Tag: Davutoglu

Genocide conference in NYC

As Genocide Continues to Shape World History, Landmark Conference will Seek Answers and Understanding

International Group of Scholars Gather to Focus Lens on Genocide through examination of Raphael Lemkin, Advocate and Initiator of United Nations Genocide Convention in 1948
Wed Oct 21, 2009 8:30am EDT

NEW YORK, Oct. 21 /PRNewswire/ — Current news headlines are a sad reminder
that genocide has been, and continues to be, a stain on human existence in all
corners of the world, from Rwanda to Armenia, to Darfur and beyond. Those
headlines also underscore the urgency of addressing every instance of the
crime, particularly in light of a statement made by Adolf Hitler before
invading Poland in 1939: “… I put ready my Death’s Head units, with orders
to send to death, mercilessly and without compassion, all men, women, and
children of the Polish race or language. … Who, after all, still talks
nowadays of the extermination of the Armenians?”

Inscribed on the wall of the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C., that quote
illustrates that Hitler was emboldened by the lack of international response
to Turkey’s killing of more than a million ethnic Armenians during World War
I. By contrast, however, that episode in human history was also the spark that
led to the tireless efforts of one man to define the crime of genocide under
international law and enable perpetrators, such as a recently arrested suspect
in the Rwandan genocide, to be charged and brought to justice. That man was
Raphael Lemkin, whose life-long devotion to the cause not only coined and
defined the word “genocide,” but led to the 1948 United Nations Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

The invaluable contributions of Lemkin will be the focus of an international
public conference, “Genocide and Human Experience: Raphael Lemkin’s Thought
and Vision,” to be held Sunday, November 15, from 9:00 a.m.-6:30 p.m., at the
Center for Jewish History, 15 West 16th Street in New York City. Bringing
together for the first time an international group of historians, political
scientists, anthropologists, philosophers, philanthropists, and legal
authorities to explore the tremendous legacy and impact of Lemkin’s work, the
landmark conference will also delve into perpetually relevant questions of
human rights and the nature of human behavior.

“Raphael Lemkin died in 1959, and while few people today may recognize his
name, most feel the impact of his work,” said Michael Glickman, Center for
Jewish History COO. “As a young Jewish lawyer in Warsaw almost 90 years ago,
Lemkin could not understand why it was a crime for an Armenian youth to murder
the Turkish official responsible for the attempted destruction of the Armenian
community in the Ottoman Empire, but not a crime for the government to murder
more than a million Armenians. That question inspired Lemkin to devote the
rest of his life to fight against such horrors and to wage a campaign of
international advocacy that led to the United Nations Genocide Convention.”

A wealth of Lemkin’s correspondence, along with papers documenting Lemkin’s
work as an activist, are housed in the archives of the American Jewish
Historical Society at the Center for Jewish History. The documents include
correspondences with public figures such as Eleanor Roosevelt, General Dwight
D. Eisenhower, and Pearl S. Buck; Lemkin’s unfinished manuscript History of
Genocide; and archival footage of interviews from the 1950s. The Lemkin
archives will also be the subject of a special exhibition at the Center for
Jewish History in partnership with Yeshiva University Museum scheduled to run
from November 16, 2009, to March 19, 2010.

Even though the crime of genocide is often understood as mass murder alone,
Lemkin viewed genocide as a nuanced concept, which shapes and is determined by
the spheres of economics, law, society, and culture. Through Lemkin’s archival
writings, the conference will focus on these gradations of genocide, as Lemkin
understood them.

Opening the conference will be an historical overview and brief biographical
account of Lemkin’s life, legal and other accomplishments, and perspectives on
the human condition, setting the context for the panel discussions to follow.
Topics to be explored by three different panels fall under the broad subjects
of Lemkin’s perspective on cultural genocide, the complex economic and social
issues surrounding genocide, and the challenging relationship between
international law and genocide.

Among the distinguished list of presenters are Vartan Gregorian, President,
Carnegie Corporation of New York; Peter Balakian, Colgate College; Donna-Lee
Frieze, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia; Alexander Laban Hinton,
Rutgers University; Jim Fussell, PreventGenocide.org; Tanya Elder, American
Jewish Historical Society; Berel Lang, Wesleyan University; Benjamin
Valentino, Dartmouth College; Lawrence Woocher, US Institute of Peace; Hilary
Earl, Nipissing University, North Bay, Ontario; Benedict F. Kiernan, Yale
University; Muhamed Mesic, Bosnia; William A. Schabas, National University of
Ireland; and Steven Leonard Jacobs, University of Alabama.

“It is the hope of the Center and the conference sponsors that this historic
gathering will not only provide some clearer understandings of both the
extraordinary courage and dynamic intellect of one individual, but will also
clarify the challenges that lie ahead in confronting the evil of genocide in
the modern world,” continued Mr. Glickman. “It is said that those who do not
learn from history are doomed to repeat it. ‘Genocide and Human Experience:
Raphael Lemkin’s Thought and Vision’ represents one small step to teach the
lessons humankind so desperately needs, as history continues to repeat itself
in the 21st century.”

The conference is open to the general public. For more information, visit
www.cjh.org/lemkin; or to register, log on to www.smarttix.com or call
212-868-4444.

