Jan. 20 (Bloomberg) — The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 14 percent between Barack Obama’s election and Inauguration Day, the biggest decline ever. The second-biggest drop gave way to a 75 percent rally in 1933.
The CHART OF THE DAY compares the Dow’s retreat since Nov. 4 with the 13 percent slide between Franklin D. Roosevelt’s election and his inauguration on March 4, 1933. The red line goes on to show the Dow’s surge during FDR’s first 100 days. No other new president since the beginning of the last century produced gains or losses of 10 percent or more in the analogous periods.
“Obama is realizing the historic parallels,” said Richard Sylla, an economic and financial historian at New York University’s Leonard N. Stern School of Business in New York. “The situation isn’t quite as serious as the 1930s but it’s serious enough that I expect Obama to take a page from FDR’s book to restore some of the confidence that’s been shattered.”
Obama becomes president today during the most severe economic crisis since Roosevelt was sworn in 76 years ago. Like his fellow Democrat, Obama plans to create jobs and boost the economy by investing in roads, bridges and public buildings and increasing oversight of the securities industry.
Stock exchanges closed for more than a week when FDR declared a bank holiday and enacted reform days after becoming president. The Dow jumped 15 percent on the day markets re- opened.
The Dow average declined 187.25 points, or 2.2 percent, to 8,093.97 as of 1:12 p.m. in New York.
To contact the reporter on this story: Jeff Kearns in New York at jkearns3@bloomberg.net.
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Brussels on January 18 and 19 to discuss Turkish-European relations. The trip, the first of its kind since 2004, comes against the background of criticism that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has abandoned its commitment to EU membership. Critics point to the government’s reluctance to take steps to break the deadlock in negotiations since the talks started in 2005. The AKP, in contrast, highlights the EU’s own mishandling of the accession process with Turkey and the EU’s internal problems following the 2004 enlargement. As some observers have called 2009 the “make or break year,” Erdogan recently began a new bid to revitalize Turkey’s stalled membership process by appointing a new state minister to lead the negotiations (EDM, January 12). His trip provided an important forum to reaffirm the parties’ willingness to mend fences and renew trust.
Erdogan held meetings with Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, High Representative of Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, and President of the European Parliament Hans Gert Pottering. He also spoke with representatives of the Turkish community, gave a talk at the European Policy Center, and delivered the keynote address at a dinner organized by Friends of Europe.
Throughout his trip, Erdogan emphasized that his government would make 2009 a “leap year.” Rebuffing criticism that the government lacked determination, Erdogan argued “the EU is our top priority, and we don’t have any alternatives to it.” Showing his self-confidence in Turkey’s future contribution to the EU, Erdogan also said that Turkey would not be a burden on the EU but was ready to share its burdens. He emphasized the compatibility of both sides’ interests, including energy security. On their part, EU officials pressed for more reforms on trade unions and minority rights and underlined the need to convince the European public about Turkey’s accession. Yet, they welcomed Ankara’s efforts to deliver some reforms to comply with the EU’s expectations and stressed the common areas of strategic interest (www.cnnturk.com, January 19, Zaman, January 20).
Overall, Erdogan appeared to be unwavering from his previous positions. First, he repeated the AKP’s claim that “Turkey did its homework.” Although the EU institutions and domestic pro-reform groups continuously criticize the government for failing to deliver on the reforms required by the EU, Erdogan highlighted his government’s “achievements,” which in his view were sufficient to fulfill Turkey’s part of the agreement. He referred to the recently opened Kurdish-language channel on the state-owned TV network and the legislative reforms on laws regulating foundations and freedom of opinion. With regard to Turkey’s shortcomings in meeting the EU’s demands, he put the blame on the Turkish opposition parties, arguing that they had failed to support the government’s reform efforts in parliament (www.cnnturk.com, January 19).
Second, Erdogan also repeated his previous criticism of the EU’s unfair attitude in the accession process. Unsatisfied with the slow pace of accession negotiations, Erdogan has been calling on the EU to accelerate the process by opening more than two chapters per presidency (every six months). He asked the future presidencies to break with this “routine.” He also complained about the EU’s delay in approving the end-of-screening reports on nine chapters since 2006. Turkey started talks on 10 of the 35 chapters, and it has completed negotiations on only one. The EU has put several chapters on hold, due to the objections of the Greek Cypriot administration and France (Today’s Zaman, January 20).
