Ensar Nişancı, director of the Beykent University Center for Strategic Studies (BÜSAM), said the process that started with the removal of despotic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa is a process of transition and that Turkey might serve as a compass during this process, during a recent interview with a local TV station about the Arab Spring and its implications for the Turkish role in the region.
Nişancı, who argues that one of the primary reasons for the Arab Spring is decline of Western model in the region, has described what has been going on in the Middle East and North Africa as a wind of freedom and democratization.
Noting that Turkey’s journey to democratization should not be analyzed separately from these developments, Nişancı believes that Western-oriented modernization, which remained popular and influential in Turkey up until the 2000s, caused alienation from the Middle East during the same period.
Nişancı, who said, “We are now able to say that normalization and awakening has started in Turkey,” further argues that like in Turkey, the process in the Middle East will result in normalization and a restructuring of the political system.
“If there is need for a compass, Turkey can play that leading role for the rest of the region. Turkey will be the center of emergence of the new world order as the old system is being broken down in Turkey. The transition is still yet to be completed, but Turkey for the time being is far from fulfillment of the task of transformation,” Nişancı said.
Nişancı also dismissed the argument that the recent policy pursued by Turkey vis-à-vis Syria is inconsistent and contradictory, pointing out that the general framework of Turkish policy, not only toward the region but also toward relations with the West, represents a moderate understanding that eschews an extreme stance or discourse in foreign policy. By doing so, according to Nişancı, Turkey criticizes the West without taking an anti-Western stance and has the ability to improve relations with the Middle Eastern countries at the same time by maintaining a distance from the regimes.
What perspective should be employed to better understand what has been happening in the Middle East?
In these special days where we are experiencing the fall of the despotic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa, we are passing through a historic crossroads, an era where the Western-oriented world that emerged out of the Industrial Revolution is dissolving. This is a period where the old has been dissolved but the new has not yet emerged. In a sense, this is a process of transition. As underlined by many foreign and domestic analysts and observers, the economic, cultural strategic center of the world has been moving from a Euro-Atlantic axis to the Orient. Up until now, the world has been shaped by Western-oriented approaches; the middle of this world, the Middle East, has been influenced and dominated by Israel, which has represented Europe in the region.
The West has promoted democracy in regions dominated by Christian and Jewish identities, whereas it pursued strategies of containment to control regions inhabited by Muslims with a visible Islamic identity. This is the explanation for the support they extended to the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East to suppress any Islamic revival. It could be said that the democratization movements that flourished in Muslim countries did not emerge because of Western promotion whereas this is just the opposite case in Christian areas where popular participation in the government was promoted. For this reason, unlike arguments held by some experts, the process known as the Arab Spring is not something the West encouraged, inspired or promoted. For this reason, it is not Western-oriented. This is something that took place as a result of the declining role of the West and its retreat in world affairs.
Now this is a wind demanding freedom and justice in the Middle East and North Africa; the wind of democratization and freedom is not a development that can be desired by Israel. That this wind blows simultaneously with the economic crisis in the West is no coincidence. In the initial phases of the unrest, with the demand for freedoms, justice and economic development triggered by the sacrifice of Muhammad Bouazizi in Tunisia, Western actors were surprised and appalled and did not know how to react or respond.
What would you like to say about Turkey’s position in geopolitical terms at this stage? What is the place of Turkey in this map you just drew?
It is impossible to consider Turkey’s democratization venture separately from this. The governing elites of Turkey, the military and civilian bureaucrats, and their strategic partners in the civilian world have internalized the Western-oriented perception of the world and looked at this history, society and culture through the lens of the West. The main axis of the modernization movement in Turkey is all about this perspective. Turkish modernization is a pro-Western rather than a Western modernization. This story is a story of alienation from its own historical and traditional roots.
We could say that a process of normalization and awakening has started in Turkey. I should note that what I mean by normalization in Turkey in the present day is that our geostrategic position has gained importance not for the West, but for ourselves. From this perspective, our south will be south; our north, north and our east, east. Turkey’s normalization and awakening started early in the 2000s. This process is also called democratization, in other words, it is an era where the people are getting rid of their constraints. The same process is taking place now in the Middle East, North Africa. The brutal states and administrations in these regions that have been supported by Israel and the West are crumbling.
It is important to see that democratization movements can be diluted by a deep structure controlled by a world state. We all know what tools and mechanisms these deep structures are using in Turkey to sustain their power. Turkey has made huge progress in dissolving these structures. The same is happening in different forms in Egypt, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen. Yes, the center of the world is not under the control of the West, and the waters are flowing downwards in the Middle East now. We could say that as in Turkey, the water has found its proper course in the Middle East as well.
How should Turkish-Syrian relations be evaluated?
