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  • Poland’s Foreign Policy Towards Middle East

    Poland’s Foreign Policy Towards Middle East

    Poland’s Foreign Policy Towards Middle East After 1989

    Dr. Magdalena KUMELSKA-KONIECKO University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn

    krakow krakov polonya

    Middle East in Polish foreign policy, after 1989, addressed secondary significance. The first priority of Poland’s diplomacy after 1989 was to pursue the return to Europe conception established by Polish prime minister – Tadeusz Mazowiecki and minister of foreign affairs – Krzysztof Skubiszewski. The main objective of the return to Europe conception was membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as well as in the European Union. Before the democratic transformation period, which was the effect of bipolar system dismantlement, Polish Middle East policy was conditioned ideological premises connected with affiliation to Eastern Block. Typical for Eastern approach to Middle East was isolation of Israel, advocate for Palestinian in their aspiration to build an independent state, favoring and developing cooperation with Arab counties of the region. In reality the relation with Arab countries limited to political support and scarce trade cooperation.

    End of the cold war has brought some changes in Poland’s Middle East policy. First significant move was the normalization of Polish relations with Israel. The next step was to establish relations with Arab countries especially with those which Poland didn’t have yet. Among other goals of Polish foreign policy in the Middle East we can mention: promotion of democracy and human rights, reinforcing economic relations, humanitarian aid and institutionalization of cooperation in the broad sense. Important area of Polish activity in the Middle East, after 1989, was participation in American intervention in Iraq in 2003, as well as UN peacekeeping missions in Lebanon and in the Golan Heights.

    Noticeable element of contemporary Polish Middle East policy is it’s convergence with the United States of America security strategy. These are: fight against terrorism, countering proliferation of weapon of massive destruction, promotion of democracy and human rights. Moreover, Poland as a member of European Union is also oblige to pursue common foreign and security policy. Unfortunately, Poland did not develop coherent, independent Middle East policy, which confirm the assumption that the Middle East is a region of low Polish interests.

    Key Words: Poland, Middle East, the USA, Iran, the European Union, Russia, foreign policy, security strategy, international relations.

    Introduction

    Middle East is one of the crucial region in the contemporary international relations. The importance of Middle East comes form for expamle possessing 2/3 of world’s crude oil and almost a half of natural gas resources. Representative for Middle East region is it’s unpredictability and unstability, which is bringing attentions of powerfull interantional relations players. Beyond many security issues which afflict Middle East prime are: Israeli-Arab/Palestine militray conflict, war in Syria, Iran’s nuclear programme, terrorist therat provoked by Daesh, al-Qaeda, PKK and other terrorist group, instability in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and insecurities coming from refugees case.

    Poland in the past has never proved special attention to Middle East, however Polish authorities related to some of the process coming there1. Before reclaming independence in 1989, Polish policy towards Middle East was conditioned to internal and external premises coming from affiliation to the Eastern Block2. For example in the 40’s Polish government, like the USSR, approved creation of Isreal state, and later analogously to Moscow, supported Arab states against Isreal. During the cold war Polish approach toward Middle East was characterized by hostility toward Israel, aiding Palestine, developing close, political realtions with Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Egypt.

    After the collapse of the USSR and definitive end of cold war, Poland started to create its own foreign policy. Concerning Middle East, Polish government decided to redefine foregoing direction. First example of new approche was decison to normalize relations with Israel, simultaneously preserving relations with Arab states. Neverteless, domestic problems and conentration on priorities objectives, definitely weaken Poland’s intrest on Middle East.

    Main Directions of Polish Foreign Policy after 1989

    End of the cold war era, has brought significant changes in Polish foregin policy. After conducting, so called partly-free, parlimaentary elections on 4th of June 1989, newly establish government coming from the Solidarity Movement – Tadeusz Mazowiecki – as a Prime Minister proceeded to develope objectives of Polish foreign strategy. The biggest priorities for Poland after 1989 were finding new security guarantees and opportunities for economic development. In other words it meant the beginning of Polish efforts to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union.

    1 M. Szydzisz, Polityka zagraniczna RP wobec Bliskiego Wschodu – zmiana czy ciągłość?, “Dyplomacja i Bezpieczeństwo”, 2016, No 1(4), p. 185.
    2 A. Dzisiów-Szuszczykiewicz, Raport. Bliski Wschód – wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki zagranicznej?,
    “Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe”, 2008, No 7/8, Vol. 1/2, p. 147.

    Polish authorities believed in Poland’s return to Europe concept, based on the confidence that Poland belong to Western civilization3. Prime Minister Mazowiecki was confident that traditional consolidated democratic states enable Poland fulfilling its objectives. Polish diplomacy under the guidance of professor Krzysztof Skubiszewski considered that Germany would play crucial role in Poland’s accesion to the European Union, whereas the United States of America would be pivotal for Polish aspiration to NATO.

    The Polish government began to implement the strategy of reconciliation between the Polish and German nations, which might to lead to the normalization of bilateral relations based on the principles of friendly and equal cooperation4. Poland, despite concerns about vague German stance towards Polish-German border on Odra River and Nysa-Łużycka River, decided to grant full support for German reunite process. In Krzysztof Skubiszewski view Poland’s decision was coherent with Polish-German unity of interests5. The basis for this assumption was common thinking for Poland and Germany about the future of Europe and the world. They agreed with the idea of European unity, meaning a policy of consolidating a divided continent based on respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law6. On 14th November 1990 Poland and Germany has signed Border Treaty which recognized the course of Polish- German border in accordance with the provisions of World War II peace conferences (Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam). Less than a year later states has signed a Treaty between Republic of Poland and Federal Republic of Germany on good neighborhood and friendly cooperation (14.11.1991). Polish-German cooperation was profitable for both sides – German became promoter of Polish interests in European area, Poland on the other hand became “linkage” between East and West. Moreover, putting Warsaw into Western security and cooperation zone has moved West border to the East, changing at the same time Berlin geopolitical location.

