Turkish Forum

Tag: Davutoglu

  • Turkey Seeks Closer Economic and Political Integration with Iraq

    Turkey Seeks Closer Economic and Political Integration with Iraq

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 155
    August 12, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, accompanied by Zafer Caglayan, the state minister responsible for foreign trade, visited Iraq on August 11, as part of an emerging strategic dialogue between Ankara and Baghdad. Prior to departing for Baghdad, Davutoglu held a lengthy press briefing and outlined the contours of the country’s Iraq policy. He said that Iraq is going through a dynamic process and is on the verge of an important transition, and added that Turkey is willing to play a constructive role in this process. He summarized the major goal of his trip as “conveying [to the Iraqis] the principled attitude Turkey has been pursuing on Iraq’s security, peace and future, and reiterating that Turkey stands with the Iraqi people regarding any development affecting the future of Iraq” (Anadolu Ajansi, August 11).

    In Iraq, he met his counterpart Hosyar Zebari and other Iraqi officials. During the joint press briefing with Zebari, he repeated his views about Iraq and the future of the region. He emphasized that Turkey’s relations with Iraq are based on four key principles: a common security area, high-level political dialogue, economic interdependence and peaceful coexistence on the basis of their common culture. He maintained that through unhindered cooperation in various areas, the two countries will shape the future of the region together.

    Davutoglu said that as a reflection of this shared understanding, Turkey will assist Iraq regarding the provision of sufficient water from its dams on the Euphrates to meet the needs of Iraqi farmers. Zebari reiterated Iraq’s support for Turkey’s fight against terrorism. Turkey and Iraq, with the participation of the United States, have initiated a trilateral mechanism to coordinate measures against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The latest meeting in this process took place in Ankara last month (EDM, July 29). Zebari, an ethnic Kurd, pledged that the Baghdad government and the Kurdish regional administration in Northern Iraq will implement the findings of the trilateral mechanism.

    Davutoglu’s visit occurred within the context of the recently launched “High Level Strategic Cooperation Council” (HLSCC). This concept builds on the intensive diplomatic traffic, which began with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Baghdad in July 2008, and continued with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani’s visit to Turkey in March, and Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Baghdad in the same month and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s visit to Ankara in July.

    The HLSCC is conceived as an inter-governmental forum to be co-chaired by prime ministers. As part of this process, eight ministers responsible for different fields (foreign affairs, interior, transportation, foreign trade, energy, development, health, and environment and forestry) will maintain communication at bilateral level to develop joint projects. The ministers will meet at least three times annually, while technical delegations will meet quarterly to develop joint action plans to be finalized by the annual prime-ministerial summits (www.orsam.org.tr, August 11). During his meetings in Iraq, Davutoglu also discussed preparations for the next HLSCC, expected to be held during Erdogan’s Baghdad visit in October.

    Davutoglu believes that the flourishing ties between Turkey and Iraq under this format represent a new partnership model. The importance he places on this process reflects his view of Iraq as not only a friend and neighboring country with which Turkey shares a common destiny, but also an important strategic partner. Davutoglu explicitly acknowledges that through such channels of mutual cooperation, Ankara hopes to integrate the economies of Iraq and Turkey and create a common area of security (Anadolu Ajansi, August 11).

    Meanwhile, the Turkish government also hopes to initiate a similar process with Syria (Cihan, July 23) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (EDM, July 13), as well as promoting a larger role for the Organization of Islamic Countries in the region (EDM, May 28). Through such cooperation schemes, Davutoglu wants to bolster relations among regional countries at governmental and societal levels, starting with Iraq and Syria, and turn Mesopotamia into a prosperous region. In this regard, Davutoglu confirmed in Baghdad that Turkey plans to institutionalize a trilateral mechanism between Ankara, Baghdad and Damascus based on its earlier meetings.

