Tag: Al-Qaeda

  • Defying the great Chinese dragon

    Defying the great Chinese dragon

    By GRAEME GREEN – Thursday, August 21, 2008

    The Muslim Uighurs claim China has used the ‘war on terror’ to label all Uighur nationalists as terrorists and supress their culture and religion While the Olympic Games have provided a chance for China to present its most polished face to the world, they have also given marginalised groups the opportunity to bring their agendas to the world’s attention.

    As the games draw to a close, we look again at China’s ‘enemies’ before they slip back intothe white noise of international news.

    The UighurWho? The Uighur, predominantly Muslim, live in Xinjiang, an autonomous region in north-west China.

    Spanning 1.6million sq km, it occupies approximately a sixth of the country.

    More than 19million people live in Xinjiang; about 8.3million are Uighur. Traditionally once an obscure nomadic tribe, the Uighur rose to challenge the Chinese Empire.

    The name Xinjiang, which means ‘new territory’ in Chinese, is considered offensive by advocates of Uighur independence who prefer historical or ethnic names such as Uyghurstan or East Turkestan.

    Why protest? Uighurs have reported arbitrary arrests, torture and executions.

    Human rights organisations have voiced their concern that, since 9/11, the ‘war on terror’ has been used as an excuse by the Chinese government to repress ethnic Uighurs; China claims Islamic fighters operating in the region have been trained and funded by Al-Qaeda and repeatedly refer to Uighur nationalists as ‘terrorists’.

    The Chinese government has also been accused of suppressing Uighur culture and religion.

    Falun Gong

    Who? Falun Gong (Work of the Law Wheel) is a religious and spiritual practice of ‘self cultivation’ based on ancient teachings but brought to public attention in 1992 by Master Li Hongzhi.

    It mixes Taoist and Buddhist principles and exercises such as meditation and the importance of truthfulness and compassion.

    Though numbers are contested, the group has an estimated 100million members worldwide (the Chinese Communist Party has 60million), including 70million in China.

    Why? After 10,000 followers staged a 24-hour silent protest outside Communist Party headquarters in Beijing in 1999 against the arrests and beatings of several of their leaders, Falun Gong was banned and declared an ‘evil cult’, accused of engaging in illegal activities, advocating superstition and jeopardising social stability.

    A German protest against Chinese presence in Tibet Since then, the state has cracked down on its followers with, say Amnesty International, torture, beatings, illegal imprisonment, psychiatric abuses and ‘re-education’ through forced labour camps.

    More than 800 followers are said to have been beaten or tortured to death in custody, though actual figures are thought higher.

    There are also reports followers have been executed to harvest organs for the profitable transplant trade.

    Tibetans

    Who? Tibet is a mountainous region in Central Asia. It was formerly an independent kingdom but, after China invaded the country in 1950, it became part of the People’s Republic of China (which claims Tibet has always been a part of China).

    It’s now known as the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Its capital, Lhasa, was previously home to the mainly Buddhist country’s spiritual and political leader, the 14th Dalai Lama, who is living in exile in India.

    Why? Since invading Tibet, China has clamped down on religious and cultural freedoms, with documented cases of human rights abuses, religious persecution and torture.

    Many Tibetans, both within the country and in exile, continue to demand a return to independence.

    Chinese authorities have also been accused of trying to bring about demographic change or ‘cultural genocide’ by giving jobs and other incentives to Chinese populations within Tibet and plundering the country’s natural resources, both likely to be hastened by the construction of a new rail connection between China and Tibet.

    Internal dissidents

    Who? Despite claiming the Beijing Olympics would open China up to the world, clamping down on dissidents and activists continues.

    Individuals and groups calling for democratic change, freedom of information, internet and other media, freedom of expression, workers’ rights and religious freedom are among those jailed or punished.

    A recent example is Hu Jia, accused of ‘inciting to subvert state power’ for writing articles about freedom, democracy, the environment and Aids and for repeated contact with foreign journalists.

    After months of house arrest, he was recently jailed for three-and-a-half years. His wife and baby daughter went missing on August 7, the day before the Olympics started, both thought to have been taken into police custody.

    Why? Chinese authorities continue to take a tough stance against internal criticism, often handing out lengthy jail sentences for ‘dissent’ or ‘subversion’ of state power.

    Activists abroad and inside China are calling for the release of dissidents in prisons or forced labour camps, and to end torture and intimidation.

    Many dissidents have sought asylum in other countries and would be arrested if they attempted to re-enter China.

    From: yawoozezzat@yahoo.com [mailto:yawoozezzat@yahoo.com]
    Subject: The Uighur

  • The Jihadist Threat and Grassroots Defense

    The Jihadist Threat and Grassroots Defense

    By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart

    It has been a rough couple of weeks for the Egyptian al Qaeda contingent in Pakistan. On Aug. 12, Pakistani security sources confirmed that an Aug. 8 operation in Bajaur resulted in the death of al Qaeda leader Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, aka Sheikh Said al-Masri. Some posters on jihadist message boards have denied the reports, but al Qaeda itself has yet to release a statement on the issue. Al-Yazid was reportedly al Qaeda’s operational commander for Afghanistan, and some reports also claim he was responsible for planning attacks within Pakistan, such as the June 2 attack on the Danish Embassy.