    The priority objective of the Polish raison d’etat, since becoming independent of the USSR’s domination, was to base Polish security on allied relations with the most powerful country in the world, the winner of the Cold War confrontation – the United States of America. Poland form the very beginning of 1989 desired to give unique character of Polish-American relations. Polish authorities expected Washington to support the transformation process and embrace Poland with American security guarantees. The process of democratization in Central and Eastern European countries in the United States was received with great satisfaction, it perfectly entered into

    3 R. Zięba, Główne kierunki polityki zagranicznej Polski po zimnej wojnie, Warszawa 2010, p. 19.
    4 M. Kumelska, Kierunek Waszyngton. Redefinicja polskiej polityki zagranicznej po wyborach czerwcowych, (w:) Polska – 25 lat po wyborach czerwcowych. Konsekwencje dla polityki wewnętrznej i pozycji międzynarodowej, T. Astramowicz-Leyk, W. Tomaszewski (ed.), Olsztyn 2014, p. 176.
    5 See more: Polska – Niemcy 1945-2007. Od konfrontacji do współpracy i partnerstwa w Europie,
    W.M. Góralski (ed.), Warszawa 2007.
    6 R. Zięba, Główne kierunki polityki zagranicznej Polski po zimnej wojnie, op. cit., p. 57.

    America’s vision of New World Order based on the peaceful relations, democracy and free market economy7.

    The TUSA perceived Poland as a leader of transformation among Middle-East European countries. Poland was the first country in the region, who was covered by the US system of general customs preferences; Washington transferred 200 M $ to Stabilization Fund for Poland and reduced Poland’s debt by 70%8. On 20th March 1990 Poland and the USA signed economic agreement and Declaration on relations between the Republic of Poland and the United States. From Warsaw’s perspective declaration of will was far from Polish expectations, but at the beginning of 90’s the US couldn’t offer more.

    9 years later Poland as well as Hungary and the Czech Republic became new members of NATO. Without America’s will and of course changing geopolitical circumstances, enlarging NATO on East wouldn’t have been possible. Gaining membership in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (20.03.1999) and the European Union (1.05.2004) was capstone of Polish priorities launched at the beginning of the 90.

    Poland’s foreign policy after 1989, beyond Euro-Atlantic vector, was also concentrated on Eastern vector. While the implementation of the strategy for Poland’s return to Europe became a priority, it was also important to shape relations with the Soviet Union/Russia Federation and states formed as a result of its disintegration behind Poland’s eastern border9. One of the priority of the Polish raison d’etat was full recognition of Poland’s sovereignty by the Soviet Union, followed by the arrangement of bilateral relations on a partnership basis and good neighborly cooperation. Polish authorities were extremely cautious in contact with Moscow, including indubitability of the Soviet Union superpower position, nor did make violent attempts to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact or the Council for Cooperation and Economic Aid, although Poland pointed the need to democratize both organizations. Polish eastern policy of the beginning of the 1990 was based on the concept of two-track strategy, which meant the simultaneous development of rebuilt relations with the USSR and union republics10. Polish diplomacy till 1994 signed with all Eastern neighbors Border Treaties and Treaty on good neighborhood and friendly cooperation including: the Russia Federation (1992), Belarus (1992), Ukraine (1992) and Lithuania (1994). Furthermore, regulating border courses was one of many criteria NATO set for the candidate countries.

    7 See more: H. Kissinger, Dyplomacja, Warszawa 2004.
    8 See more: L. Pastusiak, Prezydenci amerykańscy wobec spraw polskich, Warszawa 2003, p. 280-331.
    9 M. Kumelska, Kierunek wschodni w polskiej polityce zagranicznej po 1989 roku, (w:) Polska – 25 lat transformacji systemowej. Polityka. Gospodarka. Bezpieczeństwo, T. Astramowicz-Leyk, W. Tomaszewski (ed.), Olsztyn 2014, p. 177.
    10 Ibidem, p. 180.

    Undoubtedly, the success of Polish diplomacy of this period was the popularization of the belief that in the name of the future good relations with neighbors one should strive to give up creating a balance of historical past and urge partners to adopt a similar attitude.

    Poland’s Approach towards Middle East after Cold War

    Regaining independence by Poland after 1989 allowed it to conduct foreign policy autonomously, also towards Middle East.

    At the beginning of the 90’s Polish diplomacy decided to normalize relations with Israel. It is worth emphasizing that in 1967 due to outbreak of 6-days war Poland severed diplomatic relations with Israel as did the USSR. The renewal of diplomatic relations took place in February 1990, but already in 1986 the so-called interest representatives were opened in Tel Aviv and Warsaw11. Rebuilding Polish-Israeli relations was important in view of joint history and diasporas living in both countries. In May 1991 Polish president – Lech Wałęsa – came to Tel-Aviv and gave a speech in Knesset concerning future bilateral relations. The lasting and deep relations that currently connect Poland and Israel include close cooperation in the areas of politics, defense, economy, culture and education. These relationships are based on mutual interests, shared values and a similar assessment of the international situation, but are also a natural continuation of almost 1000 years of common Polish-Jewish history12. Since 1990 Poland and Israel has signed 19 agreements and understandings. The importance of mutual Polish-Israeli contacts is also emphasized by the fact joint government meetings, so-called intergovernmental consultations, that take place continuously since 2011; the only country beside Israel involved in such cooperation with Poland is Germany13.

    Between 1990 and 1991 Poland participated in the implementation of Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations, which gave Polish authorities wider perspective on Middle East problems14. Beyond opening to Middle East issues, Poland pursued the US vision on regional order in this part of the world. In some sense it was a strategic decision aimed at gaining the USA favor for Polish case vide membership in NATO.

    11
    12 Ibidem.
    13 M. Szydzisz, Polityka zagraniczna RP wobec Bliskiego Wschodu – zmiana czy ciągłość?, op. cit., p. 187.
    14 A. Dzisiów-Szuszczykiewicz, Raport. Bliski Wschód – wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki zagranicznej?,
    op. cit., p. 148.

    Generally, at Polish approach towards Middle East, after 1989, we can distinguish 3 consistent elements15:

    ⦁ Involvement in activities concerning development of democratic system and protecting human rights.
    ⦁ Restoring or establishing new diplomatic relations with Middle East countries.
    ⦁ Institutionalization of existed cooperation and enhancing economic ties.

