Turkish Forum

Tag: Abkhazia

  • Western Armenians demand Turkey’s recognition of Genocide

    Western Armenians demand Turkey’s recognition of Genocide

    73280PanARMENIAN.Net – On June 25, Moscow hosted Western Armenians’ convention, with 100 delegates from Moscow, St. Petersburg, Rostov, Sochi, Adler, Krasnodar, Omsk, Petrozavodsk, Vladivostok, Crimea and Abkhazia attending.

    39 Russian delegates to participate in The Third Congress of Western Armenians due December 2011 in Paris were selected during the convention, Hyusisapayl Moscow-based newspaper reported.

    “National Council of Western Armenians will defend the legal rights of the descendants of Western Armenians in international organizations, negotiate with Turkish authorities and other interested parties to achieve Turkey’s recognition of Armenian Genocide as well as condemnation of 1915 massacres and compensation of moral, material and territorial damages,” the statement issued during the convention stressed.

    via Western Armenians demand Turkey’s recognition of Genocide – PanARMENIAN.Net.

  • Maritime Security Weaknesses in the Black Sea

    Maritime Security Weaknesses in the Black Sea

    By: Vladimir Socor

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 171 September 18, 2009 04:34 PM Age: 8 hrs

    The Russian navy cruiser Moskva in Abkhazia, 2008 

     

    Russian naval operations in August 2008 highlighted the security deficit in the Black Sea. As a littoral country, Russia misused the territory of another littoral country, Ukraine, as a staging ground for attacking a third littoral country, Georgia, using its Black Sea Fleet based in Ukrainian territory in Sevastopol (warships from Novorossiysk also participated in the operation). The Russian fleet landed thousands of troops on the Abkhaz coast, attacked Georgian coastal guard vessels, as well as shore targets further south in Georgia, and blockaded Poti. In that port, Russian troops blew up Georgian coastal guard cutters at the pier.

    The Russian fleet’s actions violated Ukraine’s neutrality, which Russia otherwise professes to uphold vis-á-vis NATO. The naval operation also breached the 1997 basing agreements, which rule out any involvement in hostilities by the Russian fleet based in Ukraine.

    According to Russian media accounts from naval sources in the war’s aftermath, the Russian naval group moved slowly from Sevastopol in the direction of Georgia, four or five days before the August 8 assault. Yet, no littoral or non-littoral country or organization reacted at the political level, before or afterward, to Russia’s naval operation.

    In the war’s aftermath, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko issued a decree requiring the Russian Black Sea Fleet command to provide advanced notification to Ukrainian authorities in each case when its ships and personnel exit and re-enter Ukrainian territory. The decree cites international law and the 1997 basing agreements as the basis for this requirement. Ukraine’s foreign ministry has repeatedly taken up the issue with its Russian government counterparts. Yet the Russian government and naval command have largely ignored it.

    As part of its naval modernization program, Moscow hopes to buy a Mistral-class helicopter carrier from France. Announcing that intention, the Russian Navy’s Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy, said: “In the conflict in August last year [against Georgia], a ship like that would have allowed the Black Sea Fleet to accomplish its mission in 40 minutes, not 26 hours which is how long it took us [to land the troops ashore].” The navy also hopes to acquire the license to build three or four Mistral-class ships in Russia. Moscow is preparing an international tender for France, the Netherlands, and Spain – states which also build helicopter carriers of this class- to compete for selling the ship and the technology to Russia (Interfax, September 11, 15).

    According to Vysotskiy, the negotiations are in progress. Moscow apparently expects these NATO countries to enhance Russia’s military capabilities in order to intimidate its neighbors, after the same countries helped block Ukraine’s and Georgia’s membership action plans with the Alliance.

    Moscow has recently introduced adjustments to the command arrangements for its Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine. The fleet shall be subordinated to the Russian North Caucasus Military District (ground forces), headquartered in Rostov-on-the-Don, in the event of “operational missions in the southern and southwestern directions.” Prior to this change, the Russian Fleet in Ukraine was subordinated to the naval command at all times. The change is designed to integrate these naval forces with Russia’s ground forces for operations in the Black Sea region. By the same token this change erodes the provisions of the 1997 Russia-Ukraine agreements that ensure this fleet’s separation from the Russian ground forces and precludes the fleet’s involvement in hostilities (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 3; Interfax, September 11).