    If confirmed, al-Yazid’s death came just 11 days after the July 28 missile strike in South Waziristan that resulted in the death of al Qaeda’s lead chemical and biological weapons expert, Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar, also known as Abu Khabab al-Masri. The strike against al-Sayid also killed three other Egyptian al Qaeda commanders. In an ironic twist, the official al Qaeda eulogy for al-Sayid and his companions was given by al-Yazid.

    Unconfirmed rumors also have swirled since the July 28 attack that al Qaeda No. 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri was either killed or seriously wounded in the same operation. An audiotape in which al-Zawahiri speaks out against Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was recently released in an odd manner, in that it was given directly to a Pakistani news channel rather than via al Qaeda’s usual release pattern of having As-Sahab Media upload it directly to the Internet. The tape, in which al-Zawahiri speaks in English for the first time in a public pronouncement, is not convincing proof that al-Zawahiri was not wounded or killed. Obviously, al-Zawahiri’s loss would be another serious blow to the organization.

    Al Qaeda’s current problems are nothing new. In fact, the United States and its allies have been attacking al Qaeda’s operational infrastructure consistently since 9/11. While the United States has not yet located and killed the al Qaeda apex leadership, it has done a very good job of eliminating senior operational commanders — the men in the al Qaeda hierarchy who actually plan and direct the militant Islamist group’s operations. The nature of their position means the operational commanders must have more contact with the outside world, and therefore become more vulnerable to being located and killed or captured.

    Because of this campaign against al Qaeda’s operational infrastructure, Stratfor has been saying for some time now that we do not believe the core al Qaeda group poses a strategic threat to the U.S. homeland. However, that does not mean that the United States is completely free of danger when it comes to the jihadist threat. While the core al Qaeda group has been damaged, it still poses a tactical threat — and still can kill people. Furthermore, as the jihadist threat has devolved from one based primarily on al Qaeda the organization to one based on al Qaeda the movement, al Qaeda’s regional franchises and a nebulous array of grassroots jihadists must also be accounted for.

    With al Qaeda’s operational structure under continued attack and the fact that there are no regional franchises in the Western Hemisphere, perhaps the most pressing jihadist threat to the U.S. homeland at the present time stems from grassroots jihadists.

    Beyond the Cliches
    There are many cliches used to describe grassroots jihadists. As we have long discussed, grassroots operatives tend to think globally and act locally — meaning they tend to be inspired by events abroad and yet strike close to home. Additionally, these operatives tend to be a mile wide but an inch deep — meaning that while there are many of them, they are often quite inept at terrorist tradecraft. These cliches are not just cute; they have a sound basis in reality, as a study of grassroots jihadists demonstrates.

    There are two basic operational models that involve grassroots jihadists. The first operational model is one where an experienced operational commander is sent from the core al Qaeda group to assist the local grassroots cell. This is what we refer to as the “al Qaeda 1.0 operational model” since it literally is the first one we became familiar with. We saw this model used in many early jihadist operations, such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa. It has also been employed in a number of thwarted plots, such as Operation Bojinka in 1995 and the millennium plots in 2000. This model also was used in the thwarted 2006 Heathrow airliner plot.

    The second grassroots operational model involves operatives who launch attacks themselves without external funding or direct operational guidance. This is what we refer to as the “al Qaeda 3.0 operational model.” Examples of attacks committed using this model include the November 1990 assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane in New York, the July 21, 2005, London bombings, the July 2002 armed assault of the El Al Airlines ticket counter at Los Angeles International Airport and the botched June 2007 bombing attacks in London and Glasgow.

    Something of a gray area exists around the borders of these two operational models, and at times it can be difficult to distinguish one from the other. For example, Mohammed Siddique Khan, the leader of the cell that carried out the July 7, 2005, London suicide bombings, had attended training camps in Pakistan with another member of the cell. While there, he had at least some contact with al Qaeda, since al Qaeda released a copy of the martyrdom videos the two made during their time in Pakistan.

    Notably, these attacks show that most of these grassroots jihadists, whether as part of a 1.0 or a 3.0 structured cell, selected targets in close proximity to their place of residence. Even when such cells have established safe houses to store chemicals, to manufacture improvised explosive mixtures or to construct improvised explosive devices, those safe houses quite often have been close to the target and the attacker’s residence. Grassroots jihadists really do think globally and act locally.

    A second notable aspect of several of these attacks is that these operatives lack terrorist tradecraft such as operational security and surveillance techniques. Blunders in these areas have frequently led to the groups being identified and nabbed before they could launch their attacks. Plain old police traffic stops have exposed jihadist cells such as the Virginia Jihad Network and have helped to thwart several other terror plots.

    Even when a grassroots group is able to execute its attack without detection, it often has been hampered by a lack of bomb-making skill. The failed July 21, 2005, London bombings and the June 2007 London and Glasgow attacks exemplify this flaw. Grassroots groups simply do not have the same level of training and operational experience as the professional operatives comprising the core al Qaeda group. Operationally, they are a mile wide and tend to be an inch deep.

