Category: Regions

Wife of Swiss consul in İstanbul may face three years in prison

The wife of the Swiss consul in İstanbul, who hit a motorbike and fled the scene of the accident despite injuring the driver and the passenger, now faces charges that could result in up to three years in prison.

Wife of Swiss consulate and head of Chancery Andrea Köppel (L) allegedly fled the scene after hitting a married couple in Istanbul’s Bebek district. DHA photo

Driving a jeep, Andrea KOppel, wife of Consul and Head of Chancery Florian KOppel at the Consulate General of Switzerland in İstanbul, hit a motorbike driven by Dogan Durmus İnal in Bebek in February. The accident injured both driver and passenger. İnal’s wife, Filiz, sustained serious injuries and was hospitalized. KOppel fled the scene of the accident. She later went to a police station and told police she had panicked after the accident and had driven away.

İstanbul Public Prosecutor Resat Ugur Soysal has recently prepared an indictment, seeking a prison sentence of between eight months and three years for Andrea KOppel on charges of injury by conscious negligence.

Soysal said in the indictment that KOppel had drank too much alcohol, which led her to lose control while driving and hit a motorbike, leaving Filiz İnal critically injured.

Today’s Zaman

April 13, 2013
U.S. Embassy in Ankara, synagogue in Istanbul alleged al-Qaida targets

ISTANBUL, Turkey, April 12 (UPI) — The U.S. Embassy in Ankara was targeted to be bombed by an alleged Turkish al-Qaida cell whose members were trained in Afghanistan, Turkish police said.

Police seized nearly 50 pounds of plastic explosives with detonation systems attached, along with 10 rifles and guns, six laptop computers and other evidence, police said.

Twelve people — two Chechens, two Azerbaijanis and eight Turks — were arrested in two raids, police said.

The raids — which occurred in February but were only now reported — occurred in the northwestern city of Tekirdag and Istanbul, police said.

All 12 people were believed to be members of al-Qaida terrorist cells, the Dogan News Agency said.

The U.S. Embassy issued a travel warning at the time but said police had provided no specific threat information about the targets.

It had no immediate comment Friday.

The U.S. Embassy was the target of a suicide bomb attack in February that killed a Turkish security guard and severely injured a local resident. But that attack was attributed to an extreme left-wing organization, not Islamic militants.

The arrested alleged attackers also planned to bomb an Istanbul synagogue and the private Rahmi M. Koc Museum, police said. They additionally intended to attack Turkish TV personality-actor Acun Ilicali and author Adnan Oktar, also known as Harun Yahya, an Islamic creationist who speaks against evolution, the news agency said.

via U.S. Embassy in Ankara, synagogue in Istanbul alleged al-Qaida targets – UPI.com.

April 13, 2013
What does an Israel-Turkey Awakening Mean for Mediterranean Gas?

After nearly three years of tension, Israel’s olive branch to Turkey in late March was welcome news to most of the Eastern Mediterranean, not to mention Washington. With Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu offering an apology for Israeli actions against a Turkish aid flotilla in 2010, it seemed possible we might see some cohesion on the region’s roster of current challenges. Announcing a full resumption of diplomatic ties, the two governments opened the door to an assortment of possible joint efforts, including how to deal with a beleaguered Syria and a new Egypt. However, what stood out for many was what it all would mean for the region’s energy options.
Location of the Eastern Mediterranean (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
After years of fruitless exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean, Israel hit upon billions in potential revenue and energy independence in 2009 with the discovery of one of the largest offshore finds in a decade. Since then, the country has rushed to exploit the reserves with the help of foreign partners, including Texas’s Noble Energy, in hopes of bringing in an estimated $80 billion over the coming years. However, while Israeli gas efforts officially started flowing during the final days of March, the challenge of just how to transport the product to worthwhile markets like Europe remains a challenge. Sure they’d explored alterative options, including a Cyrus-Greece line or LNG plants. But with Turkey eager to get involved in a gas bonanza they’d previously only watched from the sidelines and with the economic stability to back up their plans, Israel’s surest best now seems to rest in Ankara.

So, with Israel and Turkey now willing to talk and plan for the future, where does this leave poor Cyprus? Always willing to play the cautiously neutral middleman as its neighbors laid claims to the region’s newfound gas fortunes, the partial island nation is finding itself newly isolated in the push to cash in on the region’s gas riches.

This could not come at a worse time for Cyprus. Over the last few weeks, the country’s fiscal situation has gone from bad to worse as a push for a financial bailout package ended with a series of missteps that dashed any remaining confidence in the country’s economy. In addition to nearly destroying the country’s bloated banking system, the experience left them in a weaker position when it comes to developing their offshore claims.