SOURCE Center for Jewish History

Cathy Callegari, +1-212-579-1370, cathy@callprinc.com

URL:

October 23, 2009
Turkey Exposed:

Cannot Pretend to be

Both Pro-Israeli and Pro-Palestinian

Publisher, The California Courier

Playing the skillful political games of their Ottoman predecessors, Turkey’s current masters present their country under various guises — as European and Middle Eastern, Islamic and secular, pro-Arab and pro-Israeli.

It now appears that the end is near for at least one of these Turkish charades. Israeli officials have finally awakened from their prolonged coma to discover that their erstwhile “strategic partner” is far more hostile than their Arab enemies.

For a long time, Turkish leaders have been calling the Israelis all sorts of unsavory names and accusing Israel of committing barbaric acts, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Strangely, Israel has shown little indignation, even in the face of persistent racist and anti-Semitic outbursts by large segments of the Turkish public.

The latest display of Turkish hostility was the exclusion of Israel from a multinational military exercise which was to start in Turkey on October 12. In protest, the United States, Italy and Holland pulled out of these maneuvers, causing their cancellation. In a move designed to further irritate the Israelis, Turkey announced that it would instead hold joint military exercises with Syria, Israel’s main adversary.

Turkey’s Prime Minster Rejeb Erdogan told the Anatolia Press Agency last week that he had banned Israel from the military drill in response to the wishes of the Turkish public. “Turkey does not take orders from anyone in regards to its internal affairs,” Erdogan boasted. Some Turkish officials indicated that the ban was instituted because the Israeli jets assigned to the exercise had participated in the Gaza bombings earlier this year.

This episode marks a major escalation of the long-standing Turkish bitterness towards Israel. For the first time, the Turkish military joined the civilian government in adopting an anti-Israeli position. Furthermore, Turkey went beyond mere verbal condemnation to taking concrete action. For years, the Israeli government was willing to swallow insults from Turkish officials, as long as its Air Force was permitted to make practice runs in the vast Turkish airspace, shared intelligence, and sold military hardware to Turkey.

Making matters worse, Israelis were deeply offended by the broadcast of a Turkish show on state TV last week, depicting graphic scenes of Israeli soldiers killing Palestinian children and committing other atrocities.

Israel’s Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman reacted by summoning the Turkish ambassador and accused Turkey of inciting hatred against Israelis. Lieberman stated that not even Israel’s enemies would air such a hostile TV series. Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister Silvan Shalom urged Turkey “to come to its senses.” Another Israeli official stated: “We need to stop accepting the Turkish dictates and humiliations. It is inconceivable that they should insult us at every opportunity, and we should continue to hold our tongues.”

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu categorically rejected any future mediating role for Turkey in talks with Syria. An unnamed “senior Israeli official” was quoted by Haaretz as stating that the strategic ties with Turkey may “have simply ended.” Meanwhile, the Jerusalem Post quoted some Israeli defense officials as stating that “advanced weapons sales to Turkey would now be reviewed.”

There were also widespread calls last week for the Israeli public to boycott Turkish resorts. National Public Radio (NPR) reported that Israel’s largest labor union would no longer plan for thousands of its workers organized tours of Turkey, and would direct them to go instead to Greece and Bulgaria. Since January, there has been a 47% drop in the number of Israelis spending their vacations in Turkey, according to Time magazine. An Israeli coffee shop chain expressed its displeasure by announcing that it would no longer serve Turkish coffee to its customers. In an unprecedented move, several Israeli cabinet ministers declared that they would turn down the Turkish Embassy’s invitation to attend Turkey’s Independence Day celebrations later this month.

Many outraged Israelis advocated that, in retaliation, Israel acknowledge the Armenian Genocide. Dan Margalit of “Israel Hayom” newspaper accused the Turks of not only committing Genocide, but also the “ongoing crime, which is expressed in energetic Turkish activity to deny the atrocity and to incite against any country and government and artist who wish to express their horror.”

Ephraim Inbar, head of the BESA Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University in Ramat Gan, reminded the Turks that they are still in need of “Israeli influence in Washington to prevent the passage in Congress of a resolution declaring the killing of Armenians during World War I a genocide.”

In an unprecedented action, the “Im Tirtzu” Israeli student movement held a protest last week in front of the Turkish Embassy in Tel Aviv. The students displayed bloody pictures of victims of the Armenian Genocide, handed out books on the Genocide to passersby, and carried signs calling on Turkey to formally recognize the Genocide.

To atone for its past sin of siding with Turkish denialists, Israel must officially affirm the Armenian Genocide as well as actively lobby for its recognition by other states. Israel should also permit the erection of a monument at a prominent location to commemorate the victims of the Armenian Genocide and reverse its long-standing ban on TV broadcast of documentaries on this subject. It is certainly in Israel’s own interest to side with the victims of genocide rather than with its perpetrators!

Instead of maintaining at all cost its unholy alliance with Turkey, Israel should earnestly pursue a peace settlement with the Palestinians and live in peace with its Arab neighbors, thus obviating the need to curry favors with the Turkish denialist regime.

==================== SUBJECT RELATED E-MAIL’S RECEIVED=

From: Ismet Takim [ismettakim@yahoo.com]

Subject: {Pax Turcica} Our problems are just begining, l worned you all before, we play this game we will loose and guess who is happy???