    Russia openly questions Ukraine’s sovereignty in the Crimea while signaling that it will try to prolong the stationing of its fleet beyond the 2017 deadline. For that deadline to be observed, the fleet would have to begin the process of withdrawal by 2011-2012. However, Moscow is unwilling and international attention is also lacking. Even some leading Ukrainian proponents of the orientation toward NATO believe that the Alliance and the United States lack a strategy for securing Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity, particularly in the case of escalating Russian pressures in the Crimea (Volodymyr Horbulin and Valentyn Badrak, Defense Express [Kyiv], September 11).

    The existing arrangements for confidence-building and security in the Black Sea are proving inadequate to these challenges. The naval confidence-building undertaking BlackSeaFor and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) are consensus-based groups, unable even to discuss officially, let alone deal with, hard-security challenges such as those relating to the territorial integrity of littoral countries.

    Those groupings and arrangements were not designed to cope with those hard-security challenges; indeed such challenges were not initially anticipated, and went unaddressed after becoming manifest. In terms of naval security, the current situation in the Black Sea amounts to a Russian-Turkish naval condominium, with Turkey probably being the stronger side. The Turkish-led exercise Black Sea Harmony, held periodically with Russia in the southern Black Sea, also has no restraining impact on Russian behavior in the eastern and northern Black Sea.

    https://jamestown.org/program/maritime-security-weaknesses-in-the-black-sea/

  • Black Sea Crisis Deepens As US-NATO Threat To Iran Grows

    Black Sea Crisis Deepens As US-NATO Threat To Iran Grows

    by Rick Rozoff

    15239

    Global Research, September 16, 2009

    Tensions are mounting in the Black Sea with the threat of another conflict between U.S. and NATO client state Georgia and Russia as Washington is manifesting plans for possible military strikes against Iran in both word and deed.

    Referring to Georgia having recently impounded several vessels off the Black Sea coast of Abkhazia, reportedly 23 in total this year, the New York Times wrote on September 9 that “Rising tensions between Russia and Georgia over shipping rights to a breakaway Georgian region have opened a potential new theater for conflict between the countries, a little more than a year after they went to war.” [1]

    Abkhazian President Sergei Bagapsh ordered his nation’s navy to respond to Georgia’s forceful seizure of civilian ships in neutral waters, calling such actions what they are – piracy – by confronting and if need be sinking Georgian navy and coast guard vessels. The Georgian and navy and coast guard are trained by the United States and NATO.

    The spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry addressed the dangers inherent in Georgia’s latest provocations by warning “They risk aggravating the military and political situation in the region and could result in serious armed incidents.” [2]

    On September 15 Russia announced that its “border guards will detain all vessels that violate Abkhazia’s maritime border….” [3]

    Russia would be not only entitled but obligated to provide such assistance to neighboring Abkhazia as “Under mutual assistance treaties signed last November, Russia pledged to help Abkhazia and South Ossetia protect their borders, and the signatories granted each other the right to set up military bases in their respective territories.” [4]

    In attempting to enforce a naval blockade – the International Criminal Court plans to include blockades against coasts and ports in its list of acts of war this year [5] – against Abkhazia, the current Georgian regime of Mikheil Saakashvili is fully aware that Russia is compelled by treaty and national interests alike to respond. Having been roundly defeated in its last skirmish with Russia, the five-day war in August of last year, Tbilisi would never risk actions like its current ones without a guarantee of backing from the U.S. and NATO.

    Days after last year’s war ended then U.S. Senator and now Vice President Joseph Biden flew into the Georgian capital to pledge $1 billion in assistance to the nation, making Georgia the third largest recipient of American foreign aid after Egypt and Israel.

    U.S. and NATO warships poured into the Black Sea in August of 2008 and American ships visited the Georgia port cities of Batumi and Poti to deliver what Washington described as civilian aid but which Russian sources suspected contained replacements for military equipment lost in the conflict.

    Less than a month after the war ended NATO sent a delegation to Georgia to “evaluate damage to military infrastructure following a five-day war between Moscow and Tbilisi….” [6]

    In December a meeting of NATO foreign ministers agreed upon a special Annual National Program for Georgia and in the same month Washington announced the creation of the United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership.

