Tag: AKP

Arab Spring, Turkish Harvest

After consolidating its domestic, political position with an impressive third straight victory in the 2011 parliamentary elections, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is poised to cement Turkey’s status as the prime indigenous power in the Middle East.

As mass protests rock most of the region, including Israel, Turkey is increasingly holding itself up as an example of economic dynamism and democratic stability.

The Arab Spring’s greatest beneficiary is neither Iran nor the United States nor Israel. Thanks to its creative foreign policy, burnished international image, and assertive political rhetoric, Turkey is arguably the biggest winner coming out of the Arab uprisings.

Turkey is increasingly holding itself up as an example of economic dynamism and democratic stability

Turkey is not only a source of ideational inspiration for Arab revolts, but it is also becoming a concrete source of political support and socio-economic assistance.

The United States and its European allies should acknowledge this as an encouraging sign of an emerging post-American order in the Middle East. After all, Turkey is proving to be both a responsible and effective status-quo power.

Foreign Policy Genius

The greatest asset of Turkish foreign policy is its flexibility and consistency of message. Beneath this elaborate policy architecture, Ankara benefits from a very deep and incisive understanding of regional politics.

Turkey is known for its quasi-mercantilist foreign economic policy, using its positive political relations as a springboard for expanding its export and investment markets in the region. Turkey is also credited for having the region’s best private sector and most diversified economy. No wonder, then, that Turkish companies—with tacit and pro-active state support—have deepened their market penetration across the Middle East.

Yet, despite growing economic relations with Arab autocrats in the region, Ankara judiciously and meticulously recalibrated its political approach once mass protests electrified the Arab street from Benghazi to Cairo. Among all major powers, regional and international, Turkey stands out for its ability to develop a coherent and nuanced policy approach in light of rapidly changing facts on the ground.

Starting with the Jasmine Revolution, Turkey began to condemn violent crackdowns and encourage leaders to listen to the voice of the people. When Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for Tunisian and Egyptian autocrats to step down and pave the way for democratic politics, he buttressed Turkey’s moral ascendancy and regional popularity. Ankara explicitly welcomed the strongly secular, populist, and even liberal character of the popular uprisings, setting itself apart from other regional powers. This, coupled with favorable domestic conditions, boosted Turkey’s position in the Arab world.

via Arab Spring, Turkish Harvest | Opinion | Epoch Times.

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September 28, 2011
What Turkey has done right

Turks are proud of their language, and Turkey is emerging as Europe’s new shinning star. PHOTO: AFP

Turkey is turning heads. A few weeks ago the top brass of the entire Turkish army resigned- an act that could have previously brought down whatever democratic government was at the helm- but Prime Minister Erdogan reacted coolly and appointed a new army chief. The present AKP (Justice and Development Party) government has slowly chipped away the power of the deep state. Moreover many have alluded to Turkey’s pluralism and democracy as an example for all Muslim countries to follow.

Turkey was also the fastest growing country in the world last year, with a growth rate of just over 9%. It has transformed itself from the sick man of Europe to its shining star, as countries like Greece, Portugal and Spain, because of their inability to depreciate currency, gasp under the Euro zone’s hangman noose. Indeed, in a conversation I had with a member of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, I discovered that Turkey was not going to go begging for European Union EU) membership but would accept it on its own terms if offered.

The greatest challenge the country faces is making a new constitution.

In a 1980 coup the military drew up a defacto constitution for the country. As one would expect the focus of this constitution was stability, not individual rights. With the AKP’s third term in power, it looks like the party is going to attempt to draw up a new constitution. From the perspective of an international observer the two most interesting things to look at will be how the constitution defines (or does not define) the role of religion and secularism, and the Kurdish issue.

It is common to associate Turkey with secularism – where religion has no business of the state. However, the Turkish state is not secular in that sense, in fact it is laicist – where the state controls what parts of religion are acceptable and what are not – an important distinction. A secular state does not care whether a woman adopts a headscarf or not; a laicist state decides whether a woman should be allowed to wear a headscarf in a university or another public space (France and historically Turkey have ruled that they cannot). The laicist state was established by Ataturk whose cult still lives on even after more than 60 years of his passing. Ataturk’s paintings are ubiquitous inside homes and on public spaces. A friend of mine who was travelling the country related to me that a person she spoke to said Ataturk was like a father to him. His importance can be judged by the fact that the Turkish blasphemy law protects Ataturk not religion!