READ

Turkey Exposed:

and any of you still have any questions about this? some of our readers here is also responsiable for this and you have no idea what we will face, you just sit and watch, pro Palestenian Turkey is comitting suicide,

Erdogan made the biggest mistake, and some of you who posts pro

Filistin BS, tags and articles here should be ashame of themselves

they have done a disservice and put our mainly my efforts back in

time, and we have to fix this now, l have to go to work again and undo some of this,

stupid stupid stupid bird brains bleeding hearts, stop your Anti Israel stands and get real, stop hurting Turkey,

======================================================

From: Metin Mangir [mangir.metin@gmail.com]
Subject: {Pax Turcica} Are you aware of the slap to Erdogan by Obama?

While we are all focussed on the Armenian issue (because of our

proxomity to the diaspora) Obama invited (!) Erdogan to come to WDC on

Oct 29 (with two weeks notice), following the cancellation of the joint

military exercises with Israel, US, and the increasing row with Israel

upon showing of a TV program on TRT. (now that Turkey has good

relations with Syria, does it not need Israel to squeeze Syria?? which

was what started the close military collaboration with Israel.)

The choice of date and such short notice is VERY significant (and

insulting)! The big brother is calling the errant boy on the carpet?

By the way, in general the news about the Armenian protocols are

positive in Turkey (amazing!). Very few voices are opposing it. Also

it has lost its luster as the “milli birlik acilimi” and the return of

34 people from Irak upon Ocalan’s orders has taken the center stage.

If the borders open the real big winner will be Russia, more than

Armenia. Since (rightly) Azerbeycan will be pissed off at Turkey and

the West, and get closer to Russia (if it can dare to play with such

danger) and the West, US will loose the Caucases.

What I do not understand is

1) how come US is willing to let this happen? What has Russia forced

upon US following Georgia?

2) Davutoglu, who has written in three different places in his book

about the crucial importance of Azerbeycan for Turkey, is going along

with this protocols steps?

Metin

==========================================

From: Ergun [ergun@cox.net]
Subject: {Pax Turcica} Re: Are you aware of the slap to Erdogan by Obama?

Metin,

I suspect one major thing behind Obama’s sudden invitation: Afghanistan.

He may ask for more troops from Turkey. Secondarily, Iraq. O. may discuss

strategy with E. on the mechanics of US pull out, the vacuum in Iraq, etc.

All have to do with US involvement in unpopular, unwanted wars that are

draining the US economy and social life.

Israel, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and others are little more than dressing for

the salad.

This is one man’s opinion. 🙂

Ergun KIRLIKOVALI

===================================================

Statement released by National Security Council that met today is below. Afghanistan issue has been discussed. Turkey will resume Kabul Area Commandership for the second time.

Afganistan‘da son dönemde meydana gelen gelişmeler, Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimleri dahil, değerlendirilmiş, ülkemizin Afganistan‘ın istikrarına yönelik katkı ve girişimlerinin sürdürüleceği belirtilmiştir. Bu kapsamda; Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Kabil Bölge Komutanlığı görevini Kasım 2009 başında ikinci defa alacağı, yine önceki görevlerde olduğu gibi, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin terörle mücadele, uyuşturucu ile mücadele, mayın temizleme görevlerinde kullanılmayacağı teyit edilmiştir.

Fariz Huseynov [huseynovfa@gmail.com]

=======================================================================

On Tue, Oct 20, 2009 at 12:52 PM, <vaslay@aol.com> wrote:

dear Ergun

you are not alone for this opinion

is isn’t funny while we are disgracing our man and women in uniform ( TSK)
Obama needs our soldiers not government

if you didn’t have one of the best army in the middle east

O. wouldn’t care less for you

regardas,

vedat aslay

——————-

Dear Metin

Excellent observation and analysis

I wonder what is going behind the close doors?

Yes Russia it seems that the big winner?

how come for the US. Are we underestimating her.

The is a big game going on over the middle east and Central Asia.

The player are strong and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Syria, TURKEY and even Israel is foot soldiers in this game

Obama will make sure that Erdogan is not out of step. If he is you know in military

SOL, SAG, SOL SAG, SOL, SOL P……. SOL
Don’t worry this game is a long game and we are just watching part I

Vedat Aslay vaslay@aol.com

========================================================

From: Yusif [yusif@azeris.com]
Subject: {Pax Turcica} Re: Are you aware of the slap to Erdogan by Obama?

That’s correct. Russia will be a winner big time.

First, they will close the discussion on Nabucco both restricting

other countries’ willingness to diversify their exports and preventing

anything that could possibly harm Russia economically and

politically.

Second, they will realize the South Stream project, always viewed as

an alternative to Nabucco and through that project will still control

southern Europe and Turkey itself.

Third, under the pretext of protection of South Stream, Russia will

completely militarize Black Sea with additional Russian fleet and will

henceforth prevent another proposed rival energy project White Stream

to go from Georgia to EU through Ukraine from realization.

Fourth, Russia will get deeper into Turkish economy through Armenia

and through Armenian element will be able to exert pressure on Turkey

and possibly other Middle Eastern states in the future. It benefits

Russia to see islamization of Turkey. The practice of moderate Islam

in the form of Gulenist ideology actually may suit Russia’s interests.

In regards to US interests in the deal there are several factors.

First of all, US was hoping for Russia’s support on the issues of

nuclear threat from Iran. In general, apart from everything else, it

is not in Russia’s interest to see containment and any sort of

democratization of Iran. There is 25 mln Azeri minority in Iran which

if needed could be a decisive factor in the future partition of Iran

or a tool to bring down the current mullah regime. That’s one of the

reasons Stalin was willing to and finally withdrew from Iran in 1946

because he did not want a more sizeable Azeri minority within Soviet

borders.