    Ankara’s motivation in initiating the Turkish-Iraqi strategic dialogue process is varied, yet the most immediate concern appears to be related to the security situation in Iraq. Ankara realizes that the uncertainty surrounding the future of Iraq beyond the planned withdrawal of American forces might undermine regional stability, hence eventually posing a serious threat to Turkey’s security. The Iraqi national political system still remains fragile and if the various Iraqi groups cannot manage to form a workable political system, there is a risk that Iraq might descend into civil war. Turkey is one of the first countries that would be affected by any instability in Iraq, as demonstrated by its experiences of the aftermath of the first Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War. Therefore, Davutoglu wants to engage the Iraqi factions to facilitate the formation of national institutions and ease the pain of the transition period, which, if mishandled, could destabilize the country and the entire region. Ankara’s ultimate objective in Iraq is to ensure that the country’s territorial integrity and political unity can be preserved during the transition period, so that regional peace will be maintained (EDM, July 27).

    Moreover, Turkey also has important commercial interests in Iraq, which again depend on preserving Iraq’s political stability. As Caglayan stressed, Iraq is Turkey’s fifth largest export market, and this year the bilateral trade volume is expected to reach $7 billion, making a 58 percent increase on the previous year. Turkey expects to boost the bilateral trade volume to $20 billion by 2011. Turkish firms are involved in various infrastructure projects and Iraq is a popular destination for Turkish consumer goods. Turkish contractors have already secured several multi-billion dollar projects in Iraq (Cihan, August 11). Partnership in energy is also another engine of mutual cooperation, as reflected in Maliki’s attendance at the Nabucco Summit in Ankara last month. If Iraq can successfully manage the post-invasion challenges and embark on a steady path towards economic recovery (thanks to its oil and gas revenues), it might emerge as a major market for Turkish businesses, perhaps also aiding Turkey’s own economic recovery.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-seeks-closer-economic-and-political-integration-with-iraq/
  • Ankara Approves Nabucco Following High Level Visit to Moscow

    Ankara Approves Nabucco Following High Level Visit to Moscow

    Ankara Approves Nabucco Following High Level Visit to Moscow

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 128
    July 6, 2009 12:48 PM Age: 4 hrs
    Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Home Page, Turkey, Energy, Foreign Policy, Economics, Featured
    By: Saban Kardas
    Ankara has reportedly finally given the green light to the Nabucco project, and the intergovernmental agreement might be signed on July 13. When the news broke on the Russian deal with Azerbaijan (EDM, July 2), the Turkish media initially suggested it represented a lethal blow to Nabucco. Partly as a result of the Russian media’s manipulation, it was interpreted as a negative development to undermine the viability of Nabucco (www.nethaber.com, June 30).

    On July 1-2, the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu visited Moscow to meet his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov. Before his departure, Davutoglu said that Turkey was unconcerned about the gas deal between Moscow and Baku, and supported enhanced cooperation between its neighbors. Davutoglu maintained that growing regional cooperation, especially in energy, will benefit everyone in the region, (Anadolu Ajansi, July 1).

    Energy Minister Taner Yildiz made a similar point, arguing that the different projects are not alternatives and choosing one does not necessarily mean foregoing another. Yildiz added that the Russian-Azeri agreement would not affect Turkish-Azeri talks on the re-negotiation of the price for Turkey’s gas imports from Shah Deniz-I, and the country’s future imports from Shah Deniz-II (www.iha.com.tr, July 1).

    In Moscow, Davutoglu held talks on bilateral relations as well as regional security issues. During their joint press briefing, Davutoglu emphasized that Turkey and Russia have developed close economic, commercial, cultural and political ties, while both countries could solve their differences through dialogue. Davutoglu told reporters that, though the date was not set, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin would visit Turkey in the near future. Lavrov also underlined that the approaches of the two countries toward regional and global problems overlap.

    Asked about the possibility of Turkey’s cooperation with Russia in the South Stream project, Davutoglu said: “There are no limitations and barriers on Russian-Turkish cooperation. We decided to consider all projects, including alternative energy projects. Therefore, I want to express our readiness to collaborate with Russia on South Stream or other projects in a transparent manner.” Responding to the same question, Lavrov said that if Turkey decided to join the project, the Russian side would prepare the necessary groundwork. He added that the Turkish energy minister will discuss the details with the Russian officials (Anadolu Ajansi, July 2).