The Kurdish question also needs to be resolved. After the breakup of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire because of various rebellions of nationalism within the country, the Turkish state imposed homogeneity. There was a single idea of Turkishness and anything that deviated from this was perceived to be a threat to the Turkish state. The largest dissidents against this policy have been the Kurds. The Kurds (who have no country of their own but are split over 4 countries) demand that their cultural rights be accepted and that they be allowed to learn their language in schools. The state has been slow to respond, but in the past few years there have been signs of progress; recently a Kurdish channel was allowed to broadcast for the first time in Kurdish. The new constitution is likely to raise many questions about what kind of state Turkey wishes to be for the better part of the twenty first century.

What lessons can be learned from Turkey?

The first thing to note is that Turks are proud of their language. They do not have insecurities or inferiority complexes about not knowing any English and their pride in their language gives them a strong and authentic sense of identity – for both the elites and the non-elites, something which post colonial states like Pakistan lack.

The second lesson is that democracy does work given time. Whenever the Turkish army has come to power it has caused short term stability but in the long run it has not helped the country. In the absence of transparency and checks, all militaries make questionable policy decisions. It may surprise readers to know that even the staunchly pro-secular Turkish military employed violent religious militant groups (sound familiar?) at one point to suppress the Kurdish rebellion.

Ataturk’s reforms lifted Turkey from a backward country to a modern nation but they came at a cost; his secularization reforms were harsh on practicing Muslims in the country and have galvanized support against secularism by conservative Muslims all over the world. Some people told me stories about Qurans being flushed into toilets in the countryside during the post reform years. There was no way to confirm the veracity of this claim but it’s important to note that this impression was created. The fear of secularization as a threat to religion is a real one from the perspective of conservative Muslims and it must be addressed

The views expressed by the writer and the reader comments do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of The Express Tribune.

via What Turkey has done right – The Express Tribune Blog.

September 18, 2011
From Ataturk to Erdogan, reshaping Turkey

By Soner Cagaptay

As the Ottoman Empire vanished after World War I, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk created a new Turkey in the mold of Europe. Controlling all levers of power, including the military, Ataturk implemented his vision by mandating a separation between religion, public policy and government, and by telling his compatriots to consider themselves intuitively Western.

It took a century and a democratic revolution invoked by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) — a coalition of conservatives, reformed Islamists and Islamists that came to power in 2002 — for Turkey’s “Kemalist Occident,” or dalliance with the West, to end. With the mass resignation of Turkey’s military leadership last month, the last standing Kemalist institution, the army, has succumbed to the AKP’s decade-long political tsunami.

This political bookend for Kemalism suggests that AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan is Turkey’s “new” Ataturk. He doesn’t have the cachet of being Turkey’s liberator, but he enjoys as much power as Ataturk once had.

Simply put, the Kemalists had it coming. When Turkey became a multi-party democracy in 1950, various parties sought for decades to maintain Ataturk’s legacy, while the military guarded the system.

Eventually, however, lethargy took hold. Far from remaining the progressive, forward-looking movement of the early 20th century, Kemalism stagnated and then shifted into an ideology for protecting the past. To those of us growing up in Turkey in recent decades, the most visible sign of this process was the emergence of mass-produced Ataturk statues, on almost every town square, after the 1980 coup that ended anarchy on the streets but also gave the country its highly restrictive and military-written constitution.

By turning Ataturk into a cult, the generals also ensured Kemalism’s demise.

Even after Turkey became a democracy in 1982, this process would not be reversed: The governing parties, mostly from the center-right, failed to produce ideas for change. The nascent Islamist parties sensed an opportunity and began building grass-roots networks and incubating a forward-looking vision for Turkey, one that cultivated permeable walls between religion, public policy and government, and that embraced the country’s Islamic identity in foreign policy.