    Another consideration that comes to light while contemplating past grassroots cases is that lacking funding from al Qaeda core, grassroots operatives are likely to indulge in petty crimes such as credit card theft, cargo theft or armed robbery to fund their activities. For example, in July 2005, a grassroots cell in Torrance, Calif., was uncovered during an investigation into a string of armed robberies. After arresting one suspect, Levar Haney Washington, police who searched his apartment uncovered material indicating that Washington was part of a militant jihadist group planning to attack a number of targets in the Los Angeles area.

    Truthfully, most grassroots operatives are far more likely to commit a criminal act such as document fraud or receiving stolen property than they are to have telephone conversations with Osama bin Laden. When they do commit such relatively minor crimes, it is local cops rather than some federal agency that will have the first interaction with them. This means that local police are an important piece of the counterterrorism defenses — they are, in essence, grassroots defenders.

    Beyond Grassroots Jihadists
    A recent study led by Brent Smith of the Terrorism Research Center at the University of Arkansas’ Fulbright College suggests that these trends extend beyond the grassroots jihadist threat. In a July article in the National Institute of Justice Journal, Smith noted that his research team studied 60 terrorist incidents in the United States over the past 25 years. The terrorist actors were from a cross-section of different ideological backgrounds, including domestic left-wing, domestic right-wing, domestic single-issue and international terrorists.

    In the study, Smith and his colleagues identified the residences of 431 terrorist suspects and found that, overall, 44 percent of the attacks were conducted within 30 miles of the perpetrator’s place of residence and 51 percent were conducted within 90 miles of the residence. When broken down by type, the numbers were actually highest for international terrorists, with 59 percent of the suspects living within 30 miles of their target and 76 percent of the suspects residing within 90 miles.

    Smith’s study also noted that many of the preparatory actions for the attacks occurred close to the attack site, with 65 percent of the environmental terrorists and 59 percent of the international terrorists studied conducting preparations for their attacks within 30 miles of their target sites. Of course, some preparatory actions, such as preoperational surveillance, by their very nature must be conducted within close proximity to the attack site. But still, the percentage of activity conducted near attack sites is noteworthy.

    One other interesting result of Smith’s study was the timeline within which preparation for an attack was completed. For international groups, the preparation could take a year or more. But environmentalist and left-wing groups proved to be far more spontaneous, with a large portion of their preparation (88 and 91 percent, respectively) completed within two weeks of the attack. This means that prior to an attack, international terrorists are generally vulnerable to detection for far longer than are members of a domestic left-wing or environmentalist group.

    Application
    While there are always exceptions to the percentages, with people like Timothy McVeigh and Mohammed Atta traveling long distances to conduct preparatory acts and execute attacks, most people conducting terrorist attacks tend to operate in areas they are familiar with and environments they are comfortable in.

    When we examine the spectrum of potential terrorist actors — from domestic people such as McVeigh and Eric Rudolph to international figures such as Mohammed Atta and Ahmed Ajaj — it is clear that a large number of them have had no prior interaction with federal law enforcement or intelligence officials and therefore no prior record identifying them as potential terrorism suspects. That means that even if they were stopped by a local police officer (as Atta was for driving without a license), any national-level checks would turn up negative. Because of this, it is extremely important for police officers and investigators to trust their instincts and follow up on hunches if a subject just doesn’t feel right. The Oklahoma state trooper who arrested McVeigh, the New Jersey state trooper who nabbed Yu Kikumura, or the rookie Murphy, N.C., officer who apprehended Eric Rudolph are all examples of cops who did this.

    Of course, following your instincts is difficult to do when management is pressuring police officers and agents investigating cases such as document and financial fraud to close cases and not to drag them out by pursuing additional leads. Indeed, when Ahmed Ajaj was arrested in September 1992 for committing passport fraud, the case was quickly closed and authorities pretty much ignored that he had been transporting a large quantity of jihadist material, including bomb-making manuals and videos. Instead, he was sentenced to six months in jail for committing passport fraud and was then scheduled for deportation.

    Had authorities taken the time to carefully review the materials in Ajaj’s briefcase, they would have found two boarding passes and two passports with exit stamps from Pakistan. Because of that oversight, no one noticed that Ajaj was traveling with a companion — a companion named Abdel Basit who entered the United States on a fraudulent Iraqi passport in the name Ramzi Yousef and who built the large truck-borne explosive device used in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

    While many state and local departments have specialized intelligence or counterterrorism divisions, training on how to spot potential terrorist preparatory activity often does not go much further than those officers specifically assigned to the counterterrorism portfolio. In some jurisdictions, however, law enforcement managers not only give investigators the leeway to investigate potential terrorist activity, they also encourage their street officers to do so — and even provide training on how to identify such behavior.

    In many jurisdictions, serious problems in information sharing persist. Much has been written about “the wall” that separated the FBI’s intelligence investigations from its criminal investigations and how that separation was detrimental to the U.S. government’s counterterrorism efforts prior to 9/11. The FBI is not the only place such a wall exists, however. In many state and local law enforcement departments, there is still a wide gulf separating the intelligence or counterterrorism division officers and the rest of the department. This means that information regarding cases that general crimes investigators are looking into — cases that very well could have a terrorism angle — does not make it to the officers working terrorism cases.

    As the shift toward grassroots operatives continues, information pertaining to preparatory crimes will become even more critical. Identifying this activity and flagging it for follow-on investigation could mean the difference between a thwarted and a successful attack. As the grassroots threat emerges, the need for grassroots defense has never been greater.