    Until the beginning of the new century, Poland foreign activity was submitted to fulfilling the return to Europe concept. Hence, interest in Middle East has weakened considerably. According to Renata Włoch, Polish foreign policy towards developing countries, including Middle East, can be specifies as parochial run by uninfluential country16. This opinion is not without reason, indeed Poland as a subject of international relations at the turn of 20th and 21st centuries had little, international significance. Poland’s interests in the Middle East were limited as it was it recognizability. Situation has changed after 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States of America. The beginning of American war against global terrorism and its supporters had influenced greatly Poland foreign and security strategy. Form the very beginning Poland provided full support to American ally. Referring to allied loyalty and obligations arising from NATO membership, Poland took part in the military operation against Afghanistan and later Iraq. The Iraqi operation had all the advantages and disadvantages, but form its strategic importance had significant meaning for Warsaw; Poland has emerged internationally as independent strategic entity, capable of making decisions instead of just following other major allies in the European Union such as France and Germany, who were pursing anti-American policy17.

    In 2004 Polish government adopted a document called Poland’s Strategy towards developing un-European Countries. According to the strategy Poland as member of the European Union would implement obligations coming from The Barcelona Process (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) and Wider Europe – New Neighborhood Strategy with regard to cooperation with Middle East states.

    Poland as a member of the European Union, consequently participant of the globalization process had to start making more contributions to development aid,

    15 See more: J. Bury, A. Kołakowska, A. Szymański, Polska a Szerzy Bliski Wschód. Stosunki i perspektywy współpracy (BMENA), “Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny”, 2006, No 2.
    16 R. Włoch, Polska a polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec krajów rozwijających się, (w:)
    17 R. Lewandowski, W. Lewandowski, Konsekwencje zaangażowania Polski w Iraku, “Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe”, 2009, No 9/10, Vol. I-II, p. 37.

    aimed at modernization and socio-economic development countries from non- European areas, including the Middle East; Engagement was one of Poland’s new tasks within the EU structures in efforts to guarantee peace and security, and supporting democratization initiatives of individual countries18.

    Polish development aid is directed mainly to Palestine as well as Lebanon, Syria and Jordan in the framework of little grant system. Assistance activities for the Palestinian under the development cooperation program focus on improving access to education, equalizing educational opportunities and raising the level of education , improving water and sanitation infrastructure, including better access to water and municipal waste management, professional activation in the field of agriculture, trade and services as well as supporting business activity and strengthening the self-government of entrepreneurs 19. The total value of development assistance provided by Poland to Palestine in the period 2005-2016 exceeded PLN 25 M. The aid was intended for20:

    ⦁ Human capital – improving the quality of health care, inclusive education and universal access to high-level education, civic education, social integration of people from groups at risk of exclusion.

    ⦁ Agriculture and rural development – food security, productivity and competitiveness of agricultural production, access to markets, use of modern technologies in agriculture, modernization of local infrastructure.

    ⦁ Entrepreneurship and the private sector – the competitiveness and innovation of micro- and small enterprises, social economy, entrepreneurship, especially women and youth, vocational education and training.

    In Multiannual Development Aid Program 2016-2020 Poland confirmed the priority of Palestine in the distribution of development assistance21. The objectives towards Palestine remained as mentioned above. An important change in the document was placing, for the first time, Lebanon as a priority state for Polish development cooperation. Since 2012, Poland has been continuously providing humanitarian aid to Lebanon in the areas of shelter, health protection and education. In order to ensure the most effective response to the protracted crisis, Poland adopts an approach in which it seeks to link humanitarian and development activities. As a result, it allows to supplement the most urgent humanitarian needs with development activities of permanent and structural character22.

    18 A. Dzisiów-Szuszczykiewicz, Raport. Bliski Wschód – wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki zagranicznej?,
    op. cit.,p. 168.
    19
    20 See more:
    21 Multiannual Development Aid Program 2016-2020, p.10.
    22 Ibidem, p. 10.

    According to Poland’s Strategy towards developing un-European Countries the most important priority for Poland in relations with Middle East counties is economy. Besides reinforcing economic ties Poland had set such goals as23:

    1- Fulfilling the obligations coming from Iraq Mission. 2- Supporting peace between Israel and Palestine.
    ⦁ Sustaining dialog with Arabs states, Israel and Iran.
    ⦁ Seeking cooperation with The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. 5- Explaining objectives of Poland’s involvement in Iraq (especially on society level). 6- Strive to achieve the status of responsible partner of the region.
    In compliance with Poland’s Strategy towards developing un-European Countries internal and external conditions of a given country, e.g. political destabilization, conflicts, religious fundamentalism will have an impact on undertaking cooperation or failure to do so24. Incontestably, this approach restrict potential cooperation. More importantly term religious fundamentalism is not very clear, strategy doesn’t explain what does it really mean.

    The strategy states that Polish government contacting with Middle East countries will use: political dialog, diplomatic presence, cooperation and development aid, promotion of Polish culture and science. According to the document the most effective tool of Polish foreign policy in the region are agreements and understandings25. Between 2003 and 2007 Republic of Poland has signed with several Middle East counties: 6 bilateral agreements, 2 bilateral memorandums, 5 bilateral deals, 2 bilateral cooperation agreement and 1 bilateral protocol.

    Among the most important countries in the Middle East, the document has highlighted: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait26. Poland wished to develop close economic relations with those countries, especially in the field of energy resources. This is dictated by the need to diversify supplies from the Russia Federation27. Qatar turn out to be a country that really supports Poland in the process of its diversification of Russian gas supplies. In 2009 Polish Oil and Gas Mining (Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo – PGNiG) has signed a 20-year contract with Qatar for gas supplies. The first delivery of Qatari gas to the Polish terminal in Świnoujście took place in November 2015 and is supplied regularly.

    23 Poland’s Strategy towards developing un-European Countries, November 2004, p. 32-39.
    24 Ibidem.
    25 Ibidem.
    26 Ibidem.
    27 See more: D. Boćkowski, Polska polityka zagraniczna wobec świata muzułmańskiego. Próba definicji problemu, (w:) Polityka zagraniczna RP. 20 lat po przełomie. Tom 1: Koncepcje, bezpieczeństwo, kwestie prawne i polonijne, A. Jarosz, K. Olszewski (ed.), Toruń 2011, p. 111-119.

    Despite Polish authorities will to boost economic cooperation with Middle East states, its effects are still insufficient. The reasons for this situation should be seen in28:

    ⦁ Lack of a governmental agency providing assistance outside the country.
    ⦁ Reluctance of some Polish business entities and educational institutions afraid of taking risk.
    ⦁ Limited material and financial possibilities for example insufficient number of diplomatic missions.
    ⦁ No mutual information and no direct contacts between entrepreneurs. 5- Cultural differences.
    ⦁ Inability of using by Polish authorities Middle East expert knowledge and experience.
    ⦁ Uneffective promotion of Polish cultural and scientific institutions in the region. 8- Scarce knowledge about partner culture and customs.