Calling on the EU to revitalize the process, Erdogan said, “We are not requesting privileged treatment; we ask for equal and fair treatment.” He was echoing Euro-skeptic sentiments among the Turkish public, which increasingly feels that the EU is applying double standards against Turkey by treating it differently from other candidates. In that regard, he also maintained that the declining support for EU membership in the opinion polls was caused by negative remarks of some European leaders about Turkey (Hurriyet Daily News, January 20).
As part of his complains that internal EU politicking posed obstacles to Turkey, Erdogan did not hesitate to name the Greek Cypriots. He lambasted the EU’s decision in 2004 to admit the Republic of Cyprus without resolving the divided status of the island (Anadolu Ajansi, January 19). Since its accession to the EU, according to Ankara, the Greek Cypriots have blocked the start of negotiations with Turkey on crucial chapters, most significantly energy.
Given the growing importance of energy security on the EU agenda in the wake of the Russian-Georgian war and the Russian-Ukrainian standoff, the implications of the energy issue for Turkey’s membership process occupied an important part of Erdogan’s portfolio. As the Budapest Summit on Nabucco approaches, the EU is to support the Nabucco project, which would transport Caspian gas to European markets through Turkish territory (EDM, January 16).
Erdogan stated at the European Policy Center on Monday that if Turkey were confronted with a deadlock in the energy chapter, it might have to revise its position on Nabucco. This raised concerns that Turkey might be threatening to use its position in energy security as a bargaining chip for Turkish-EU talks. Erdogan also said that although some countries didn’t want Turkey to cooperate with Iran in energy transportation, “cutting ties with Iran is out of question. Nobody can dictate our [energy] policies” (ANKA, January 19).
Nonetheless, following his meeting with Commission President Barroso on the second day, Erdogan ruled out a threat, saying that Turkey would not “use energy as a weapon.” Barroso emphasized areas of mutual cooperation and highlighted Turkey’s strategic position in particular. He pointed to the need for a good partnership in energy security between Turkey and the EU and praised Turkey’s constructive role in Middle Eastern diplomacy (Anadolu Ajansi, www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, January 19).
European officials constantly remind Turkey that its strategic position alone will not suffice to bring it full membership. Nonetheless, at a time when the EU is pressed hard in energy security, Turkey’s geography apparently does pay some dividends. Responding to Erdogan’s call for help against the EU members blocking negotiations, Barroso promised his full support to start talks on the frozen chapters moving again.
If both Erdogan and Barroso can keep their promises, the former delivering on postponed reforms and the latter removing internal EU obstacles, Turkish-EU relations may experience a new phase of dynamism, similar to that from 2002 to 2005.
As Israel’s only ally in the region, increasingly vocal criticism from Ankara and the streets of Turkey about the operations in Gaza raises questions about the future of Turkish-Israeli relations. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had refused to talk to Israeli leaders before a ceasefire was reached. Nonetheless, in response to growing calls from across the political spectrum for breaking off ties with Israel or imposing sanctions, Erdogan said that this was out of question, stressing that Turkey could not afford the political consequences of such a decision (Anadolu Ajansi, January 17).
Likewise, on a live TV show Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan ruled out severing diplomatic relations with Israel, because such a populist move would not serve regional stability and would undermine Turkey’s mediation attempts by closing channels of communication. Nonetheless, Babacan confirmed earlier press reports that he had refused to meet Israeli Foreign Minister “Tzipi” Livni, who wanted to visit Ankara. Babacan told Livni on the phone that unless she wanted to discuss conditions for a ceasefire, “it did not make sense to pay a good-intentions visit” (www.ntvmsnbc.com, January 16). Earlier, Babacan had indirectly criticized American support for Israel, by saying, “Israel will continue its operations as long as it gets a green light from some countries” (www.kanaldhaner.com, January 15).