    Tell Stratfor What You Think

    This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to www.stratfor.com

  • Has China got a terrorist problem?

    Has China got a terrorist problem?

    From
    August 5, 2008

    The Uighur attack in the northwest was shocking but not a precursor to a bigger outrage

    The Olympics will open on Friday inside a triple ring of steel. Anti-terrorism precautions have been an unavoidable feature of the Games since the PLO massacre of Israeli athletes at Munich in 1972, but China has taken things to extremes.

    It has mobilised 110,000 police and other security forces in Beijing itself, plus 1.4 million security “volunteers” with Red Guard-style armbands and no fewer than 300,000 spy cameras. The security bill for Beijing alone exceeds £3 billion. Outside the capital, cities hosting Olympic events will be patrolled by 34,000 troops, surface-to-air missiles guard key sites, and 74 military aircraft, 48 helicopters and 33 naval vessels have been placed on high alert. While insisting that none of this will dampen the “festive atmosphere”, the Chinese official in charge dourly insists that “safety is the main symbol for success of the Games”.

    Not a rat will scurry Chinese streets undetected – and that, charge those few dissidents who have not already been arrested or shipped out of town, is the real purpose. The Communist Party is obsessed, they say, not by terrorists, but by fear that demonstrations by law-abiding citizens will mar the image of China’s “harmonious society”. “One world, one dream” is the slogan, and woe betide anyone whose dreams deviate from the party line. Far from redeeming its pledge that to be awarded the Olympics would improve respect for human rights, China has seized the excuse for a crackdown. By po-facedly lumping together as “terrorist threats” not just separatist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang, but the nonviolent though eccentric “Falun Gong evil cult” and “common citizens who are discontented”, Chinese officialdom reinforced the cynics’ case.

    It would carry cynicism too far to say that this week’s brutal attack, almost certainly by Uighur militants, on a border police garrison in the far northwestern frontier city of Kashgar was nicely timed to still such criticism. Killing 16 police, it has badly shaken the nation and compels fresh examination of China’s assertion that it has a serious terrorist problem in the predominantly Muslim Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, and that Uighur separatists have the Olympics in their sights. The attack is also a big embarrassment, given the massive security clampdown that China has mounted in recent months across this, its largest province.

    But it does not, however shocking, prove Beijing’s point. The fact that this was the deadliest terrorist incident on Chinese soil for a decade and that the attackers were arrested indicates, to the contrary, that violence in Xinjiang is ill-organised. Nor does it prove, contrary to Chinese assertions since 9/11, that the Uighurs are a fount of Islamist terrorism, inspired by if not linked to al-Qaeda. The truer analogy is between Xinjiang and Tibet.

    Both these vast terrains are officially classed as “autonomous regions”. To walk the streets of Kashgar or Khotan, the scene of demonstrations earlier this year, is to sense immediately how much more they have in common with Kabul than with China proper. In both, that autonomy is mocked by heavy-handed Han Chinese domination of government and economic life: not for nothing does Xinjiang, only sporadically under Chinese control until it was conquered by the Qing dynasty in the 16th century, mean “New Dominion”.

    The Uighurs have been at odds with the Chinese for centuries. Like the Tibetans, they fear becoming a minority in their own land, where officially encouraged Chinese migration under the slogan “Go West”, accelerating over the past decade with the aggressive development of Xinjiang’s rich oil and mineral resources, has lifted the Han Chinese from 5 per cent to 40 per cent of the population. Like the Tibetans, the 8.5 million Uighurs of Xinjiang are treated as second-class citizens; a US congressional committee records that in 2006, the Xinjiang Communist Party reserved 800 out of 840 Civil Service job openings for Han Chinese – using the excuse that “the cultural level of the people here is quite low”. Their mosques are closed or razed at will; their traditional homes are being demolished in the name of modernisation; and they fear, with some reason, that their language and culture are being reduced to the level of tourist attractions.

    A decade ago these discontents spasmodically erupted in attacks by separatists, chief among them the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). A few Uighurs did train with al-Qaeda – 22 ended up in Guantanamo. But their purchase in Xinjiang was marginal even then, and the Chinese security presence has, by most expert reckoning, reduced ETIM to fewer than 100 fighters. The Uighurs are a disgruntled lot, but they are not by and large Islamists and they are realistic enough to recognise independence as a pipedream.

    China does not have a terrorist problem, in Xinjiang or anywhere else. It might not even have a nationalist problem in Xinjiang if it gave Uighurs a fairer deal. Beijing needs to wake up, smell the kebabs, and acknowledge the Uighurs’ right to be themselves. The threat to the Olympics is minimal.

  • Turkey’s future Flags, veils and sharia

    Turkey’s future Flags, veils and sharia

    Turkey’s future

    Flags, veils and sharia

    Jul 17th 2008 | ANKARA, KARS AND TOKAT
    From The Economist print edition

    Behind the court case against Turkey’s ruling party lies an existential question: how Islamist has the country become?