    American Factor in Polish Middle East Policy

    Since the beginning of the 90′ in Polish approach towards Middle East region noticeable element was presence of the American strategic thinking, especially after September 11 2001. After that it became clear that Polish and American objectives towards Middle East are convergent.

    Before al-Qaeda’s terrorist attack on the USA, Poland despite very good economic relations with Iraq (commercial exchanges between $ 200-250 M per year)29 supported the US actions against Iraq between 1990 a 1991. Except political support Polish authorities decided to sent to Iraq military contingent and medical personnel. In the following weeks, negotiations were conducted with the government of Saudi Arabia regarding the rules for the participation of Polish soldiers and civilian employees within the anti-Iraqi coalition. In the end they decided to send a contingent carrying humanitarian aid – included two Polish Navy vessels, rescue and evacuation and medical personnel who stationed in the territory of Saudi Arabia.

    The participation of Polish Marines in operations in the Persian Gulf region proved to be a great challenge, because for the first time after the end of World War II, they were to perform combat operations; of course Polish navy previously performed tasks outside the Baltic Sea basin, but these were mainly navigation and training cruises,

    28 A. Dzisiów-Szuszczykiewicz, Raport. Bliski Wschód – wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki zagranicznej?,
    op. cit., p. 174-175.
    29 1991/pdf/.

    rescue exercises and tasks resulting from membership in the Warsaw Pact30. The participation of the Polish Contingent in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a part of the anti-Iraqi coalition forces was governed by the Agreement of 16 December 1990 between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; the document stated that the members of the Polish contingent stationed in Saudi Arabia and at sea were to enjoy the immunity belonging to the administrative and technical staff of diplomatic missions. It is worth emphasizing that the costs associated with sending and staying Polish staff were covered by the Saudi side. Alongside with marines, in accordance with the agreement: 14 doctors, 38 medical technicians, 98 nurses and 2 liaison officers were also part of the Polish Contingent31.

    In the 90′ and later Polish military forces were also present in peacekeeping missions under the assistance of the United Nation Organization in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and Syria (UNDOF), which was a symptom of responsibility for the stability of international order, established after the end of cold war era32. The USA according to president George H.W. Bush and his New World Order Strategy regional conflicts were considered as a predominant military threat which need to be resolved33. Although the US is ambivalent about UN peacekeeping missions, stabilization activities in the Middle East were coherent with American security strategy. Therefore, one may risk a statement that Poland’s participation in peacekeeping missions in the Middle East entered into American foreign policy.

    Analyzing strategic documents of Poland and the USA one can see convergence of international objectives as well as common perception of security challenges34. Both countries identify the Middle East region as a biggest challenge for contemporary international relations. What is more, the USA as well as Poland believe that vast majority of security threats comes from Middle East. Among both countries strategic goals there is promotion of democracy, fee market, human rights and fundamental freedoms, which are the basic elements of the US strategies since their independence. Another common thing for Poland and US is perception of contemporary security threats. Among the biggest modern security threats both states include: international terrorism, proliferation of weapon of massive destruction, failed states and authoritarian regimes, religious extremism. All of these threats occur in the Middle East. The USA as well as Poland give priority to diplomatic instruments, but in exceptional circumstances use of force is also foreseen. And here comes the prime

    30 Ibidem.
    31 Ibidem.
    32 Polacy w służbie pokoju 1953-2003, Agencja Wydawnicza CB, Warszawa 2002.
    33 See: National Security Strategy of the United States, 1991.
    34 Compare: Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2014; Biała Księga Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2013; Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2003; National Security Strategy, 1991, National Security Strategy, 1996; National Security Strategy, 2002; National Security Strategy, 2006; National Security Strategy, 2009.

    difference. Poland’s resources only allow it to participate in military operations. US military capabilities do not require additional commentary.

    Basically, since Poland regained independence, it’s Middle East approach is consistent with American security strategies. On the one hand, this line is an element of the wider West strategic vision, and after all Poland belongs to the West, but on the other hand it is an example of a lack of assertiveness. In situation of pursuing non-assertive foreign policy a matter of national interests is thrown into doubts. Thereupon, a basic question arises – does the non-objective entity pursue its own or other country’s interests? In case of Poland some decisions made by Polish authorities have been questionable for instance sending Polish Contingent to Iraq in 2003 and organizing in Warsaw in 2019 Middle East Conference Peace and Security. In both cases Polish interests unfortunately were of secondary importance. Warsaw’s military and political support given to Washington is mostly conditioned by the need to increase American security guarantees. Despite political affiliation most of Polish governments presented those approach. This is a consequence of Polish historical experience and geopolitical location. The issue of Poland’s border security, especially eastern border, has become particularly relevant after the Russian annexation of Crimea. The priority of contemporary Polish government is to establish American military base in Poland to counter Russia’s regional ambitions35, but for now American soldiers will stay on Polish territory only temporarily.

    Polish authorities’ support of the American strategy in the Middle East implies consequences for Poland’s relations with other entities of international relations. It is particularly apparent in Poland’s relations with the European Union. For instance, American intervention in Iraq in 2003 led to the deepest crisis in the transatlantic relations, and Poland became an object of numerous attacks, especially from German and France side. It is worth emphasizing that during this period of time Poland was at the finish line of its accession to the EU. There were some concerns that dispute around Iraqi war could negatively impact on the whole process.

