Tag: Davutoglu

Turkey’s zero-problems foreign policy

The Turkish government this week brokered an 11th-hour nuclear fuel swap deal with Iran. Turkey’s foreign minister explains the principles that made it possible.

by Ahmet Davutoglu

Throughout modern history, there has been a direct relationship between conflict and the emergence of new ways of arbitrating world affairs. Every major war since the 17th century was concluded by a treaty that led to the emergence of a new order, from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 that followed the Thirty Years’ War, to the Congress of Vienna of 1814-1815 that brought an end to the Napoleonic Wars, to the ill-fated Treaty of Versailles that concluded the first World War, to the agreement at Yalta that laid the groundwork for the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. Yet the Cold War, which could be regarded as a global-scale war, ended not with grand summitry, but with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of the Soviet Union. There was no official conclusion; one of the combatant sides just suddenly ceased to exist.

Two decades hence, no new international legal and political system has been formally created to meet the challenges of the new world order that emerged. Instead, a number of temporary, tactical, and conflict-specific agreements have been implemented. From the Nagorno-Karabakh region to Cyprus, and even the deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian dispute, a series of cease-fire arrangements have succeeded in ending bloodshed but have failed to establish comprehensive peace agreements. Overall, the current situation has quantitatively increased the diversification of international actors and qualitatively complicated the foreign-policy making process.

The Sept. 11, 2001, attacks made it clear that this situation is not sustainable. Immediately after the attacks, the United States began attempting to establish an international order based on a security discourse, thus replacing the liberty discourse that emerged after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. It is in this context that the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq can best be understood. The intent was to transform an unstable international environment by targeting crisis-prone zones that were considered to be the sources of insecurity. But in the process, predictions about the end of history and the expansion of civil rights and liberties have largely lost their appeal.

U.S. President Barack Obama challenged the security-based perspective of the post-Sept. 11 era as soon as he assumed the presidency in 2009. He has actively attempted to restore America’s international image, and has made considerable efforts to adopt a new vision that embraces a multilateral international system and fosters close cooperation with regional allies.

Still, we are faced with an incredibly difficult period until a new global order is established. Many of today’s challenges can only be resolved with broader international involvement, but the mechanisms needed to meet fully those challenges do not exist. It will therefore fall largely to nation-states to meet and create solutions for the global political, cultural, and economic turmoil that will likely last for the next decade and beyond.

In this new world, Turkey is playing an increasingly central role in promoting international security and prosperity. The new dynamics of Turkish foreign policy ensure that Turkey can act with the vision, determination, and confidence that the historical moment demands.

Turkey in the post-Cold War era

Turkey experienced the direct impact of the post-Cold War atmosphere of insecurity, which resulted in a variety of security problems in Turkey’s neighborhood. The most urgent issue for Turkish diplomacy, in this context, was to harmonize Turkey’s influential power axes with the new international environment.

During the Cold War, Turkey was a “wing country” under NATO’s strategic framework, resting on the geographic perimeter of the Western alliance. NATO’s strategic concept, however, has evolved in the post-Cold War era — and so has Turkey’s calculation of its strategic environment. Turkey’s presence in Afghanistan is a clear indication of this change. We are a wing country no longer.

Turkey is currently facing pressure to assume an important regional role, which admittedly has created tensions between its existing strategic alliances and its emerging regional responsibilities. The challenge of managing these relationships was acutely felt in recent regional crises in the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East. Turkey remains committed to establishing harmony between its current strategic alliances and its neighbors and neighboring regions.

Turkey’s unique demographic realities also affect its foreign-policy vision. There are more Bosnians in Turkey than in Bosnia-Herzegovina, more Albanians than in Kosovo, more Chechens than in Chechnya, more Abkhazians than in the Abkhaz region in Georgia, and a significant number of Azeris and Georgians, in addition to considerable other ethnicities from neighboring regions. Thus, these conflicts and the effect they have on their populations have a direct impact on domestic politics in Turkey.

Because of this fact, Turkey experiences regional tensions at home and faces public demands to pursue an active foreign-policy to secure the peace and security of those communities. In this sense, Turkish foreign policy is also shaped by its own democracy, reflecting the priorities and concerns of its citizens. As a result of globalization, the Turkish public follows international developments closely. Turkey’s democratization requires it to integrate societal demands into its foreign policy, just as all mature democracies do.

The European Union and NATO are the main fixtures and the main elements of continuity in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey has achieved more within these alliances during the past seven years under the AK Party government than it did in the previous 40 years. Turkey’s involvement in NATO has increased during this time; Turkey recently asked for, and achieved, a higher representation in the alliance. Turkey also has advanced considerably in the European integration process compared with the previous decade, when it was not even clear whether the EU was seriously considering Turkey’s candidacy. EU progress reports state that Turkish foreign policy and EU objectives are in harmony, a clear indication that Turkey’s foreign-policy orientation aligns well with transatlantic objectives.

As we leave behind the first decade of the 21st century, Turkey has been able to formulate a foreign-policy vision based on a better understanding of the realities of the new century, even as it acts in accordance with its historical role and geographical position. In this sense, Turkey’s orientation and strategic alliance with the West remains perfectly compatible with Turkey’s involvement in, among others, Iraq, Iran, the Caucasus, the Middle East peace process, and Afghanistan.

Our principles

Over the past seven years, Turkey has been able to formulate a systematic and cohesive methodological approach to world affairs because its political party has been able to govern, resulting in real political stability at home.

Three methodological and five operational principles drive Turkey’s foreign policy today. The first methodological principle is its “visionary” approach to the issues instead of the “crisis-oriented” attitude that dominated foreign policy during the entire Cold War period.

For example, Turkey has a vision of the Middle East. This vision encompasses the entire region: It cannot be reduced to the struggle against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), the radical Kurdish separatist group that for decades has waged a campaign of terror against Turkey, or efforts to counterbalance specific countries. Turkey can use its unique understanding of the Middle East, and its diplomatic assets, to operate effectively on the ground. Turkey’s Lebanon policy, its attempts to mediate between Syria and Israel and achieve Palestinian reconciliation, its efforts to facilitate the participation of Iraqi Sunni groups in the 2005 parliamentary elections, and its constructive involvement in the Iranian nuclear issue are integral parts of Turkey’s foreign-policy vision for the Middle East.

The second methodological principle is to base Turkish foreign policy on a “consistent and systematic” framework around the world. Turkey’s vision for the Middle East is not in opposition to its approach in Central Asia or in the Balkans; our approach to Africa is no different from our approach to Asia. Turkey is also actively trying to improve relations with nearby countries like Greece, Iraq, the Russian Federation, and Syria.

The third methodological principle is the adoption of a new discourse and diplomatic style, which has resulted in the spread of Turkish soft power in the region. Although Turkey maintains a powerful military due to its insecure neighborhood, we do not make threats. Instead, Turkish diplomats and politicians have adopted a new language in regional and international politics that prioritizes Turkey’s civil-economic power.

From these three methodological approaches, five operational principles guide Turkey’s foreign policy-making process. The first principle is the balance between security and democracy. The legitimacy of any political regime comes from its ability to provide security and freedom together to its citizens; this security should not be at the expense of freedoms and human rights in the country. Since 2002, Turkey has attempted to promote civil liberties without undermining security. This is an ambitious yet worthy aim — particularly in the post-Sept. 11 environment, under the threat of terrorism, in which the general tendency has been to restrict liberties for the sake of security.

Turkey has made great strides in protecting civil liberties despite serious domestic political challenges to such freedoms over the past seven years. This required vigorously carrying out the struggle against terrorism without narrowing the sphere of civil liberties — a challenge Turkey successfully overcame. In the process, we’ve found that Turkish soft power has only increased as our democracy has matured.