    Indeed, Yildiz also visited Moscow at the same time, at the invitation of the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin. As the co-chairs of the joint Turkish-Russian economic council, Yildiz and Sechin discussed bilateral economic relations. Yildiz raised issues relating to Turkish investors operating in Russia, particularly the “customs crisis.” Cooperation in energy issues occupied a large part of Yildiz’s itinerary. Energy related topics included the Russian offer to build Blue Stream II beneath the Black Sea, the current status of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant tender which was awarded to a Russian consortium, preliminary negotiations for additional gas purchases from Russia, and the South Stream project (Milliyet, July 1).

    Sechin told Yildiz that Moscow has studied the feasibility of various possible projects to diversify energy supplies to Europe. He claimed that South Stream outperforms Nabucco in terms of its efficiency and economic feasibility, and invited Turkey to join the project. In particular, he claimed that Russia has enough proven gas reserves to feed South Stream. Nonetheless, the Russian delegation did not elaborate any specific role envisaged for Turkey in South Stream, which in its current form would not cross Turkish territory.

    Yildiz repeated Ankara’s frequent argument that Nabucco and South Stream are not necessarily competitors: “This is a strategic package. It includes important projects that concern the two countries, our regions and our neighbors.” The Turkish government will evaluate all offers on the table, and choose the project that satisfies both countries’ interests, Yildiz added (Cihan, July 2).

    These developments led to speculation that Nabucco was in crisis (www.cnnturk.com, July 2). On his return to Turkey, Yildiz dismissed Russian media reports that Moscow asked Ankara to withdraw from Nabucco. Moreover, Yildiz said that the negotiations on Nabucco were well advanced and the parties were close to signing a deal, though avoiding specifying a date. He added that the talks were being carried out by the foreign ministry and prime minister’s office (Hurriyet, July 3).

    On the same day, European Commission officials announced that Turkey extended an invitation to its Nabucco partners to attend a ceremony in Ankara to sign the long-delayed intergovernmental agreement on July 13 (Anadolu Ajansi, July 3). The commission spokesman and Nabucco officials provided no further details as to whether Turkish demands were met to ensure its supply security, especially the controversial 15 percent clause, which had been stalling the negotiations (www.euobserver.com, July 3).

    Davutoglu flew from Moscow to Bucharest at the invitation of his Romanian counterpart Cristian Diaconescu, where he met the Romanian president and other officials. He discussed bilateral partnerships and regional cooperation in the Black Sea. After emphasizing the flourishing ties between the two countries, Davutoglu praised their cooperation in the context of the Nabucco project. Though he noted that Nabucco and South Stream were not mutually exclusive, Davutoglu maintained “Nabucco is a strategic project for us. This will continue to remain our main priority” (Cihan, July 3).

    Both Davutoglu and Yildiz declined to set a date but affirmed that the intergovernmental agreement will be signed soon. Sources close to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s office, however, reportedly confirmed that the government plans to hold a ceremony on July 13. If the schedule of the heads of state from the other Nabucco partners, Bulgaria, Romania, Austria and Hungary permits, then the agreement will be signed in Ankara (Hurriyet, July 4).

    What led to this turnaround in Turkey’s position and whether it secured concessions from its partners will be clarified if Ankara hosts the intergovernmental agreement next week. However, last week’s heavy diplomatic traffic, combined with Erdogan’s earlier contacts in Brussels, shows the extent to which Turkey wants to maximize its political and commercial gains by pitting the rival pipeline projects against each other.

    https://jamestown.org/program/ankara-approves-nabucco-following-high-level-visit-to-moscow/
  • Turkey Welcomes NATO-Russia Military Cooperation

    Turkey Welcomes NATO-Russia Military Cooperation

    Turkey Welcomes NATO-Russia Military Cooperation

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 125
    June 30, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu attended the informal meeting of OSCE foreign ministers on the Greek island of Corfu on June 27-28. In addition to presenting Ankara’s views on the future of the European security architecture, Davutoglu also discussed Turkey’s bilateral relations on the sidelines of the meeting. The OSCE foreign ministers initiated the “Corfu Process” to discuss concrete steps that might be taken to manage European security challenges, and prepare the way for the next ministerial meeting in December. OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyanni, outlined the new security challenges facing the members. She said that in addition to traditional security issues, new threats and challenges continuously emerge. She added that the participants “concurred that the OSCE is a natural forum to anchor [an open, sustained, wide-ranging and inclusive dialogue on security], because it is the only regional organization bringing together all states from Vancouver to Vladivostok on an equal basis” (www.osce.org, June 28).

