Tag: AKP

Co-authored with Hilal Elver

There has been a dramatic shift in critical international responses to the current Turkish political leadership that has been recently highlighted by reactions to the resounding AKP electoral victory of June 12th. The earlier mantra of concern was expressed as variations on the theme that Turkey was at risk of becoming ‘a second Iran,’ that is, an anti-democratic theocratic state in which sharia law would dominate. Such a discrediting approach has itself been discredited to the extent that it is all but abandoned in serious discussions of the Turkish governing process.

The new mantra of criticism is focused on the alleged authoritarian goals of the Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan. He is widely accused of seeking to shift the whole constitutional order of Turkey from a parliamentary to a presidential system, and coupled with a little disguised scheme to become Turkey’s first president under the new constitution, and then look forward to being reelected the leader of the country for a second five year term. Some of these anxieties have receded since the AKP did not win the needed 2/3s majority in the parliament that would have enabled a new constitution to be adopted without needing to gain the consent of the citizenry through a referendum. In his victory speech on the night of the elections Erdogan went out of his way to reassure Turkish society, including those who voted against the AKP, that he will heed the message of the voters by seeking the widest possible participation in the constitution-making process with the aim of producing a consensus document that will satisfy a wide spectrum of Turks. It might be expected that such a process would likely preclude any shift to a presidential system, and would certainly make politically impossible the adoption of the strong French version, which does give a president extraordinary powers.

From outside of Turkey the new line of criticism seems to reflect American and Israeli priorities and perspectives, and is not too closely related to Turkish realities. The tone and substance of this line was epitomized by a lead NY Times editorial published the day after the Turkish elections. After acknowledging some AKP achievements, including giving it credit for the flourishing Turkish economy and a successful reining in of the deep state, the editorial moved on to criticize “Mr. Edgogan’s increasingly confrontational foreign policies, which may play well at the polls, but they have proved costly for the country’s interests.” Such a comment by the supposedly authoritative and balanced NY Times is quite extraordinary for its display of ignorance and slyly disguised bias. After all, the hallmark of Turkish foreign policy during the Erdogan years, as developed under the inspired diplomatic leadership of the Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, has been ‘zero problems with neighbors’ as manifest in a series of conflict-resolving and reconciling diplomatic initiatives, and a broad conception of neighbor to include the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Caucuses, as well as the entire Arab world. It is possible to argue that this direction of non-confrontational foreign policy went too far in some instances, most notably Syria, and possibly Libya, and as a result have generated some serious challenges for Turkey.

The only exception to this pattern of zero problems has been Israel, but here the NY Times once again displays an uniformed and opinionated outlook when it writes “Once-constructive relations with Israel have yielded to tit-for-tat  provocations and, if they continue, could threaten Turkey’s substantial trade with Israel.” It would be hard to compose a more misleading description of the deterioration of Turkish/Israeli relations. It should be remembered that prior to the Israeli attack on Gaza at the end of 2008, Turkey was doing its best to promote peace between Israel and Syria by acting as an intermediary, a role at the time appreciated by both parties. It is also quite outrageous to speak of “tit-for-tat provocations” when it was Israeli commandos that boarded in international waters a Turkish ship, Mavi Marmara, carrying humanitarian goods for the long blockaded people of Gaza, and killed in cold blood nine Turkish citizens. Even here in responding to Israeli unlawfulness in this Flotilla Incident of May 31, 2010, Turkey has subsequently tried its best to calm the waters, asking Tel Aviv only for an apology and compensation paid to the families of the victims, as preconditions for the restoration of normal relations with Israel. It has been Israel that has up to now defiantly refused to make even these minimal gestures in the interest of reconciliation.  And recently Davutoglu has gone further, perhaps too far, in his dedication to peaceful relations by openly discouraging Turkish participation in plans for a second Freedom Flotilla at the end of June, asking activists to wait to see if the blockade is broken due to changes in the Egyptian approach at the Rafah Crossing. The latest indications are that the Mavi Marmara will join the second freedom flotilla.