Cypriot leaders, including newly elected Prime Minister Nicos Anastasiades have insisted that gas revenues be left alone when it comes to dealing with the country’s current crisis. In order to avoid selling off the country’s future wealth in a panic to ensure a quick bailout or loans, gas revenue would be kept separate and not be considered until production efforts really started bringing in revenue, which they expect as early as 2018 or 2019. Even during recent negotiations to secure funding to fend off a collapse of their banking system and restructure a Russian loan, Cyprus balked at the idea of exchanging support for exploration and production rights to their offshore claims.

However, as the dust has now settled and the reality of the country’s path towards economic recovery has become a little more clear – long and difficult – the ability to hold off on potential gas revenue has become much more difficult. Even with financial support pledged from Europe and the IMF, Cyprus may likely soon have to appeal for further support to stay afloat. Keeping gas off the table during those discussions may soon become impossible.

In a more immediate, logistical sense, Cyprus’s role in exporting gas out of the region and to Europe has become a lot more difficult in terms of being able to pay to play. With an economy in tatters and investor confidence in the dumps, its unclear just how the country’s leaders plan to support their own energy infrastructure development, much less taking part in regional efforts linking the Eastern Mediterranean with more eager markets. Israel may have floated early partnerships when offshore gas first became a reality, but given Nicosia’s current financial standing,

Here, it appears is where Turkey enters the picture. While Cyprus will be struggling to find ways to meet even basic spending needs, Turkey has shifted billions towards infrastructure projects in recent years.

For now, Cyprus has pledged to push on with or without regional partnerships they explored over the last year. Also working with Noble Energy, Cyprus lays claim to an estimated 60 trillion cubic feet of offshore gas reserves, which they hope will start flowing within the next few years. While they intend to move on alone if they have to, moving the gas out of Cyprus may prove challenging or at the very least, very expensive. Early proposals include building a pipeline to Cyprus where Liquefied Natural Gas plants could process the reserves for transport to the rest of Europe, though such an effort would cost an estimated $13.3 billion. For a country that just barely nailed down a bailout package worth about as much, this is not an easy task.

via What does an Israel-Turkey Awakening Mean for Mediterranean Gas? – Forbes.

April 12, 2013
Are Israel and Turkey friends again?

Turkey will not alter its hawkish stance, yet Israel needs Turkey as a strategic partner. But not at any price.

Billboards put up in Ankara to thank Erdogan for getting Israel to apologize for Marmara incident. Photo: REUTERS/Umit Bektas

For many years, the relationship between Israel and Turkey has been extremely good. The close cooperation between the countries has been reflected in diplomatic relations, tourism, military cooperation and security, including joint military maneuvers and extensive defense trade.

Behind the scenes, there has also been cooperation in the intelligence field. However, Operation Cast Lead brought about a dramatic change.

Immediately thereafter, relations began to deteriorate as a result of initiatives carried out by Turkey’s leadership, supposedly in response to Israeli violence against Palestinians. In reality, however, it was only an excuse Turkey used to cover up its aspiration to become an influential player in the Muslim world.

Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan gradually began taking more and more extreme positions and speaking out strongly against Israeli policy. The peak came when the Mavi Marmara flotilla attempted to enter Israeli waters and the IDF used force to stop it. Turkey recalled its ambassador, diplomatic ties were cut off and joint military training was canceled. There was a total disconnect between the countries.

Erdogan needed to cut ties with Israel, and to weaken Turkey’s secular military, so that he could strengthen his position in the eyes of his Muslim constituents. He was also interested in positioning Turkey as a regional leader. To do so, Turkey had to constantly become more radical to keep up with Iran and Syria. Turkey’s demand that Israel apologize for the Marmara incident, and Israel’s refusal to do so, was the excuse Erdogan used to become even more extreme.

There are a number of ramifications to the cutting off of security cooperation between Turkey and Israel.

The defense industry took the hardest hit. Israeli exports to Turkey, including potential orders which were canceled as a result of the crisis, reached hundreds of millions of dollars. And the commercial relationship Israel had with Turkey was not limited to defense. Commercial, nonmilitary cooperation was also seriously hit. Numerous projects, including upgrading Turkish tanks in Israel, were canceled. Sensitive technological systems that had previously been sold to Turkey were exported in much smaller quantities. Large Israeli companies such as Elbit Systems, ELTA Systems, Elbit Systems Electro-optics – Elop and Israel Aerospace Industries were hit the hardest.

The IDF’s operational readiness was also affected.

Throughout the years, the IDF had benefitted from joint sea, land and air exercises with the Turkish military. In addition, they jointly planned operations that were carried out in distant locations, strengthened cooperation with NATO countries and practiced scenarios that could only be carried out with Turkish assistance.