When the dominant center-right parties collapsed after a debilitating economic crisis in 2000 and 2001, the Islamists used a platform of moderation to attract voters. Once in power, the AKP garnered popular support for change, succeeding in part because of the decade of stable economic growth the party has provided. A buoyant AKP established itself as Turkey’s new elite, gradually replacing Kemalist power centers in the media, business, academia, civil society, unions and, after amendments to the constitution last year, the high courts.

The military was the final institution of Kemalism. Since 2007, a court case known as Ergenekon, which alleged that the army was plotting a coup against the government, has crippled the military’s power. The army has been criticized for allegedly planning a vicious takeover bid and accused of planning to bomb Istanbul’s historic mosques to precipitate a political crisis. Although the assertions remain unproven, the effects are clear: The military’s status as the country’s most trusted institution is plummeting. In 1996, 94 percent of Turkish respondents to the World Values Survey said they trusted their military, while in 2011 the same poll found that barely 75 percent do.

Recognizing this and the AKP’s dominance, the military leadership threw in the towel on July 28.

Now, the AKP, as the dominant elite, can repeat the cycle of a powerful force shaping the country.

Just as Ataturk molded Turkey in his rigidly secular and Western image because he could, Erdogan will remake Turkey to match his image of rigid social conservatism and Islamic identity.

Domestically, this means a blend of government-imposed social conservatism and popular will. An example of this occurred days after the AKP’s victory in the June national assembly elections; officials of the AKP-run Istanbul city government raided downtown drinking establishments and banned outdoor tables (and, hence, publicly serving alcohol). The change prevents potential “sins” in the public eye.

Overnight, drinking disappeared from parts of downtown Istanbul.

In Erdoganist Turkey, the line between public morality and religious values will blur, and the government’s popular power will make opposition impossible.

In foreign policy, a Turkey satisfied with its Islamic identity would stop considering itself intuitively Western, especially given the resonance of the notion of a politically defined “Muslim world” since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. This means an increasingly tense relationship between Turkey and NATO, the symbol of all Western institutions. It also means that Turkey will be open to all sorts of non-Western dalliances. An AKP decision to buy Russian weapons, say, or invite the Chinese to a joint naval exercise in the Mediterranean would be applauded by Turks, including the military.

For a century, the Turks emulated Ataturk because his political descendants controlled all power. Now, it is Erdogan’s turn. He has a vision and controls all levers of power. Time will tell how far he is able to shape Turkey in his conservative design.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

via From Ataturk to Erdogan, reshaping Turkey – The Washington Post.

September 6, 2011
Ataturk’s vision for Turkey slowly diminishing

By Austin Bay

Even for a television talk show, it was an extraordinary claim.

During his January 1, 2000, end-of-the-millennium broadcast, “McLaughlin Group” host John McLaughlin declared that his award for “the Person of the Full Millennium” went to the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, a “Muslim visionary who … abolished the Ottoman sultanate … emancipated women … the only leader in history to successfully turn a Muslim nation into a Western parliamentary democracy and secular state.

Quite a claim, but fact supports it. Ataturk’s pragmatic approach to modernizing a nation devastated by World War I and subsequent regional violence has real resonance for Arab Spring 2011’s continuing drama. Ataturk left Turkey with a democratic political structure, and Turkey’s democracy is his still evolving legacy. This “Turkish Model” influences contemporary Arab modernizers.

However, last month’s resignation of Turkey’s most senior military officers is indicative of Turkey’s domestic political struggles, as well as its internal battles over what Ataturk’s vision means in the 21st century. From the staunch Turkish secularist point of view, the resignations marked the bitter end of Ataturk’s separation of mosque and state and the stealthy return of Islamist tyranny.

Ataturk used the Turkish military as an instrument for modernizing the nation; the Turkish military committed itself to protecting republican Turkey’s secular political system. The leaders of the Justice and Development Party (AKP, Turkey’s governing moderate Islamist political organization) claim the resignations demonstrate that they are solidifying civilian control over the military — that’s how democracies do it — and therefore forwarding Ataturk’s visionary goals.