    Poland’s participation in military actions against Iraq, apart from gaining valuable combat experience, was negatively assessed by the majority of Polish scientific community as well as Poles36. According to Maria Wągrowska: participation in the

    35 J. Smolenski, V. Pietromarchi, US lead Middle East conference in Warsaw: All you need to know, 13.02.2019, (w:) 190212230343271.html
    36 Compere: Uwarunkowania i kierunki polskiej polityki zagranicznej w pierwszej dekadzie XXI wieku, M. Wolański (ed.), Toruń 2004; O. Osica, Irak – i co dalej?, “Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny”, 2006, No1;
    J. Bartkiewicz, Zaangażowanie Polski w wojnę i stabilizację w Iraku, “Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej”, 2004; R. Kuźniar, Droga do wolności. Polityka zagraniczna III Rzeczpospolitej, Warszawa 2008; R. Kuźniar, Jeszcze możemy zachować twarz, “Tygodnik Powszechny”,11.01.2004 No 2;
    R. Zięba, Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej, Warszawa 2013; M. Strzeszewski, Stosunek do obecności żołnierzy polskich w Iraku i Afganistanie, October 2007, (w:)

    Iraqi operation was the most controversial undertaking in Poland’s foreign and security policy for 15 years. It wasn’t preceded enough in depth analysis of profits and losses for foreign and internal policy, as well as argumentation convincing majority of citizens37. Even more explicitly explained this Roman Kuźniar: Poland’s participation in the war and the stabilization of Iraq was an example of badwagoning strategy understood as what is good for the United States will be also beneficial for Poland. Unfortunately, it was a wishful thinking, based on the wrong perception of American policy and the failure to calculate the profits achieved thanks to this war by the Polish side38.

    It was difficult for the Polish authorities to convince, in particular skeptical European countries, about the Polish position on Iraq. A similar misunderstanding (not only among EU countries) accompanied organization in Warsaw the Middle East Conference. Officially, the purpose of the conference was peace and stability in the Middle East. But how this can be achieved without crucial actors like Iran, Palestine, or Turkey39? It happened because the real goal of the Trump administration was to isolate Iran and strengthen Israel’s security. Moreover, the conference aim was also to persuade the Arab countries of the Gulf region to create a common front against Iran perceived by the current American administration as the main factor of destabilization in the region40. It is interesting that Arab countries and Israel met in Warsaw for the first time since 1991 (Madrid Peace Conference), which may indicate the construction of anti-Iranian front, at least in political sphere.

    What was the role of Poland in this event? Certainly, a country with medium potential, which is a co-organizer of a large international event, strengthens its global visibility. Poland by part of members of international community might be seen as a promoter of American vision of Middle East order. Such international image has been attributed to Poland since its military engagement in the war against Iraq. As with the war in Iraq, the Warsaw summit revealed a clear divide between the US and the European Union. The largest differences between the USA and the European Union are seen in the background of Iran. The EU remains strongly supportive of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) that was abandoned by the US, even if it criticizes Iran’s ballistic missile programme41. According to International Agency of Nuclear Energy Iran

    37 M. Wągrowska, Udział Polski w interwencji zbrojnej i stabilizacyjnej w Iraku, “Raporty i Analizy”, 2004, No 12, p. 2.
    38 R. Kuźniar, Polityka i siła. Studia strategiczne – zarys problematyki, Warszawa 2006, p. 345-346.
    39 Iran was uninvited whereas Palestine refused the invitation; Turkey, Lebanon and Qatar also did not attend to the conference – M.K.K.
    40 T. Zalewski, Co się uda osiągnąć (a czego nie) na konferencji bliskowschodniej w Warszawie?, “Polityka”, 12.02.2019, (w:) osiagnac-a-czego-nie-na-konferencji-bliskowschodniej-w-warszawie.read
    41 P. Wintour, European powers to present cool front at Warsaw summit, 12.02.2019, (w:) on-middle-east.

    carries out each of the points included in the agreement42, amid the USA had no valid reasons to withdraw JCPOA.

    In regard of Iran, Polish stance is unfortunately vague. The Polish authorities are again putting themselves between Brussels and Washington, which neither serves Poland nor the transatlantic alliance. What is more, this unclearness in Poland’s position also reflects on its international image. Some may fault Poland for being untrustworthy. The effects of Polish confusing policy are already known. Iran has withdrawn from the agreement regarding the supply of liquefied gas to Poland. Additionally, Polish national energy companies such as PGNiG and Orlen, which signed an cooperation agreement with Iranian counterpart won’t be able to proceeded it. On another note it is worth knowing that since 2013 Polish-Iranian trade has increased sixfold43. Reaction from European countries may occur during next European budget negotiations.

    Conclusions

    The Middle East region has never been a priority for Poland. This is a result of Polish geopolitical location, the hierarchy of national interests and its medium international potential. Poland’s average international importance procure Warsaw to choose bandwagon strategy, which also suggest lack of own vision. Despite Polish ambitions to play a more important role in global international relations, no comprehensive strategy regarding Polish activity in the Middle East has been developed yet. It is an example of the provinciality of Polish foreign policy and at the same time a conscious resignation from the opportunities offered by the region. And the Middle East region offers a lot, not only in economic sphere, but also social, scientific or cultural. Poland possess professional scientific resources that should be used in preparing a comprehensive strategy for the development of bilateral and multilateral relations in the region. The starting point for the Polish Middle East concept could be reliance it on historical, mostly positive relations, between Poland and region countries. A good example that can serve as a model are Polish-Turkish relations, which last continuously 605 years, even during the lack of Polish subjectivity; Turkey was the only country in the world that did not recognize the Partitions of Poland.

    If Poland really wants to play more important role in the Middle East, first of all must to correct its foreign policy and define own national interests, as well as instruments enabling its implementation. Moreover, in order to avoid the impression of promoting the American vision of the Middle East, Polish foreign policy should be much more assertive towards the American ally. The execution of Polish foreign

    42 USAIran.
    43 M. Zaborowski, Konferencja bliskowschodnia, czyli jak zostać podwykonawcą USA, 12.02.2019, (w:) zostac-podwykonawca-usa.read.

    policy by the current government calls into question the correction of the Middle East strategy, much less adopting an assertive attitude towards the USA.

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  • China’s Man-Made Islands

    China’s Man-Made Islands

    China’s Man-Made Islands in the Spratly’s and Why It’s Rising Concern Throughout the Region

    Sümeyra Betül COŞKUN Bursa Uludağ University

    The South China Sea is believed to be rich in oil and gas and is important for fishing reasons for the countries surrounding it. It is also crucial for its strategic location, as it is one of the world’s busiest waterways. For these reasons, it is subject to several overlapping territorial disputes which include China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. Among all these countries, China is seen as the most aggressive state among them. It is believed that China is aiming to create a strategic triangle within the South China Sea which could result in China gaining full control over the region. Such control is perceived as a direct threat for the US, most of the South China Sea states and US allies within the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, China’s man-made islands located in the South China Sea, particularly in the Spratly archipelago, has raised attention both regionally and worldwide. At first, China started off with land reclamation in the area which started raising questions and caused tension on some level. These man-made islands are the result of China’s salami- slicing tactics at which it is very successful at. Then, China militarized its artificial islands and turned them into advanced military bases. As of today, China has 7 artificial islands located in the Spratly archipelago. When added to the islands in the area in which China has seized control over, it is possible to say that China has emerged as a serious strategic force in the region and is seen as a threat to mostly all whom directly have interest in the South China Sea.