    EPA  

    A MARBLE fountain held up by bare-breasted maidens in the eastern city of Kars is a source of pride for the city’s mayor, Naif Alibeyoglu. Yet last November the sculpture vanished a few days before a planned visit to Kars by Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Fearful of incurring the wrath of Mr Erdogan and his mildly Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP), the mayor (himself an AKP man) reportedly arranged for its removal.

    In the event, the prime minister never arrived—and the fountain came back. The incident may be testimony to the prudery of Mr Erdogan, and of the AKP more broadly. But could it also be evidence of their desire to steer Turkey towards sharia law? The country’s chief prosecutor, Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya, might say so. In March he petitioned the constitutional court to ban the AKP and to bar Mr Erdogan and 70 other named AKP officials, including the president, Abdullah Gul, from politics, on the ground that they are covertly seeking to establish an Islamist theocracy.

     

    Turkey has been in upheaval ever since. After hearings earlier this month, a verdict is expected soon, maybe in early August. Most observers expect it to go against the AKP. Turkey has banned no fewer than 24 parties in the past 50 years, including the AKP’s two forerunners. In 23 of these cases, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the bans violated its charter.

    Yet Mr Yalcinkaya’s indictment lacks hard evidence to show that the AKP is working to reverse secular rule. Much of his case rests on the words, not the actions, of Mr Erdogan and his lieutenants. Among Mr Erdogan’s listed “crimes” is his opinion that “Turkey as a modern Muslim nation can serve as an example for the harmony of civilisations.” That is hardly a call for jihad. The AKP has promoted Islamic values, but it has never attempted to pass laws inspired by the Koran.

    None of this seems to impress Turkey’s meddlesome generals, who are widely believed to be the driving force behind the “judicial coup” against the AKP. This follows the “e-coup” they threatened last year by issuing a warning on the internet against making Mr Gul president. Some renegade generals are also involved in the so-called Ergenekon group; 86 members were charged this week with plotting a coup (see article).

    The generals and their allies believe that nothing less than the future of Ataturk’s secular republic is at stake. Similar rumblings were heard when the now defunct pro-Islamic Welfare party first came to power in 1996. It was ejected a year later in a bloodless “velvet coup” and banned on similar charges to those now levelled at the AKP. But with each intervention the Islamists come back stronger.

    Unlike their pro-secular rivals, Islamists have been able to reinvent themselves to appeal to a growing base of voters. Nobody has done this more successfully than Mr Erdogan with the AKP. An Islamic cleric by training, Mr Erdogan became Istanbul’s mayor when Welfare won a municipal election in 1994. He was booted out in 1997, and jailed briefly a year later for reciting a nationalist poem in public that was deemed to incite “religious hatred”.

     

    It was a turning-point. Mr Erdogan defected from Welfare with fellow moderates to found the AKP in 2001. He and his friends said that they no longer believed in mixing religion with politics and that Turkish membership of the European Union was the AKP’s chief goal. And when the AKP won the general election of November 2002, it formed a single-party government that did something unusual for Turkey: it kept its word.

    The death penalty was abolished; the army’s powers were trimmed; women were given more rights than at any time since Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the secular Turkish state, made both sexes equal before the law. Despite Mr Erdogan’s calls for women to have “at least three children”, abortion remains legal and easy. This silent revolution eventually shamed the EU into opening formal membership talks with Turkey in 2005, an achievement that had eluded all the AKP’s predecessors in government.

    The government’s economic record was impressive, too. The economy bounced back from its nadir in 2001, growing by a steady average annual rate of 6% or more. Inflation was tamed (though it has crept back up recently). Above all, foreign direct investment, previously paltry, hit record levels. For a while, Turkey seemed to have become a stable and prosperous sort of place. That is surely why 47% of voters backed the AKP in July 2007, a big jump from only 34% in 2002.

    Many see the campaign to topple the AKP as part of a long battle pitting an old guard, used to monopolising wealth and power, against a rising class of pious Anatolians symbolised by the AKP. Others say it is mostly about an army that believes soldiers, not elected politicians, should have the final say over how the country is run.

     

    Yet the real struggle “is between Islam and modernity”, says Ismail Kara, a respected Islamic theologian. Adapting to the modern world without compromising their religious values is a dilemma that has long vexed Muslims. For Turkey the challenge is also to craft an identity that can embrace all its citizens, whether devout Muslims, hard-core secularists, Alevis or Kurds. If the generals had their way, everyone would be happy to call himself a Turk, all would refrain from public displays of piety and nobody would ever challenge their authority. But the Kemalist straitjacket no longer fits the modern country. Opinion polls suggest that most Turks now identify themselves primarily as Muslims, not as Turks. The AKP did not create this mindset: rather, it was born from it.

    The caliph of Istanbul

    Islam has been intertwined with Turkishness ever since the Ottoman Sultan adopted the title of “Caliph”, or spiritual leader, of the world’s Muslims almost six centuries ago. When Ataturk abolished the caliphate in 1924 and launched his secular revolution, he did not efface piety; he drove it underground. Turkey’s brand of secularism is not about separating religion from the state, as in France. It is about subordinating religion to the state. This is done through the diyanet, the state-run body that appoints imams to Turkey’s 77,000 mosques and tells them what to preach, even sometimes writing their sermons.