Second, the principle of zero problems towards neighbors has been successfully implemented for the past seven years. Turkey’s relations with its neighbors now follow a more cooperative track. There is a developing economic interdependence between Turkey and its neighboring countries. In 2009, for example, we achieved considerable diplomatic progress with Armenia, which nevertheless remains the most problematic relationship in Turkey’s neighborhood policy.

Turkey’s considerable achievements in its regional relationships have led policymakers to take this principle a step further and aim for maximum cooperation with our neighbors. Since the second half of 2009, Turkey established high-level strategic council meetings with Iraq, Syria, Greece and Russia. These are joint cabinet meetings where bilateral political, economic, and security issues are discussed in detail. There are also preparations to establish similar mechanisms with Bulgaria, Azerbaijan and Ukraine as well as other neighboring countries. Turkey abolished visa requirements with, among others, Syria, Tajikistan, Albania, Lebanon, Jordan, Libya and Russia. Turkey’s trade with its neighbors and nearby regions has substantially increased in recent years.

The third operative principle is proactive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy, which aims to take measures before crises emerge and escalate to a critical level. Turkey’s regional policy is based on security for all, high-level political dialogue, economic integration and interdependence, and multicultural coexistence. Consider Turkey’s mediation between Israel and Syria, a role that was not assigned to Turkey by any outside actor. Other examples of pre-emptive diplomacy include Turkey’s efforts to achieve Sunni-Shiite reconciliation in Iraq, reconciliation efforts in Lebanon and Palestine, the Serbia-Bosnia reconciliation in the Balkans, dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the reconstruction of Darfur and Somalia.

The fourth principle is adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign policy. Turkey’s relations with other global actors aim to be complementary, not in competition. Such a policy views Turkey’s strategic relationship with the United States through the two countries’ bilateral strategic ties and through NATO. It considers its EU membership process, its good neighborhood policy with Russia, and its synchronization policy in Eurasia as integral parts of a consistent policy that serves to complement each other. This means that good relations with Russia are not an alternative to relations with the EU. Nor is the model partnership with the United States a rival partnership against Russia.

The fifth principle in this framework is rhythmic diplomacy, which aspires to provide Turkey with a more active role in international relations. This principle implies active involvement in all international organizations and on all issues of global and international importance. Turkey became a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and is chairing three critical commissions concerning Afghanistan, North Korea, and the fight against terror. Turkey undertook the chairmanship-in-office of the South-East European Cooperation Process, a forum for dialogue among Balkan states and their immediate neighbors, for 2009 and 2010. Turkey is also a member of G-20, maintains observer status in the African Union, has a strategic dialogue mechanism with the Gulf Cooperation Council, and actively participates in the Arab League. Turkey has also launched new diplomatic initiatives by opening 15 new embassies in Africa and two in Latin America, and is a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol. These developments show a new perspective of Turkey, one that is based on vision, soft power, a universal language, and implementation of consistent foreign policies in different parts of the world.

A new vision

Today, Turkey has a great deal of say in the international arena. More importantly, there is a critical group of countries that lends a careful ear to Turkey’s stance on a myriad of regional and international issues. At this point, the world expects great things from Turkey, and we are fully aware of our responsibility to carry out a careful foreign policy.

Our “2023 vision,” to mark the Turkish Republic’s centennial, is a result of this necessity. The first step of this vision is to integrate Turkey’s foreign-policy discourse into its national discourse. Any possible contradiction, gap or contrast between these two will make it difficult to carry out an active, responsible, and successful foreign policy. In the coming era, Turkey plans to deepen and strengthen its democracy, place relations between Turkish society and Turkey’s governing institutions on firm ground, and show the world the strength of its own domestic balance. There is a continuous need to integrate domestic political accomplishments into the vision of foreign policy (i.e. democratization and cultural respect) and to inject foreign-policy activism and self-confidence back into the domestic political scene.

Thanks to the multi-dimensional and dynamic nature of Turkish foreign policy, Turkey’s relations with the US are being built on firmer ground. Turkish-U.S. relations have reached a point where they can ensure bilateral cooperation and work toward global stability. Put into a framework of “model partnership” described by President Obama when he visited Turkey on his first overseas trip, bilateral relations are of vital importance for both countries. The term “model partnership” emphasizes the importance of high-level cooperation between Turkey, with its multiple regional identities and an increasing say in global affairs, and the United States, which has long-lasting ties with regional countries and direct responsibility for global stability. The partnership is guided by a set of shared values and principles aimed at bringing peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity to the zones of conflict in various regions.

Meanwhile, relations with the EU are also being bolstered. It is no longer possible to think of the EU and Turkey independent of one another when considering Turkey’s foreign policy. EU integration is undoubtedly a process that is favorable to Turkey. But this process brings great benefits to the EU itself, both regionally and globally.

Turkey’s foreign-policy objectives and its vision of how to achieve them are very clear. Turkey has multiple goals over the next decade: First, it aims to achieve all EU membership conditions and become an influential EU member state by 2023. Second, it will continue to strive for regional integration, in the form of security and economic cooperation. Third, it will seek to play an influential role in regional conflict resolution. Fourth, it will vigorously participate in all global arenas. Fifth, it will play a determining role in international organizations and become one of the top 10 largest economies in the world.

These goals aim to build a strong and respectable Turkey that is able to make an original contribution to the world community. To achieve them, Turkey must make progress in all directions and in every field, take an interest in every issue related to global stability, and contribute accordingly. This collective effort will make Turkey a global actor in this century. Turkey’s actions are motivated by a great sense of responsibility, entrusted to it by its rich historical and geographic heritage, and by a profound consciousness of the importance of global stability and peace.

www.foreignpolicy.com, May 20, 2010

May 27, 2010

The Gülen movement plays big in Washington

.The Assembly of Turkish-American Associations, or ATAA’s, president, Günay Evinç, was pretty upset. Evinç, who has had good relationships with the Gülen Movement’s organizations so far, did not seem as thrilled with the idea of this alternative Turkish assembly of Gulen <……………………………..

Gülen appears to be hitting the organizations closer to Turkish Government in power and thus closer to him. ATAA is one example next lucky organization Might Be the FTAA. We are not sure about TCA (Turkish Coalition of America .. Since about 2 years old TCA consists of only 3 paid people and lots of green dollars from Turkish Deep State which happens to choose not to actively engage Fetullah Gülen.. but to follow or copy his teachings and his way of operation .. If we look at broader picture Both Gulen and Turkish deep state get their direction from the same corner of OBAMA which we call it CIA they are the 2 friendly actors of the same game .. and “THE GAME CONTINUES” …. TURKISH FORUM

Friday, May 14, 2010

İLHAN TANIR

It was one of the lavish lounges of the Willard Hotel in Washington where hundreds of Turkic people from all across America with plain name tags gathered to mark the creation of a new umbrella Turkic Assembly last Wednesday. Six Turkish-American federations, which have close proximity to Mr. Fethullah Gülen, a Turkish cleric and the exiled leader of the Turkey-based religious Gülen Movement joined to form the Assembly of Turkic American Federations, or ATAF, a non-profit organization.

Half a dozen U.S. Senators and a few dozens of U.S. Representatives made a strong showing at the reception and the Gülen Movement hinted that its new assembly has some muscles to flex in Washington already.

One would think bringing that many U.S. Senators and Representatives should require loads of money for campaign donations. “No,” said, Mahmut Yeter, president of one of the six federations that formed the ATAF, “this strong turnout owes its success to their members who worked voluntarily, often visited these lawmakers in their local offices and finally convinced them with their persistence that they have to be at the reception.”

