Tag: Arab Spring

  • Meeting the Geopolitical Challenges  of the Arab Spring: A Call for a joint  EU-Turkish Agenda

    Meeting the Geopolitical Challenges of the Arab Spring: A Call for a joint EU-Turkish Agenda

    Meeting the Geopolitical Challenges of the Arab Spring: A Call for a joint EU-Turkish Agenda

    by Günter Verheugen

    This policy brief discusses the potential for cooperation between Turkey and the EU in  the countries that are going through political transformation in the Middle East and North Africa. Since both sides have a vested interest in seeing stability, peace and strong economic development in this shared neighbourhood, they must work together and develop a common strategy by which to combine their strengths and advantages while offsetting their weaknesses. The brief highlights how the relationships between Turkey, the EU, and the Arab world are all fraught with diffi culties and tensions that prevent coordinated action between the fi rst two parties. Despite these limitations, if the European Union and Turkey managed to cooperate on such a geopolitically important project, it would have an enormous additional benefit: revitalizing the stalled relationship between the EU and Turkey and lending it a sense of urgency and importance.

    To read the full report both in English and in French, visit:

     

  • Turkey Wants to Resume Talks on Iranian Nuclear Program

    Turkey Wants to Resume Talks on Iranian Nuclear Program

    Turkey Wants to Resume Talks on Iranian Nuclear Program

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 6
    January 10, 2012
    By: Saban Kardas
    Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, paid a crucial visit to Tehran on January 6, amidst the increasing confrontation between Iran and the West. The visit mainly provided an opportunity to address bilateral issues, as it followed a heated debate in recent months which questions whether Turkey and Iran were involved in an undeclared rivalry in the Arab Spring. The two countries’ diverging positions on Syria, Turkey’s decision to host NATO’s early warning radar, as well as differences on the Palestinians’ quest for recognition, arguably pitted the two against each other. The confrontational mood was further worsened by harsh statements against Turkey by Iranian politicians and high-ranking officials (EDM, October 11, 2011).

    As such statements even led to direct threats voiced by some Iranian lawmakers and military officers, indicating that Iran might take military action against NATO facilities in Turkey, Davutoglu was prompted to convey his uneasiness and demand an explanation. Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, visited Ankara in an effort to allay Ankara’s growing concerns. Reiterating the two countries’ friendship, Salehi sought to assure his Turkish counterpart that such remarks reflected personal opinions and did not represent official Iranian policy on Turkey (Anadolu Ajansi, December 14, 2011).

    Ankara also downplayed such threatening remarks as personal opinions, in an effort to maintain channels for dialogue with Tehran. Though not hiding the differences of opinion on regional issues, Davutoglu and other Turkish officials prefer to focus on issues of converging views and continue to view Tehran as a major stakeholder in the region whose cooperation is essential. More importantly, Davutoglu is keen to reassure his Iranian counterparts that Turkey will not take part in any direct military action against Iran, which seems as a calculated move to comfort Tehran and convince it to steer away from the path of escalation.

    With such considerations in mind, Davutoglu paid a working visit to Iran on January 6, to meet Salehi and other Iranian officials. Davutoglu worked hard to stress the defensive nature of the ballistic missile shield and reiterated that Turkey would not let its territory be used in any attack against Iran. The two ministers also agreed to continue to discuss regional issues, and meet at least twice each year (Anadolu Ajansi, January 5).

    Beyond the immediate Turkish-Iranian frictions, Davutoglu addressed a number of regional issues with Iran. Foregoing the speculations of rivalry, Davutoglu invited his Iranian counterparts to work together in order to address the escalating tensions in the region, which some claim could lead to Sunni-Shiite sectarian divisions. In the last two days, because the uprising in Syria, the ongoing political crisis in Iraq, and the situation in Bahrain involve some sectarian elements, Davutoglu increasingly refers to an imminent danger of sectarian conflict and warns against a new Cold War in the Middle East (Dogan, January 8).

    Moreover, the uncertain future of the dispute over the Iranian nuclear program, especially in view of US sanctions policy and the Iranian brinkmanship in the Strait of Hormuz is a growing concern for Turkey. Ankara recognizes Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear technology, but also invites the country to be more transparent about its ongoing program and allay concerns on the part of Western powers.