The NY Times goes even further in its Orientalist approach to Turkey, writing that “Ankara must discourage private Turkish groups from initiating a second blockade-running Gaza flotilla..” Why must it? Is it not the blockade, approaching its fourth anniversary, that is widely condemned as cruel and unlawful, a flagrant violation of the legal prohibition on collective punishment set forth in Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention? Should not putting such a demand to Turkey at least be balanced by a call on Israel to end the blockade? Given the failure of the UN or neighboring governments to protect the people of Gaza, should not members of civil society feel a duty to do so, and in democratic societies should not be hampered by their governments?

The other foreign policy complaint in the Times’s editorial on Turkey deals with Iran. Here, of course echoing complaints from Washington as well as Tel Aviv, Turkey is blamed for playing “cozy games with Iran” that have “only encouraged Iran’s nuclear ambitions.” Perhaps wrongheaded, but hardly an example of Erdogan’s allegedly confrontational style! What NY Times obviously favors, not surprisingly, is confrontation, urging the Turkish government to “press Turkish companies and banks to enforce international sanctions against Iran.” What is at stake here is the foreign policy independence of Turkey. Its efforts to find a peaceful resolution of the dispute surrounding Iran’s nuclear program are clearly designed to lessen the tensions surrounding the present coercive diplomacy of the U.S. led coalition, and backed by the UN, that is based on sanctions and military threats. It is in Turkey’s clear national interest to avoid a military encounter that could eventuate in a damaging regional war that would be disastrous for Turkey, as well as dashing the hopes raised by the Arab Spring, while also using its diplomatic leverage to discourage Iran from developing nuclear weapons, thereby producing an exceedingly dangerous situation for itself and others.

Another Western criticism of the Erdogan’s approach is to blame Turkey for a diminishing prospect of accession to membership in the European Union. The Financial Times in their far more reasonable post-election editorial nevertheless appears to blame Turkey for “strained relations with the EU.” On what basis is not disclosed. What was not even discussed, but should be mentioned as the main explanation of the strained relations, is the rise of Islamophobia throughout Europe and reflected in public attitudes of governmental skepticism in Paris and Berlin, as well as elsewhere on the continent, about whether Turkey is a suitable candidate for membership, given its large Muslim population. It needs to be appreciated that Islamophobia in Europe while resurgent is not new. Recently, it had been associated with Turkophobia, in reaction to the Turkish guest workers that stayed on, and became a strong presence, often unwanted, in Germany. In the two earlier centuries prior to the 20th there existed European fear and loathing of an invading Ottoman Empire, and even earlier, of course, The Crusades with their marauding militarism.

What emerges overall is this American led reluctance to accept Turkey as an independent regional force in the Middle East that has achieved enormous influence in recent years by relying on its own brand of soft power diplomacy. A dramatic indicator of this influence is the great popularity of Erdogan throughout the region, including among the youth who brought about the uprisings against authoritarian rule throughout the Arab world. It is an encouraging sign of the times that these new Arab champions of democracy are coming to Ankara and Istanbul, not Washington, Tel Aviv, or Paris, for guidance and inspiration.  Whether through the NATO intervention in Libya or the crude efforts to intimidate Iran, the West under faltering American leadership remains addicted to hard power statecraft, which no longer achieves its goals, although it continues to cause great suffering on the ground. It is time that the West stops lecturing Turkey, and starts to learn better what succeeds and what fails in 21st century foreign policy. A good place to start learning and listening might be Ankara!

Hilal Elver is a visiting professor of global and international studies at the University of California – Santa Barbara and an editor of the Middle East Report.