We know that during the [Justice and Development Party] AK Party term in power, a new concept of foreign policy was adopted. We also know that the main component of this axis is the “zero problems with neighbors” policy. Another parameter that shapes Turkish foreign policy was to promote a policy of conscience instead of a policy of interest. The main axis that would serve as a basis in relations with Syria was determined by these parameters. Just as Turkey settled its internal problems that negatively affected its regional stance for so many years by promoting more democracy in domestic affairs, this policy was used as a model to reshape its relations with the region based on mutual understanding and cultural and economic interdependence. Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad could have used this opportunity. Even if he is the son of Hafez al-Assad, the founder of the Ba’ath regime, based on the mentality of a police state, Bashar al-Assad could have been a good partner in Turkey’s good neighboring policies in the region owing to his education abroad, dynamism and eagerness to introduce reforms. To this end, close friendships were maintained between Assad and his family and their counterparts in Turkey. By eliminating visa requirements, the two countries also created bridges between their respective nations and peoples. In short, Assad had taken proper measures and steps consistent with Turkey’s new vision of foreign policy and expressed his satisfaction with the new mentality that dominates the Turkish government’s perspective. Assad even went further: After a meeting held at Dolmabahçe Palace in İstanbul, the young Syrian leader made an interesting statement, saying, “The region will most likely experience great changes; you may even see the borders changed.”
What determined the relations between Turkey and Syria in the 1990s was not friendship; the two countries were on the verge of war. However, the 2000s were a turning point for the bilateral relations between these two neighbors, but after the Arab Spring, their relations deteriorated again.
Could you elaborate on the ups and downs of the Syrian case in Turkish foreign policy? Is there something twisted in the mental map of Turkish foreign policy?
The Ba’ath regime was shaped before Bashar al-Assad’s reign in Syria. Assad is not the one who shaped the regime; he is the one who was shaped by the regime. He is nothing but an ordinary representative of the system. In Libya, however, [Muammer] Gaddafi was the owner/founder of his regime. In other words, his acts were not determined by the regime, but the regime was determined by Gaddafi. For this reason, Gaddafi was the regime itself.
Turkey’s support for Syria was not unconditional. Syria and Assad were asked to introduce reforms and create a regime based on participation and the rule of law. Therefore, Turkey would have supported Assad as long as he showed determination to make reforms. The doctrine that emerged out of Turkey’s Middle East foreign policy perspective was to maintain a principled alliance rather than a strategic alliance. Such an alliance was preserved with those who honored the principles, whereas those who did wrong or violated these principles were warned. It is possible to observe the traces of this approach in a wide range of fields from the March 1, 2003 motion [in which the Turkish Parliament denied a US request for troop access to Iraq from Turkey in the Second Gulf War] to EU relations. Ankara is able to criticize the West without being pro-Western and able to love the Middle East without exaggerating it. From this perspective, Turkey’s initial support for Assad and later opposition to him is not a contradiction, it is in fact consistency. Alliances are now based on principles. This serves as a viable framework for us to better understand the relations between Turkey and Israel.
What do you think about the fact that the Turkish prime minister was the first leader to travel to the Middle East [during the Arab Spring]?
The prime minister was the first leader to travel to the Middle East after the Arab Spring. However, Turkey had headed many initiatives in some fields before anyone else in recent times. The Turkish prime minister adopted the clearest and most consistent stance vis-à-vis Egypt when the Arab Spring accelerated. Turkey’s reliance on a foreign policy perspective based on principles rather than alliances and a policy that speaks to the hearts of the people and focuses on principle and conscience rather than strategic considerations, as well as its disregard for what the US says, what Moscow says and what Tel Aviv says, points to a first following the end of Cold War. And because these firsts are welcomed in the hearts of the people, Turkish foreign policy becomes even more confident. We now have a foreign policy approach based on self-confidence. Turkey has become a pivotal regional actor and a mid-sized power. Maybe the Turkish delegation’s venture to the Middle East is a first, but the interest in a foreign leader in the same region is also a first. These firsts will play determinative roles not only in the Middle East but also in the world as well.
How should we evaluate Western reaction to the popular uprisings in the Middle East?
What occupies the Western agenda is the fact that perhaps for the first time it has had to expend its resources in dealing with its internal problems rather than projecting its power to global issues. The economic crisis is the fundamental crisis of the West, and its basic concern is that this is not seen as a conjectural crisis. For this reason, the Western countries are not confident enough to design the world and initiate a process of change. For this reason, they prefer siding with the powerful in the countries experiencing popular uprisings. They do this in order to make sure that they keep control in the Middle East. For this reason, it is not possible to compare the presence of Britain, France and the US in Libya to their presence in the same region in the colonial period. The West’s potential is well behind its capacity; however, Turkey’s potential is ahead of its capacity. Turkey gains greater confidence and boosts its potential as it resolves its problems. On the other hand, the West has now realized that employing its powers in interventions in different parts of the world poses great danger for them.
Will the Syrian case follow the same path of revolution with Tunisia, Libya and Egypt? What is your opinion on this matter?
There are many historical similarities between these countries, and in fact, they are more than similarities; they are almost identical. However, there are certain differences in terms of the advance of the popular uprisings in these countries. For instance, different segments of the people and society gathered together in Tahrir Square, the symbol of revolution in Egypt, while the people failed to create a joint front against the Syrian regime in Syria. Besides, there is no visible and significant support and participation by businessmen and the army in this country. In Egypt and Tunisia, the army and the businessmen did not act against the people. In the case of Syria, there is no international support for reform seekers as was observed in the Libyan case.
However, it seems impossible for the Assad regime to remain in power. In the Arab Spring, the Syrian case represents a rare day left from the heavy winter; however, it is possible to argue that this day will soon be over.