Princeton foreign affairs professor Sukru Hanioglu’s new book, “Ataturk: An Intellectual Biography” (Princeton University Press, 2011), provides clarifying insight in this unsettled moment.

Hanioglu explores the ideas that stimulated Ataturk’s mind and political imagination and influenced the modernization program he pursued in Turkey after 1923.

Hanioglu’s Ataturk is not a “sagelike dispenser of wisdom” (the Ataturk cult-of-personality narrative) but a very “down-to-earth leader who strove to realize a vision not depending on any one ideology but by utilizing a range of sources.”

Ataturk’s hometown, Salonika (Greek Thessalonica), was a cultural amalgam — a seaport with Greek, Slavic, Turkish and Jewish communities mixing and clashing. The city was as eclectic as Ataturk’s intellectual influences, which included H.G. Wells, Thomas Henry Huzley and Gustave Le Bon. Ataturk blended diverse and often contradictory influences; Hanioglu notes that Ataturk was influenced by both authoritarian doctrines and Enlightenment liberalism. The political expression of this eclecticism — at times utilitarian, at times expedient — was a “nationalism sanctified by science.”

Ataturk built on the work of 19th-century Ottoman Empire modernizers who “embraced a modernity within the parameters of an international civilization.” Hanioglu argues that Ataturk’s philosophical eclecticism and his pursuit of goals advocated by previous Turkish modernizers in no way diminishes Ataturk’s political achievement. Ataturk’s creative genius was creative, transformative leadership.

Yet, even Ataturk never fully bridged the “tension between the traditional and the modern” that was evident in the late 19th century Ottoman Empire. The AKP’s scrap with the Turkish military reflects this tension. (At one point, Hanioglu notes that Ataturk believed “the crude intervention of the military in politics” would ultimately harm the military as an institution.)

Arguably, the AKP itself — if we can take their leaders at their word — is an attempt to further the process of harmonizing Turkish Muslim social values and secular electoral politics. Mob confrontations between liberalizers and Muslim Brotherhood extremists in Cairo’s Tahrir Square are an anarchic expression of this tension in the Arab Muslim context. Libya’s chaotic civil war takes the tension further into the abyss of violence and uncertainty.

These current conflicts attest to the continuing value of Ataturk’s Turkish achievement.

Austin Bay is a syndicated columnist.

via Ataturk’s vision for Turkey slowly diminishing | Sun Journal.

August 27, 2011
AKP’s 10 years: Are justice and development enough?

The Kurdish Globe

Supporters of Turkey 's ruling party the Justice and Development Party (AKP) celebrate with party flags after the first results of the parliamentary election in front of party headquarters in Ankara on June 12, 2011. /ADEM ALTAN/AFP/Getty Images

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been involved in Turkish political life since Aug. 14, 2001. Coming on the political scene during a tough time in Turkish politics and the period in which it has faced the most arduous economic crisis of the history of Turkish Republic, AKP came to power as a single party very quickly. It has been the strongest party and had the widest social base since the day it came to power. AKP broke new ground in Turkish politics by winning three general elections, two local elections and augmenting its votes and its effective power in two referendums. In the first election it participated in, on Nov. 3, 2002, it came into power as a single party by obtaining 34.3 percent of votes; winning over two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. In the July 22, 2007 elections, it became indisputable power by getting 46.6 percent; but its seats fell to 341. In the general elections on June 12, 2011, it took 50 percent of votes, showing it has become stronger over the years.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul, Idris Naim Sahin, Binali Yildirim and Bulent Arinç, among the founders of AKP, are leading figures in the party. AKP organized as a party of the masses with a charismatic leader to combine members of different parties and differing views, both during its establishment and afterward. It has members who come from the National Salvation Party (MSP), the Welfare Party (RP), the Virtue Party (FP), National Vision Movement, Motherland Party (ANAVATAN), the Justice Party (AP), the True Path Party (DYP). As a 15-month party, it formed the 58th government under President Abdullah Gul by taking the highest vote rate in the selections made in November 2002. The ban imposed on general president Erdogan, who could not enter the cabinet and the Turkish National Grand Assembly (TBMM) because of this political ban, was removed with a constitutional amendment that was also approved by main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). Erdogan entered the Turkish parliament by being elected as deputy in the renovation elections in Siirt, a Kurdish city. So, after the resignation of 58th government under the presidency of Abdullah Gul on March 11, 2003, Erdogan founded the 59th government on March 15, 2003.