    These declarations for improving security cooperation aside, in concrete terms, the meeting served as an important test for whether the divisions created following the Russo-Georgian war could be overcome. The NATO-Russia dialogue received a serious blow due to increased tension after the war. Since then, Russia has expected the West to accept the “new realities” in the region, particularly the independence of the breakaway Georgian regions. Moreover, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has called for a treaty to launch a new Europe-wide security structure.

    Although NATO-Russia relations thawed gradually after Obama’s election, formal military cooperation remained suspended. The NATO-Russia Council met on the margins of the OSCE’s Corfu meeting, which marked the highest level contact since the Georgian war. The outgoing NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced that the parties agreed to resume military cooperation, but noted that “fundamental differences of opinion” over Georgia remained. He added that the details of the cooperation will be fleshed out through further meetings. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, however, stressed that Moscow’s decision to recognize Georgia’s two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the war is “irreversible” (www.rferl.org, June 27; www.greeknews.com, June 29).

    Davutoglu attended the OSCE discussions, and held several bilateral meetings with his counterparts and E.U. officials. Davutoglu expressed Turkey’s satisfaction with the resumption of NATO-Russia dialogue and the OSCE’s decision to develop mechanisms to deal with future security threats. He added that maintaining institutional ties is needed for the promotion of effective security cooperation (Cihan, June 29).

    Turkey’s bilateral relations with Armenia and Greece were also on Davutoglu’s agenda. Diplomatic observers speculated on whether Davutoglu would meet the Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandyan. Although former Foreign Minister Ali Babacan met Nalbandyan several times during such multilateral meetings, Davutoglu has not held an official meeting with him since being appointed. He told reporters that he talked briefly with Nalbandyan, but his busy schedule did not allow time for an official meeting. Nonetheless, the Turkish-Armenian normalization process occupied an important part of Davutoglu’s agenda during his other contacts. He met the Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy Rey who is moderating the secret talks between Ankara and Yerevan, which resulted in the announcement of a roadmap for normalization (EDM, April 29). Rey also held a separate meeting with Nalbandyan. Since the announcement of the roadmap, however, Ankara has come under criticism for stalling the process in order to allay Baku’s concerns, and no concrete steps have since been taken towards normalization. Although this long silence raised fears that the dialogue might have prematurely ended, Swiss diplomatic sources reportedly told the Turkish daily Zaman that the parties had reached consensus, and the details of the roadmap might be announced soon (Zaman, June 29).

    Davutoglu also met his Greek counterpart Bakoyanni. Following the meeting, Davutoglu said that they had a very fruitful conversation and that the two sides agreed to “change Turkish-Greek relations from an area of risk into pursuing mutual interests through high-level contacts.” However, he added that differences of opinion between both countries remain deep rooted and cannot be resolved overnight. “It is essential that the parties appreciate each other’s positions and concerns,” he added (www.cnnturk.com, June 28). Greek media interpreted his attitude as maintaining Ankara’s stubborn position, and claimed that no common ground could be reached (Milliyet, June 29). Indeed, despite their ability to break the decades-old security dilemma, several issues continue to bedevil relations between Ankara and Athens, such as the Aegean disputes, Cyprus, concerns over illegal immigrants and the condition of minorities (EDM, June 22).

    Given its policy during the Russia-Georgia war and its flourishing ties with Russia, one might argue that Turkey is one of the few countries that wholeheartedly welcomed the resumption of NATO-Russia cooperation. Though disturbed by the Russian aggression last year, Turkey expressed openly its opposition to punitive NATO measures against Russia, and instead charted an independent course to balance its ties between the West and Moscow. This foreign policy approach even led to charges that Turkey might be drifting away from its traditional alliance commitments, which it vehemently refuted (EDM, August 27, 2008). Moreover, Turkey initiated the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform to bring a permanent solution to regional problems (EDM, September 2, 2008). Now that Russia and Turkey are seeking to mend fences, this new development removes an important source of tension in Ankara’s relations with the West.