    In the past week a top-level delegation of NATO defense and logistics experts visited Georgia on September 9 “to promote the development of the Georgian Armed Forces” [7] and on September 14 high-ranking officials of the U.S. George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies arrived at the headquarters of the Georgian Ministry of Defense “to review issues of interdepartmental coordination in the course of security sector management and national security revision.” [8]

    The ongoing military integration of Georgia and neighboring Azerbaijan, which also borders Iran – Washington’s Georgetown University is holding a conference on Strategic Partnership between U.S. and Azerbaijan: Bilateral and Regional Criteria on September 18 – by the Pentagon and NATO is integrally connected with general military plans in the Black Sea and the Caucasus regions as a whole and, even more ominously, with joint war plans against Iran.

    As early as January of 2007 reports on that score surfaced in Bulgarian and Romanian news sources. Novinite (Sofia News Agency) reported that the Pentagon “could be using its two air force bases in Bulgaria and one on Romania’s Black Sea coast to launch an attack on Iran….” [9]

    The bases are the Bezmer and Graf Ignitievo airbases in Bulgaria and the Mihail Kogalniceanu counterpart near the Romanian city of Constanza on the Black Sea.

    The Pentagon has seven new bases altogether in Bulgaria and Romania and in addition to stationing warplanes – F-15s, F-16s and A-10 Thunderbolts – has 3,000-5,000 troops deployed in the two nations at any given time, and Washington established its Joint Task Force-East (JTF-East) permanent headquarters at the Mihail Kogalniceanu airbase in Romania.

    A U.S. government website provides these details about Joint Task Force-East:

    “All U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force training operations in Romania and Bulgaria will fall under the command of JTF–East, which in turn is under the command of USEUCOM [United States European Command]. Physically located in Romania and Bulgaria, JTF East will include a small permanent headquarters (in Romania) consisting of approximately 100-300 personnel who will oversee rotations of U.S. Army brigade-sized units and U.S. Air Force Weapons Training Deployments (WTD). Access to Romanian and Bulgarian air and ground training facilities will provide JTF-East forces the opportunity to train and interact with military forces throughout the entire 92-country USEUCOM area of responsibility. U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and U.S Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) are actively involved in establishing JTF-East.” [10]

    The four military bases in Romania and three in Bulgaria that the Pentagon and NATO have gained indefinite access to since the two nations were incorporated into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 2004 allow for full spectrum operations: Infantry deployments in the area and downrange to Afghanistan and Iraq, runways for bombers and fighter jets, docking facilities for American and NATO warships including Aegis class interceptor missile vessels, training grounds for Western special forces and for foreign armed forces being integrated into NATO.

    Added to bases and troops provided by Turkey and Georgia – and in the future Ukraine – the Bulgarian and Romanian sites are an integral component of plans by the U.S. and its allies to transform the Black Sea into NATO territory with only the Russian coastline not controlled by the Alliance. And that of newly independent Abkhazia, which makes control of that country so vital.

    Last week the Romanian defense ministry announced the intention to acquire between 48 and 54 new generation fighter jets – American F-16s and F-35s have been mentioned – as part of “a new strategy for buying multi-role aircraft, which means to first buy aircraft to make the transition to fifth generation equipment, over the coming 10-12 years.” [11]

    With the recent change in government in the former Soviet republic of Moldova – the aftermath of this April’s violent “Twitter Revolution” – the new parliamentary speaker, Mihai Ghimpu, has openly spoken of the nation merging with, which is to say being absorbed by, neighboring Romania. Transdniester [the Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic] broke away from Moldova in 1990 exactly because of the threat of being pulled into Romania and fighting ensued which cost the lives of some 1,500 persons.

    Romania is now a member of NATO and should civil war erupt in Moldova and/or fighting flare up between Moldova and Transdniester and Romania sends troops – all but a certainty – NATO can activate its Article 5 military clause to intervene. There are 1,200 Russian peacekeepers in Transdniester.

    Transdniester’s neighbor to its east is Ukraine, linked with Moldova through the U.S.-concocted GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) bloc, which has been collaborating in enforcing a land blockade against Transdniester. Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko, whose poll ratings are currently in the low single digits, is hellbent on dragging his nation into NATO against overwhelming domestic opposition and can be counted on to attack Transdniester from the eastern end if a conflict breaks out.

    A Moldovan news source last week quoted an opposition leader issuing this dire warning:

    “Moldova’s ethnic minorities are categorically against unification with Romania.