Erdogan uses every opportunity to express his criticism of Israel’s occupation of Gaza and the silence of the international community. He has addressed large public gatherings, such as party meetings preceding municipal elections, which have been important forums for airing his views on Gaza. During a party congress, for instance, he questioned the silence of the international community over Israel’s disregard of numerous UN Security Council resolutions (www.cnnturk.com, January 16). Similarly, when UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Ankara on Friday, Erdogan told him that Turkey had expected the UN to be more proactive (Star, January 17).
Before his departure to Brussels on Sunday, Erdogan called on the Western leaders to demonstrate a resolute attitude toward Israel. Criticizing international efforts to reach a settlement by excluding Hamas from the negotiation table, Erdogan maintained that “Hamas is a party that won elections. The West, which has failed to respect Hamas’s democratic openings, is responsible for the current situation” (Cihan Haber Ajansi, January 18).
When addressing the representatives of the Turkish community in Brussels, the developments in Gaza and Turkish diplomatic efforts again occupied a central place. Although he found Israel’s unilateral declaration of a ceasefire important, he said that the continuing presence of Israeli forces in Gaza was an issue of concern and asked Israel to give assurances that it would allow uninterrupted humanitarian aid. Referring to Hamas’s decision to halt its military activities, Erdogan maintained that the new situation approximated what he had sought to achieve through his earlier diplomatic initiatives (www.ntvmsnbc.com, January 18).
Erdogan’s claim of credit for Turkey’s contributions to regional diplomacy is not baseless. Despite its critical tone toward Israel, Ankara has maintained ties with both parties to the conflict, hoping to find a peaceful solution. In addition to its own diplomatic efforts (EDM, January 5), Turkey has supported the Egyptian plan of January 6, which was also backed by France and called for an end to violence first, followed by talks on allowing access into Gaza and ensuring the security of Gaza’s borders.
In the run up to Sunday’s Sharm el-Sheikh summit, co-hosted by Egypt and France, a Turkish delegation led by Ahmet Davutoglu shuttled between Cairo and Damascus meeting with Hamas leaders in Syria in an effort to mediate between the parties. On Friday, Turkey had offered the parties its own draft agreement for a ceasefire, which Babacan called a “solid offer.” On Saturday the Turkish delegation told reporters that parties were close to a mutual understanding on the terms of a ceasefire. On Sunday Israel and then Hamas declared a ceasefire (Anadolu Ajansi, January 17).
President Abdullah Gul represented Turkey at the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, which was also attended by leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Germany, Spain, Britain, Italy, and the Czech Republic, as well as Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the Secretaries General of the UN and Arab League. Gul welcomed the conclusions of the summit but asked Israel to pull out from Gaza entirely and to lift the embargo. He also emphasized the need to reach reconciliation between Palestinian factions for a sustainable peace in the region, which Turkey had advocated since the beginning of the crisis (Hurriyet, January 19).
Although following the summit the European leaders went to Israel to a dinner hosted by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Gul returned to Ankara. Turkish reporters speculated that Gul had not been on the invitation list and interpreted this as Israel’s grave disrespect toward Turkey (www.stargundem.com, January 18). Gul, however, dismissed these claims and maintained that the European leaders went to Israel to discuss the details of an earlier deal between Israel and the United States, which would regulate American involvement in monitoring the border crossings between Gaza and Egypt (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, January 18).
Since the beginning of the crisis, Turkey has said that it was ready to send troops to the region as part of an international force to monitor either a ceasefire or patrol the border between Gaza and Egypt in order to allay Israel’s concerns about weapons smuggling. Gul told reporters that there had been no decision to for such an international force in Sharm el-Sheikh. As a matter of fact, specific arrangements for monitoring weapons traffic remained unresolved at the summit, with French President Nicolas Sarkozy pledging that the European leaders would provide Egypt and Israel with the necessary technical, military, and naval assistance.
Gul also emphasized that Turkish-Israeli relations would continue, although Turkey would not hesitate to criticize Israel’s blatant human rights violations, which outraged the entire Turkish population. He maintained that such misguided policies were the greatest threat to Israel’s own security and noted that the Palestinian problem was the source of many problems throughout the world. He asked the incoming Obama administration to contribute to the peace process, noting that “the just and determined involvement of the United States will go a long way toward a long-term resolution of the problem” (ANKA, January 18).