    Moreover, in retrospect, Ankara might claim credit for its own policy of balancing and prioritizing its multidimensional security cooperation, during and in the aftermath of the Georgian crisis. Ankara’s new foreign policy approach prioritizes cooperative security to respond to traditional and non-conventional threats to regional and national security, an approach which is also shared by its military leadership (EDM, June 25). However, as the persistence of some disputes with its neighbors illustrate, it provides no magic bullet for the resolution of all disputes.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-welcomes-nato-russia-military-cooperation/
  • Can Erdogan Break the Stalemate in Turkish-E.U. Relations?

    Can Erdogan Break the Stalemate in Turkish-E.U. Relations?

    Can Erdogan Break the Stalemate in Turkish-E.U. Relations?

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 124
    June 29, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On June 25-26, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Brussels where he was presented an award for his contribution to peace. Reflecting on his efforts to revitalize Turkey’s European Union membership project, Erdogan delivered a speech on the issue and met E.U officials. He was accompanied by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and the chief negotiator for E.U. talks Egemen Bagis. The statements from both sides reflected the fundamental differences between Ankara and Brussels, in terms of their approaches to the causes of the stalemate in Turkish-E.U. relations and how to proceed.

    The Turkish government was severely criticized for backtracking on E.U-related domestic reforms after Brussels decided to launch the negotiations with Turkey in 2005. Last year, concerns grew that unless Ankara took drastic steps, Turkish-E.U. relations might reach deadlock. Amidst speculation that 2009 will be the “make or break” year, Erdogan sent strong signals that he was determined to accelerate the membership process. To this end, he appointed Bagis as the new chief negotiator (EDM, January 12), and visited Brussels (EDM, January 20).

    Despite various declarations of intent and high level contacts between Turkish and E.U. officials, so far, no major progress has been accomplished. On the contrary, the prospects of Turkey joining the E.U. appear to be diminishing, while the discussion is gaining ground on giving the country a special status that falls short of full membership.

    This stalemate has several related causes. On the European front, the leaders of France and Germany adopted a clear stand against Turkey’s full membership, and instead argued that it should be offered a more realistic alternative, such as a “privileged partnership” (EDM, May 13). Furthermore, during the recent European elections, representatives were elected to the European Parliament from the conservative and center-right parties. Many observers believe that, given these parties’ opposition to Turkey, the political environment in Europe has further turned against Turkey (EDM, June 10).

    In Ankara, however, the government has been preoccupied with domestic politics, as well as by pursuing controversial foreign policy initiatives. In the first quarter of the year the municipal elections and the discussions on how to tackle the global financial crisis diverted attention from the European agenda. Although the government has strived to refocus on constitutional change and accelerate the E.U. membership process, it failed largely as a result of its inability to build consensus with the opposition parties (EDM, April 1). The latest discussions on an alleged military document concerning plans to illegally change the government had significant repercussions for the E.U. membership process. It demonstrated the shortcomings of Turkish democracy, and generated an added impetus for the AKP to revitalize the E.U. reform agenda to normalize civil-military relations (EDM, June 23).

    Nonetheless, Erdogan’s statements during his recent trip show that his views on Europe remain unchanged. In that sense, the overall dynamics of this visit followed the pattern set in January. He preferred to criticize the Europeans for their mishandling of the accession process, while the latter reiterated their argument that Turkey had to reform its political system in order to comply with European norms.

    Erdogan openly criticized some member states’ efforts to stall the accession talks and questioned the sincerity of the Greek Cypriots over finding a lasting solution on the island. Commenting on the European elections, he raised his concerns about the growing populism within Europe. He expressed uneasiness with European politicians’ questioning Turkey’s future membership for short-term political gains. “We want Europeans to resist such inconsistent policies [i.e., openly questioning Turkey’s full membership]. These fluctuating [views] curb Turkey’s enthusiasm to join the E.U. We expect Europe to fulfill its promises to us. The rules cannot be changed in the middle of the game.” Erdogan also maintained that “Europe cannot keep pace with Turkey’s reform performance. We expect the E.U. to accelerate the process [i.e., more chapters should opened be for negotiation]” (Cihan, June 26).

    After his meeting with the E.U. Commissioner for Enlargement Oli Rehn, Davutoglu emphasized that the growing number of high-level visits reflected Ankara’s eagerness for membership, and that Turkey will accelerate the process. “We are aware of our responsibilities and requirements in terms of the reforms,” Davutoglu added. Rehn, however, ruled out any delay in membership talks being caused by the E.U.’s own shortcomings, and stressed that Turkey has to take “concrete” steps and maintain its commitment to reform (Hurriyet, June 26).