The rupture led to an end to joint maneuvers for which the IDF had no suitable alternative.

The third area that was affected was intelligence.

Valuable security information regarding technology and intelligence had been transferred between the two countries over the years. This trade of information was the basis for the trust that had been forged. To a large extent, this was a prerequisite for Israel to achieve its goals. As relations with Turkey deteriorated, however, the fear that sensitive security information might find its way to hostile or even enemy countries grew. Security agreements were canceled and the alienation intensified.

Non-military commercial and legal interests were also hit. Following the cut in relations, there was a steep fall in the number of Israeli tourists who visited Turkey. Numerous lawsuits were submitted in Turkey against Israeli individuals and senior officers, which limited their movement outside Israel.

In recent months, there has been a change in the Turkish leadership. Erdogan realized that if Turkey wishes to be considered a regional power bridging East and West, and to remain on good terms with the US, then it would need to be more moderate.

At the same time, Syria, Turkey’s neighbor to the south, is falling into chaos, which could put Turkey in danger. Therefore, Erdogan has softened his tone and the atmosphere has become more relaxed. Turkey’s goals have not changed, and it is still maneuvering in an effort to gain status and power in the regional Arab leadership.

However, its need to remain close to the US and Europe requires that it watch its step.

The Turks received the apology they asked for, and the ambassadors will probably be reinstated. Smiles may replace the angry faces, and defense cooperation might even return to some extent. But the trend has not really changed. Turkey must continue to walk on the thin line between its desire to lead the predominately Muslim Middle East, and its need to please the West and retain its image as a moderate country.

We in Israel are sitting right on that thin line. Apologies like the one Netanyahu gave Erdogan are apparently necessary to keep the thin line from breaking. But the future holds many more difficulties in the relationship between the two countries. Turkey will not alter its hawkish stance, yet Israel needs Turkey as a strategic partner. But not at any price.

The writer is a former brigadier-general who served as a division head in the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency). The original article appeared in Hebrew in Sof Hashavua.

Translated by Hannah Hochner.

via Are Israel and Turkey friends again? | JPost | Israel News.

April 12, 2013
Turkey building refugee camps for Syrian Christians, Kurds

By Jonathon Burch

ANKARA | Wed Apr 10, 2013 10:21am EDT

(Reuters) – Turkey is building two camps along its far southeastern border with Syria to house a growing number of refugees from Syrian minority groups, mainly Assyrian Christians as well as ethnic Kurds, a government official said on Wednesday.

More 250,000 Syrians fleeing civil war in their homeland have registered in Turkey, most of whom stay in 17 camps along the 900-km (560-mile) border, although Turkish leaders say the total number of refugees is closer to 400,000.

Those who have fled are predominantly ethnic Arabs from Syria’s Sunni Muslim majority, most of whom largely support the rebels fighting to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad, who himself belongs to the Alawite minority of Shi’ite Islam.

Apart from housing refugees, Turkey, which also has a Sunni majority, has thrown its weight behind the rebels, giving them sanctuary, although it denies arming them. This has drawn accusations of sectarianism leveled at the government from Assad as well as Turkish minority groups and opposition parties.

Ankara strongly denies a sectarian or ethnic agenda.

The two tented camps, to be completed in less than a month, are being built in Midyat, a town in southeastern Mardin province some 50 km from the Syrian border, the official from Turkey’s foreign ministry said.

One camp with a capacity of 2,500 people will house mainly Assyrian Christians as well as refugees from other Christian denominations. It will be constructed on empty land next to an Assyrian church, which has been donated by its Assyrian owner.

Turkey has its own small Assyrian minority, most of whom live in Mardin and in Istanbul, Turkey’s largest city. It was on their request that the camp is being built, the official said.

Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan recently met Assyrian leaders in Turkey.

The other camp will have a capacity of 3,000 and would house any Syrian Kurds fleeing violence though Arabs could also stay, the official said. Mardin, home to many Turkish Kurds, borders an area of Syria with a large concentration of Syrian Kurds.

Syria’s 22 million population is roughly three-quarters Sunni Muslim, which includes Arabs and Kurds, and around 15 percent other Muslim groups, including mostly Alawites but also some Shi’ites and Druze. Some 10 percent are Christian, while Syria is also home to a tiny Jewish community.

Ethnic Kurds make up around 10 percent of the population.

(Editing by Nick Tattersall/Mark Heinrich)

via Turkey building refugee camps for Syrian Christians, Kurds | Reuters.