    Since the talks held between Iran and the P5+1 in Istanbul one year ago, diplomatic channels were largely closed. In order to push things forward on that front, Davutoglu seems to have attempted shuttle diplomacy. In the wake of his Tehran trip, he announced that he was in touch with Catherine Ashton, the EU’s foreign policy chief, on this issue. Davutoglu raised expectations by maintaining that both parties were ready to resume nuclear talks in Turkey. Earlier, Salehi also expressed his readiness to return to nuclear talks in a suitable time and venue agreed upon by the parties, adding that Turkey would be the best option (Anadolu Ajansi, January 8). Commenting on this development, US State Department spokesperson, Victoria Nuland, said that the US remained in consultation with Turkey over Davutoglu’s trip and agrees with Turkey’s goal of bringing Iran back to the negotiating table and complying with its international obligations, though they might differ on tactics. She also emphasized Washington’s readiness to resume discussions, though adding that Iran has yet to formally convey its decision to start the talks (Today’s Zaman, January 7).

    Adding urgency to the matter, the United States and its European allies are initiating a new wave of sanctions to pressure Iran on the economic front. The sanctions recently approved by President Barack Obama involve penalizing the financial institutions doing business with Iran as well as halting oil imports from Iran, by targeting its Central Bank. Turkey abides by the sanctions regime introduced by the UN Security Council in the summer of 2010, but refuses to implement the unilateral Western sanctions on the grounds that they are non-binding. However, there has been growing US expectation for Turkey to join the new sanctions, while Ankara seeks an exemption, given its oil and gas imports from Iran, requiring it to work with Iranian financial institutions.

    A visit by a US delegation led by Deputy Secretary of State, William Burns, to Ankara on January 9, offered an opportunity to discuss these issues. During his talks with Turkish officials, the US delegation, among others, solicited Turkey’s support for unilateral sanctions. Prior to the meeting, some senior US Congressmen and diplomats visited Turkish government officials and bureaucrats, underscoring the importance attached to this issue (Haberturk, January 9).

    Commenting on the visit, Nuland dismissed the argument that Turkey opposes US policy on Iran. She emphasized that the US acknowledges Turkey’s sensitivities given Ankara’s trade ties, but the two sides will continue their dialogue on how to maximize the pressures on Iran to force it to comply with its international obligations (Haberturk, January 10). Turkish sources also reported that Ankara does not want to see a further escalation of the already heightened tensions in the region (Sabah, January 10).

    Uneasy at the growing escalation, Ankara seeks to dampen tensions through a reassertion of its facilitator role and engaging the parties, without taking any side. Once again, Turkey is walking a diplomatic tightrope due to its difficult neighbor’s relations with the West.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-wants-to-resume-talks-on-iranian-nuclear-program/
  • Turkey, Israel, Iran—Winners and Losers from Arab Spring

    News Analysis

    By Gary Feuerberg
    Epoch Times Staff Created: January 8, 2012 Last Updated: January 9, 2012
    Related articles: World » Middle East

    An Egyptian demonstrator waves Egyptian and Palestinian flags at Cairo’s Tahrir Square on May 13, 2011. There is strong pro-Palestinian sentiment among the Arab populace, which will make it harder for post-Arab Spring leaders to advocate peace with Israel. (Khaled Desouki /AFP/Getty Images)

    WASHINGTON—Arab Spring upheavals have not only affected the balance of power in countries where they have occurred, they have also had a strong ripple effect, shaking up the strategic outlook of the region’s dominant countries: Israel, Turkey, and Iran.

    Superficially, the Arab upheavals—with dictators being overthrown and popular cries for democracy—may look desirable to the liberal democratic governments of Israel and Turkey, and a blight for Iran—but a closer look reveals that the regional winners and losers may not be so obvious.

    Israel

    For Israel, the Arab awakenings has created a “dramatic transformation” in the structure of the Middle East peace process, said Robert Malley, program director for Middle East and North Africa at the International Crisis Group (ICG), and a former special assistant to President Bill Clinton for Arab-Israeli Affairs (1998–2001).

    Malley spoke at a Middle East Policy Council (MEPC) sponsored conference on Capitol Hill on Jan. 5 titled, Israel, Turkey & Iran in the Changing Arab World.

    Malley said, the Palestinian cause weighs more heavily now due to popular sentiments in the Arab world that Arab leaders ignore at their peril.