Turkey’s policy toward the Israeli invasion of Gaza continues to reverberate in its external relations. Whereas Erdogan is praised by people in Muslim countries (EDM, January 15), Ankara is criticized by Western observers who view the recent developments as potentially damaging to Turkey’s relations with the West. According to Dr. Ian Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, although Turkey’s initiatives are worthy of praise, by departing from “the transatlantic consensus on how to deal with Hamas,” Turkey “loses credibility as an interlocutor” (Hurriyet Daily News, January 18).
Baku–APA. Today is 19th anniversary of the 20 January tragedy. Soviet troops entered into Baku without warning and committed terrible massacre over the night from January 19th to 20th, 1990, APA reports.
Helplessness of the government to prevent the separatist movement in Nagorno Karabakh caused fair protest among the people and hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets demanding the government to resign. It was decided to send troops to Azerbaijan to protect local pro-Moscow government and crack down the protest actions. USSR defense and interior ministries, as well as KGB, state security committee, conducted joint operation in Baku where they used 66 000 troops. The soviet army opened fire on peaceful people, killing 134 and wounding 700. There were more than 20 women and children among the victims of the 20 January tragedy. Despite that long years have passed this boldly event has not received its legal assessment yet.
Every year Azerbaijan and its Diaspora organizations abroad commemorate memory of martyrs on the day of anniversary of the 20 January tragedy.
Caucasus Update No. 18, Jan. 19, 2009, published by Caucasian Review of International Affairs (www.cria-online.org)
In early January, a number of Azerbaijani news outlets reported that Russia had, throughout 2008, transferred an estimated $800 million worth of military hardware to Azerbaijan’s rival Armenia. The story is murky, but an Azeri media organisation received a list of equipment allegedly supplied, including tanks and armoured personnel carriers, grenade launchers, ammunition, and rockets. At the time of writing, the Russian response had been mixed: some carefully worded denialsfrom the Foreign Ministry, promises of clarification from the Russian embassyin Baku, and stonewalling from the Defence Ministry. Russia’s overall approach has been moving towards denial, but the lack of an outright, immediate statement has inevitably fanned the flames of rumour. The Azerbaijani armed forces allegedly put their forces on high alert in response.
If the story is true, the implications could be significant. The peace process over Nagorno-Karabakh is in an extremely delicate phase, and Russia has recently gone to great lengths to depict itself as an impartial mediator. Any truth in the arms transfer rumours would destroy Moscow’s reputation as an honest broker and undo much of the tentative progress that has been recently achieved.
The military implications are also significant, since the size of the transfer would go some way towards redressing the huge growth in Azerbaijan’s armed forces in recent years. Precise, up-to-date figures are very difficult to come by, given the opaque nature of both countries’ defence sectors, the difficulties of gathering information on Armenian forces in Karabakh, and the rapid expansion of armed forces. But most independent estimatesgive Azerbaijan the quantitative edge over Armenia, particularly in terms of heavy equipment.
A far more significant factor, and arguably a key reason for the lack of major combat since 1994, is the topography of the Karabakh region. The ceasefire line currently runs through rugged, mountainous terrain topped with multiple defensive lines which would favour the Armenian side in any war launched by Baku. Azerbaijan’s purchase of 25 Su-25 ground attack aircraft from Georgia and unmanned aerial vehicles from Israel should be seen in this context: as an attempt to maintain air superiority and therefore compensate for the difficulties of ground artillery in such terrain. Turkey has also offered to upgrade the Azerbaijani air force, alongside its other assistance in the fields of education and technical support.
The Russian 102nd Army base in Armenia has played a huge role in assisting and upgrading Armenia’s military so far. The base’s inventory of hardware was boostedin 2005 when Russia closed its bases in Georgia and transferred 370 pieces of equipment to the 102nd base. The forces at the base are militarily very significant: 74 tanks, 224 armoured combat vehicles, 60 towed artillery systems, 14 aircraft and the advanced S-300 missile system. Although the limited number of Russian personnel there would prohibit a large-scale deployment of this equipment, it is possible that the 102nd would, in the event of war, ‘lend’ the equipment to Armenia’s armed forces under the terms of the Russo-Armenian military alliance. There are also estimated to be huge – relative to the territory’s size – number of tanks and other pieces of hardware within Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding regions. This allows Armenia to circumvent its restrictions on such equipment under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, although it has accused Azerbaijan of doing the same.