    “If we, those who are not ethnic Moldovans, will have to defend Moldova’s
    statehood, then we will find powerful allies outside Moldova, including in Russia. Along with it, Ukraine, Turkey and Bulgaria would be involved in this fighting. Last year we all witnessed how Russia defended the interests of its nationals in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Why does somebody believe that in case of a civil war in Moldova Russia will simply watch how its nationals are dying? Our task is to prevent such developments.” [12]

    Indeed, the entire Black Sea and Caucasus regions could go up in flames if Western proxies in GUAM attack any of the so-called frozen conflict nations – Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Georgia, Nagorno Karabakh by Azerbaijan and Transdniester by Moldova and Ukraine. A likely possibility is that all four would be attacked simultaneously and in unison.

    An opportunity for that happening would be a concentrated attack on Iran, which borders Azerbaijan and Armenia. The latter, being the protector of Nagorno Karabakh, would immediately become a belligerent if Azerbaijan began military hostilities against Karabakh.

    On September 15 news stories revealed that the Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington, DC, founded in 2007 by former Senate Majority Leaders Howard Baker, Tom Daschle, Bob Dole and George Mitchell, had released a report which in part stated, “If biting sanctions do not persuade the Islamic Republic to demonstrate sincerity in negotiations and give up its enrichment activities, the White House will have to begin serious consideration of the option of a U.S.-led military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.” [13]

    The report was authored by Charles Robb, a former Democratic senator from
    Virginia, Daniel Coats, former Republican senator from Indiana, and retired General Charles Wald, a former deputy commander of the U.S. European Command.

    Iran is to be given 60 days to in essence abandon its civilian nuclear power program and if it doesn’t capitulate the Obama administration should “prepare overtly for any military option” which would include “deploying an additional aircraft carrier battle group to the waters off Iran and conducting joint exercises with U.S. allies.” [14]

    The main Iranian nuclear reactor is being constructed at Bushehr and would be a main target of any U.S. and Israeli bombing and missile attacks. As of 2006 there were 3,700 Russian experts and technicians – and their families – living in the environs of the facility.

    It has been assumed for the past eight years that a military attack on Iran would be launched by the United States from aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf and by long-range Israeli bombers flying over Iraq and Turkey.

    During that period the U.S. and its NATO allies have also acquired access to airbases in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan (in Baluchistan, bordering Iran), Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in addition to those they already have in Turkey.

    Washington and Brussels have also expanded their military presence into Bulgaria, Georgia and Romania on the Black Sea and into Azerbaijan on the Caspian Sea bordering northeastern Iran.

    Plans for massive military aggression against Iran, then, might include air and missile strikes from locations much nearer the nation than previously suspected.

    The American Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced plans last week to supply Turkey, the only NATO member state bordering Iran, with almost $8 billion dollars worth of theater interceptor missiles, of the upgraded and longer-range PAC-3 (Patriot Advance Capability-3) model. The project includes delivering almost 300 Patriots for deployment at twelve command posts inside Turkey.

    In June the Turkish government confirmed that NATO AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) planes would be deployed in its Konya province.

    The last time AWACS and Patriot missiles were sent to Turkey was in late 2002 and early 2003 in preparation for the invasion of Iraq.

    On September 15 the newspaper of the U.S. armed forces, Stars and Stripes, ran an article titled “U.S., Israeli forces to test missile defense while Iran simmers,” which included these details on the biannual Juniper Cobra war games:

    “Some 1,000 U.S. European Command troops will soon deploy to Israel for a large-scale missile defense exercise with Israeli forces.

    “This year’s Juniper Cobra comes at a time of continued concern about Iran’s nuclear program, which will be the subject of talks in October.

    “The U.S. troops, from all four branches of service, will work alongside an equal number of Israel Defense Force personnel, taking part in computer-simulated war games….Juniper Cobra will test a variety of air and missile defense technology during next month’s exercise, including the U.S.-controlled X-Band.” [15]

    The same feature documented that this month’s exercise is the culmination of months of buildup.

    “In April, about 100 Europe-based personnel took part in a missile defense exercise that for the first time incorporated a U.S.-owned radar system, which was deployed to the country in October 2008. The U.S. X-Band radar is intended to give Israel early warning in the event of a missile launch from Iran.