Secondly, in my opinion, it’s not the US that is exerting pressure on

Turkey. I think it’s Turkey which is using its inadequate behavior

with Israel to pressure the United States. If we go back to 2003 we

would see that Turkey was bold enough to withstand pressure from US

during proposed invasion of Iraq from Turkey. To me personally, it

doesn’t make sense to see America give up Azerbaijan and Georgia and

the existing energy projects therefore losing both economically and

politically.

As far as Turkey’s position about Azerbaijan is concerned, I think

they might have striken a deal on withdrawal of Armenian troops from 5

occupied regions and agreed with Russia and US on joint peacekeeping

mission. In any case, allowing any peacekeeping missions in Karabakh

would be disastrous for Azerbaijan. If Russia’s troops are allowed to

be stationed on Azerbaijani soil in any form, this would be the end of

Azerbaijani independence and goodbye to Karabakh. Experience with

Georgia is a good example.

Presence of US troops would mean almost the same. Experience with

Kosovo is a good example. That’s why Kaidanow is all around (http://

www.a1plus.am/en/official/2009/10/20/nalbandian-tina-kaidanow)

Presence of Turkish troops, if any, would mean nothing at all,

especially if the protocols are ratified and diplomatic relations

established and ‘good will of friendly’ Turkish government is

recognized in Armenia and separatist regime in Karabakh.

Any peacekeeping mission whatsoever would mean protraction of this

conflict and interim status of NK last forever, therefore ending in

partitioning of Azerbaijan forever.

I guess, the original plan of these regional players is:

1. to strike a deal, have Armenian troops withdrawn from 5 regions;

2. bring in the peacekeeping force into those regions;

3. ensure return of Azerbaijani refugees to those regions;

4. re-arrange routes of energy resources from Azerbaijan and Central

Asia through Armenia and/or through occupied Karabakh, as many allege;

5. build confidence between people of the region

6. hold a referendum in NK. Holding a referendum in Karabakh would

mean complete loss.

Opening any borders means directly benefitting Armenia economically

which will stimulate economy and therefore human reproduction of

Armenians in Karabakh. That’s when the numbers will matter.

Yusif

================================================

Turkey’s The policy of “zero problems” creating “new problems”

https://www.turkishnews.com/en/content/2009/10/20/turkeys-the-policy-of-zero-problems-creating-new-problems/

From: Ergun [ergun@cox.net]

The policy of “zero problems” with neighbors seems to be creating “new problems” with neighbors

Case one: Azerbaijan.

The U.S.-Russia-mandated protocols with murky gains but sure losses for Turkey are already costing Turkey dearly. Check out these recent developments:

1- Azerbaijan Looks For Gas Routes To Europe Bypassing Turkey

2- Azerbaijan warns Turkey, West on gas exports

3- Azeri leader slams Turkey as gas route to Europe

https://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSLG44450320091016

4- Azerbaijan stops flying the Turkish flags over the Turkish martyrs’ cemetary in Baku.

When the U.S. and Russia (an EU) forced these protocols on Turkey, they probably expected the estrangement of Azerbaijan. If the oil and gas lines from Azerbaijan to Turkey run dry, the biggest beneficary would be, you guessed it, Russia. Risk all you got for something in return that may or may not pan out. We are sold this deal as “dialog, normalization, peace, and democracy” package. Sometimes I wish an engineer was the leader in Turkey so that he would know simple math, as in addition and subtraction.

April 24 is not far away. We will all see if the protocols bring “normalization and peace” or ” more chaos, polarization, and stalemate”, with the net result of poorer Turkey due to weakened/lost energy lines. (Prediction: the latter. Why? Because the deal incredibly left Azerbaijan out. Huge mistake!)

Case two: Israel

This one has to do with Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, although the tensions came to a head over other things like a cancelled joint military exercises and an aired TV-show:

TV Show Deepens Split Between Israel and Turkey

https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125573461255590957

Turkey points to Israel to deflect from itself

Netanyahu declares in Madrid that due to recent developments, Turkey is no longer an impartial mediator for peace talks between Syria ad Israel.

My take on all this:

I am not against dialog or peace. I am against poor business deals, especially if they are conducted under pressure of partisans with vested interests clashing with yours.

The foreign policy of Turkey should be updated from “zero problems with neighbors” to “zero old and new problems with neighbors”.

Ergun KIRLIKOVALI

October 20, 2009
Turkey Boosts its Ties with Syria and the Middle East

Turkey Boosts its Ties with Syria and the Middle East

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 171September 18, 2009 05

By: Saban Kardas

The Syrian President Bashar al-Assad visited Turkey on September 16-17 as the special guest of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, during which the two countries signed landmark agreements to deepen their bilateral relations. Assad attended a Ramadan fast-breaking dinner on September 16, held in his honor by the Justice and Development Party (AKP). He expressed Syrian support for Turkey’s recent Kurdish opening. Both leaders emphasized their desire to end the terrorist problem in Turkey through democratic initiatives and transform the Middle East into an area of peace and stability. Assad also praised Turkey’s role as peacemaker in the Syrian-Israeli indirect peace talks, which he described as “reliable.” He said that they still needed Turkey’s impartial mediatory role in the peace process (Anadolu Ajansi, September 16).