    The fate of the Turkish-E.U. process appears to hinge on whether the two sides can allay each other’s concerns. For Brussels two issues remain of vital importance: whether the Turkish government will implement constitution reforms and if Ankara will change its attitude toward the Greek Cypriots. Ankara’s major concerns are its perceptions that it is being treated unfairly due to some E.U. member states’ overtly anti-Turkish position, and that its achievements are unacknowledged as a result. Moreover, the slow pace of the accession talks and the growing salience of the “privileged partnership” discussions undermine Turkey’s trust in the E.U.

    However justified he might be in his criticism of the Europeans, eventually it will be up to Erdogan to break this stalemate. If he is serious about revitalizing the E.U. membership process, he needs to acknowledge that its current impasse is his own making, whether knowingly or not. He must abandon his complacency and act decisively on the Cyprus issue, similar to his revisionist foreign policy vision prior to 2005. Erdogan has to “talk to” the opposition parties and build domestic consensus to facilitate political reform. Then, he might satisfy both the E.U.’s expectations and strengthen the hands of pro-Turkey groups within the E.U, thus mitigating the intra-E.U. opposition to Turkey.

    https://jamestown.org/program/can-erdogan-break-the-stalemate-in-turkish-e-u-relations/

  • Turkish Government and Opposition Remain Divided over Foreign Policy

    Turkish Government and Opposition Remain Divided over Foreign Policy

    Turkish Government and Opposition Remain Divided over Foreign Policy

     

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 121
    June 24, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On June 23, the Turkish Parliament approved a motion that will authorize the government to renew the term of the Turkish peacekeeping force contributing to the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), for one more year, effective from September 5. The parliamentary discussions preceding the vote demonstrate that differences remain between the governing AKP and the opposition parties in regards to their approaches to foreign policy.

    Reflecting its growing involvement in Middle Eastern politics, Turkey played an active role during the 2006 summer war between Israel and Hezbollah. To pacify Lebanon following the Israeli military strikes, the U.N. Security Council enhanced the mandate of UNIFIL in August 2006 to undertake additional tasks, including monitoring the cessation of hostilities and helping the Lebanese armed forces to expand its authority in the south (www.unifil.unmissions.org).

    European nations expressed an interest in fielding a peacekeeping force to prevent the destabilization of the entire region. Given the Turkish army’s experience in peacekeeping operations, and Turkey’s ties to both Israel and Arab nations, there emerged an expectation that Turkey could play a central role in this initiative. The participation of Turkey as a Muslim nation was seen as necessary in order to prevent the impression that the international force was seeking to impose a “Western” plan. It was even suggested that Turkey could lead the international force, on its own or jointly with France. Although Israel reportedly favored this idea, Hezbollah sources did not welcome it (Yeni Safak, June 25, 2006).

    Moreover, Turkish public opinion was strongly opposed to the participation of Turkish soldiers in such a controversial mission. Since this international force was perceived as a measure to contain Hezbollah, there were concerns that the Turkish forces might be forced to engage in armed conflict with Hezbollah militants, which might have complicated Turkey’s friendly relations with Arab states. Given the growing anti-American sentiments within Turkish society, this force was portrayed as an occupation force acting on behalf of Israel (Yeni Asya, August 14, 2006). Despite this domestic opposition, the government preferred to cooperate with the international community. It conducted a careful risk analysis, and the then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul consulted other regional actors and the major political factions in Lebanon to gauge their reactions to any military deployment (Zaman, August 15, 2006; Aksam, September 3, 2006).

    As a compromise solution, Ankara agreed to contribute to the UNIFIL with non-combat units, and stressed that it would not participate in the demilitarization of Hezbollah. The Turkish Parliament approved the deployment in September 2006, following intense discussions. The opposition parties voted against the motion, but given its parliamentary majority, the AKP was able to obtain the necessary authorization (Turkiye, September 6, 2006). The Turkish contingent was deployed to Lebanon in October 2006 (Sabah, October 12, 2006), and the mandate of the force was renewed in 2007 and 2008. The Turkish armed forces have contributed patrol boats to the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force and a military engineering company to assist the reconstruction efforts in Lebanon (www.tsk.tr; www.unifil.unmissions.org).