    “For nearly a year, a mix of troops and U.S. Defense Department contractors have been managing the day-to-day operation of the X-Band, which is situated at Nevatim air base in the Negev Desert.” [16]

    The same publication revealed two days earlier that the Pentagon conducted a large-scale counterinsurgency exercise with the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade last week in Germany, “the largest such exercise ever held by the U.S. military outside of the United States….” [17] The two units are scheduled for deployment to Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, but could be diverted to Iran, which has borders with both nations, should need arise.

    What the role of Black Sea NATO states and clients could be in a multinational, multi-vectored assault on Iran was indicated in the aftermath of last year’s Georgian-Russian war.

    At a news conference at NATO headquarters in Brussels a year ago, Russian ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin “said that Russian intelligence had obtained information indicating that the Georgian military infrastructure could be used for logistical support of U.S. troops if they launched an attack on Iran.” [18]

    Rogozin was further quoted as saying, “What NATO is doing now in Georgia is restoring its ability to monitor its airspace, in other words restoring the whole locator system and an anti-missile defence system which were destroyed by Russian artillery.

    “[The restoration of surveillance systems and airbases in Georgia is being] done for logistic support of some air operations either of the Alliance as a whole or of the United States in particular in this region. The swift reconstruction of the airfields and all the systems proves that some air operation is being planned against another country which is located not far from Georgia….” [19]

    Early last October Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Russian Security
    Council “described the U.S. and NATO policy of increasing their military presence in Eastern Europe as seeking strategic military superiority over Russia.

    “The official added that the United States would need allies in the region if the country decided to attack Iran.” [20]

    Patrushev stated, “If it decides to carry out missile and bomb attacks
    against Iran, the US will need loyal allies. And if Georgia is involved in this war, this will pose additional threats to Russia’s national security.” [21]

    Later last October an Azerbaijani website reported that 100 Iranian Air Force jets were exercising near the nation’s border and that “military sources from the United States reported that territories in Azerbaijan and in Georgia may be used for attacking Iran….” [22]

    Writing in The Hindu the same month Indian journalist Atul Aneja wrote of the effects of the Georgian-Russian war of the preceding August and offered this information:

    “Russia’s military assertion in Georgia and a show of strength in parts of West Asia [Middle East], combined with domestic political and economic preoccupations in Washington, appear to have forestalled the chances of an immediate strike against Iran.

    “Following Russia’s movement into South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev acknowledged that Moscow was aware that serious plans to attack Iran had been laid out. ‘We know that certain players are planning an attack against Iran. But we oppose any unilateral step and [a] military solution to the nuclear crisis.’

    “Russia seized control of two airfields in Georgia from where air strikes against Iran were being planned. The Russian forces also apparently recovered weapons and Israeli spy drones that would have been useful for the surveillance of possible Iranian targets.” [23]

    The same newspaper, in quoting Dmitry Rogozin asserting that Russian military intelligence had captured documents proving Washington had launched “active military preparations on Georgia’s territory” for air strikes against Iran, added information on Israeli involvement:

    “Israel had supplied Georgia with sophisticated Hermes 450 UAV spy drones, multiple rocket launchers and other military equipment that Georgia, as well as modernised Georgia’s Soviet-made tanks that were used in the attack against South Ossetia. Israeli instructors had also helped train Georgia troops.” [24]

    Rather than viewing the wars of the past decade – against Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq – and the concomitant expansion of U.S. and NATO military presence inside all three countries and in several others on their peripheries as an unrelated series of events, the trend must be seen for what it is: A consistent and calculated strategy of employing each successive war zone as a launching pad for new aggression.

    The Pentagon has major military bases in Kosovo, in Afghanistan and in Iraq that it never intends to abandon. The U.S. and its NATO allies have bases in Bulgaria, Romania, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait, Bahrain (where the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet is headquartered) and other nations in the vicinity of the last ten years’ wars which can be used for the next ten – or twenty or thirty – years’ conflicts.