The first visible achievement of Assad’s trip was the lifting of visa requirements between the countries. In a related development, they also agreed to remove taxes on trailer trucks operating between both countries. Given the flourishing of bilateral trade, these developments were welcomed by many Turks, especially those living in provinces on the border, where trade with Syria constitutes a major source of economic activity. Representatives of the business community expect the trade volume to double following the agreement on these new regulations (Yeni Safak, September 18).

In a related decision a High-level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC) was established between the two countries. Turkey has followed a similar pattern in its efforts to deepen its multi-dimensional political, economic and cultural ties with Iraq. The format of the Turkish-Syrian council will resemble the model used between Turkey and Iraq (EDM, August 12).

During his joint press briefing with his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoglu, the Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mualem said that “this is the biggest demonstration of cooperation, solidarity and mutual trust.” Davutoglu concurred by saying that this decision moved the brotherhood between the two nations to a political level (Anadolu Ajansi, September 17).

Meanwhile, the first ministerial meeting of the Turkey-Iraq HLSCC also took place in Istanbul on September 17. Speaking at this meeting, Davutoglu said that the two governments are willing to shape their countries’ future in line with the model partnership framework being developed. He added that their goal is to achieve the most comprehensive economic integration between the two countries. His Iraqi counterpart reciprocated by saying that “we desire cooperation that could help shape the future of the region” (Anadolu Ajansi, September 17).

This intensive diplomatic traffic also provides another opportunity for Turkey to act in a mediation role. On the sidelines of the Turkey-Iraq HSCC, Davutoglu brought together Mualem and his Iraqi counterpart Hoshyar Zebari, joined by the Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa. The meeting was held to facilitate the ongoing dialogue between Syria and Iraq aimed at reducing tensions between the two countries following Baghdad’s claim that Damascus was behind the terrorist attacks in the Iraqi capital in August. They mutually withdrew their ambassadors and Turkish diplomats have been working intensively to heal the strained relations, which it views in terms of developing closer regional integration. Earlier, Davutoglu toured the two capitals and attended an Arab League meeting in Cairo to address this problem. Although no specific steps to solve Syrian-Iraqi tensions were announced, Davutoglu emphasized that Turkey would promote confidence building measures between the two brotherly nations, and he will also explore the involvement of the United Nations in the crisis (Cihan, September 17).

The removal of barriers between Turkey and Syria has a strong symbolic meaning, and reflects a deliberate attempt on the part of the two governments to overcome the political divisions that kept them apart for decades. When the Turkish-Syrian border was formed following the First World War, many families were separated on both sides of the border. During the Cold War even mutual family visits on the occasion of religious feasts were difficult to conduct. In the post-Cold War era, such border crossings were facilitated through the issuing of short term visas. Nonetheless, for decades, the Turkish-Syrian border and those visa difficulties symbolized the political and ideological isolation of Turkey from its Middle Eastern, cultural hinterland. This decision, therefore, complements earlier initiatives undertaken by the AKP government to normalize Turkish-Syrian relations, such as the clearing of the mines on the Turkish side of the border (EDM, May 21), or holding joint military exercises in border areas (EDM, May 1). Through such steps, Turkey has moved toward reconnecting with its Middle Eastern neighbors. Moreover, it sees this reorientation as more than a cultural project: rather, it is part of Turkey’s efforts to develop platforms to resolve security problems in the region through the involvement of local actors.

Indeed, Assad also underscored a similar vision when he addressed the fast-breaking dinner. After emphasizing that for centuries people sharing the same culture were divided, he maintained that this problem was caused by the local leaders’ failure to appreciate the pitfalls of acting in line with the manipulations of great powers. However, he avoided apportioning the blame exclusively on great powers, and engaged in self-criticism by noting that many of the problems in the region were of their own making. He called for the resolution of “regional problems by the regional countries themselves,” a sentiment that resonates well with Turkey’s foreign policy vision (www.cnnturk.com, September 17).

Nonetheless, such initiatives raise the question of whether Turkey is reorienting its foreign policy priorities. Although the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) Deputy Head Onur Oymen, a former diplomat, supported the establishment of the HLSCC and the normalization of relations with the country’s neighbors, he still raised key questions: “Given its values, Turkey belongs to Europe. We do not even have mutual visa lifting agreements with our E.U. neighbors… But we sign such agreements with Syria and other Muslim countries with which [we do not share the same world view]. Is this indicating a break with Turkey’s traditional foreign policy orientation?” (ANKA, September 17).

https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-boosts-its-ties-with-syria-and-the-middle-east/

September 23, 2009
Turkish Opposition Remains Skeptical of Government’s “Armenian Opening”

Turkish Opposition Remains Skeptical of Government’s “Armenian Opening”

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 169

September 16, 2009

By: Saban Kardas

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu met the leaders of opposition parties as part of his attempt to brief them about recent developments in Turkish foreign policy, and solicit their support for the government’s “Armenian opening.” On August 31, Turkey and Armenia announced the details of a roadmap for the normalization of bilateral relations. The parties initialed two protocols regulating the steps to be taken toward the resolution of contentious issues. To allay concerns among domestic opposition parties and in Azerbaijan, the Turkish government emphasized that the final decision would rest with parliament and that Baku’s views would be taken into account during the parliamentary approval process (EDM, September 8).

Since accomplishing the objectives of normalization would require bold steps and political determination on the part of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, this new initiative is denoted as the “Armenian opening,” echoing the recent Kurdish opening. Given the necessity of parliamentary approval, the focus of the policy on Armenia has shifted to the domestic political processes.