AKP whose founding staff had a political ban came to power before it had fully formed as a party and it also made its first ordinary congress after it came to power. When AKP declared its politic philosophy to the public as “conservative democracy,” 18 months had passed. Even though it came to power in its first period and the in the following two periods, AKP had huge success despite its unprepared and delayed experiment of becoming a party. It took advantage of the shortcomings of its rival secular political actors, and AKP’s slogans and policies created an excitement in society. The close relationship the party leader and staff developed with the public because of its municipal activities in the past, and the support it gave for liberal economic integration policies, are the AKP’s ammunition. In addition, AKP and the other conservative-Islamist parties, which preceded it, are always ahead of the secular parties in Turkish political life. One reason for this advantage is the partnership between conservative-Islamist parties and Turkish society in terms of “ideological positioning.” AKP took action with the statement, which embodies in the axis of two of its founding concepts “justice” and “development” and made two promises to Turkish public opinion. The first one is economic reform and relieving the destruction experienced after the crisis of 2001, and the second one is resolving the problem of fundamental rights and freedoms which still exist in Turkey.

Although the AKP has been accused by its opponents, especially in its early years, as being a part of the movement of the “national vision” (Turkish: milli görüs) and has been represented as the extension of FP or of related political tradition, the leading figures of the party vehemently reject this implication. The most explicit example of this is reflected in the statement by Erdogan, the party’s founder and the prime minister, in his speech saying that “we took off the national vision shirt.” AKP has come up against serious threats even though it had an indisputable power in the period it held power. In 2007, especially in large cities like Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, anti-AKP demonstrations (“Republican Meetings”) were organized by some institutions and organizations such as the Kemalist Thought Association (ADD), the ultra-secularist Support for Modern Life Association (ÇYDD), the Istanbul Bar Association, the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers, Unions (DISK), the Confederation of Public Sector Trade Unions (KESK). In 2008, within the Ergenekon Operation, it asserted that these meetings were arranged by a terrorist organization to provide basis for a coup. Investigations and arrests that put into practice then still continue. The party was on the verge of being closed down. It was the subject of a lawsuit with the request of closing it down by asserting that it was “the center of actions which were against secularism.” Six members of the Constitutional Court voted to close it down, five members voted the other way. On July 30, 2008, the decision was handed down to allow the party to remain open but to reduce its funding from the treasury. The main discourse of the opposition against the AKP was that the party was not a legitimate political power because of its founders, political pasts and they presented the AKP as a reactionary political movement against secularism. The opposition against the AKP has consisted of not only parties in the Turkish parliament but also a political opposition that has included media moguls and top-level commanders of Turkish army.

The relative impact of economic growth provided by AKP, which has been an undisputed power in its 10 years, and the foreign policies it has followed, have shown their impact throughout the region. The relative economic prosperity in Turkey, along with new capital and an empowered middle class, seem to have weakened the traditional and powerful ruling elites, including the army, the judiciary and the administrative bureaucracy. The constitutional amendments, accepted with margin of 58 percent on Sept. 12, 2010, have registered that change. The series of operations which started in Istanbul, Umraniye in 2007 against the “deep state” organization known as Ergenekon, included the shocking arrests of many ultra-nationalist attorneys, political leaders, members of the Turkish media and also Turkey’s military sphere. These were considered important steps in the goal of resembling Western democracies. Especially with the meeting of the Supreme Military Council (YAS) in August, insistence of using authority not used by any other Turkish government, although they had the right to, can be seen as an interference which is designating the commanding rank of the Turkish Army for next 10 to 15 years. Some problems have still not been resolved, including Cyprus policy, the Armenian question and relations with Greece. More importantly, the new process of acceptance and recognition of the Kurdistan Regional Government is considered a serious deviation from the traditional Turkish foreign policy. Some practical steps taken include a solution in the issue of the headscarf, although not completely resolved; Kurdish opening; the new discourse in the Kurdish issue; such as the launch of TRT-6, Turkey’s first Kurdish-language channel run by the government. Additionally, institutes and programs on Kurdish language started in some universities though limited, which can be counted as limited steps to erase traditional Turkish domestic policy. However, although AKP has taken some important steps and changed certain conditions in the Kurdish issue, it didn’t manage to sustain these changes because AKP’s approach to the issue is not grounded on a systematical political philosophy and the bureaucratic tradition behind itself is also another burden in this failure.