    KEY WORDS: China, South China Sea, Man-made Islands, Soil Reclamation, Spratly Islands

    Introduction

    The purpose of this study is to put forth a general introduction on China’a man-made islands in the Spratly’s and why these islands are raising concern both in the region and beyond the region. To better understand this topic, the importance of the South China Sea was touched upon first. In this part of the study, the importance of energy resources, fishing and shipping lanes in the South China Sea were briefly mentioned. After a brief introduction of the region, how China achieved building and militarizing these seven man-made islands in the Spratly’s are discussed followed by a general evaluation of these artificial islands according to international law. Lastly, why these islands are raising concern both in the region and beyond the region were touched upon.

    The Importance of the South China Sea, Both On A Regional and Global Level

    ⦁ The South China Sea

    The South China Sea is the largest body of water after the five oceans. It is estimated to be around 3.700.000 square kilometers. It connects to the East China Sea with the Taiwan Strait and the Philippine Sea with the Luzon Strait. It also connects the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean with the Strait of Malacca, which also is the regions most important waterway. The South China Sea is important for it’s energy resources, which consist of oil and gas, for fishing and for it’s shipping lanes. Generally speaking, it is important in terms of economic and strategic factors, which form the basis of the South China Sea conflicts.

    cinadasi728

    Figure 1. The South China Sea

    Energy Resources

    The South China Sea is believed to contain important amounts of energy resources, although when the regions estimated energy reserves are taken into consideration, the region does not contain energy resources as much as other oil and natural gas-rich regions. Even so, it is still considered to be a crucial aspect for states within the region, hence is of great importance for the economies and policies of the states in the region. Therefore, energy resources are among the elements that form the basis of South China Sea conflicts. It is possible to say that these disagreements will become even

    ⦁ South China Sea.org, Hydrographic Boundaries of the South China Sea, http://www.southchinasea.org/files/2013/02/South-China-Sea-hydrographic-boundaries.png⦁ ,⦁ 27.07.2019.

    more important as the energy consumption of developing Asian countries is expected to double by 2030, and half of this growth is expected to be generated by China alone.1

    ⦁ Oil

    There is believed to be around 11 billion barrels of oil in the South China Sea, although this amount can vary from state to state. For example, according to the US, there are around 15.6 billion barrels of oil while according to China, there around 105- 213 billion barrels of oil.2 As one can see, the the amount increases massively, which is why the South China Sea is also sometimes referred to as “The Second Persian Gulf”. Chinese researchers hope to increase drilling investment interest in the region may be a possible explanation for the difference in claims. Another reason for the changing claims could be the media’s misunderstood interpretation of “resource estimates” (which predict the total amount of oil) and the “reserve estimates” (the generally recoverable amount, which is typically estimated at 10%).3 Lastly, the increasing tension between the South Sea states could be another reason researchers and potential oil drilling companies face, which may be a deterrent for investment.4 Thus, the question of how much oil is found in the South China Sea may continue to remain unanswered for the time being. If China’s estimates are correct, China and other South China Sea states energy demand from the Middle East and through the Strait of Malacca will be reduced.

    ⦁ Gas

    Gas is another important energy resource in the region. In fact, according to estimations, the region is believed to be richer in gas reserves than oil reserves. It is believed that there is a total of 266 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the open sea basins of the South China Sea.5 It is also estimated that natural gas consumption in the region will increase by 5% per year compared to other fuels and reach 20 trillion cubic feet per year in the next 20 years. 6 This makes gas reserves in the region even more crucial for region states. When we examine the chart below (Figure 2), we can see that the South China Sea is nearly 5 times richer in gas than the Gulf of Mexico and very close to the amount of gas reserves found in the North Sea Region. However,

    1 Robert D. Kaplan, “Why the South China Sea is so crucial”, Business Insider Austrailia, 20.02.2015, , 30.05.2019.
    2 Matthew R. Costlow, Gunboat Diplomacy in the South China Sea, (MSU Graduate Thesis), Springfield: Defense and Strategic Studies, 2012, p. 5.
    3 Matthew R. Costlow, Gunboat Diplomacy in the South China Sea, (MSU Graduate Thesis), Springfield: Defense and Strategic Studies, 2012, p. 5.
    4 Costlow, op.cit, pp. 5-6.
    5 Tim Daiss, “South China Sea Energy Politics Heat Up”, Oil Price, 02.03.2019, , 30.05.2019.
    6 Global Security, South China Sea Oil and Natural Gas, , 30.05.2019.

    if we were to take a closer look, we see that the South China Sea’s gas production is half of what the Gulf of Mexico produces and a fourth of what is produces in the North Sea Region. This result shows the lack of infrastructure within the South China Sea region.

    cinadasi730

    Figure 2. Comparison of Energy Reserves by Region

    ⦁ Fishing

    Fishing is important both on a regional and global level for both economic and military reasons. Economically, about 50% of fishing ships in the world pass through the South China Sea which come to show how important just fishing is for the region.7 A large portion of the income of region states rely on fishing which has led to an overfishing problem. This is why in 1995, The United Nations (UN) formed the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement. This agreement has opened the door to a number of regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) to cope with the excessive use of highly valuable but also highly mobile fish stocks that cross EEZ boundaries. This is the importance of fishing ecconomically. On the other hand, the importance of fishing militarily is due to Chinese fishermen carrying out paramilitary activities on behalf of

    ⦁ Ibid.
    7 Gregory B. Poling, “Illuminating the South China Sea’s Dark Fishing Fleets”, Stephenson Ocean Security Project, 09.01.2019, fishing-fleets/, 31.05.2019.

    their state; these fishermen are also referred to as “fishermen soldiers”.8 These fishermen soldiers have emerged as the largest power at sea (within the region), especially around the Spratly Islands. These fishermen carry the possibility of triggering at least as severe a conflict as the armed forces of China within the region; in fact, it is even more likely because a significant number of fishing boats in the region that are engaged in full-day handline fishing to function are a direct branch of the state through official marine militants.9 This is why these soldiers are a big threat to everyone who has interest in the region.