Davutoglu, at the urging of Prime Minister of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has taken time out from his heavy international diplomatic agenda to win over the opposition parties for the normalization policy. Davutoglu met Deniz Baykal, the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), and the leaders of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Felicity Party (SP) Numan Kurtulmus and Masum Turker respectively. However, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli, who has been the most outspoken critic of the Armenian opening, refused to meet him. Earlier, Davutoglu met Parliamentary Speaker Mehmet Ali Sahin, and he is scheduled to have additional meetings with the leaders of parties that received at least 1 percent of the popular vote in the July 2007 parliamentary elections. He also met the opposition leaders in May, following his appointment as foreign minister (Today’s Zaman, September 16).

One common theme emerging from Davutoglu’s contacts is that the opposition leaders unequivocally state that any progress in Turkish-Armenian relations needs to be contingent upon the protection of Azerbaijan’s concerns over Karabakh. In response, Davutoglu sought to reassure them that normalization with Armenia would not come at the expense of harming ties with Azerbaijan, and that Baku was being informed about the progress of Turkish-Armenian talks (Anadolu Ajansi, September 15).

Another common theme is the skepticism of the opposition parties toward the contents and the form of the Armenian opening, especially the involvement of foreign actors. They continue to view the opening as an agenda imposed upon Turkey by external forces, and believe that the main benefactor of the process will be Armenia.

For instance, SP’s Kurtulmus maintained that according to popular perceptions, the process seemed to be driven by Armenia, and that Turkey appeared to be only a passive player. He asked Davutoglu to correct this image. He also expressed his reservations about the committee of historians, and maintained that the committee would be unlikely to reach a decision disproving Armenian genocide claims. Kurtulmus also criticized the government’s recognition of Switzerland as the mediator between Turkey and Armenia, arguing that as a country that punishes the denial of the “Armenian genocide” claims, Switzerland could not be considered as impartial in this issue. DSP’s Turker, also shared similar concerns (Cihan, September 15).

The main opposition leader Baykal raised the most vocal criticisms. During the joint press brief after meeting with Davutoglu, Baykal noted that the CHP considered foreign policy issues as “state policies” that require a national consensus. He added that his party’s decision to meet Davutoglu was meant to make a contribution to state policy, and should not be interpreted as representing “support” for the government’s agenda. He stated his disappointment with the government’s overall approach to this issue, and reiterated his earlier position that the normalization agenda is imposed upon Turkey. “There is a process and a roadmap underway which is beyond the knowledge of the opposition parties. Now, through these contacts, the government is not asking ‘Let us discuss Turkey’s interests, and formulate [the policies] together.’ The government is saying to us. ‘We are given a roadmap. We decided to implement it; come, help us realize this roadmap.’ This is not an effort to formulate a policy. This is an effort to find support for a program that is already formed,” Baykal objected (ANKA, September 15).

Baykal also characterized the two protocols as “traps.” He argued that although the protocols satisfy Armenian concerns by laying out the details of Turkey’s re-opening of the border, they fall short of meeting Turkish demands regarding Armenia’s recognition of the Kars Treaty on defining the Turkish-Armenian border, or the renunciation of its policy of having its genocide claims recognized worldwide, and ending its occupation of Karabakh. He expressed concern that the protocols offered no safeguards against the possibility that after Turkey opens the border, Armenia might later renege on its promises. Therefore, he demanded that the government must refuse to sign the protocols. Baykal also speculated that the government would sign the protocols with Armenia on October 13 (Hurriyet, September 16).

Both the Turkish and Armenian governments have to tackle domestic opposition, in addition to the dilemmas of overcoming differences of opinion and building trust in the bilateral talks. Indeed, the Turkish-Armenian declarations recognize the challenges of obtaining broad-based social and political support, and give the parties six weeks to engage in domestic discussions before the protocols are forwarded to parliaments for final ratification.

Given the strength of nationalistic sentiments in Turkey, one challenge for the AKP government has been to present the Armenian opening as a “national” policy, rather than a parochial agenda promoted by the AKP, or a project externally imposed upon Turkey. The six-week deadline has provided an impetus for each government to stimulate debate on the issue, but as the Turkish case suggests this deadline is too unrealistic to facilitate any meaningful and genuine democratic deliberation on a dispute mired in historical memories and current geopolitical conflicts. Davutoglu’s meetings further show that a new conflict is looming over the AKP’s foreign policy when the Armenian opening comes before parliament.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-opposition-remains-skeptical-of-governments-armenian-opening/

September 17, 2009
Davutoglu’s Visit to Iran Highlights Ankara’s Regional Diplomacy

Davutoglu’s Visit to Iran Highlights Ankara’s Regional Diplomacy

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 167

September 14, 2009 04:19 PM Age: 1 days

By: Saban Kardas

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu paid an official visit to Iran on September 12-13. He met the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani and the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili. Following his meeting with Mottaki, Davutoglu and his counterpart stressed the importance they attach to bilateral relations, as well as regional cooperation. Davutoglu noted that the two countries shared deep-rooted historical ties and their neighborly relations are based on the principle of refraining from interfering in each other’s affairs. He outlined many areas where they explored boosting bilateral relations, ranging from economic cooperation to security. Referring to this multi-dimensional partnership, Mottaki described Turkish-Iranian relations as “strategic” (Cihan Haber Ajansi, Anadolu Ajansi, September 12).