April 11, 2013
How Turkey is emerging as a development partner in Africa
Turkey provides assistance for relief aid and reconstruction, but also works as a business partner and invests in youth education
- Alpaslan Özerdem
- Guardian Professional, Wednesday 10 April 2013 13.19 BST
A displaced Somalian man walks away with food at a centre run by Turkish aid agency in the Howlwadaag district of southern Mogadishu. Photograph: Feisal Omar/Reuters

Turkey has emerged as a generous donor for humanitarian crises across the world over the past five years, especially in the context ofAfrica.

In 2011, while official development assistance (ODA) fell in 16 DAC countries, Turkey’s net ODA increased by over 38%. Following the ‘Turkey – Africa Co-operation summit’ in Istanbul in August 2008, the African Union declared Turkey a ‘strategic partner’ and in May 2010, Istanbul was the venue for the 4th UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries (LDCs).

Though Turkey is relatively new in African politics, trade and aid circles, it has already expanded its area of influence in the continent by linking its soft power tools of transportation links, trade and education closely with its foreign policy.

In the most simplified terms, this is the process undertaken by Turkey: once an African country is identified for bilateral relations by the Turkish foreign ministry, a diplomatic presence will be established, Turkish Airlines will launch a flight destination and economic links will be formed by globally active Turkish companies.

Meanwhile, the foreign ministry might sign an agreement to ease the existing visa regime to increase interaction in commerce, academia and culture. A number of Turkish schools run by the Gülen Movement – highly sought after by local communities – also play an active role in consolidating relations and the Turkish government may provide scholarship opportunities for graduates of these schools to take a university degree in Turkey.

Though some of these measures are fairly traditional means of forming bilateral relations for other donor countries, what Turkey seems to do differently is that it joins up its efforts in the realms of diplomacy, economics, trade, culture and education.

In Somalia, for example, Turkey has become the largest donor among non-OECD-DAC countries and one of the most active actors in humanitarian aid and peace-building. There are a number of reasons for Somalia to become an interest for Turkey in this way, including geopolitical interests, socio-cultural and religious ties and Turkey’s wider business interests in Africa as well as Turkey’s newly gained confidence in tackling global challenges.

In August 2011, Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, accompanied by a large entourage, travelled to Somalia to raise awareness among the international community of the ongoing conflict – the first non-African leader visiting Somalia over the past two decades. The visit brought Somalia back to the attention of a number of other donors, as it received a huge coverage by international media. For Turkey’s internal politics too, such high profile coverage meant strong public support for the Somalia aid campaign and popularity for the governing party.

Turkish aid organisations such as Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay) and theTurkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) are highly active in a wide range of infrastructure, welfare and service sector programmes in the country such as clearing rubbish, providing clean water, building hospitals and running the Mogadishu’s permanent settlement for displaced Somalians. In 2011, the Turkish government donated $49m (£32m) to Somalia, but its successful mobilisation of private donations resulted in another sum of $365m. In 2012, over 1,200 Somali students received full scholarships to study in Turkey with a budget of nearly $70m.

One key to Turkey’s success is that it has much more presence in the streets of Mogadishu than many other actors. Some UN agencies and international NGOs have been running their programmes through remote management from Nairobi due to security challenges, however Turkish officials and aid workers have continued to work in the city. This is because Turkey has established a high level of trust within government, various armed groups and war-torn communities. Its Islamic background is also an important factor, according to Kilian Kleinschmidt, the UN’s deputy humanitarian co-ordinator in Somalia.

So, the Somalia experience shows that Turkey’s main strength in response to peace-building challenges is the way it uses its different capacities and resources in a co-ordinated way; providing assistance for relief aid and reconstruction, but also working with Somalia as a business partner and investing in the youth education.

However, this is not going to be a trouble free journey for Turkey. Although a joined up humanitarian strategy co-ordinated by its ministry of foreign affairs seems to increase effectiveness on the ground, Turkey may have to face tough future questions on the ethics of such a strategy, due to the dual principles of neutrality and impartiality for humanitarian responses.

Also, being an emerging power and getting involved in humanitarian crises around the world demands a sophisticated aid strategy and there is a huge need for Turkey to learn from the experiences of traditional donors such as US, EU countries and Japan. Avoiding their mistakes is key, but at the same time, there is no point in re-inventing the wheel.

Turkey hasn’t yet come to terms with the fact that it would make more sense to work with these actors and take a co-ordinated response rather than going it alone as often it does. In the long-term this is likely to create unnecessary tensions. If it wants to become a long-term player in the field of humanitarian response, Turkey will need as many friends as possible.

Professor Alpaslan Özerdem is director of the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies at Coventry University. He tweets as@AlpOzerdem

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April 11, 2013