    1) New York Times, September 9, 2009
    2) Ibid
    3) Russian Information Agency Novosti, September 15, 2009
    4) Ibid
    5) Wikipedia
    6) Agence France-Presse, September 8, 2009
    7) Trend News Agency, September 9, 2009
    8) Georgia Ministry of Defence, September 14, 2009
    9) Turkish Daily News, January 30, 2007
    10) U.S. Department of State
    11) The Financiarul, September 9, 2009
    12) Infotag, September 11, 2009
    13) Bloomberg News, September 15, 2009
    14) Ibid
    15) Stars and Stripes, September 15, 2009
    16) Ibid
    17) Stars and Stripes, September 13, 2009
    18) Russian Information Agency Novosti, September 17, 2008
    19) Russia Today, September 17, 2008
    20) Russian Information Agency Novosti, October 1, 2008
    21) Fars News Agency, October 2, 2008
    22) Today.AZ, October 20, 2008
    23) The Hindu, October 13, 2008
    24) The Hindu, September 19, 2008

    https://www.globalresearch.ca/black-sea-crisis-deepens-as-us-nato-threat-to-iran-grows/15239

  • Georgia challenges Russia to detain its ships in Abkhaz waters

    Georgia challenges Russia to detain its ships in Abkhaz waters

    TBILISI, September 15 (RIA Novosti) – Georgia said on Tuesday it would resist any attempts by Russia to detain its ships in the waters of its former province of Abkhazia.

    A Russian border protection service official said earlier in the day that Russian border guards would detain all vessels that violate Abkhazia’s maritime border. Tbilisi considers Abkhazia and its waters part of Georgian territory, and has declared any unauthorized maritime shipments of goods illegal.

    The Georgian Foreign Ministry condemned the Russian statement and said it would not tolerate any attempts to detain its ships.

    In a statement Georgia said, it “is determined to block any pirate-like actions on the Russian side by all legal, diplomatic and political methods available.”

    It stressed that in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Abkhazia’s 12-mile maritime zone, as well as the special zone and continental shelf, is part of Georgia.

    Georgia seized the Panama-flagged Buket tanker and its cargo of gasoline and diesel fuel off Abkhazia last month as it sailed from Turkey to the tiny republic on the Black Sea.

    Abkhaz Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba said in early September that Abkhazia was ready to resort to force as President Sergei Bagapsh had given the order “to open fire on Georgian ships if they continue their acts of piracy.”

    Russia recognized Abkhazia and another former Georgian republic of South Ossetia last August after a five-day war with Georgia over the latter, which was attacked by Tbilisi in an attempt to bring it back under central control. Most residents of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia have held Russian citizenship for several years.

    Under mutual assistance treaties signed last November, Russia pledged to help Abkhazia and South Ossetia protect their borders, and the signatories granted each other the right to set up military bases in their respective territories.

    Russia’s Defense Ministry has said it plans to open a base in Gudauta, in the west of Abkhazia, and staff it with at least 1,500 personnel by the end of this year.

  • Russia: Asserting Influence in the Black Sea

    Russia: Asserting Influence in the Black Sea

    Stratfor.com
    September 15, 2009

    Summary

    The Russian maritime border patrol chief said Sept. 15 that Russia will detain any ships illegally entering the waters of Georgia’s breakaway republic of Abkhazia. Moscow’s warning is aimed at Georgia, which has used its navy to detain several vessels heading for Abkhazia. Now that Russia has officially threatened to capture ships, Georgia has lost another way to contain Abkhazia and will likely think twice before it detains a ship sailing to Abkhazia, as the Georgians are well aware that their navy is no match for the Russian navy.

    Analysis

    The head of Russia’s coastal division of the border guards service, otherwise known as the FSB coast guard, issued a warning Sept. 15 that it will detain any ships entering the maritime territory of the Georgian breakaway region of Abkhazia without permission. The statement was directed specifically at Georgia, whose navy and coast guard have carried out numerous detainments of cargo ships traveling to Abkhazia via the Black Sea. The latest such interception occurred Aug. 15, when the Georgian coast guard detained a ship, with a Turkish captain and a crew of Azerbaijanis and Turks, carrying $2.4 million worth of fuel heading toward the Abkhazian port of Sukhumi. The crew was released on bail, but the Turkish captain was not released until Turkey’s foreign minister traveled to Georgia to appeal the decision personally. The governments of Turkey and Azerbaijan clearly were not happy about the detainment.

    In addition to irking the ship’s crew and their respective governments, the uptick in such naval detainments off the coast of the Black Sea has particularly angered Abkhazia ­ and by extension its security guarantor in Moscow. Such hostilities have been common ever since the Russo-Georgia war broke out in August 2008, when Moscow wrestled control over the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia. Russia has since established a significant military presence in these regions, and tensions have been high ­ both on land and sea ­ between Tbilisi and its breakaway republics. Following the incident on Aug. 15, Abkhazian President Sergei Bagapsh threatened to open fire on Georgian ships if Georgia continued such detainments. Georgia’s leadership dismissed these claims, saying that Abkhazia lacked the military capability to carry out such attacks, referring to the Abkhazian leader’s threats as a “bluff”.