I had a chance to talk with some of the congressmen and senators who participated at the reception. I asked Ms. Gabrielle Giffords, representative from Arizona’s 8th. District, why she chose to come to a Turkic community gathering, considering that there is a very tiny Turkic community in her district. Gifford turned and pointed out a young Turkish man who was standing next to her. According to the congresswoman, that young Turkish man had visited Gifford’s district office several times recently and finally persuaded her to show up for the reception “even though I do not like to go such events,” Gifford said, before responding my question and telling me that she never heard of Fethullah Gülen.

The Gülen Movement accelerated its activities in U.S., especially since the leader of the Movement, Fethullah Gülen settled in Pennsylvania about a decade ago. During the mid ’90s, after almost three decades in the making, it was still operating very much under the radar in Turkey.

The unexpected and sudden decision to combine all of their 180 organizations under one umbrella assembly was a surprising move, at any rate, for those who follow the Gülen movement closely and are aware about its cautious strategies and steps.

Mr. Gülen first decided to go public with a wide ranging interview in early 1995, and in the following years the movement attracted ever-increasing attention. The postmodern-military coup of Feb. 28, 1997 pushed Gülen out of Turkey to find refuge in the U.S. Only more than a decade later, the Gülen Movement gathered enough manpower, recognition and credit to bring dozens of members of Congress to its half-official Washington debut night. The Turkish ambassador to the U.S., Mr. Namık Tan, came to the reception and stayed there almost the entire night, having conversations with the members of the U.S. Congress – alhough not everyone was as joyful about the new kid in town. The Assembly of Turkish-American Associations, or ATAA’s, president, Günay Evinç, was pretty upset about the name of this new assembly because of its similar word selection with their own assembly. Evinç argued that this name similarity has created a big administrative disaster for their organization to explain the difference.

Evinç, who has had good relationships with the Gülen Movement’s organizations so far, did not seem as thrilled with the idea of this alternative Turkish assembly. “ATAA,” Evinç said while describing the difference, “promotes an inter-Turks dialogue, not interfaith.” Evinç pleaded that he wanted “a dialogue and to stay on good terms with everyone, including this new organization.” However, this name confusion is such a huge issue, he said, adding that they would even consider finishing “the whole partnerships and dialogue with them.”

Another Gülen Movement member in Washington said when told about this complaint, “for 30 years, ATAA has been the leading voice to represent Turkish people in the U.S. Now rapidly increasing numbers of Gülen-tied assemblies are taking the market, and ATAA’s and others’ maneuvering room is shrinking.”

Decision from Gülen

This decision of “combining all Gülen-related Turkic or Turkish associations and federations under one assembly,” was decided by Fethullah Gülen, another active member of the movement who came to the reception from a long distance said. “This decision was too big to let other leading members of the Gülen Movement to take on. Gülen took the initiative,” said the well-connected member while listening to speakers at the reception.

It is the “Turkic American Federations,” not Turkish, because this umbrella organization represents not only those Turks who are from Turkey, but those “citizens from Central Asia, Anatolia and the Balkans… as part of [America’s] cultural mosaic” the website of the ATAF notes.

The Gülen Movement also sent an important signal to the political leadership in Ankara by fetching this many U.S. Congress members. The movement made a psychological statement in Washington that they should be also taken into consideration in terms of multi-leveled relations between Turkey and America by demonstrating that they have a few strings to play in Washington.

Mr. Gülen motivates his followers in the U.S. to contribute and visit their local representatives. Gülen, according to another active member of the movement at the reception, asks those who want to visit his compound in Pennsylvania “to donate to their local representatives first,” before they show up at his door.

“This is just a beginning,” another participant told me during the night, while pointing out a group of senators and representatives along with the Turkish ambassador having a conversation.

The Gülen Movement last week made it official that its members are here in America to stay and expand at an even faster pace in coming years.

This looming scenario would have two possible upshots for Turkish-American relationships. One is: increasing the presence of the movement in Washington will help Turkey during some of the threatening developments for its interests, such as the Armenian genocide resolution discussions. The Gülen Movement proved with this year’s “genocide” fights in Washington and other states that the movement will be another influential venue to advance Turkey’s interests in Washington on many matters.

The second upshot is the strong possibility for the Gülen Movement to become a leading voice among the Turkish groups in Washington to reach the U.S. Congress and other Washington decision makers to narrate the contemporary domestic issues of Turkey and relate them to U.S. politicians. In that sense, members of the U.S. Congress, most of whom do not have much international affairs on their resume, might be just happy while swallowing concentrated education pills on Turkey through Gülen Movement recipe.

The Gülenists deserved a big round of applause with being able to pull off such an impressive gathering at the heart of Washington this week at the end of the day.

The Gülen Movement members are disciplined, loyal and they complete their assignments as they are told. The movement is able to mobilize its members to fulfill its leader’s vision even in America.

It is a tough competitor for any other movement.

That is why we hear more often greetings to Pennsylvania these days from unexpected places.

List of Websites About Fethullah Gulen

Fethullah Gülen was listed among the top hundred public intellectuals by Foreign Policy magazine .

Fethullah Gulen’s website: www.fgulen.com, www.fethullahgulen.org

Gulen Institute’s Website: www.guleninstitute.org

Gulen Library’s website: www.gulenlibrary.org

Fethullah Gulen Forum: www.fethullahgulenforum.org

Gulen Conferences’ Websites:

www.fethullahgulenconference.org, www.gulenconference.net , www.gulenconference.us , www.gulenconference.org.uk , www.gulenconference.nl

http://gulenmovementforabetterworld.blogspot.com/

READER COMMENTS

Guest – Frustrated “Eniste”

2010-05-15 23:00:06

Having lived in the US with my Turkish wife, during the time of ASALA; I find myself very confused by your report. In those days, my friends the Turks were totally patriotic to their homeland, at the risk of their lives. They were mostly well educated, financially secure people; which probably differentiated them from the obvious, Tarikat type Gulen disciples you describe. I find it a sign of the total govt. disaster of AKP, that “our” Ambassador pays lip service to the prosperity of a fugitive, who desires the total destruction of the republic’s democracy! I think the comment by the Rep. from Arizona, that she didn’t even know who Imam Gulen was, shows the pathological lies, which underpin the movement! I also pity my countrymen for their stupidity; and condemn them for interference in the affairs, of another nation. Turkey is more subtle; but little better than Iran and Chile!!

May 16, 2010

ARMENIAN ATTROCITIES UPON OTTOMAN MOSLEMS

By Erkan Esmer, Ph.D., Prof. Engineer

Armenians prospered greatly under the protection of Ottoman Turks. They were dubbed as the “Loyal Tribe” by the Ottoman Sultans. The Ottomans were late in accepting the Industrial Revolution. They preferred to stay as soldiers, farmers, and bureaucrats as was fashionable at the feudal era. They left the services, trade, banking, and industrial production to their Christian subjects (Greeks and armenians) who were a small segment of the population in Anatolia (Asia Minor). This made them very wealthy and powerful. Russian General Maievski’s 1890 map is presented in Figure 1 in the ensuing page, clearly shows that they were a small minority. Of course, the Russians naturally would inflate the Greek and armenian populations within the empire, because they had invented the so called “Eastern Problem”. They under the pretext of protection of Christian Ottoman citizens, vied for conquest of Ottoman lands.