    ⦁ Shipping Lanes

    According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 80% of global trade is carried out by the sea, and 60% of this trade passes through Asia; of this percentage (80%), the South China Sea carries out a third of global maritime trade, and China carries out 60% of its trade by sea.10 The Strait of Malacca, the Sunda Strait and the Lombok Strait are some of the important strait in the region. Of these straits, the Strait of Malacca is the most important. The reason this strait is the most important is because it provides the shortest, therefore, the most economical transition between the Pacific and Indian Ocean. To better comprehend the importance of this strait, a comparision with the Suez Canal and Panama Canal can be made. The Strait of Malacca carries out three times the amount of oil carried out by the Suez Canal and fifteen times more than the Panama Canal, and this is only an example of oil carried out through the strait.11 When the amount of other goods and energy resources that are carried out through the canal are taken into consideration, it is possible to say that the Strait of Malacca is not just important on a regional level, but also on a global level.

    ⦁ China’s Man-made Islands in the Spratly’s

    ⦁ China’s Salami-Slicing Tactics

    Salami-slicing tactics, also known as the “cabbage strategy” in the military, was first used in the 1950’s by the Communist Party in Hungary. It was used as a strategy by the communist party for non-communist parties in Hungary. Today, China is amoung, if not the most, the most successful user of this strategy. China is the only state that

    8 Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia”, CNA, S. 7, , 22.06.2019.
    9 Yamaguchi, “Strategies of China’s Maritime Actors in the South China Sea: A Coordinated Plan under the Leadership of Xi Jinping?”, p. 24.
    10 China Power, How much trade transits the South China Sea?, transits-south-china-sea/, 31.05.2019.
    11 Robert D. Kaplan, “Why the South China Sea is so crucial”, Business Insider Austrailia, 20.02.2015, , 30.05.2019.

    has expanded its borders in the region after World War II, both on land and at sea, despite of its neighbors.12 China has used these tactics in 1974, when it occupied the Paracel Islands, right after the US withdrew from Vietnam. It also used the same tactics on the Spratly’s in 1988. During that time, both the US and the Soviet Union had other things on their agenda. China used this towards its own benefit and occupied some land in the Spratly archipelago. Another example that could be given is when China occupied Mischief Reef in 1995; however, this time China actually attracted unwanted attention from the US. This unwanted attention led to the first US South China Sea policy, however, this attraction is not significat at all when compared to the 2011 US South China Sea (Rebalance) policy.

    China not only uses this strategy in the South China Sea but also the East China Sea, Taiwan and the border of India. So how does China use this strategy? First of all, it starts off by claiming rights over a region and repeats its claim on the region on all the possible platforms. Subsequently, it propagates in response to the claim of the other party, this way the region in question is considered to carry a dispute between China and the other party; at this point, China then uses its military and diplomatic power to resolve the conflict.13 This way China can constantly repeat and increase the power of its actions and have a permanent presence in the claimed region.

    ⦁ China’s Man-made Islands in the Spratly’s

    Although China first occupied the majority of its seven reefs in 1988, it first started building its man-made islands in the Spratly’s in December of 2013. China drained sand from the bottom of the ocean and piled the drained sand on top of the reef, hence forming an artificial island. China continued its soil reclamation activities in 2014. Towards the end of 2014 and in 2015, it started militarizing the islands. The main reason China started militarizing the islands were due to the US control of international trade in the Indian and Pacific Ocean. As of today, there are seven artificial islands in the Spratly archipelago; Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, Gaven Reef, Johnson South Reef, Hughes Reef and Cuarteron Reef (see Figure 3). China built short-range air defense systems with large anti-aircraft guns on each of these islands. The distance of these reefs/man-made islands to mainland China is more than 800 km. It is estimated that 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 cubic meters of gas are in the waters surrounding these artificial islands.14 Subi Reef, Fiery Cross

    12 Prabhash K Dutta, “What is China’s salami slicing tactic that Army chief Bipin Rawat talked about?”, India Today, 07.09.2017, general-bipin-rawat-1039864-2017-09-07, 25.06.2019.
    13 Prabhash K Dutta, “What is China’s salami slicing tactic that Army chief Bipin Rawat talked about?”, India Today, 07.09.2017, general-bipin-rawat-1039864-2017-09-07, 25.06.2019.
    14 David Brennan, “U.S. Could ‘Take Down’ Man-Made Islands In South China Sea If It Needed To Says Pentagon Official”, Newsweek, 06.01.2018, islands-south-china-sea-if-it-needed-says-pentagon-952451, 24.05.2019.

    Reef and Mischief Reef are amoung the biggest and most equipped of these seven artificial islands. These three islands also form a triangle. Subi Reef is located in the North part of the Spratly archipelago, while Fiery Cross Reef is located in the southwest and Mischief Reef is located in the southeast of the archipelago. Together, it can be said that they form a strategic triangle in the Spratly archipelago. Gaven Reef is located in the center of this triangle while both Johsnon South and Hughes Reef are located amoung the south border of the triangle. Cuarteron Reef is located to the southwest, outside of the triangle but holds great importance strategically.

    cinadasi733

    Figure 3. China’s Artificial Islands in the Spratly Archipelago

    Subi Reef is one of the three big and advanced artificial reefs in the are. It is located on the North part of the Spratly archipelago and is 25 nautical miles (nm) from the

    ⦁ BBC News, China media denounce US warship in South China Sea, 28.10.2015, ⦁ https://www.bbc.com/new⦁ s/world-asia⦁ -china-34655845, 24.05.2019.