    Israel’s strategic outlook has historically been one of “pre-empting threats,” said Malley, which has required having a good sense of what the threats are. That approach, however, is harder to apply after the Arab upheavals when the unpredictable and uncertainty of the masses enters the equation. It’s impossible to know what the threat will be in a year’s time, he said.

    “It’s one thing for Egypt to develop a certain strategic posture when you have President Mubarak or Gen. Tantawi in power. It’s very different if you have the Muslim Brotherhood,” said Malley.

    Israel also has to deal with the reality that public opinion in the Arab countries has a greater role to play than it did before. The question of Palestine resonates more deeply today, Malley said. Any Arab political leader now will not enhance his popularity by reaching out to Israel or by advocating peace with Israel, he said.

    The “peace process” between Israel and Palestinians will have to be “reinvented,” he said. The days of strong moderate Arab leaders and a strong U.S. role are called into question, said Malley.

    Karim Sadjadpour, at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said that Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei is increasingly centralizing his control of the country while President Ahmadinejad has been in a power struggle with him. Listening is professor Omer Taspinar, at Brookings, who spoke in what sense Turkey can be a model country for the Middle East. Both gentlemen spoke at the Middle East Policy Council’s Capitol Hill Conference, Jan. 5, 2012. (Gary Feuerberg/ Epoch Times)

    “Who are the Arab leaders that are going to stand with [Palestinian President Mahmud] Abbas in the event of a peace treaty?” Malley asked rhetorically.

    Malley said that he sees Israel adopting a “hunker down mentality,” waiting and acting very cautiously. Changes in the Arab countries are viewed in Israel as bad news with the exception of Syria. If Israel does anything bold, it would be against Iran and its nuclear program, he said.

    Iran

    In recent years, Iran has moved in a different direction from Egypt and other Middle East countries, beginning with its repression of democratic sentiments in 2009. In Iran, “power and influence are increasingly driven by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei,” says Karim Sadjadpour, who in the past has interviewed dozens of senior Iranian officials and hundreds of Iranian intellectuals, clerics, among others for ICG.

    The real power behind Iran’s nuclear program and Iran’s role in the Middle East is decided by Khamenei and the sector of Revolutionary Guards with access to him. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is no longer content to sit on the sidelines, and a power battle has ensued between him and the supreme leader, said Sadjadpour at the MEPC conference.

    While suppressing democracy at home, Iran in the past has welcomed the representative government movement in the Middle East, as it has served Iran’s own interests well. Elections in Lebanon led to Hezbollah; in Palestine, Hamas won; and in Iraq, Shi’ite interests became dominate. So, Iran assumes, “The average citizen has much more in common with Tehran’s world view than the West view,” said Sadjadpour.

    Robert Malley says the political upheavals in the Arab world have introduced more uncertainty and unpredictability resulting in a more cautious Israel. Dr. Malley is director at the International Crisis Group. Prior to joining ICG, Dr. Malley served as special assistant to President Clinton for Arab-Israeli Affairs. He spoke at the Middle East Policy Council’s Capitol Hill Conference, Jan. 5, 2012 (Gary Feuerberg/ Epoch Times)

    But the actual result has been mixed. Sadjadpour said Iran did not anticipate the Syria uprising. Syria is Iran’s “only consistent ally,” he said. “The loss of the al-Assad regime would be a tremendous blow to Tehran.”

    There are already reports that Iran has threatened to withhold funding if Hamas relocates its headquarters from Damascus to Doha, Qatar, revealed Sadjadpour.

    Iran’s patronage of Lebanon-based Hezbollah—“the crown jewel of the Iranian revolution”—is going to be very difficult to sustain in the same way, he said. Hezbollah was created with financial backing from Iran in the early 1980s after Israel invaded Lebanon.

    Turkey

    Turkey is often touted as a role model for the Middle East, and one could argue that Turkey was the big winner of the Arab Spring. It is simultaneously modern, Islamic, and democratic. No one has done that before, says Sadjadpour. It owes its current form to the Islamist-based Justice and Development Party (AKP), which was victorious in the election of 2002.

    Despite the Islamic origins of the AKP, Turkey’s government is secular. When Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan visited Egypt in recent months and argued that Egypt should be a secular country, the position “shocked the Muslim Brotherhood,” said professor Omer Taspinar, speaking at the MEPC conference. Taspinar teaches at the U.S. National War College, and is director of the Turkey Project at the Brookings Institution.