When Russians attacked the Ottomans in 1877, they along with concurrence of European powers established Principality of Bulgaria. They advised the armenians that they could establish their own country in Eastern Anatolia. I doubt that they would ever allow them to have their own country. They had no intensions to do so, but wanted to use the armenians. Czarist Russia along with the help of American missionaries armed the armenians all over Anatolia. These terrorist forces were stationed all over the Turkish mainland. {Fig. 2-15} These above mentioned facts are confirmed by August 23, 1895 New York Times article. They were united under the command of armenian terrorist groups Dashnaks and Hunchaks. The armenians’ barbaric atrocities and heinous crimes upon the Moslems were unspeakable. {Fig. 16-29} These massacres naturally angered the authorities and Moslem population who defended themselves. They knew that this would bring the wrath of European powers (super powers of the era), because Europeans wanted to dismember the Ottoman Empire for its fertile land, valuable mineral and oil resources (Iraq, Saudi Oil Fields). They finally achieved this goal at the end of World War I.

During World War I, all of Turkish and Moslem young men were not home, but were fighting for their homeland in many different fronts. Only Women, children, and old Men lived in Ottoman Anatolian provinces, then. All of them were unarmed!!! Many of the armenians who were inducted into Ottoman forces, ran away with their weapons. The armenian cowards butchered these unarmed civilians. They acted as scouts/vanguards for the Russian forces. They ambushed Ottoman forces, cut down the telegraph lines, which caused a lot of havoc at the time. The Ottoman government had to relocate them from the war zone to provinces where there were no fighting with the means available to them at the time. {Fig. 30-33}. Many armenians migrated to other countries such as USA, France, and England, enhancing their lives tremendously. Since this barbaric tribe of armenians left the corpses of Moslems rot in open air, since they drowned them in wells, or threw the corpses in creeks or rivers, this caused a severe cholera epidemic which took many lives, including their own. Even though armenians and Russians massacred about 2,500,000 Moslems, where as, armenian losses were between 36,000 and 125,000, this is the so-called “ARMENIAN GENOCIDE”.

“Photographs are from Turkish Armed Forces archives or my own post card collection”

May 8, 2010

Do we have to defend the actions of the Committee of Union and Progress?

AN ARTICLE LOVED BY ARMENIANS —

for Original comments from Armenians see

ordudan kovulan bu yazar hakkindabasinda cikanlar :

Ümit Kardaş*

In January 1913, the Committee of Union and Progress overthrew the government and started to implement a policy to homogenize the population through a planned ethnic cleansing and destruction and forced relocation.

The term “genocide,” defined as the “crime of crimes” in the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rwanda decision, was first coined by Raphael Lemkin, a Jewish lawyer from Poland.

He was particularly known for his efforts to draft the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which cast genocide as an international crime in 1948.Dealing with the case of Talat Paşa being murdered by an Armenian youth in Berlin in 1921, Lemkin started to compile a file about what happened in the Ottoman Empire in connection with the case. As he discussed the case with his professor, he learned that there was no international law provision that would entail the prosecution of Talat Paşa for his actions, and he was profoundly shocked when his professor likened the case of Talat Paşa to a farmer who would not be held responsible for killing the chickens in his poultry house.

In 1933, Lemkin used the term “crime against international law” as a precursor of the concept of genocide during the League of Nations conference on international criminal law in Madrid. After Nazi-led German forces devastated Europe and invaded Poland in 1939, Lemkin was enlisted in the army, but upon the defeat of Polish forces, he fled to the US, leaving his parents behind. Later, while working as an adviser during the Nuremberg trials, he would learn that his parents had died in the Nazi concentration camps.

In his book “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe,” published in 1944, he defined genocide as atrocities and massacre intended to destroy a nation or an ethnic group. Coining the term from the Greek genos, meaning race or ancestry, and the Latin cide, meaning killing, Lemkin argued that genocide does not have to mean direct destruction of a nation. In 1946, the UN General Assembly issued a declaration on genocide and unanimously accepted that genocide is a crime under international law, noting that it eliminates the right of existence of a specific group and shocks the collective conscience of humanity. However, Lemkin wished that in addition, a convention should be drafted on preventing and punishing the crime of genocide. This wish was fulfilled with the signature of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948. Lemkin died in a hotel room in New York in a state of poverty at the age of 59 in 1959. Although they left this idealist defender of humanity alone, people were gentle enough to write, “The Father of the Genocide Convention,” as an epitaph on his grave.

1843-1908 period

In 1843, Bedirhan Bey, who commanded the Kurds who were assigned with the duty of massacring the people of Aşita (Hoşud), connected to the sanjak of Hakkari, where the population was predominantly Armenian and Nestorian, persuaded the Armenians and Nestorians who had fled to the mountains to return and hand in their weapons, and then, the people who were massacred were largely thrown in the Zap River. The majority of their women and children were sold as slaves. It is reported that at least 10,000 Armenians and Nestorians were killed in this massacre. In 1877, the Ottoman Army and the Russian Army started to fight again, and availing of this opportunity, Armenia once again became a battlefield, and the soldiers shouted, “Kill the disbelievers.” Circassians and Kurds slaughtered 165 Christian families, including women and children, in Beyazıt. In 1892, Sultan Abdülhamit II summoned the Kurdish tribal chiefs to İstanbul and gave them military uniforms and weapons, thereby establishing the Hamidiye cavalry regiment with some 22,500 members. In this way, Abdülhamit II played with the foreign policy equilibrium between the UK and Russia and organized a specific ethnic/religious group against another ethnic/religious group based on a Muslim vs. non-Muslim dichotomy. The Ottoman administration appointed the worst enemies of Armenians as their watchdogs, thereby creating a force that could crush them even in peacetime. The persecution of Armenians peaked in the Sason massacre in September 1894. Abdülhamit II declared resisting Armenians rebels and ordered that they should be eradicated.

1908-1914 period

Europe and America extensively supported the Young Turks, who were seeking legitimacy. When the Movement Army threatened to launch a campaign against İstanbul, Abdülhamit II declared a constitutional monarchy on July 24, 1908. Without using any discretion, ordinary people were both amazed and pleased. Moved by slogans calling for equality, freedom and brotherhood, Armenians, too, welcomed with joy the government backed and controlled by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP).

Britain and France made loans available to the new regime and sent consultants for the treasury and the navy in support. To alleviate the consequences of the massacres of 1895 and 1896, European countries increased their humanitarian assistance. Orphaned children of Christian families were placed in care centers, and schools were opened in eastern Anatolia. The introduction of the second constitutional monarchy was seen as an assurance of the creation of equality among all races and religions. However, on April 14, 1909, a new wave of slaughter started against Christians in Adana. The CUP’s close alliance with the Armenian Dashnak Party was a major reason for the rekindling of these massacres. For the first time, these attacks did not discriminate between Armenians and eastern Christians. Thus, Orthodox Syriacs, Catholic Syriacs and Chaldeans were also killed. Apparently, Armenians had stood apart with their penchant for trade, banking, brokerage as well as for pharmacy, medicine and consulting and other professions; they constituted a wealthy portion of the population. As a result, this and their identity as non-Muslims made Armenians a clear target. As a commercial and agricultural factor, Armenians also served as an obstacle to the Germanification of Anatolia.

After the Adana massacre of 1909, there was a period of good faith that lasted until 1913. Meanwhile, the CUP improved its ties with the militant Dashnak Party. After transforming into a democratic party, this party was represented with three deputies in the Assembly of Deputies (Meclis-i Mebusan) that was renewed in 1912. This assembly also had six independent Armenians members. In 1876, the Assembly of Deputies had 67 Muslim and 48 non-Muslim deputies. However, in January 1913, following the defeat in the first Balkan War, the CUP overthrew the government (known as the Raid of Bab-ı Ali) and started to implement a policy to homogenize the population through a planned ethnic cleansing and destruction and forced relocation.