Undoubtedly, AKP has been the most successful party in the history of Turkish politics. It is easy to see it will hold on to its achievements. However, the most crucial problem AKP has to face in the political arena is the Kurdish issue, which has its origins in the Ottoman Empire and cannot even be agreed on its name. Of course, we should not ignore the fact that such a historical question cannot be solved without following a certain process. But it must be admitted today that the AKP doesn’t have a paradigm that can distinguish it from the previous governments because AKP, like the other Turkish governments, is approaching the Kurds as a cultural group or diversity, not as a nation. The Kurdish issue will remain a bleeding wound as long as this paradigm is not changed.

August 27, 2011
Islam Takes a Backseat to Realpolitik in Turkey

Jonathan S. Tobin | @TobinCommentary 07.07.2011 – 4:42 PM

Turkey’s Islamic government has spent the last few years gradually dismantling that country’s once warm alliance with Israel. Motivated as much by their ideological affinities as any notion of their national interest, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s AKP party government had distanced itself from Jerusalem and then assumed the role of one of the Jewish state’s most ardent critics. Things came to a head last year when the Turks allowed an “aid” flotilla to Gaza to be launched from their shores to break the blockade of the Hamas-run strip. When Turkish nationals were killed as armed activists on one of the ships resisted Israeli commandos who bordered the vessel, it seemed a complete rupture between the two countries was in the cards.

Thus, the news that Israeli and Turkish diplomats are meeting today to settle their differences must be considered a remarkable turn of events. It shows that despite the sympathy for Israel’s Islamist foes among the Turks and the belief among some members of the AKP that their country should assume the pose of the successor of the Ottoman Empire, shoring up their strategic position in the region may be a higher priority.

The Arab Spring wave of protests has not only brought down Arab authoritarians such as Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, it has also apparently scared the Turks who see the region now as roiling with unrest and instability. In particular, the chaos in Syria, a longtime antagonist of the Turks, is scaring Ankara. Israel knows it needs the Turks to act as counterbalance to the growing influence of Iran and its Hamas and Hezbollah allies, as well as to an increasingly hostile Egypt. By the same token, Turkey now realizes it needs Israel to act as a check on some of these same Islamic forces as much as they did in the past.

The sticking point between the two countries is agreeing on the final language of a United Nations report on the Marvi Mamara incident. Though chaired by a former prime minister of New Zealand, the committee has both Israeli and Turkish representatives. Both sides want the issue to go away. The key, as the New York Times noted today, is to find “a word that would sound like an apology in Turkish, but not in Hebrew.” The publication of the report is being held up to allow the two nations to arrive at a compromise. If, by giving a little on the wording, Turkey can be induced to back away from a confrontation, it will be a major triumph for Israeli diplomacy.

If this rapprochement happens, it will prove two common assumptions about the Middle East are totally wrong. One is that the Netanyahu government is ideologically too rigid and incompetent to conduct Israeli foreign policy. Given the skillful way he has held off pressure from the Obama administration while rekindling relations with Turkey, it appears the Likud-led coalition has a firm grasp on the nation’s interest. By the same token, Erdoğan’s apparent willingness to kiss and make up with Israel shows he is more worried about Turkey’s strategic needs than his ambition to be the leader of the Muslim world. If so, it shows that for all of the uncertainty about the Middle East and the rise of political Islam, the only two democracies in the region know they still need each other.

via Islam Takes a Backseat to Realpolitik in Turkey « Commentary Magazine.

July 9, 2011