocols are not infinite chances.

‘‘Many of our friends advised us to wait for Parliamentary elections in Turkey. Next few months will show whether there is any change in approaches after the elections. We shall make our moves regarding the protocols on the basis of these observations, although, frankly speaking, the past two months do not inspire much optimism in this context,’’ said President Sargsyan.

via Turkey must understand that Armenian-Turkish protocols are not infinite chances – Armenian president | Armenia News – NEWS.am.

August 31, 2011
Armenia should withdraw signature from Armenia-Turkey protocols

YEREVAN. – There is a hope that Armenia will celebrate May 28 holiday [Republic Day] without political prisoners, thus, demands of every Armenian citizen, every political leader will be fulfilled, said leader of Heritage Party Raffi Hovannisian.

Speaking at a civil forum organized by Heritage Party, Hovannisian said there are many other problems in Armenia, apart of issue on political prisoners.

He said the power should be returned to people who will form a new government by means of snap election.

Hovannisian also commented on Armenia’s foreign policy problems. According to him, Armenia should withdraw its signature from Armenian-Turkish protocols “which accepts directly all preconditions of Bolshevik-Kemalist treaty signed back in 1921”.

“We must reject the Madrid Principles. We should decide how to do it ourselves,” he added on Karabakh peace process.

via Armenia should withdraw signature from Armenia-Turkey protocols – opposition | Armenia News – NEWS.am.

May 22, 2011