    In the early days of Ataturk’s republic, the façade of modernity was propped up by zealous Kemalists, who fanned out on civilising missions across Anatolia. They would drink wine and dance the Charleston at officers’ clubs in places like Kars. “My grandmother, she told me about the balls, the beautiful dresses. Kars was such a modern place then,” sighs Arzu Orhankazi, a feminist activist. In truth, life outside the cities continued much as before: deeply traditional and desperately poor.

    A big reason why Anatolia seemed less Islamist in the old days is because it was home to a large and vibrant community of Christians. But this demographic balance was brutally overturned by the mass killings and expulsions of Armenians and Greeks in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Take Tokat, a leafy northern Anatolian town where Armenians made up nearly a third of the population before 1915. The only trace that remains of a once thriving Armenian community is a derelict cemetery overgrown with weeds and desecrated by treasure-hunting locals.

    Much of this history is overlooked by the secular elite. Pressed for evidence of creeping Islamisation under the AKP, they point to the growing number of women who wear the headscarf, which is proscribed as a symbol of Islamic militancy in state-run institutions and schools. Mr Erdogan’s attempt to lift the ban for universities, which was later overturned by the constitutional court, is a big part of Mr Yalcinkaya’s case against him and the AKP.

    Yet surveys suggest that, except for a small group of militant pro-secularists, most Turks do not oppose Islamic headgear, least of all in universities. Its proliferation probably has little to do with Islamist fervour, but is linked to the influx of rural Anatolians into towns and cities. The exodus from the countryside accelerated under Turgut Ozal, a former prime minister who liberalised the economy in the early 1980s. For conservative families, covering their daughters’ heads became a way of protecting them in a new and alien world.

    Once urbanisation is complete the headscarf will begin to fade, says Faruk Birtek, a sociologist at Istanbul’s Bogazici University. Bogazici was always refreshingly unbothered by students with headscarves. But the rules were tightened in the 1990s. And around the time the constitutional court in June overturned the new AKP law to let women with headscarves attend university, Bogazici’s liberal female director was squeezed out.

    Like many, Summeye Kavuncu, a sociology student at Bogazici, has been caught in the net. She complains that her stomach “gets all knotty each time I go to university. I no longer know whether to keep my scarf on or to take it off. The secularists look upon us as cockroaches, backward creatures who blot their landscape.” Few would guess that Ms Kavuncu belongs to a band of pious activists who dare to speak up for gays and transvestites.

    Social and class snobbery may partly drive the secularists’ contempt for their pious peers. But it is ignorance that drives their fear. Bridging these worlds can be tricky, “because Islam is not like other religions, it’s a 24-hour lifestyle,” comments Yilmaz Ensaroglu, an Islamic intellectual. “Devout Muslims pray five times a day.”

    Wine, women and schools

    The biggest fault-lines in Turkey’s sharpening secular/religious divide concern alcohol, women and education. When Welfare rose to power in the 1990s, one of its first acts was to ban booze in restaurants run by municipalities under its control. Party officials argued that pious citizens had the right to affordable leisure space that did not offend their values. Some AKP mayors have pushed this line further. They want to exile drinkers to “red zones” outside their cities. A newly prosperous class of devout Muslims is creating its own gated communities, and a growing number of hotels boast segregated beaches and no liquor. A survey shows that the number of such retreats has quadrupled under the AKP. Taha Erdem, a respected pollster, says the number of women wearing the turban, the least revealing headscarf of all, has quadrupled too.

    All this is feeding secularist paranoia about creeping Islam. Are these fears justified? In the big cities conservative Anatolians are expanding their living space. But this is not at the secularists’ expense. Life for urban middle-class Turks, and certainly for the rich, continues much as before. It is in rural backwaters that freewheeling Turks fall prey to what Serif Mardin, a respected sociologist, calls “neighbourhood pressure”. For instance, Tarsus, a sleepy eastern Mediterranean town (and birthplace of St Paul), made headlines recently when two teenage girls were attacked by syringe-wielding assailants who sprayed their legs with an acid-like substance because their skirts were “too short”.

    Habits in the workplace are changing too. Female school teachers have been reprimanded for wearing short-sleeved blouses. During the Ramadan fast last year the governor’s office in Kars stopped serving tea for a while. Secular Turks contend that Islam will inevitably wrest more space from their lives and must be reined in now. With no credible opposition in sight, many look to the army as secularism’s last defender.

    So do many of Turkey’s estimated 15m Alevis, who practise an idiosyncratic form of Islam: they do not pray in mosques, they are not teetotal and their women do not cover their heads. The government has not kept its promise formally to recognise Alevi houses of worship, called cemevler. Nor has it heeded Alevi demands for their children to be exempted from compulsory religious-education classes that are dominated by Sunni Islam. “There is a systematic campaign to brainwash us, to make us Sunnis,” complains Muharrem Erkan, an Alevi activist in Tokat.

    The battle for Turkey’s soul is being waged most fiercely in the country’s schools. Egitim-Sen, a leftist teachers’ union, charges that Islam has been permeating textbooks under the AKP. Darwin’s theory of evolution is being whittled away and creationism is seeping in. Islamist fraternities, or tarikat, continue to ensnare students by offering free accommodation. The quid pro quo is that they fast and pray, and girls cover their heads.