Talat Paşa prepared plans for homogenizing the population by relocating ethnic groups to places other than their homeland. According to the plan, Kurds, Armenians and Arabs would be forced to migrate from their homeland, and Bosnians, Circassians and other Muslim immigrants would be settled in their places. The displaced ethnic groups would not be allowed to comprise more than 10 percent of the population in their destinations. Moreover, these groups would be quickly assimilated. The Greeks had already been relocated from the western coasts of the country in 1914.

In addition to the regular army, Enver Paşa believed that there must be special forces that would conduct undercover operations. Thus, he transformed the Special Organization (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa), which he had established as a secret organization before the Balkan War, into an official organization. This organization had intelligence officers, spies, saboteurs and contract killers among its members. It also had a militia comprised of Kurdish tribes. Former criminals worked as volunteers for this organization. Talat Paşa created the main body of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa from gangs of former criminals whom he arranged to be released from prisons. In Anatolia, the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa worked at the disposal of the 3rd Army.

Forced relocations of 1915-1916

The German-backed pan-Islamist policy implied a fatal solution for non-Muslims living within the borders of the empire. The conditions for the forced relocation campaign launched in 1915 were different from previous ones. The two-month campaign covered not only Armenians but also all Christians in eastern Anatolia. These relocations could not be considered a resettlement because the specified destinations were not inhabitable and only very few could make it there. Many people were immediately killed either inside or outside the settlements where they were born or living, and others were murdered on the roads on which they were forced to walk on foot.

Most of those who were immediately killed were men. Women and children formed the largest portion of the groups banished toward the southern deserts. There were continual attacks on these processions, accompanied by rapes of women and kidnappings of children. Provincial officials did not take any measures to provide the convoys with food, water and shelter. Rather, high-level officials and local politicians mobilized death squads against them. These squads would confiscate the goods of the relocated people, sending some of them to the Interior Ministry and embezzling the rest.

Eventually, the forced relocation campaign turned into a series of atrocities which even bothered the Germans. The ongoing campaign was never a population exchange. As noted by British social historian David Gaunt, the purpose of these forced relocation campaigns was to remove a specific population from a specific location. Because it was intended to be performed quickly, this added to the intimidation, violence and cruelty involved. As resettlement was not intended, neither the administration nor the army cared about where the deported population was going or whether they would survive physically. The high degree of the culture and civilization exhibited by Armenians made the atrocities against them all the worse in the eyes of the world. Talat Paşa mistakenly made his last conclusion: “There is no longer an Armenian problem.”

Conclusion and suggestions

The foregoing account cannot duly express what really happened in its scope, dimension and weight. These atrocities and massacres were not only regularly reported on in European and US newspapers, but were also evidenced in the official documents of Britain and the US and even Germany and Austria, which were allies of the Ottoman Empire, and in the minutes of the Ottoman Court Martial (Divan-ı Harbi), the descriptions of diplomats and missionaries, in commission reports and in the memoirs of those who survived them.

No justification, even the fact that some Armenian groups revolted with certain claims and collaborated with foreign countries, can be offered for this human tragedy. It is misleading to discuss what happened with reference to genocide, which is merely a legal and technical term. No technical term is vast enough to contain these incidents, which are therefore indescribable. Atrocities and massacres are incompatible with human values. It is more degrading to be regarded as a criminal in the collective conscience of humanity than to be tried on charges of genocide.

A regime that hinges upon concealing and denying the truth will make the state and the society sick and decadent. The politicians, academics, journalists, historians and clerical officials in Turkey should try to ensure that the society can face the truth. To face the truth is to become free. We can derive no honor or dignity from defending our ancestors who were responsible for these tragedies. It is not a humane or ethical stance to support and defend the actions of Abdülhamit II and senior CUP members and their affiliated groups, gangs and marauders. Turkey should declare to the world that it accepts said atrocities and massacres and that in connection with this, it advocates the highest human values of truth, justice and humanism while condemning the mentality and actions of those who committed them in the past.

After this is done, it should invite all Armenians living in the diaspora to become citizens of the Turkish Republic. As the Armenians of the diaspora return to the geography where their ancestors lived for thousands of years before being forced to abandon it, leaving behind their property, memories and past, this may serve to abate their sorrow, which has now translated into anger. The common border with Armenia should be opened without putting forward any condition. This is what conscience, humanity and reason direct us to do. Turkey will become free by getting rid of its fears, complexes and worries by soothing the sorrows of Armenians.

*Dr. Ümit Kardaş is a retired military judge.

02 May 2010, Sunday

May 4, 2010

How A Court Case Was Won In France Against A Dashnak

Maxime Gauin
Paris, May 2, 2010

“We live in fact for some moments, intense and special; the rest of the time, we wait these moments.”

Edgar Faure (1908-1988), French lawyer and statesman.

On April 27, the Lyon’s tribunal declared Movsès Nissanian, municipal counselor of Villeurbanne (biggest city of Lyon’s suburb) member of Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF-Dashnak), guilty of “public insult against an individual” (me) and sentenced him. As a preliminary information, I have to say the following:

— Lyon is comparable to Boston in USA for the influence of Armenian nationalism, and the ambiance in Villeurbanne could be compared, by some aspects, with New Jersey’s ambiance. The mayor and former MP, Jean-Paul Bret, has some common points with US Senator Robert J. Menendez.

— I received no support from Lyon’s Turkish associations for the costs, or any other aspects, of my court case.

— As a MA student in history, I sued Mr. Nissanian to defend my dignity and the freedom of speech, against the political misuse of history.

I) Background: the facts, the procedure, the collateral incidents

.

February 15, 2008. During a meeting about the Sirma Oran affair, Movsès Nissanian says that I am exactly like “those who sent Jews to Auschwitz” during the WWII. He says that because I wrote an article, published on the Web, criticizing the mayor of Villeurbanne (who harassed Sirma Oran by his questions about the so-called “genocide”) and the ARF (for his crimes of the past, including terrorism and massacres of Muslims and Jews). I signed the article by initials only, to remain quiet, but my name was revealed on the free-access forum of armenews.com, first French-Armenian Web site. His editor-in-chief is Ara Toranian, former spokesman of ASALA (1976-1983) then of dissident group ASALA-RM (1983-1985).

May 15, 2008. I file a complaint in Lyon’s tribunal.

June 2008. The Lyon’s prosecutor opens a criminal investigation.

October 21, 2008. I file a complaint in the police station of my Parisian district, against vitriolic messages who insult and defame me, on the forum of armenews.com. I sent before several e-mails to Mr. Toranian, but he did not respond, so I take my promise to complaint. Less than seven hours after that, Mr. Toranian destroys for ever his dear free-access forum. Even some of his friends asked to him, before my complaint, to close this forum, because it was full of racist, anti-Semitic and anti-homosexual messages, several with direct incitation to physical violence, including murder.

December 2008 (I do not remember the precise date). I give to the chief of Lyon’s investigative magistrates, in charge of my complaint, the record of Mr. Nissanian’s statements during the meeting of February (Jean-Patrick Martz, husband of Sirma Oran, was in the room and recorded the speeches). The record is later authenticated by an expert, because a demand of Mr. Nissanian.

July 31, 2009. The procedure is completely finished. Both the chief of investigative magistrates and the deputy prosecutor ask that Mr. Nissanian be sent in front of Lyon’s tribunal for “public insult against an individual”.

September 9, 2009. The trial is fixed to November 3.