    According to Malley, the main reason for Turkey’s ascension in the region is that it “speaks loudly for the Palestine cause,” which is popular among the Arab masses. For example, Erdogan gained popularity points when he walked out of a conference in Davos, Switzerland, in 2009 to protest Israeli President Shimon Peres’s speech defending Israel’s Gaza offensive.

    Although Turkey is a member of NATO, and until the Gaza flotilla fallout had military ties with Israel, in the past it has also tried to maintain good relations with its neighbors Iran and Syria. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu proclaimed the “zero problem with neighbors” policy, which aimed to establish a zone of peace and tranquility between neighbors.

    Its nonaligned policy led Turkey, joined by Brazil, to vote against new sanctions on Iran in June 2010. Taspinar says that Turkey does not want to give the impression it is following Western foreign policy. Rather, it states that it wants “regional solutions to regional problems,” said Taspinar.

    However, the sudden breakdown in Turkey’s relations with Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Israel has forced Turkey to abandon the “no problems” doctrine, said Taspinar. Turkey’s relationship with Iran soured when Turkey, agreed last year to host radars as part of NATO’s missile defense.

    Taspinar said one positive remainder of the Turkish approach is its avoidance of the Sunni-Shi’ite divide. Turkey as a secular state disagrees with Saudi Arabia and Iran’s sectarian agendas, and is a voice for peace on this divide that is playing out violently in Iraq and Syria.

    All three speakers agreed that post-Mubarak Egypt will recover its top leadership role in the Arab world. Even in its current chaotic state, Egypt has had more influence than Turkey on the Palestinian question. Egypt brokered the prisoner exchange involving Israeli captive Gilad Shalit, after Turkey had tried. The reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah was hammered out in Cairo, although Turkey had tried very hard, Taspinar said.

  • 30 million tourists visit Turkey in 2011

    30 million tourists visit Turkey in 2011

    Addressing Turkish ambassadors in Ankara, Turkey’s Culture and Tourism minister Ertugrul Gunay said that despite political turmoil the country witnessed more than 30 million tourists in 11 months of 2011, exceeding their expectations, Zaman reported.

    turGunay was glad to announce that for the first time Turkey has registered 30 million tourists in 2011 which is an important edge in tourism history of the country. Last year Turkey lost many tourists due to the unrest sweeping across the Middle East but the number of tourists visiting Turkey relatively increased compared to 2010.

    Gunay said that the global financial crisis I past thee years has been affecting countries across the globe but the tourism industry of Turkey was least affected. Gunay said Turkey hosted only 13 million tourists in 2003 and now the number reached to 30 million today which was possible due to the progressive efforts of his government. The minister said Turkey received 28.6 million tourists in 2010 and many tourist reservations were canceled in 2011 because of the Arab Spring.

    via 30 million tourists visit Turkey in 2011 | New Europe.

  • The Turkish Model: Can It Be Replicated?

    The Turkish Model: Can It Be Replicated?

    by Peter Kenyon

    turkey 01 wide

    Mustafa Ozer/AFP/Getty ImagesTurkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (right) has been enthusiastically received by Arab Spring countries that look to Turkey as a potential model. Here, Erdogan hosts Mustafa Abdul Jalil, chairman of the National Transitional Council of Libya, in Istanbul, last month.

    January 6, 2012

    In the Arab states that have ousted dictators and begun building new political and economic systems, many are looking to Turkey as an example of a modern, moderate Muslim state that works. Perhaps no country has seen its image in the Arab world soar as quickly as Turkey, a secular state that’s run by a party with roots in political Islam. As part of our series on the Arab Spring and where it stands today, NPR’s Peter Kenyon examines whether the “Turkish model” can be exported.

    As Tunisians held an election in October, merchant Mohammed Bengerbal paused in front of his shop in the capital, Tunis, to ponder a question: Now that Tunisia’s dictator is gone, what kind of government does he really want?

    “We want Tunisia to become a modern country, not extremist,” he says. “A place like Turkey. People work hard there and also practice Islam. They are modest and modern at the same time.”

    If there was one way for me to define what makes Turkey unique compared to all of its Muslim neighbors to the south and east, it’s what I call the ‘Turkish miracle’ — and it’s not a political miracle, it’s an economic miracle.