Georgia has a critical and often under-realised role in any potential conflict for a number of reasons. Firstly, in the aftermath of the August war it suspended most Russian flights over Georgian territory to the 102nd base, preventing the base from receiving critical military supplies: therefore the figures given for the Russian base should be taken with a pinch of salt. More broadly, as military analyst Roger McDermott notes, the transfer of any equipment from northern states such as Ukraine to Armenia could be blocked by Georgia, since they would have to be shipped through Georgian territory from a Black Sea port, although such a deal was confirmed in November.
Secondly, and related to this, Tbilisi will have to make a clear and difficult choice in any renewed war between Baku and Yerevan. Georgia has no interest in spoiling its ties with Yerevan, and has expressed interest in defence co-operation (for instance, on upgrading Armenian tanks in a Georgian plant). But these links cause friction with Azerbaijan, with whom Georgia has a close economic and political relationship. Georgia relies on Azerbaijan for its own gas supplies and for the transit of Azeri gas and oil through the BTC and BTE pipelines, which bring in vital transit fees for Georgia’s struggling economy. Supporting Armenia could lead Baku (in the name of ‘energy security’) to re-route its gas and oil flows through Russia. It therefore seems likely that Georgia would support Azerbaijan, perhaps closing its border with Armenia and leaving the country almost entirely isolated from the outside world.
Even if the rumours of the $800 million arms transfers are false, the Karabakh conflict is incredibly volatile. The military balance between the two sides remains difficult to assess, but its uncertain nature, along with the peace process, has managed to prevent either side from reigniting a major conflict. If Russia really has shipped such a quantity of equipment to Armenia, the prospects for peace are grim. This would raise tensions on the ground and give further weight to hawks in the Azeri defence forces who argue that Azerbaijan’s military is sufficient, and that Baku should strike now to liberate the occupied territories before Armenia can reinforce itself any further. Perhaps even more disastrously, the transfer would fatally damage Moscow’s reputation as an honest broker and would remove the constraining brake of the peace process from a highly dangerous arms race. Nobody – Azerbaijan, Russia, or Armenia – would benefit.
Jewish-American Professor Norman Finkelstein has said Israel, a state built on the ashes of the Holocaust, is now committing a holocaust against Palestinians in Gaza.
American Jewish Professor Norman Finkelstein has heavily criticized Israel over its operation in Gaza. A son of Holocaust survivors, Finkelstein has been barred from Israel for 10 years and was denied tenure at DePaul University in Chicago because of his critical stance on Israeli policies.
According to Finkelstein, Israel, a state built on the ashes of the Holocaust, is now committing a holocaust against Palestinians in Gaza. In a telephone interview with Today’s Zaman, Finkelstein said Israel was a “terrorist state” created by the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians in 1948. Praising Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Turkish people for their courage in supporting Palestinians, Finkelstein referred to Israel as a “satanic” and “lunatic” state. Finkelstein’s parents survived the Nazi camps in World War II and then immigrated to the US.
After his book “The Holocaust Industry,” in which he accused many prominent Jewish leaders of abusing the victims of the Holocaust, was published, Finkelstein was almost declared persona non grata by America’s influential Zionist circles.
What does Israel want to achieve with this operation?
Basically, Israel wants to achieve two goals: to restore what it calls its deterrence capacity — that means to spread fear among Arab states about itself. This is a core principle of Israeli strategic doctrine. Arab states have to be afraid of Israel, afraid of its military might, and Arabs should do what Israelis want. They shall follow Israeli orders.
Israel’s military deterrence suffered a setback in May 2000, when Hezbullah succeeded to expel Israeli occupying forces from south Lebanon. Almost immediately in the aftermath of the failure, Israel planned another war with Hezbullah to re-establish its deterrence capacity. In 2006, after long preparation and using its air force, Israel suffered another ignominious defeat in Lebanon against Hezbullah.
The second goal was to defeat the Palestinian peace offensive. This has been another basic principle of Israeli doctrine: You do not negotiate with Arabs. You give them orders. The Palestinian organization Hamas was becoming too moderate; it was transmitting, giving the signal that it was ready to go along with the two-state settlement based on pre-1967 borders. The leadership of Syria and the West Bank have also been making statements like this. So Israel started to get worried that it would be obliged to negotiate a settlement which the international community has been supporting for the last 30 years.