End of October 2009. Mr. Nissanian’s lawyer, Xavier Vahramian, files his written conclusions: 18 pages, plus 33 pieces, mostly about the so-called “genocide”; Mr. Nissanian lawyer argues that since I “denied the genocide”, I am guilty of “provocation”, as defined by law, and that, as a result, Mr. Nissanian must be not sentenced. He adds that “ARF did never use terrorism” and even that “ARF has always condemned terrorism”. The defense lawyer filed nothing during more than one year of investigation. It is now too late to make an appropriate response. Me and my lawyer ask that the trial be postponed; the tribunal accepts and fixes the date to January 5.

One can notice that the accusations of war crimes against Muslim and Jewish civilians, perpetrated by ARF members from 1914 to 1922, were never challenged, or even mentioned, by Mr. Nissanian or his lawyer, during the whole procedure.

November 3, 2009. Oran vs. Bret trial. The ambiance is terrible. I am scolded upset when I am leaving the tribunal’s room, by fanatic young Dashnaks (it is fair to add that few others young Dashnaks were unaggressive and expressed their disapprobation to such an aggressive attitude). I prevent insult and assault only in asking: “Do you want take the place of Mr. Nissanian?” I file a “main courante” (complaint without legal consequence) in the police station of my Parisian district, in coming back to my home.

November-December 2009. In French National Library, I search extensively in the archives of Haïastan, official newspaper of young Dashnaks and France-Arménie, monthly edited by Dashnaks of Lyon; I photocopy many articles supporting stridently terrorism. During the same time, I write a draft of response, about Dashnak crimes (terrorism of 1890’s and 1900’s years; terrorism of interwar period; collaboration with Nazism; terrorism of 1970’s and 1980’s; celebration of terrorism until today) and about the allegations of “genocide”, using writings of Feridun Ata, Donald Bloxham, Gwynne Dyer, Edward J. Erickson, Yusuf Halaçog(lu, Hilmar Kaiser, Guenter Lewy, S,inasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, Stanford J. Shaw, Philip H. Stoddard, Malcom E. Yapp and others. My lawyer makes with this draft two appendixes for the revised version of his written conclusions (the first was established in October 2009). Written statements of Türkkaya Ataöv, Mumtaz Soysal and Norman Stone are also filed. I would like express my thanks to these professors.

January 4, 2010. Ara Toranian publishes on his site armenews.com a defamatory article against me, saying that Movsès Nissanian was right in saying that I have the same mentality of those who sent Jews to Auschwitz. Immediately, I sent an e-mail to him, threatening to make a new court case. Less than one half-hour, he answers that to prevent any misunderstanding about his intentions, he is deleting the article (and keeps his promise).

II) The trial of January 5, 2010, and its consequences

The trial happens in front of the same tribunal than for Oran vs. Bret case. However, the ambiance is much more quiet for this trial that on November 3. Not a single young Dashnak, and less activists in general. All are calm — excepted one, expelled by the president in the beginning of my statement. I speak about terrorism: nobody screams. I say that Mr. Toranian was president of the “National Armenian Movement for ASALA” (I say that because Mr. Nissanian used one of his articles for his defense); Mr. Toranian is three or four meters behind me; he says absolutely nothing. The president asked to everybody to be short, so I say almost nothing about “genocide” claims, just quoting Hilmar Kaiser’s praising of Yusuf Halaçog(lu.

Movsès Nissanian’s lawyer asks few question to me, but no one about history. My lawyer asks to his colleague of defense: “You asserted in your written conclusions that ‘ARF has always condemned terrorism’; did you file a single piece proving that?” No reply. My lawyers asks then to Mr. Nissanian if he regrets to have used such words against me. The defendant answers that yes.

Later during the trial, the president says: “the tribunal has not to decide between historical thesis”.

As usual in French procedure, the last word is for the defendant. In his short final declaration, Mr. Nissanian says: “I reprove these acts of terrorism” used by ARF and ASALA.

Mid-January 2010. Clash in the staff of France-Arménie, which published my account of trial on its Web site. Readers are chocked by what Mr. Nissanian said about terrorism, and call him a “coward”, a “shame” for ARF. Both my account and the comments are finally deleted, and the editor-in-chief, the passionately anti-Turkish racist Laurent Leylekian is furious because this incident.

III) The judgment: some commentaries

It is pronounced on April 27. The full text is available here:

Even more quiet ambiance than on January 5. No one Armenian media announced the date of the judgment. The tribunal rejects the excuse of provocation, arguing that such an excuse needs to be a direct and personal attack against the person who insult, and must be made few time before that the insult happens. No allusion to “genocide” claims in the discussion of the excuse of provocation. Mr. Nissanian is declared guilty of insult against an individual and sentenced. The president found a judgment of the Cour de cassation (French Supreme court) of April 1908 (!), saying that there is a difference between a “fault” of victim (excessive imprudence in the expression), which decreases the sentence, and the excuse of provocation, which prevents a sentence. In this case, the tribunal argues that it is an unneeded strident formulation to quote Gaïdz Minassian’s critical analysis about Dashnak terrorism (ARF “elevated terrorism until a saint method”, he writes in his book “Guerre et terrorisme arméniens”) in a context which concerns not ARF, but its Villeurbanne’s chapter, not involved in terrorism or in glorification of terrorism. I wanted not to libel this section, but to show the contrast between the repeated ask to Sirma Oran about “genocide” recognition (asks made by the Villeurbanne’s mayor) and the complete absence of ask of “recognition” about crimes perpetrated by ARF; but I did not insist of this point, before and during the tribunal, because I did not know the decision of 1908, and because my lawyer did not think to it.

So, Mr. Nissanian is sentenced, but to slight punishment: 300 € of suspended fine; 90 € as costs of judgment’s registration; 500 € for me. The president says that “it is a warning” to him.

Despite the slightness of the sentence, this judgment is terrible for ARF. The “genocide” claims are not accepted, not even discussed; the tribunal confirms by this way that he does not want “decide between historical thesis”.

The basic accusation of terrorism against ARF is validated; the judgment says that I mentioned “the acts attributable to ARF”, referring, among others, to terrorism. Even the use of jurisprudential notion of “fault” is terrible for ARF: the fundamental contradiction between the Dashnak terrorism on one side, the Dashnak desire of respectability, not the say the Dashnak arrogance in pretending to say what is good, on the other side. Mr. Nissanian escaped to a severe sentence only in substantiating his claims to be not favorable to terrorism, i.e. in saying “I reprove these acts of terrorism”; so, he broken ties with a considerable part of Dashnak activists. But the worst is perhaps that this defeat happened in front of the same tribunal than Mr. Bret’s success against S?rma Oran.

When I am writing this text, not a single Armenian Web site or forum has been mentioned the judgment; so, even is the sentence is slight, it seems sufficient for a strong symbolic effect.

As a result of two years of I renounce to nothing and regret nothing; I express my thanks to the thirty persons who I did not know before the judgment, and who sent to me their congratulations for the success in front of Lyon’s tribunal.

Many other people could make a successful court case, in France as well as in other countries of Western Europe, against Armenian nationalists who use insult or defamation as a political instrument — frequently with more viciousness and perseverance than Mr. Nissanian; one can hope, at least, that I will not remain alone to do that for a long time.

Maxime Gauin
Paris, May 2, 2010

Google Translation Of Maxime gauin’s Article in

The Theodor Mommsen Villeurbanne
A misunderstood genius: Jean-Paul Bret
By Mr. G, lundi11 February 2008

“Hypocrisy is a tribute that vice pays to virtue. “

Francois de La Rochefoucauld, Maxims.