    Yet the biggest boost to religious education came from the army itself, after it seized power for the third time in 1980. Communism was the enemy at the time, so the generals encouraged Islam as an antidote. Religious teaching became mandatory. Islamic clerical-training schools, known as imam hatip, mushroomed.

    Another example of how army meddling goes awry is Hizbullah, Turkey’s deadliest home-grown Islamic terrorist outfit. Hizbullah (no relation to its Lebanese namesake) is alleged to have been encouraged by rogue security forces in the late 1980s to fight separatist PKK rebels in the Kurdish south-east. The group spiralled out of control until police raids in 2001 knocked it out of action. But not entirely. Former Hizbullah militants are said to have regrouped in cells linked to al-Qaeda, and took part in the 2003 bombings of Jewish and British targets in Istanbul.

    Banning the AKP could strengthen the hand of such extremists, who share the fierce secularists’ belief that Islam and democracy cannot co-exist. If instead the AKP stayed in power, that would bring Islamists closer to the mainstream. “Six years in government has tempered even the most radical AKP members,” comments Mr Ensaroglu. True enough. AKP members of parliament wear Zegna suits and happily shake women’s hands; their wives get nose jobs and watch football matches; their children are more likely to study English than the Koran.

    Had Mr Erdogan made an effort to reach out to secular Turks, “we might not be where we are today,” concedes a senior AKP official. He missed several chances. The first came last autumn when the AKP was trying to patch together a new constitution to replace the one written by the generals in the 1980s. Mr Erdogan never bothered to consult his secular opponents. He ignored them again when passing his law to let girls wear headscarves at universities. Critics say that his big election win turned his head. “Erdogan accepts no advice and no criticism,” whispers an AKP deputy. “He’s become a tyrant.”

    Maybe he has. But that does not mean he deserves to be barred from politics, and his party banned.

  • The Not-So-Historic Talabani-Barak Handshake

    The Not-So-Historic Talabani-Barak Handshake

    Sunday, 13 July 2008, 2:54 pm

    Column: Ramzy Baroud

    A Kodak Moment:

    The Not-So-Historic Talabani-Barak Handshake (Photo: AFP)

    By Ramzy Baroud

    Most people would not have even realised that the 23rd congress of the Socialist International was being held near Athens were it not for the moment when Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak shook the hand of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani.

    An Associated Press report, published in the Israeli daily Haaretz, dubbed the handshake “historic”. History was supposedly made in Athens on 1 July 2008. Centred in a photo, featuring a widely grinning Barak and Talabani, is Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who was credited for introducing the two.

    The three individuals involved are members of political establishments that are largely funded and sustained by the US government. Both Abbas and Talabani are at the helm of puppet political structures that lack sovereignty or political will of their own, and are entirely reliant on scripts drafted in full or in part by the Bush administration.

    As for Israel, which enjoys a more equitable relationship with the United States, normalisation with the Arabs is something it covets and tirelessly promotes, granted that such normalisation doesn’t involve ending its occupation of the Palestinian territories, or any other concessions.

    One might suggest the happenstance handshake and very brief meeting was not accidental at all. This is what Haaretz wrote, rewording Barak’s comments on the handshake. He “said that Israel wished to extend its indirect peace talks with Syria to cover Iraq as well.” That was a major political declaration by Israel — one surely aimed at further isolating Iran, as Israel’s newest moves regarding Syria, Lebanon and Gaza clearly suggest. But the fact is Israel’s ever-careful leaders could make no such major political announcement without intense deliberation and consensus in the Israeli government prior to the “accidental” handshake.

    Talabani owes Barak more than a reciprocal handshake; a heartfelt thank you is in order for his newly found fortunes as Iraq’s sixth president starting in 2005. Indeed, over time, pointing the finger at Israel’s leading role in the Iraq war — as it’s now being replayed in efforts to strike Iran — has morphed from being a recurring discussion of writers and analysts outside the mainstream media, to US government and army officials.

    In a recent commentary, US writer Paul J Balles brings to the fore some of these major declarations, including those of Senator Ernest Hollings (May 2004) who “acknowledged that the US invaded Iraq ‘to secure Israel’, and ‘everybody knows it.’Retired four-star US army general and former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Wesley Clark is another: “Those who favour this attack (against Iraq) now will tell you candidly, and privately, that it is probably true that Saddam Hussein is no threat to the United States. But they are afraid at some point he might decide if he had a nuclear weapon to use it against Israel,” he was quoted in The Independent as saying.

    In his recent review of Michael Scheuer‘s Marching Toward Hell: America and Islam after Iraq, Jim Miles wrote, “It is not so much the Israeli lobby itself that he [Scheuer] criticises, but the ‘Israeli-firsters’, those of the elite who whole-heartedly adopt the cause of Israel as the cause of America. He describes them as ‘dangerous men… seeking to place de facto limitations on the First Amendment to protect the nation of their primary attachment [Israel].

    Scheuer, an ex-CIA agent who primarily worked on gathering information on Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, wrote in his book, “to believe that relationship is not only a burden but a cancer on America’s ability to protect its genuine national interests… equates to either anti- Semitism or a lack of American patriotism.”

    Not only is Israel directly and indirectly responsible for a large share of the war efforts (needless to say media propaganda and hyped “intelligence” on Iraq’s non-existing nuclear programme), but it also had much to say and do following the fall of the Iraqi government in March 2003.