The Turkish election results are in with few surprises but with major questions as to Turkey’s political directions. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), with its conservative-Muslim roots, claims the most victory, taking over half of the votes and improving three straight elections in a row, though it will lose seats in the new parliament. The Republican People’s Party (CHP), with its secular, Kemalist legacy, improved on its last showing, but gained only a quarter of the vote. The ultranationalist National Movement Party (MHP) survived last-minute scandals to enter parliament with 13% of the vote. Even the Kurdish party managed to take seats in parliament with its independent candidates garnering 6% of the votes. What do the results betoken for the self-proclaimed model democracy in the Middle East? With these election results Turkey now faces a political crossroads. The new government of the AKP can either take Turkey down the road to constitutional reform in a more liberal democratic direction or revert to some of its campaign rhetoric that promoted illiberal tendencies that will only increase Turkey’s societal divisions and repress fundamental political freedoms.

During the election, the rhetoric of all parties was shockingly partisan, but the AKP was the most divisive. AKP leaders attacked Turkey’s principal religious minority, the Alevis, as well as its principal ethnic minority, the Kurds. The AKP rhetoric was often unabashedly anti-Semitic. Although pitched for domestic consumption, the rhetoric has also been heard by Turkey’s neighbors in the Middle East and its friends around the globe — all of whom are wondering how this illiberal rhetoric will translate into not only domestic policies but also Turkey’s foreign policies in the Middle East and relations with the West.

Turkey has prided itself on using its soft-power to build good relations with its neighbors. Based on that decision it developed strong economic ties with Syria, Iraq and Iran doubling its trade in less than a decade. It spoke of important historical and cultural connections. With that came cooperation on the issue of Kurdish separatism and terrorism plaguing Turkey, Syria and Iran and dependent on cooperation with Iraq whose mountains serve as the base for many of the Kurdish separatist fighters. During the 1990s Turkey lost approximately 30,000 citizens in a tragic civil war in its southeast. Though it ended with the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Turkish Kurdish separatist leader in 1998 Turkey still loses countless citizens senselessly each year to terrorist acts.

The Kurdish issue in Turkey requires more than military and intelligence cooperation with its neighbors. It requires a strong domestic policy of improving the economy in the Southeast, which is home to a large number of Kurds, recognizing their cultural demands such as allowing Kurdish courses in the public schools and recognizing that Turkey is a multi-ethnic nation. Therefore the Prime Minister must find a way to reverse the extremely harsh language he leveled in this campaign towards the Kurdish population of Turkey going so far as to call the main Kurdish party “terrorists.” Now as he and the AKP seek to create a coalition for constitutional reform including this Kurdish voice will be critical.

Internationally Turkey is facing a Middle East increasingly threatened by a Sunni-Shia divide. Therefore playing on sectarian differences is a dangerous double-edged sword. The fact that the main opposition candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglu is an Alevi and that the Alevi community of Turkey forms approximately 20% of Turkey should be a source of pride, not derision. Unfortunately throughout the campaign when speaking in strongly Sunni areas Prime Minister Erdogan made sure to mention the opposition leader’s Alevi roots thereby galvanizing audiences into jeering anti-Alevi slogans and creating a spirit of divisiveness that does not augur well for an inclusive and multi-confessional democracy. This behavior is directly at odds with the care the Prime Minister took to visit Shiite Mosques and leaders on his recent visit to Iraq. Bridging this divide at home will be critical for Turkey as it tries to stay above the fray of regional sectarian politics and set a successful example for the region.

The new AKP government must rise above its campaign rhetoric if it is to live up to the mandate it has won in the latest election to write a new social contract. For Turkey’s pluralist political community, the contract should be based on liberal democratic principles, if Turkey wishes to maintain its influence as a model democracy in the region and aspire for global status.

Dr. Lenore G. Martin is the Louise Doherty Wyant Professor at Emmanuel College and Associate of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies both at Harvard University. She is currently in Turkey.

Dr. Joshua W. Walker is a postdoctoral fellow at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University and a research fellow at the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School.

via Joshua W. Walker: Turkey’s New AKP Government: Will It Move Towards a Liberal or Illiberal Democracy?.