    Georgia did acknowledge, however, that if someone did have the means to respond aggressively to such detainments, it would be Russia. Until this point, Moscow had been relatively quiet about the detainments, simply issuing statements for Georgia to stop intercepting ships. But this could have been Russia’s strategy of allowing the Georgians to dig themselves in a deeper hole before making a decisive threat. Now that Russia has officially threatened to seize ships, Georgia has lost another lever for containing the Abkhazians, as the Georgians are well aware that their navy is no match for the Russian navy.

    Most of the larger warships in Georgia’s small navy were lost during the war with Russia. What remains of an already hollow naval force are mostly gunboats, including some five patrol boats fitted with old Soviet 23mm anti-aircraft artillery pieces (possibly for use as naval guns). It is these gunboats and patrol vessels that likely would be involved in any security or interdiction effort off the coast.

    Just north of Abkhazia, the Russian FSB has provided coastal security forces of its own to the breakaway republic now recognized by two countries in addition to Russia. The size and disposition of these forces are unknown; Russia has simply stated that its forces patrolling the area will seize ships and “do everything to ensure the security of the Russian state, the Abkhaz state.” While it is possible that the FSB contingent is somewhat smaller than the remaining Georgian navy, it may have the overall capacity to be more active; especially considering that Russia has significant ports in the Black Sea in Novorossiysk and Sochi, it likely has better overall access to spare parts and support from Moscow.

    The bottom line is that the difference between the two forces is not so great that the finer points of a hypothetical tactical engagement could not push the outcome in either direction. But unlike Georgia, the FSB contingent has access to reinforcements in its much larger and more powerful Black Sea Fleet that could be quickly deployed to the waters off Abkhazia (the very ones used in the August 2008 war). The issue, however, is speed. Deploying a warship to sea unexpectedly can take as much as a day on the optimistic end of the spectrum, and transit to the Georgian coast would be the better part of another day. The amount of trouble Georgia could get itself into in the intervening time also merits consideration. Ultimately, Russia has a keen interest in keeping decisive military control over the situation. And in the end, without assistance from NATO ­ assistance clearly not coming ­ the Russian Black Sea Fleet, for all its challenges from maintenance to morale, is the dominant naval reality for Tbilisi.

    As such, these new developments may suggest that Georgia will now think twice before it detains a ship heading to Abkhazia. If it does not, there very well may be a much higher price to pay the next time.

  • Turkish-Abkhazia Ties Test Turkey’s Strategic Partnership with Georgia

    Turkish-Abkhazia Ties Test Turkey’s Strategic Partnership with Georgia

    Turkish-Abkhazia Ties Test Turkey’s Strategic Partnership with Georgia

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 164

    September 9, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    The plight of the Turkish captain of a tanker intercepted by Georgian authorities while carrying goods en route to Abkhazia highlighted the dilemmas of Turkey’s position on the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.

    Since the war last August, Georgia has blockaded the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has intercepted various ships carrying Turkish goods. In the latest incident, a vessel transporting fuel to Abkhazia was captured by the Georgian coastguard on August 17. Following the seizure, the Georgian authorities took the captains, one Turkish and the other Azeri, into custody. On August 31, a Georgian court sentenced them to 24 years in prison. The ship was confiscated and brought to Batumi port to be sold in an auction (Today’s Zaman, September 6).

    Growing concerns over the fate of the Turkish captain generated domestic pressure on the government to free him, which prompted the involvement of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. The Turkish foreign ministry announced that Davutoglu would visit Tbilisi and that the government would do everything possible to secure the release of the captain. Meanwhile, on September 4, the shipping company paid a fee, and it was announced that an appeals court would reconsider the case. Davutoglu visited Tbilisi on September 7-8, and a Georgian court released the Turkish captain on September 8 (Anadolu Ajansi, September 8).

    The case highlighted tensions caused by similar practices by the Georgian authorities. Georgia has been seizing Turkish ships destined for Abkhazia, and in the past decade over sixty ships have been captured. Even prior to the latest crisis, representatives of Turkish exporters and Caucasian diaspora groups in Turkey raised concerns that the Turkish government was too complicit toward the “bullying” of the Georgian authorities.