The mayor of Villeurbanne, Mr. Bret is an extraordinary perspicacity. He decided to joint list with the Greens. He asked one of the candidates nominated by the party to “recognize the genocide of Armenia. This person has a Turkish name, she would have called Jeannine Smith, the same question he asked was, no doubt. This person runs. It is not enough for Mr. Bret: he asks her to repeat the “Armenian community” of Villeurbanne. She runs again. It is still not enough for Mr. Bret, which then requires a “recognition” writing.

Hunting “revisionist”

For Mr. Bret, anyone denying that the plight of Armenians in 1915-1916 could be a genocide, he said, “Holocaust denier” – even if this dispute does not affect the individual suffering and the magnitude of various crimes. The slightest suspicion that subject can cause the most severe sanctions, the most exemplary. Mr. Guenter Lewy, professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts, who fled Nazi Germany as a teenager with his family in 1939, is “revisionist”.

“The three pillars of the Armenian claims, to classify the losses suffered during the First World War as genocide fail to substantiate the charge that the Young Turk regime organized the massacres. Other alleged evidence of a plan of annihilation are no better.

Apply or not the term genocide to events which occurred here nearly a century may seem unimportant to many historians, but this application – or not – keeps a great political importance. The Armenians and their supporters, such as Turkish nationalists have made claims and defended their cause at the cost of simplification of historical reality, complex, and by ignoring crucial evidence that would lead to a more nuanced view of the past. Scholars have based their professional position on previous work, often ignoring dishonest interpretations of primary sources as they behaved. Against the backdrop of major policy issues, both sides have sought to silence opponents of their views, and to prevent a confrontation of all arguments in this case [1]. “

Historians specializing in Ottoman history, and whose fame is international, so all are “deniers”, including MM. Bernard Lewis (Jewish), Stanford Jay Shaw (of the Jewish faith), and Gilles Veinstein (born in 1945 in Paris, in a Jewish family).

“During the rest of the [First World War], much of the Armenian population was killed or fled. […] The Armenians say that these deaths are the result of a policy of genocide implemented by the Ottoman government. […] The minutes of the council of ministers did not confirm this, rather they show great willingness to investigate and improve a situation where six million people (Turks, Greeks, Arabs, Armenians, Jews and others) were killed by a combination of rebellions, attacks by bandits, killings and massacres-cons, famine and diseases, compounded by sudden foreign invasions, in which all peoples of the empire, Muslim and non-Muslims, have counted the victims and criminals. […] After the Revolution [Russian], a truce was signed between the Republic and the Ottoman Empire, but the Armenian units then began a massacre of Turkish peasants generalized still resident in the South Caucasus and eastern Anatolia, where were more than 600,000 refugees, in addition to 2,295,705 Turks living in the provinces of Erzurum, Erzincan, Trabzon, Van and Bitlis after the war [2]. “

“1) There was no hate campaign aimed directly at the Armenians, no demonizing comparable to European anti-Semitism.

2) The deportation of the Armenians, although widespread, was not total, and in particular it did not apply to the two main cities of Istanbul and Izmir.

3) The Turkish actions against Armenians, although disproportionate, were not born from nothing. The fear of a Russian advance into the eastern Ottoman provinces, knowing that many Armenians viewed the Russians as liberators against the Turkish regime and awareness of Armenian revolutionary activities against the Ottoman State, all contributed to create an atmosphere of anxiety and suspicion, aggravated by the situation becoming more desperate by the Empire and the neuroses – oh – usual time of war. In 1914, the Russians formed four large Armenian volunteer units and three others in 1915. These units accounted for many Ottoman Armenians, including some well-known public figures.

4) The deportation for criminal reasons, strategic or otherwise, had been practiced for centuries in the Ottoman Empire [3]. “

“Second point: there were also many casualties among Muslims throughout the war, the fighting but also by actions against them by Armenians, in a context of ethnic and national rivalry. If there are victims forgotten, are those, and the Turks of today are right to denounce the bias of Western opinion in this regard. Is it because there were only Muslims that are neglected, or because they implicitly consider that the ultimate success of their peers deprives them of the status of martyrs? What view would carry us so on the same facts, if things had turned out differently, if the Armenians were eventually based on the rubble Ottoman state in Anatolia sustainable?

But the last point is crucial, debate, its legal and political implications, is whether the massacres perpetrated against the Armenians were the order of the Young Turk government, if the transfers have been a lure for systematic extermination company, implemented in different ways, but decided, planned, RC governmental level, or if the Young Turks were only guilty of recklessly triggered movements which ended in bloodshed. Merely asking the question may seem absurd and outrageous. It is true that state involvement is a prerequisite for the complete application to the Armenian tragedy of the term genocide, as it was coined in 1944 and defined by the Nuremberg Trials and the United Nations Convention of 1948.

It must however admit that one has so far no evidence that government involvement [4]. “

Similarly, are counted among the “deniers”, Professor Eberhard Jäckel, one of the leading names of Nazi [5], the UK government [6], the German government [7], the Spanish government, Israeli Parliament [8], the Bulgarian Parliament [9] and the Nobel Peace Shimon Peres. [10]

Some disgruntled say that Mr. Bret has led a miserable political operation, whose methods disturbingly reminiscent of inquisitorial trials: the repentant heretic in public, and is excluded from the community if it persists in the heresy. Daring to proclaim the truth loud and clear: Mr. Bret is a genius – a misunderstood genius. Although he never made a study of history (like many other “specialists” self-appointed Ottoman history, such as Yves Ternon surgeon), he managed to unmask the “denial,” where is: in scientific research, recognized as such, and the governments of key allies of France. This genius can not be praised enough.

Dear friends of Mr Bret

Think! He is already struggling Turkish hydra, but it must also be wary of his friends. Mr. Bret indeed maintains the best relations with the local Armenian Revolutionary Federation (USA-Dashnaktsutiun). For, as amazing as it sounds, this foreign party (or to be absolutely correct its youth branch) has a section villeurbannaise, and also a section of Paris, Lyon, Marseille, Nice, and another in Décines, situated, as Villeurbanne, a suburb of Lyon. If a reader knows a European Turkey section of the PS in the suburbs of Munich, Milan, and Edinburgh, he would write to the association, which will transmit.

The heroic and visionary Mr. Bret managed a tour de force: to remain an impeccable democrat, while the friend of the local members of the FRA. Indeed, the FRA has “elevated to the rank of terrorism sacrosanct practice [11]. The list of major terrorist acts in the ARF include:

the first hostage of the contemporary era, which took place at the Ottoman Bank (Istanbul), August 26, 1896, the stated purpose (and succeeded, unfortunately, beyond all hope) promote violence antiarméniennes, a pretext for intervention further increased the great powers in the Ottoman Empire [12];

the failed assassination attempt against Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1905, which killed the founder of the Dashnaktsutyun, Christapor Mikaelian, who died while handling a bomb he was preparing [13];

the assassination of Bedros Kapamaciyan Mayor Armenian Van, 10 December 1912 [14];

the massacre of many Muslim civilians between 1914 and 1922 [15];

the assassination of Archbishop Leon Tourian, head of the Armenian Church in the Americas, New York, December 24, 1933 [16];

a series of attacks between 1973 and 1985, including the suicide bombing of Lisbon, July 27, 1983, commemorated each year by the FRA [17];

the twin bombings of August 1, 1993, against Viktor Polianitchko (Russian officer) and General Ossetian Safonov [18] who won, the FRA to be prohibited in Armenia until the election of Mr. Kocharian, a of his friends, as President of the Republic [19].