Those who are against this settlement are the US or Israel, backed by the US. So when Hamas was becoming moderate and holding to the cease-fire it agreed in June 2008, it was showing herself to be a credible negotiating partner. Hamas was standing by its word. In the meantime, Israel has neglected another core principle of cease-fire, namely easing the blockade. So Israel had to defeat this Palestinian peace offensive. It always does this. It provokes Palestinians into reacting, and it wants to either destroy Hamas or inflicts so much damage that Hamas will have to say it will never negotiate with Israel. That is exactly what Israel wants. Israel never wants a moderate negotiating partner because if there is one, pressure on Israel will grow. Hamas is willing for a settlement; Hamas stands by its word. But Israel does not want to negotiate.
What you are basically saying is that Israel is not interested in peace at all.
Israel wants peace in its terms, and its terms are that West Bank should belong to their state.
Will the operation be successful?
First of all, we have to use proper language. There is no operation, and there is no war. What is happening is a slaughter, a massacre. When you have 200 to 300 kids killed, that is not a war. When you have a strong military going in against a defenseless population, that is not a war. When you shoot a fish in a barrel, we do not call it a war. As an Israeli columnist put it, it does not need too much courage to send jets and helicopter gunships to shoot inside a prison. What just happened was not a war. One-third of the casualties were children. It was not a war; it was a just a massacre.
In terms of the Israelis’ goals, you have to say it was successful. It inspired fear among Palestinians and Arabs generally that Israel is a lunatic state and that you have to follow its orders. No. 2, it destroys Hamas as a negotiating partner. You now hear from Hamas that it will not negotiate peace. That is what Israel wanted.
On your Web site, there is an argument that the grandchildren of Holocaust survivors are doing to the Palestinians exactly what was done to them by the Nazis. Do you agree with that?
I think Israel, as a number of commentators pointed out, is becoming an insane state. And we have to be honest about that. While the rest of the world wants peace, Europe wants peace, the US wants peace, but this state wants war, war and war. In the first week of the massacres, there were reports in the Israeli press that Israel did not want to put all its ground forces in Gaza because it was preparing attacks on Iran. Then there were reports it was planning attacks on Lebanon. It is a lunatic state.
But do you agree with the characterization?
Look at the pictures and decide for yourself. I am not going to tell people what they should think about it. But what I say is they should look at the pictures and decide for themselves. (For the pictures go to: )
Why have you been barred from entering Israel for 10 years? As the son of Holocaust survivors, you cannot enter Israel.
Let’s be clear on a certain point. I was not entering Israel; I have no interest in going to Israel. I was going to see my friends in the occupied Palestinian territories. And Israel blocked me to go and see my friends in the West Bank. Under international law, I do not think they have any right to do that! I was not posing any security threat to Israel. The day after I was denied entering Israel, the editorial of Haaretz was asking, “Who is afraid of Norman Finkelstein?” They were also saying that I was not a security threat. I do not have any particular interest to go and visit that lunatic state.
There are Jewish intellectuals who now call Israel a “terrorist state.” Is that a correct naming?
I am not sure how you cannot agree with that. The goal of the operation was to terrorize the civilian population so that Palestinians would be afraid of Israel. This is the dictionary definition of terrorism. The dictionary definition of terrorism is targeting a civilian population to achieve a political goal. The goal of this operation or rather massacre was to terrorize the civilian population and to wreck and destroy as much civilian infrastructure such that the Palestinians would submit. When you attack schools, mosques, ambulances, hospitals, UN relief organizations, what is that? If this is not terrorism, then what is terrorism?
In your famous book, “The Holocaust Industry,” you argue that the state of Israel, one of the world’s most formidable military powers, with a horrendous human rights record, cast itself as a victim state in order to garner immunity to criticism. Have we seen this during the Gaza operation?