    As the mandate of the Turkish contingent expires in September, the government forwarded a motion to the parliament seeking an extension. Since the AKP’s recent foreign policy initiatives have encountered strong resistance from opposition parties, the fate of the motion was unclear. In another recent parliamentary debate, the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), supported by the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP), literally waged a “war of attrition” to prevent the passage of a bill concerning mine clearance on the Turkish-Syrian border. The bill eventually passed after these delays, only after the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan pressured the deputies from his party (EDM, May 21, 29, June 5).

    No major discussions emerged over the governmental motion extending the mandate of the Turkish contingent, which might be related to its forces not encountering any serious issues thus far. The CHP continued to approach the UNIFIL from a skeptical perspective. The CHP speaker maintained that the UNIFIL’s mission is not limited to the provision of humanitarian services and ensuring regional stability alone. Rather, its purpose is to provide conditions for a future military operation to “eliminate Hezbollah and… act as a shield to protect Israel in the event of such an operation.” He also maintained that despite U.S. President Barack Obama’s rhetoric on mending fences with Turkey, he has not been sensitive to Turkey’s interests in the Middle East, most importantly regarding the PKK issue. The MHP speaker praised the achievements of the Turkish force, but restated his criticism of the policies pursued by other international actors toward the Middle East. The opposition parties failed to oppose the government’s motion, but demanded that it act more assertively to protect Turkish interests vis-à-vis international actors -in particular the United States. In his address to parliament, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu emphasized that Turkey’s contributions to Lebanon has to be discussed in the context of its new strategy of contributing to global and regional peace. Davutoglu maintained that, both through its soft power and military capabilities, “Turkey is playing an order instituting role” in its region (www.tbmm.gov.tr, June 23).

    Nonetheless, the parliamentary discussions highlighted the underlying divisions between the AKP and the opposition parties, over their positions on how to harmonize Turkey’s regional policies with those of other global actors. The opposition maintains a deep-rooted skepticism toward the agendas of international actors in the Middle East. In contrast, the AKP considers Turkey’s cooperation with the international institutions and Western nations as complementary to its own regional policies. As the AKP strives to promote the country’s regional power status, it triggers suspicions among some circles in the West that view this new policy as a departure from Turkey’s Western orientation. However, on the domestic front, the AKP’s concern not to challenge the interests of international actors, exposes it to criticism for failing to adequately protect its national interests. How Davutoglu manages this “double-challenge,” might prove a major test of his skills as a geostrategist.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-government-and-opposition-remain-divided-over-foreign-policy/
  • Davutoglu signals Turkey’s growing agenda-setting role within the Islamic world

    Davutoglu signals Turkey’s growing agenda-setting role within the Islamic world

    Davutoglu signals Turkey’s growing agenda-setting role within the Islamic world

    Turkey Calls for OIC Involvement in Conflict Resolution

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 102
    May 28, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On May 23-25 the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu participated in the thirty sixth session of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Foreign Ministers Council in Damascus. As well as marking Turkey’s increased profile within regional diplomacy, the event provided an opportunity for Davutoglu to hold several bilateral meetings with his counterparts.

    Envoys from Muslim states discussed a wide range of issues, and considered proposals for mitigating Western Islamophobia, increasing the OIC’s role in conflict resolution, and raising its visibility in humanitarian affairs. The Turkish Secretary-General of the OIC, Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, also organized a brainstorming session on the organization’s role in promoting peace and security. Reminding its members of the numerous conflicts taking place within the Muslim world, he called on them to consider developing OIC’s mechanisms for conflict resolution, including establishing future peacekeeping capabilities (www.oic-oci.org).

    Since his election in 2005, Ihsanoglu has launched several initiatives to reform the organization, and his recent proposal is consistent with such efforts. Turkey has welcomed his appointment and praised the subsequent activities of the OIC under his leadership, as evidence of the country’s increased profile in international diplomacy.