The long record of party Dashnak not limited to these terrorist activities, it also includes the pro-Nazi activism of some of its most prominent members, never disavowed activism, but rather glorified, until today, by the direction of FRA. Hairenik, party organ Dashnak United States, has shown its unwavering support and full support to Nazi ideology. The edition of September 17, 1936 states as follows:

“Then came Adolf Hitler, after fighting worthy of Hercules. He spoke of race in the pulsing heart of the Germans, making the fountain spring of the national genius. “

A month earlier, on August 19 exactly Hairenik not hesitate to write:

“It is sometimes difficult to eradicate these harmful [Jews], when they have contaminated up to the root like a chronic illness, and when it becomes necessary for one people [in this case the Germans, or rather Nazis] to eliminate an uncommon method these attempts are regarded as revolutionary. During such surgery, it is natural that the blood flows. Under such conditions, a dictator emerges as a savior. “

Other members of the FRA are not content to support the Third Reich by words: they gave him the gift of their person. Thus General Ganayan (or Kanayan, according to a transcript of the Armenian alphabet in Latin script), better known by his nickname, Dro, he formed and led the 812th battalion of the Armenian Wehrmacht, the main fact of weapon was the roundup of Jews in occupied Soviet Union [20]. Dro is in the mausoleum since 2000, inaugurated by President Kocharian [21]. In an editorial in April 2001, General Dro Hairenik ranks among the “heroes” of the Armenian people [22], thereby demonstrating his perfect continuity with the line of the 1930 pro-Nazi. Mr. Vahan Hovhannesian, candidate of the ARF in the presidential elections in Armenia, also believes Dro as a “hero” [23].

It goes without saying that Mr. Bret has asked all his friends from the USA to recognize and condemn, orally then in writing, all of his crimes. It goes without saying that Mr. Bret is necessarily also “committed” to the “recognition” of the “Armenian genocide” as “recognition” of numerous crimes of the FRA, the 1890s to today.

How? You have not read, heard or seen it in the media, but then not at all? This may be an omission on their part. Just think, a genius like Mr. Bret can not ignore such acts.

[1] Guenter Lewy, “Revisiting the Armenian Genocide,” Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2005.

[2] Stanford and Ezel Kural Shaw Jay Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, New York / London, Cambridge University Press, Volume II, revised edition, 1978, pp. 315-325 (according to Ottoman documents).

[3] “The explanation of Bernard Lewis,” The World, 1 January 1994.

[4] Gilles Veinstein, “Three questions about a massacre,” The History, April 1995.

[5] “But if we take into account the fact that Turks and Kurds have also deplored the heavy loss, and certainly more than combat due to illness, approximately one third of British soldiers Indians and taken prisoner by the Turks in 1916 have died, all this strongly suggests that no genocidal intent existed. “Eberhard Jäckel,” Genozid oder nicht? “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 22, 2006.

[6] “The evidence is insufficient evidence to convince us that the events should be classified as genocide under the terms of the UN Convention on Genocide of 1948 which, anyway, is not to retroactive application. The interpretation of events in Eastern Anatolia in 1915-1916 is still the subject of genuine debate among historians. “Lady Scott (Foreign Office), statement on behalf of the British Government in the House of Lords, 2001.

[7] “The federal government believes that consideration of massacres in 1915-1916 can not be by definition a matter of history and that it therefore applies only to historical research and both countries are interested in ascertaining the Turkey and Armenia. Response from the German Minister of Foreign Affairs to a parliamentary question in March 2001.

[8] “Israeli Parliament Rejects Alleged Genocide Bill”, Turkish Daily News, March 16, 2007.

[9] “Bulgarian Lawmakers reject Armenian” genocide “claims”, Turkish Daily News, January 18, 2008.

[10] “We reject attempts to create a similarity between the Jewish Holocaust and the Armenian allegations. Nothing comparable to the Holocaust has taken place. What the Armenians suffered a tragedy but not a genocide. Shimon Peres interview with the Turkish Daily News, April 10, 2001.

[Eleven] Gaïdz Minassian, Armenian War and Terrorism, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2002, p. 262.

[12] Francis Georgeon, Abdulhamid II, Sultan Caliph, Paris, Fayard, 2003, pp. 299-300, Stanford and Ezel Kural Shaw Jay Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, op. cit., pp. 203-205.

[13] Gaïdz Minassian, Armenian War and Terrorism, op. cit., p. 2.

[14] Justin McCarthy, Esat Arslan, Ömer Cemalettin TASKIRAN and Turan, The Armenian Rebellion at Van, Salt Lake City, Utah University Press, 2006, pp. 164-165.

[15] Justin McCarthy et al, The Armenian Rebellion at Van, op. cit., pp. 233-251.

[16] Michael M. Gunter, “Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People. A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1986, p. 55.

[17] Gaïdz Minassian, Armenian War and Terrorism, op. cit., pp. 21-114, especially pp. 88-93 on the attack in Lisbon.

[18] “A representative of Boris Yeltsin killed in the North Caucasus”, Le Monde, August 3, 1993; Gaïdz Minassian, Armenian War and Terrorism, op. cit., p. 262. It is true that the two victims have not breached the global humanism, is the least we can write, but they deserved a trial, not an ambush.

[19] The ban was also motivated by the relations between the USA and part of the Russian extreme right, one led by Mr. Zhirinovsky: Gaïdz Minassian, Armenian War and Terrorism, op. cit., p. 241.

[20] Sedat Laçiner, “The Second World War: Armenian-Nazi Collaboration? “The Journal of Turkish Weekly, May 21, 2005. id = 1133

[21] “Dro, became pro-Nazi hero,” L’Humanite, 19 April 1999. See also the official website of the FRA:

[22]

[23]
URL for this article: http://www.turquieeuropeenne.org/article2455.html

© 2004 European Turkey. All rights reserved

May 3, 2010
Nancy Pelosi: “We are all Armenians!”

House Speaker pledges to fight on for Genocide recognition

by Emil Sanamyan

Published: Wednesday April 21, 2010

Speaker Pelosi speaking at April 21 congressional commemoration. The Armenian Reporter

Washington – “Tonight we are all Armenians!” House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) declared as she began her address at the annual congressional commemoration of the Armenian Genocide on April 21.

“We are tired of the story being told [about why Congress should not adopt an Armenian Genocide resolution] but we are not tired of fighting for the truth,” Pelosi insisted as she spoke in front of some 200 people, mostly Armenian Americans.

Speaker noted the importance of last month’s House Foreign Affairs Committee vote on the Armenian Genocide resolution that “insisted on the truth” and expressed hope that the vote was “of some comfort” to Armenian Americans.

Pelosi added that she and other supporters of affirmation would not rest until the federal government clearly recognizes the Armenian Genocide, but she made no commitments about bringing the House resolution to vote, a move that is opposed by the Obama Administration.

She also referred to last year’s court decision in California that used the U.S. government position as justification to deny Armenian Americans an opportunity to collect on WWI-era insurance policies of their ancestors.

The event organized by co-chairs of the Armenian caucus Frank Pallone (D-N.J.) and Mark Kirk (R-Ill.), included House Majority leader Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) and Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Howard Berman (D-Calif.) and more than a dozen other members of Congress, including two members of Armenian descents Reps. Anna Eshoo (D-Calif.) and Jackie Speier (D-Calif.)

The event also featured remarks by Armenia’s Ambassador to U.S. Tatoul Markarian, Artsakh’s Representative Robert Avetisyan, and invocations by the Armenian Church clergy, including Archbishop Oshagan Choloyan who offered an opening prayer for the House of Representatives earlier in the day.

April 22, 2010