By Assadollah Athari

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) won a decisive victory in the recent parliamentary election in Turkey. Many people believe that the main factors behind the AKP’s third consecutive victory were the party’s achievements in the political, economic, and cultural development of Turkey.

Let’s take a closer look at these achievements.

——— Political development

The emergence of a new political elite in various governmental posts and institutions in recent years is a manifestation of the fact that the new political structure is now open to a broader spectrum of the country’s elites. Earlier, the secular elite was always in power, and other academics and politicians were not allowed to have a say in the political process. But finally, in the 1950s, the Turkish Democratic Party was able to alter this equation.

In recent years, the religious elite has emerged as a new driving force in Turkey. And Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s AKP has actually provided the religious elite with a clear voice in the current administration.

Even Turkey’s minority Kurds, who were isolated for many decades, finally got a chance, and their candidates were allowed to run in the elections. The Kurdish politicians, who had successfully established a faction in the previous parliament, participated in the recent election as independent candidates. Earlier, Kurdish politicians were severely restricted. For example, Leyla Zana was imprisoned for 10 years for speaking Kurdish in the Turkish Parliament after taking her parliamentary oath. But now Turkey’s Kurds have a clear voice in the political structure. Therefore, it can be said that Erdogan has broken very dangerous taboos in Turkish society.

———– Economic development

Turkey is currently experiencing nine percent economic growth, which is comparable to China. The AKP has played an important role in the economic advancement of Turkey, and especially in the country’s energy issues. Turkey is now the world’s seventeenth largest economy and the sixth largest economy in Europe, and it plans to attain a place among the top ten economic powers by 2023.

———– Cultural development

The AKP has managed to create a balance between the elements of Islam and the national identity. Moreover, it has successfully resolved Turkey’s cultural disputes with Greece and Armenia. Indeed, the policy of zero tension with neighboring countries has created a congenial atmosphere for Turkey at the regional level.

Given the public confidence which was manifested in the recent election, the people of Turkey were the best ones to judge the performance of the government over the past few years.

The main supporters of the AKP in Turkey are the members of the Muslim bourgeoisie. The ideology of the party, its objectives, and also the ruling elite are three influential factors which led to the AKP winning over a large segment of the public in previous elections. Of course, Erdogan’s charismatic leadership is also an important element in the party’s popularity. Erdogan is a charismatic leader, not a populist ideologue. Populism has no place in Turkish civil society because the institutionalized political structure of Turkey does not tolerate such a way of thinking.

Through the revision of the constitution in 1909, Turkish society set off on the path of modernization, and this gradually paved the way for the establishment of a new political structure. Thus, populist concepts and practices have been properly controlled in this structure.

Erdogan’s victory speech provided another important example of how the AKP won the election. In the speech, he promised to work together with other parties to pave the way for the drafting of a new constitution that would fulfill the Turkish people’s demands for peace and justice.

Assadollah Athari is a senior university lecturer and a researcher at the Center for Middle East Strategic Studies, which is based in Tehran.

via tehran times : Factors behind the AKP’s victory.

Ramzy Baroud writes: Success of its democracy is clearly institutionalised, not merely inspired by one charismatic individual

• By Ramzy Baroud, Special to Gulf News

The third consecutive victory of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the country’s parliamentary election on June 12 was noted by many for its timing, and its relevance to the political turmoil currently under way across the Middle East.

Commentators in the Arab world have long been fascinated with Turkey’s success at achieving a stable democracy, a thoroughly functioning and growing economy, a vigorous civil society, and a largely free media, while simultaneously maintaining an Islamic political identity. With the exception of Turkey, political Islam in the Middle East and North Africa has been trapped between different ideas as to whether Islam and democracy are compatible.

Islamic politics as a whole has seemed less than encouraging. The Taliban’s ‘Islamic emirate’ experience in Afghanistan represented an example of political Islam gone wrong. The Algerian army’s violent crackdown on Islamists following their 1991 election victory — and the civil war that followed — left behind hundreds of thousands of dead and wounded.