    Ahmet Hamdi Gurdogan, the head of the exporters association in the Black Sea region, advanced several criticisms of Tbilisi (www.tekilhaber.com, August 25). First, he maintained that although Georgia claims to block all the trade routes to Abkhazia, Georgian coastal patrols cannot do anything against vessels carrying the Russian flag en route to Abkhazia. In a related charge, he argued that the Georgian patrol boats captured the Turkish ships in international waters, even in some cases immediately after they leave Turkish territorial waters. Therefore, Turkish exporters expect the government to flex its muscles, yet considering that Turkey supports Georgia’s territorial integrity and the Georgian embargo in place, the government might do little to stop the interception of Turkish ships in Georgian waters. Nonetheless, during his press briefing on the recent case, a spokesman for the foreign ministry expressed Ankara’s concern that some of the seizures might have taken place in international waters, and Georgia’s actions may violate international maritime laws (www.denizhaber.com, September 2).

    Turkish exporters also complain that the Georgians have turned such practices into an undeclared “piracy” in the Black Sea, since the Georgian authorities allegedly sell the vessels in auctions and demand large sums of money to release the crew of the captured ships. They also claim that in some cases, ships carrying humanitarian goods are also intercepted.

    The representatives of the Abkhazian diaspora in Turkey, also utilize similar arguments, and urge the Turkish government to lift its embargo. Turkey still supports the economic sanctions imposed against Abkhazia by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Irfan Argun the Speaker of Caucasus-Abkhazia Solidarity Committee, for instance, maintained that the sanctions are creating a major humanitarian crisis in Abkhazia and that Turkey should end its policy of supporting the Georgian embargo and play a larger role in the resolution of the issue of Abkhazia (www.ajanskafkas.com, August 22). Around 500,000 Turkish citizens consider themselves to be of Abkhazian origin.

    At a more fundamental level, this crisis reflects the underlying dilemmas in Turkish policy on the Georgian-Abkhazian dispute. In an analysis published by the Ankara-based think tank close to the foreign ministry, the Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies, it was maintained that Ankara could no longer ignore the new reality in the region and act on the presumption that there was no problem relating to Abkhazia (www.orsam.org.tr, September 1). This line of thinking suggests that Ankara might need to redefine its policies toward the region. It justifies a redefinition with reference to the fact that if the present Georgian embargo continues, it might result in a situation whereby Abkhazia is forced to integrate itself into the Russian orbit both politically and economically. The best way to reverse such a trend, according to this view, would be to end the blockade of Abkhazia.

    Reflecting the demands of the Abkhazian diaspora, deputies from Republican People’s Party submitted a question to parliament. They lambasted the government’s silence and requested that the prime minister explain why the government still insisted on implementing the embargo (www.kafkasfederasyonu.org, August 22).

    Meanwhile, the Georgian attempts to implement the blockade have raised tension in the Black Sea region. The Abkhazian leader Sergei Bagapsh described the activities of Georgian ships in “Abkhazian waters” as piracy, and threatened to destroy them if Georgia did not cease its military activities (Anadolu Ajansi, September 2). A Russian foreign ministry spokesman warned Georgia about its practice of seizing commercial vessels, and said “attempts to enforce a sea blockade on Abkhazia could lead to a serious armed incident” (Anadolu Ajansi, September 3).

    Against this background, Davutoglu visited Tbilisi, where he met his Georgian counterpart Nikoloz Gilauri and President Mikheil Saakashvili. He held a lengthy meeting with Saakashvili about the release of the captain. Davutoglu described Georgia as a “strategic partner,” and reiterated Turkey’s support for its territorial integrity, and for Tbilisi’s NATO membership bid. Davutoglu said “We know very well that without ensuring Georgia’s peace and stability, it will be difficult to meet these goals in the South Caucasus” (Cihan, September 7).

    In addition to the necessity of responding to the demands made by domestic pressure groups, the risk of Georgian-Abkhazian tensions escalating into a destabilizing regional conflict energizes Ankara to address Georgian-Abkhazian problems. The Turkish government values its partnership with Georgia, but it is also under pressure to realign its policies in light of the geopolitical transformations in the region. It will represent a major challenge for Turkish diplomacy in the days ahead to engage Abkhazia without severing ties with Tbilisi.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-abkhazia-ties-test-turkeys-strategic-partnership-with-georgia/