    In a comprehensive study entitled “The US War on Iraq: Yet Another Battle To Protect Israeli Interests?” published in the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs in October 2003, Delinda C Hanley discussed Israel’s involvement following the invasion of Iraq. The article poses an important question, among others: did Bush’s Israel-first advisers invade Iraq in order to assure that Israel would have easy access to oil? — a question that is not predicated on a hunch, but rather statements made by top Israeli officials, including the country’s national infrastructure minister at the time Joseph Paritzky, who “suggested that after Saddam Hussein’s departure, Iraqi oil could flow to the Jewish state, to be consumed or marketed from there.” A 31 March 2003 article in Haaretz reported on plans to “reopen a long-unused pipeline from Iraq’s Kirkuk oil fields to the Israeli port of Haifa.”

    Israel’s interest in Kirkuk’s oil, and thus Iraqi Kurds, didn’t merely manifest itself in economic profits, but extended far beyond. Seymour M Hersh wrote in The New Yorker, 21 June 2004: “Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s government decided… to minimise the damage that the war was causing to Israel’s strategic position by expanding its long-standing relationship with Iraq’s Kurds and establishing a significant presence on the ground in the semi- autonomous region of Kurdistan…
    Israeli intelligence and military operatives are now quietly at work in Kurdistan, providing training for Kurdish commando units
    and, most important in Israel’s view, running covert operations inside Kurdish areas of Iran and Syria.”

    Perhaps Talabani is the president of Iraq, but he is also the founder and secretary-general of the major Kurdish political party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). His advocacy for Kurdish political sovereignty spans a period of five decades. Thus, it is also difficult to believe that the influential leader didn’t know of Israel’s presence and involvement in northern Iraq. Ought one to understand the Athens handshake as a public acknowledgment and approval of that role?

    To suggest that the Barak-Talabani handshake was “historic” is completely unfounded, if not ignorant. What deserves scrutiny is why the governments of Tel Aviv and the Green Zone decided to upgrade their gestures of “good will” starting in 2003 to a public handshake. Is it a test balloon or is there a more “historic” and public agreement to follow?

    *************

    -Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net) is an author and editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His work has been published in many newspapers and journals worldwide. His latest book is The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People’s Struggle (Pluto Press, London).

    Source: PalestineChronicle.com,

  • Arming for Asymmetric Warfare: Turkey’s Arms Industry in the 21st Century

    Arming for Asymmetric Warfare: Turkey’s Arms Industry in the 21st Century

    Dr. Andrew McGregor
    June 2008

    Executive Summary

    Located at the strategic crossroads of Europe, Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East,
    Turkey still maintains a vast conscript army of over one million men, the second-largest
    in NATO and the largest in Europe. Major reforms to the military are underway which
    will reduce its overall size by 20-30 percent while increasing its professionalism, training
    and technological capabilities.

    • Turkey’s drive for self-sufficiency in arms has brought about administrative,
    financial, political and military reforms designed to enable Turkey to remain a
    regional power capable of independent action outside its borders if it feels its
    national integrity is threatened.

    • Turkey is the world’s fourth-largest importer of arms and the world’s 28th largest
    arms exporter. Turkey is aggressively seeking to increase its market share,
    expecting to increase its annual exports to $1.5 billion in the next three years.
    Turkey is also seeking to increase its share of domestically produced military
    equipment from the current 25 percent to 50 percent and its share of NATO
    projects from 4 percent to 20 percent by 2011.

    • Turkey’s arms program is designed to address the armed forces’ requirements in
    two main areas: Conventional warfare in cooperation with its strategic allies in
    NATO and the new challenges posed by asymmetrical warfare (insurgencies,
    terrorism, guerrilla warfare, etc.).

    • Turkey faces internal security threats from right-wing, left-wing, religious and
    ethno-nationalist extremists. These groups include the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
    (PKK), al-Qaeda, Turkish Hizbullah and the Great Eastern Islamic Raiders’ Front
    (IBDA-C).

    • Turkey’s arms sector continues to be tightly controlled by the state, though
    procurement is jointly handled by civil and military authorities. Institutions like
    the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) and the Turkish Armed Forces
    Foundation (TSKGV) have recourse to financing outside the state budget in their
    efforts to coordinate the activities of Turkish defense industries with Turkish
    military requirements and encourage the development of new enterprises and
    technology.

    • Licensed production and joint projects are seen as stepping stones to eventual
    Turkish independence and self-sufficiency in arms production. To this end,
    technology transfer plays a critical part in the awarding of foreign arms and
    equipment contracts.

    • Foreign debate on issues like the alleged Armenian genocide of World War I and
    Turkish methods in repressing militant Kurdish separatism have come to
    influence the award of arms contracts. Turkey has begun to look further afield for
    nations that are willing to meet its military needs without feeling the need to
    become involved in internal political or historical issues.

    • Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and information management are
    viewed as the keys to military success in the 21st century, especially in meeting
    the challenge of asymmetrical threats.

    • The Turkish defense establishment is pushing the Turkish arms industry in the
    direction of independent production of high-tech weapons. Mastering these
    technologies will allow Turkey to expand its export market, which will in turn
    help finance arms production for Turkey’s internal needs.