    – Soner Cagaptay, Turkey analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy

    As secular, despotic regimes tumbled in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the iron fist that had been throttling opposition parties was no longer there. Suddenly north Africans are looking to political Islam not to fight off a dictatorial regime, but to guide them toward a better future.

    And when they look around to see where that has actually been achieved, they find Turkey, with its ruling Justice and Development Party, known as the AKP, and its deeply religious Sunni Muslim prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

    Erdogan recently toured the revolutionary Arab states, and during a visit to Egypt he was mobbed by adoring crowds, packed with supporters of Egypt’s rising political power, the Muslim Brotherhood.

    The adulation was interrupted, however, when the Turkish leader went on television to tell Egyptians they shouldn’t be afraid of secular government. That was a notion that didn’t sit well in a culture where for many people “secular” translates as atheist or anti-faith.

    Turkey analyst Soner Cagaptay, with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, says it must have been a surprise for Erdogan, who’s accustomed to being seen as the conservative in the room at home.

    “He was given a hero’s welcome, and then the next day he goes out to them, he says, ‘Oh, by the way, you gotta be secular too,’ ” Cagaptay said. “And I think this shows to you that the Turkish model in some ways is perhaps not so directly transferable.”

    turkey 02 custom

    EnlargeMustafa Ozer/AFP/Getty ImagesMany Arabs admire Turkey as an Islamic state with a modern economy and a democratic political system. Here, Turks break their fast during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan on a bridge in Istanbul in August.

    Turkey’s Appeal

    But on one crucial level, Turkey has a far more powerful and fundamental appeal, says Cagaptay — it’s a Muslim country that works, with a large and growing middle class.

    “If there was one way for me to define what makes Turkey unique compared to all of its Muslim neighbors to the south and east, it’s what I call the ‘Turkish miracle’ — and it’s not a political miracle, it’s an economic miracle,” he says.

    Except for a brief downturn during the recession of 2008, Turkey under Erdogan has grown at a robust clip for most of the past decade. And crucially, large numbers of ordinary Turks in the broad Anatolian heartland have moved up into the middle class.

    Erdogan’s top foreign policy adviser, Ersat Hurmuzlu, says people around the Middle East are demanding not just the right to choose their own leaders, but the right to a better future.

    “People are seeing the success on the economic side in Turkey,” he says. “And they are questioning themselves: If Turkey has conducted this, why we cannot do that? So this is a normal question, and we urge the people to ask this question themselves,” he says.

    Turkish writer and analyst Mustafa Akyol says the Arab Spring had many causes, but it’s useful to focus on a question that has dogged the region for centuries: Why has the Muslim world lagged so far behind the West?

    Akyol says the answer often heard in recent decades, pushed by hard-line Islamists, was that Muslims weren’t being pious enough — they had to grow even more conservative.

    “Well, the AKP in Turkey, the Justice and Development Party, gave a different answer to this question. They said, well, ‘We lagged behind because we did not work enough.’ And they remained pious, but they also did what everybody does in the world when you want to build a better economy. So I think this is something now realized by the more reasonable actors in the Middle East economy as well,” he says.

    A Growing Economy

    If you want to see Turkey’s economic miracle in action — and get a taste of how it could be threatened by regional changes — the southeastern city of Gaziantep, near the Syrian border, is a good place to start.

    The production lines are clanking away at this factory owned by the Naksan Holding Group. These aren’t high-end luxury goods, but company officials say Naksan is one of the top three producers of plastic packaging in Europe, and in the top 10 worldwide.

    Business is booming: From a few hundred workers at its start, Naksan now employs some 4,000 people. As the taxi drivers here like to boast, with only slight exaggeration, in Gaziantep everybody works.

    In recent years, the city enjoyed thriving relations with northern Syria, especially in the city of Aleppo. Those relations took years to build, but crashed very rapidly last year as Erdogan became one of the most vocal critics of Syria’s bloody crackdown on dissent.

    Taner Nakiboglu, a Naksan board member, is bullish on Turkey’s prospects, but he doesn’t like to see good business go bad because of politics.

    “Aleppo is very close, only 80 miles. So, they were coming here, we were going there — this is now stopped,” he says. “Normally, technically you can go, they can come without visa, but because of security reasons nobody wants to go.”