More recently, when Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006, the Islamic movement in Palestine began to explore various models for combining Islamic ideals with a pluralistic political system.

Some Hamas officials continue to speak of the need to emulate the example of modern Turkey.

Evidently, ‘modern Turkey’ cannot be reduced to the political successes of the AKP. It goes back to earlier generations, starting with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder of the Republic of Turkey. A larger-than-life figure in the eyes of several generations of Turks, Ataturk was able to win Turkey’s independence — no easy feat at the time. However, he was unable to resolve the question of Turkey’s cultural and political identity, as a majority Muslim country that defined modernity based on western ideals.

Ataturk reformed his country’s political infrastructure and laid the foundation for a civil society. But ‘Kemalism’ was hardly enough to transform Turkish society. It was the resentment of some European governments towards Turkey’s full incorporation into the European Union that strengthened a political current in the country, one which sought to reach out to Turkey’s long deserted Arab and Muslim neighbours.

In fact, such an approach defined the foreign policy of late Turkish prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, who served a short term between 1996 and 1997 before resigning amid intense pressure from the military. The powerful Turkish military had staged three coups since 1960, and appointed itself as the protector of Turkish secular nationalism.

Erbakan, who passed away recently at the age of 85, is largely credited with laying the roots of political Islam in Turkey. He was also one of the first modern Turkish leaders to seek serious economic integration with neighbouring Muslim countries.

Even though he was eventually pushed out of politics, Erbakan’s legacy continues. His students have become the leaders of a Turkey that is arguably at peace with itself.

Despite Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan ’s immense popularity, the success of the Turkish model is clearly institutionalised, and not merely inspired by one charismatic individual. This sets Turkey apart from most countries in the Middle East.

And while the interface of the military in Turkish politics is progressively becoming a historical footnote, the AKP is looking beyond maintaining the balancing act of yesteryear. It is more focused on revamping the constitution, cementing civil liberties and continuing with the process of reforms.

This peaceful democratic transition must be juxtaposed with another alleged attempt at democratisation.

In 2005, former US president George W. Bush outlined his policies regarding the democratisation of the Middle East. He presented Iraqi and Afghani elections as his models. Foreign-occupied, politically fragmented, and economically devastated, the two Muslim countries were the least inspiring democratic models by any definition.

Turkey, largely governed by its own political diktats — and with a self-assured ‘zero problem with the neighbours’ policy (as expressed by its Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu) — is distancing itself from the aggressive foreign policies of the US, and has rendered the Iraqi ‘model’ simply abhorrent.

“Few Egyptians or Tunisians appear to have much appetite for European or American sermons about the right way to build a democracy or market economy,” wrote Katinka Barysch, Deputy Director of the Centre for European Reform in YaleGlobal Online.

She argued that although “Turkey’s democracy is far from flawless” and “the political scene is deeply split,” it is “these very imperfections that might add to its appeal in the Muslim world.”

In fact, the growing appeal of the Turkish model owes some of its success to the failure of US foreign policies in the Middle East. Considering its waning influence in the region, the US is finding itself in the precarious position of having to accept the ascendency of a regional power, and to contend with the implications.

“Turkey’s rise signifies the emergence of modernist Islam, which seeks to balance the religion with the modern world,” wrote Frankie Martin for CNN, shortly after the ousting of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak. He once more underlined the fact that “many Arabs are increasingly looking to their northern neighbor, Turkey…as a model of a modern, democratic and Islamic nation nurturing pluralist ideals.”

It will take Arab countries more than enthrallment with Turkey’s success to engender their own successful democracies. However, looking at Turkey for possible answers to current political crises will certainly prove much more rewarding than seeking answers from those who tailor democracy to serve their specific political agendas and military ambitions.

Ramzy Baroud is an internationally-syndicated columnist and the editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story.