They tried to use the Holocaust; it was funny in a very sick way. The leader of the American Jewish Committee, David Harris, wrote an article, and he said it is no coincidence that this war in Gaza is occurring around Jan. 27, which is Holocaust Remembrance Day. He wants to pretend some connection. In fact there is a connection, and the connection is Israel is committing a holocaust in Gaza. But that is not the connection he had in mind. He wanted to play the Holocaust card; I think that it is not working very much anymore. It was clear that during this last massacre in Gaza, liberal Jewish public opinion turned against Israel. If you look at the petitions, demonstrations, letters, support to Israel, not only in the international community but also among the Jewish community, is diminishing. So the Holocaust card, the anti-Semitic card, is not working as efficiently as it was working once.
You will probably be called anti-Semitic as well.
I do not think this propaganda is successful anymore.
In your book “Beyond Chutzpah,” you argue that Israel was created after the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians, but the question whether it was premeditated remains to be answered. If it is premeditated, then can it be called genocide?
Well, it was premeditated, and I think the record is pretty clear. Even Israel’s former minister of foreign affairs, Shlomo Ben-Ami, in his book published several years ago called “Scars of War,” said that it was quite clear that it was a premeditated expulsion in 1948 and it was anchored in the Zionist philosophy of transfer. Ethnic cleansings are ethnic cleansings, and they are war crimes.
Why do you think US media is so one-sided and so pro-Israeli?
I think it has two components. First of all, Israel serves American interests in the region and American media always give a free pass to those states that serve American interests. That is the overall picture and not much different from other parts of the world. The horrendous governments like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, they also get free passes in the American media. This is the larger context. And there is, of course, the secondary factor, which is the ethnic element. In many of these newspapers and the media in general, there is a large Jewish presence, and there is a sense of Jewish ethnic solidarity, which plays a role. But I think we have to qualify the secondary factor in two ways. We should not lose sight of the primary factor, which is Israel is the client state of US. No. 2: In this past war, the liberal Jewish population mostly under the age of 40 completely defected from the war, the massacre. They have been opposed to the massacres from the first day.
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been very critical of Israel on Gaza, and some American circles lambasted him in return. What do you think about his stance?
I wish he had done further. I wish he had gone as far as Qatar, Mauritania, Bolivia and Venezuela in breaking diplomatic relations with that lunatic state. But as far as he has gone, the point on which he stands, has been terrific. And I was glad to see Hamas respected the gestures of the Turkish government and said they would be willing to have Turkish troops stationed on “our border.” That is a very high praise for the Turkish government.
Turks are showing Palestinians compassion, decency and justice. All the Turkish people should take pride of this stance as was the case on the eve of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. It was the Turkish people and government who showed courage. Ninety-six percent of Turkish people opposed the war in Iraq. The Turkish government refused to give Americans use of their land to attack Iraq. Now Turkish people and Turkish government are redeeming themselves again by standing on what is right, what is decent and what is just. I say the highest praise for Erdoğan and the Turkish people.
How do you feel about Israel’s operation in Gaza personally as the son of Holocaust survivors?
It has been a long time since I felt any emotional connection with the state of Israel, which relentlessly and brutally and inhumanly keeps these vicious, murderous wars. It is a vandal state. There is a Russian writer who once described vandal states as Genghis Khan with a telegraph. Israel is Genghis Khan with a computer. I feel no emotion of affinity with that state. I have some good friends and their families there, and of course I would not want any of them to be hurt. That said, sometimes I feel that Israel has come out of the boils of the hell, a satanic state. Ninety percent of the population continues to cheer, to exalt and feel proud and heroic. They send a Sherman tank to a playground and torch children. Is this heroism? Is this courage?
You were not allowed to teach at DePaul University despite a very good academic record and also had some problems in getting your Ph.D. from Princeton. Why?
Well, I had some problems. I really cannot discuss my problems in the face of what is going on in Gaza. It will be so silly, trivial and stupid. Three hundred or so children — they were incinerated to death; phosphor bombs were thrown indiscriminately over Gaza. Everything these people wanted to rebuild, rebuild and rebuild was destroyed again. This state invaded in 1978, again in 1982, again in 1993, again in 1996, again in 2006, and 2008, and it always destroys, destroys and destroys. And then these satanic narcissistic people throw their hands up in the air and ask, “Why doesn’t anybody love us? Why don’t our neighbors want us to be here?” Why would they?