    Commenting on his discussions during the conference, Davutoglu told reporters that Turkey supported Ihsanoglu’s initiatives to reform the institution, and added that the proposal for greater OIC involvement in conflict resolution was developed in coordination with Ankara. He said “We cannot expect others to solve our problems… This [conflict resolution] is its [OIC’s] founding mission. Although everyone acknowledges this mission, there is no mechanism to realize it.” Davutoglu added that the formation of peacekeeping forces might be considered at a later stage, but it is urgently required to develop conflict prevention mechanisms which address the crises within the Islamic world (www.cnnturk.com, May 24).

    Davutoglu said that all participating countries respected Turkey’s recent initiatives and Ankara’s leading role in regional diplomacy, while having high expectations from Turkey. Davutoglu argued that Turkey is no longer a country that is merely a passive recipient of an agenda from international organizations. He called the country’s new role as surukleyici (pioneer or leader) and added that Turkey is now acting as an agenda-setter within international organizations (Anadolu Ajansi, May 25).

    In his address, Davutoglu touched on several issues facing Muslim communities, including the plight of Palestine, the instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the denial of minority rights to the Turkish community living in Western Thrace and the frozen conflict in Karabakh. He highlighted Ankara’s constructive policies and effective use of its soft power toward the resolution of these issues. Emphasizing an urgent need for “peace, dialogue, communication and stability,” Davutoglu called on Muslim countries to respond to their contemporary challenges: “There is a new geostrategic, geopolitical and geoeconomic culture within the Islamic world. We need to develop a new vision according to the expectations, traditions and values of our era” (Anadolu Ajansi, May 24).

    Davutoglu also held several bilateral meetings, including with the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the Arab League Secretary-General Amr Musa and the foreign ministers from other OIC countries, including his Iranian, Iraqi and Azeri counterparts (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 24). The statements emerging from these discussions emphasized the new sense of cooperation that exists between Turkey and its eastern neighbors, which the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has fostered since coming to power in 2002.

    Davutoglu demonstrated a constructive attitude toward Baghdad and Damascus. Following his meeting with Iraq’s foreign minister Hoshyar Zebari, Davutoglu told reporters that Turkey will release more water from its dams on the Euphrates to meet the needs of Iraqi farmers threatened by a drought. Earlier, an Iraqi delegation composed of Sunni leaders visited Ankara and submitted similar proposals. Turkey has now officially opened the dams and increased the water flow to Syria and Iraq (Yeni Safak, May 24; Hurriyet Daily News, May 25).

    As the former chief advisor to the Turkish prime minister and now in his role as foreign minister, Davutoglu has been the architect of the new Turkish foreign policy (EDM, March 25, May 4, 8). Davutoglu’s geopolitical approach to international relations has been complemented by his understanding of the role played by civilizations in world history. In Davutoglu’s weltanschauung, the Islamic civilization faces a major challenge and needs to transform itself in the fields of economics, politics, culture and education to meet its contemporary challenges. He links the transformation in Turkish domestic and foreign policies to this broader trend, and assigns the country a “special mission” in this process. He does not want to enforce Turkish leadership on other Islamic countries, but he believes that Turkey can set an example. In his view, other OIC countries will naturally come to recognize Turkey’s leadership if it can develop constructive policies within the Islamic world.

    His efforts to boost Turkish ties within the Islamic world have led some analysts to criticize his policies, by representing them as a drift away from the West -making Turkey more Islamic or Middle Eastern. However, though the Islamic world has been increasingly more central in Turkish foreign policy priorities, such initiatives are not necessarily at the expense of the country’s Western orientation. Since his appointment as foreign minister, Davutoglu has pursued an active agenda aimed at revitalizing stalled Turkish-European relations, improving ties with the United States, and refocusing Ankara’s attention on Central Asia. This reflects Davutoglu’s emergence as a major geopolitical thinker, advocating a more proactive and multi-dimensional foreign policy -balancing Ankara’s interests within several regions simultaneously along Turkey’s fragile Eurasian periphery.

    The real question may not be ideological -whether Turkish foreign policy is drifting away from its traditional Western orientation- but a practical consideration. Davutoglu faces the challenge as to whether Turkey can sustain this ambitious, multi-dimensional foreign policy agenda, and fulfil the many expectations this creates without overstretching its resources.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-calls-for-oic-involvement-in-conflict-resolution/