The foreign ministers emphasized that given the centrality of the threat of terrorism facing both countries, they will continue their collaboration in combating this phenomenon, referring to their joint efforts against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK). Davutoglu also highlighted the flourishing economic activity between the two countries, noting that the bilateral trade volume has reached $11 billion annually, despite the global economic crisis. In addition to discussing cooperation in various areas, the two main items on Davutoglu’s agenda were the nuclear issue and energy cooperation. Davutoglu’s meeting came in the wake of the announcement by Washington that it will consider holding talks with Tehran, despite the latter’s reluctance to discuss its nuclear program. Iran forwarded a proposal to the major powers expressing its readiness to discuss global nuclear disarmament, as well as other international issues. Although the White House did not find Iran’s proposals as responsive to its concerns about its nuclear program, it nonetheless showed interest in holding direct talks with Iran (Today’s Zaman, September 14).

Davutoglu reiterated Turkey’s position that the resolution of the nuclear problem should be based on mutual respect. He also conveyed to Jalili Turkey’s readiness to host negotiations between Iran and Western countries (Anadolu Ajansi, September 13). However, this is not the first time that Turkey has proposed to mediate between Iran and the West, and its previous offers failed to produce any practical results. Reportedly, both Washington and Tehran were reluctant to see Ankara play such a role (EDM, March 10). Following the press briefing with Davutoglu, Mottaki thanked his Turkish counterpart for Turkey’s support for Iran’s right to obtain nuclear energy (Anadolu Ajansi, September 12). Although Ankara remains eager to act as a mediator, what leverage it may hold to convince Tehran to compromise on the Western demands remains to be seen.

Energy was the other key issue on the agenda. Turkey has a major incentive to help solve the diplomatic problems bedeviling Iran’s relations with the West and bring Iran into the orbit of the European energy security discussions, a policy which is also supported by many European countries.

Turkey seeks to deepen its energy partnership with Iran, especially considering its efforts to become a major energy hub. Indeed, one of the biggest obstacles before the Nabucco project, which Turkey considers as a strategic priority, is finding suppliers, Iran is the most likely alternative, since it possesses the second largest gas reserves in the world. Turkey indeed has been eager to act as a bridge connecting Iranian gas to the European grid through Nabucco. Although Ankara signed a major energy cooperation deal with Iran in 2007, it had to suspend those plans due to American objections. U.S. sanctions toward Iran prevent the development of the Iranian gas sector and the export of its gas to Western markets. Since its fields are underdeveloped and it needs immense transportation infrastructure, Iran has not emerged as a major player in gas markets, and even has been forced to import gas from Turkmenistan to meet its domestic demand. Prior to the signing of the Nabucco inter-governmental agreement in Ankara, Turkish officials, including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan emphasized their willingness to tap into Iranian gas, but U.S. officials reiterated their objection to the Iranian option (EDM, July 14). However, Davutoglu said that Turkey would work to help Iran export its gas to European markets.

Turkey’s Iran policy resonates well with the recent course of its regional diplomacy. Ankara has fostered closer regional dialogue with Iraq, Syria and other Arab countries in order to create a peaceful neighborhood and develop closer economic partnerships, including energy projects (EDM, August 12). Bringing Iran into the same circle is definitely a prime motive driving Ankara’s policies toward Tehran.

Davutoglu, as the architect of this policy, appreciates the central role that Iran plays in the region and expresses his aversion to any instability that might be caused by the ongoing diplomatic problems, as well as the developments in Iranian domestic politics. This concern, however, results in a status quo policy of supporting the Iranian government. As reflected in Ankara’s acquiescent attitude during the Iranian regime’s harsh crackdown on the protestors following the disputed presidential elections, Turkey was criticized for not being sensitive to domestic developments in Iranian politics (EDM, June 18).

Another underlying problem in Turkey’s Iran policy concerns the differing interpretations both parties attach to “regional cooperation.” Iran views regional cooperation as a way to limit the involvement of the West and the United States in regional affairs, as well as to exclude Israel. Turkey, in contrast, values its ties to the West and defines its regional policies in complementary terms. Indeed, such differences of opinion were apparent in Ahmadinejad’s statements following his meeting with Davutoglu, which contained strong anti-Western rhetoric. Ahmadinejad claimed that the improvement of Turkish-Iranian relations is an obligation “in a process whereby great and oppressor powers are in decline” (Anadolu Ajansi, September 12).

A major test for Turkey’s regional diplomacy might perhaps stem from its ability to foster closer cooperation among its neighbors, while also ensuring that it does not present an anti-Western platform.

https://jamestown.org/program/davutoglus-visit-to-iran-highlights-ankaras-regional-diplomacy/

September 16, 2009
Turkish-Abkhazia Ties Test Turkey’s Strategic Partnership with Georgia

Turkish-Abkhazia Ties Test Turkey’s Strategic Partnership with Georgia

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 164

September 9, 2009

By: Saban Kardas

The plight of the Turkish captain of a tanker intercepted by Georgian authorities while carrying goods en route to Abkhazia highlighted the dilemmas of Turkey’s position on the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.