    Turkey’s Evolving Role

    In another corner of the city sits a stark reminder of how Arab Spring politics have changed Turkey’s foreign policy.

    The Syrian Consulate — the only foreign consulate outside Istanbul or Ankara — is dark and empty. The sign next to the padlocked door reads, “Closed Until Further Notice.”

    Among activists seeking to overthrow Arab dictators, this is a tangible sign that Turkey has finally come down on the side of the people despite its longstanding economic ties to autocratic regimes.

    At a recent forum here on the Arab Spring, Turks were the first to admit that their model is still a work in progress. As one speaker put it, “If you copy us, please don’t copy our record on minority rights” — a reference to longstanding suffering by Kurds, Alawites and others. Another noted the scores of journalists in Turkish jails and chimed in, “and don’t follow our lead on freedom of the press, either.”

    Professor Ibrahim Ghanem, an Egyptian who teaches in Dubai, says many Arabs are now taking a closer, more skeptical look at the Turkish model.

    “What is the meaning of ‘Turkish model’? Do you mean in dealing with minorities like Alawites and Kurds? Do you mean the Turkish model in terms of the vital role of the army in the political life? So, it is a vague argument when you talk about Turkish model,” he says.

    But for all its flaws, Turkey today presents the clearest example of a modern and moderate Muslim country. And as it sets about trying to rewrite its constitution, analyst Sabiha Gundogar at Sabanci University says Arab Spring countries can see Turkey, for all its economic success, still struggling to improve its democracy.

    “Why Turkey is so relevant to the region is that democracy is still in the making also in Turkey, as well. So, I mean, that’s also another aspect that makes Turkey very relevant to other countries that are also remaking themselves,” she says.

  • How times have changed: Hamas leader feted in Turkey

    The first visit of a Hamas leader to Turkey, in Februrary 2006, caused great controversy in the host country.

    When Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal arrived, it was during the fourth year of AK Party rule, and there were still questions about the “real intentions” of the Islamist-based ruling party in the minds of Turkey’s secular establishment.

    Following the March 1 Decree crisis with the United States, when Turkey refused to allow American forces to invade Iraq from the South of Turkey, and at a time when the Turkish government was heavily criticising both the US – over an attack in the Iraqi town of Fallujah – and Israel because of the assassination of Hamas leaders in previous years, the visit of Khaled Meshaal also ruffled feathers in international circles.

    But this time around, the visit of Ismail Haniyeh to Turkey has been comparatively quiet. The Palestinian leader in Gaza met Prime Minister Erdogan, political party leaders and with members of human rights organisations. He made speeches, and paid a sentimental and symbolic visit to the Mavi Marmara ferry. He visited Istanbul’s famous Blue Mosque, led a prayer there and shook hands with Turks who have supported the Palestinian cause perhaps more than that of any other nation in the last couple of years.

    Haniyeh said from in front of the Mavi Marmara: “The Mavi Marmara broke the siege around Gaza” and thanked activists, listening to him. But this statement is an exaggeration: the Mavi Marmara incident at most only shook the siege but could not break it definitively.

    After the Mavi Marmara attack in 31 May, 2010 when Israeli commandos killed nine Turkish activists during a raid on the ship, Turkish and Israeli relations sank to rock bottom. Meanwhile the siege around Gaza did not move an inch; Israel simply allowed some aid into Gaza temporarily.

    What really changed the situation in the Middle East concerning the siege was the strategic change in leadership in Arab countries, mainly Egypt. With the impact of street revolts in neighbouring Egypt, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s increasing influence in national politics, the embargo on Gaza was eased.

    Ismail Haniyeh is able to pay visits to certain regional capitals because of the Arab revolt. The same current in politics is now forcing Palestinian groups to sit together and find a new way to unite powers against Israel.

    From the Turkish point of view, this visit also related to the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. Turkey’s desire to become involved in Middle East politics as a regional “provider of order” as Foreign Minister Davutoglu conceptualises it, requires it to maintain good relations with Hamas and support the Palestinian cause. Turkey’s support for Palestinians is welcome in streets in the Arab world, because for many years people have been fed up with the silence of their own governments against Israel’s atrocities.

    And this good impression is opening the way for Turkey, which would like to have a say in the restructuring of the region.

    Bora Bayraktar, Euronews-İstanbul

    via How times have changed: Hamas leader feted in Turkey | euronews, world news.