Since the war last August, Georgia has blockaded the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has intercepted various ships carrying Turkish goods. In the latest incident, a vessel transporting fuel to Abkhazia was captured by the Georgian coastguard on August 17. Following the seizure, the Georgian authorities took the captains, one Turkish and the other Azeri, into custody. On August 31, a Georgian court sentenced them to 24 years in prison. The ship was confiscated and brought to Batumi port to be sold in an auction (Today’s Zaman, September 6).

Growing concerns over the fate of the Turkish captain generated domestic pressure on the government to free him, which prompted the involvement of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. The Turkish foreign ministry announced that Davutoglu would visit Tbilisi and that the government would do everything possible to secure the release of the captain. Meanwhile, on September 4, the shipping company paid a fee, and it was announced that an appeals court would reconsider the case. Davutoglu visited Tbilisi on September 7-8, and a Georgian court released the Turkish captain on September 8 (Anadolu Ajansi, September 8).

The case highlighted tensions caused by similar practices by the Georgian authorities. Georgia has been seizing Turkish ships destined for Abkhazia, and in the past decade over sixty ships have been captured. Even prior to the latest crisis, representatives of Turkish exporters and Caucasian diaspora groups in Turkey raised concerns that the Turkish government was too complicit toward the “bullying” of the Georgian authorities.

Ahmet Hamdi Gurdogan, the head of the exporters association in the Black Sea region, advanced several criticisms of Tbilisi (www.tekilhaber.com, August 25). First, he maintained that although Georgia claims to block all the trade routes to Abkhazia, Georgian coastal patrols cannot do anything against vessels carrying the Russian flag en route to Abkhazia. In a related charge, he argued that the Georgian patrol boats captured the Turkish ships in international waters, even in some cases immediately after they leave Turkish territorial waters. Therefore, Turkish exporters expect the government to flex its muscles, yet considering that Turkey supports Georgia’s territorial integrity and the Georgian embargo in place, the government might do little to stop the interception of Turkish ships in Georgian waters. Nonetheless, during his press briefing on the recent case, a spokesman for the foreign ministry expressed Ankara’s concern that some of the seizures might have taken place in international waters, and Georgia’s actions may violate international maritime laws (www.denizhaber.com, September 2).

Turkish exporters also complain that the Georgians have turned such practices into an undeclared “piracy” in the Black Sea, since the Georgian authorities allegedly sell the vessels in auctions and demand large sums of money to release the crew of the captured ships. They also claim that in some cases, ships carrying humanitarian goods are also intercepted.

The representatives of the Abkhazian diaspora in Turkey, also utilize similar arguments, and urge the Turkish government to lift its embargo. Turkey still supports the economic sanctions imposed against Abkhazia by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Irfan Argun the Speaker of Caucasus-Abkhazia Solidarity Committee, for instance, maintained that the sanctions are creating a major humanitarian crisis in Abkhazia and that Turkey should end its policy of supporting the Georgian embargo and play a larger role in the resolution of the issue of Abkhazia (www.ajanskafkas.com, August 22). Around 500,000 Turkish citizens consider themselves to be of Abkhazian origin.

At a more fundamental level, this crisis reflects the underlying dilemmas in Turkish policy on the Georgian-Abkhazian dispute. In an analysis published by the Ankara-based think tank close to the foreign ministry, the Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies, it was maintained that Ankara could no longer ignore the new reality in the region and act on the presumption that there was no problem relating to Abkhazia (www.orsam.org.tr, September 1). This line of thinking suggests that Ankara might need to redefine its policies toward the region. It justifies a redefinition with reference to the fact that if the present Georgian embargo continues, it might result in a situation whereby Abkhazia is forced to integrate itself into the Russian orbit both politically and economically. The best way to reverse such a trend, according to this view, would be to end the blockade of Abkhazia.

Reflecting the demands of the Abkhazian diaspora, deputies from Republican People’s Party submitted a question to parliament. They lambasted the government’s silence and requested that the prime minister explain why the government still insisted on implementing the embargo (www.kafkasfederasyonu.org, August 22).

Meanwhile, the Georgian attempts to implement the blockade have raised tension in the Black Sea region. The Abkhazian leader Sergei Bagapsh described the activities of Georgian ships in “Abkhazian waters” as piracy, and threatened to destroy them if Georgia did not cease its military activities (Anadolu Ajansi, September 2). A Russian foreign ministry spokesman warned Georgia about its practice of seizing commercial vessels, and said “attempts to enforce a sea blockade on Abkhazia could lead to a serious armed incident” (Anadolu Ajansi, September 3).

Against this background, Davutoglu visited Tbilisi, where he met his Georgian counterpart Nikoloz Gilauri and President Mikheil Saakashvili. He held a lengthy meeting with Saakashvili about the release of the captain. Davutoglu described Georgia as a “strategic partner,” and reiterated Turkey’s support for its territorial integrity, and for Tbilisi’s NATO membership bid. Davutoglu said “We know very well that without ensuring Georgia’s peace and stability, it will be difficult to meet these goals in the South Caucasus” (Cihan, September 7).

In addition to the necessity of responding to the demands made by domestic pressure groups, the risk of Georgian-Abkhazian tensions escalating into a destabilizing regional conflict energizes Ankara to address Georgian-Abkhazian problems. The Turkish government values its partnership with Georgia, but it is also under pressure to realign its policies in light of the geopolitical transformations in the region. It will represent a major challenge for Turkish diplomacy in the days ahead to engage Abkhazia without severing ties with Tbilisi.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-abkhazia-ties-test-turkeys-strategic-partnership-with-georgia/

September 10, 2009