    Philippines.15 It is a low-tide island that is normally under sea level. It is claimed by China, Taiwan, Philippines and Vietnam. It was first occupied by China in 1988. Later, in 1990, China started construction on the island. In 2014, China started soil reclamation. As of today, the island is home to an access channel, eleven temporary loading piers, a 3000 meter airfield, a large facility, seven possible satellite communication antennas, a possible security watchtower with a radome, reinforced sea walls, a helipad, a pre-existing military facility and three power plants.16

    cinadasi734

    Figure 4. Subi Reef

    Fiery Cross Reef is the second of the three advanced artificial islands. It is located on the West part of the Spratly archipelago. It happens to be the most advanced artificial reef in the area. It is estimated to be around 2.740.000 m² and is claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam. China started the islands soil reclamation in 2014. The same year, it started the construction of an airfield and completed it by 2015. To better protect the navigation and transportation security in the South China Sea, China also announced it had established a South China Sea Rescue Center in 2019.17 Currently on the reef there is an airfield, a port (630,000 square meters) large enough to accommodate tankers and large surface fighters, multiple cement plants, multiple support buildings, nine temporary loading piers and a pre-existing pier, pre-existing air defense weapons, a possible radar tower under construction, eight possible weapon sites, anti-frogman defense systems, communication equipment, a greenhouse, two heliports, a military facility, a new multi-storey administrative facility adjacent to the airstrip, two lighthouses and ten possible satellite communication antennas.18

    15 The Strait Times, Before and after satellite images: What has been built on the reefs that China occupies in the Spratlys, 29.02.2016, images-what-has-been-built-on-disputed-islands-in-the-south, 25.05.2019.
    16 Southfront, Island Building in South China Sea, china-sea-review/, 25.05.2019.
    ⦁ Subi Reef, ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, , 05.25.2019.
    17 MAREX, “China Establishes South China Sea Rescue Center”, The Maritime Executive, 29.01.2019, , 25.05.2019.
    18 Southfront, ibid.

    cinadasi735

    Figure 5. Fiery Cross Reef

    Mischief Reef is the last of the three advanced artificial islands that form the triangle and is 129 nm from the Philippines. It is claimed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. It was first occupied by China in 1995, as mentioned before, when it’s salami tactics first attracted unwanted international attention. It is located on the east of the Spratly archipelago. China started soil reclamation on the island in 2015. The island is around 5.580.000 m² and is believed that China is expanding the entrance of the reef to build an naval air station on top of it.19 There is currently an access channel, a fortified sea wall, nine temporary loading docks, nine cement plants, two pre- existing military facilities, a pre-existing shelter for fishermen, and three possible satellite communications antennas on the Mischief Reef.20 Frigate and coast guard ships have also been identified in the surrounding waters, and a huge array of antennas have been established, which is thought to enhance China’s ability to monitor the environment.21

    ⦁ BBC News, Flying close to Beijing’s new South China Sea islands, 14.12.2015, ⦁ https://www.bbc.com/news/⦁ magazine-35031313⦁ , 24.05.2019; New York Times, What China has been building in the South China Sea, 27.10.2015, ⦁ https://www.nytimes.co⦁ m/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-the-south- china-sea.html,10.05.2018.
    19 Southfront, ibid.
    20 Southfront, ibid.
    21 CNBC, China builds new military facilities on South China Sea islands: think tank, 30.06.2017, , 24.05.2019.

    cinadasi736

    Figure 6. Mischief Reef

    Cuarteron Reef is located to the southeast of the “triangle” in the Spratly archipelago. It is claimed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. It was occupied by China in 1988, construction on the island started in 1990 and soil reclamation started in 2014. Although Cuarteron Reef is located outside of the triangle, it is believed to be strategically important. Experts believe that Cuarteron Reef improves China’s abitility to monitor air and sea traffic in the South China Sea, especially in the Strait of Malacca. Therefore, Cuarteron Reef is considered to be strategically significant for the South China Sea. Currently, the reef is equipped with a 125-meter wide access channel, breakwaters, multiple support buildings, three power stations, two heliports and reinforced sea walls.22 Although it is not certain, it is assumed that there are five possible communication antennas, a radar facility, two radar towers under construction, missile sites, a pre-existing large multi-level military facility and a satellite communication antenna.23 It is also thought to contain some kind of short- range ship air defense system with an anti-aircraft.24

    ⦁ BBC News, https⦁ ://www.bbc.com⦁ /news/⦁ magazine-35031313 and Daniel Bishton, Mischief-Reef- Analysis-1, Spatial Source, 06.03.2018, ⦁ https://www.spatialsource.com.⦁ au/gis-data/satellite-images- reveal-completed-military-bases-spratly-islands/attachment/mischief-reef-analysis-1. 25.05.2019.
    22 Southfront, ibid.
    23 Amanda Macias, “This satellite image of Chinese construction in South China Sea is a wake-up call to us all”, Business Insider, 14.07.2016, 2016-7, 24.05.2019.
    24 AMTI, China’s New Spratly Island Defenses, 13.12.2016, island-defenses/, 25.05.2019.

    cinadasi737 Image 0001

    Figure 7. Cuateron Reef

    Gaven Reef is located in the middle of the “triangle”. It is claimed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. It is located on the Tizard Banks. It was occupied by China in 1988. There used to just be an old and small facility on the reef but after China’s soil reclamation on the island, it built an artifical island on the bank and connected it with the small facility (see Figure 8.). The reef is believed to contain an anti-aircraft defense system and other small objects; although the objects cannot be identified, they are thought to be a kind of short-range ship air defense system that provides protection against cruise missile attacks.25

    cinadasi737 Image 0002

    Figure 8. Gaven Reef

    Johnson South Reef is the sixth reef and is located along the south line of the “triangle”. It is located on Union Bank and is claimed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. It was occupied by China in 1988 after a battle with Vietnam. On the reef there is a 125 meter wide access channel, a concrete plant, defense towers, desalination pumps, a fuel tank, a multi-level military facility, a possible radar facility, a small port and two loading stations, a 3,000 m² port area, four possible gun towers, a lighthouse and a possible solar power farm that contains 44 panels, a pre-existing communication facility, a pre-existing garrison building, two heliports, Ro-ro (roll on, roll off) ports, a large pre-existing military multi-level military facility, a pre-existing pier, reinforced sea walls, three possible satellite

    ⦁ ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, Cuarteron Reef, reef/, 05.25.2019.
    25 AMTI, ibid.
    ⦁ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Gaven Reefs, , 24.05.2019.

    communication antennas, two possible radar towers under construction and two wind turbines.26

    cinadasi738 Image 0001

    Figure 9. Johnson South Reef. The red area indicated in the first photo is the area focused on in the subsequent photos.

    The last of the seven reefs is Hughes Reef. Hughes Reef is also located on Union Bank and is to the east of Johnson South Reef. Like Johnson South Reef, it is claimed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam but unlike Johnson South, it is also claimed by Malaysia. It is normally a low-tide reef and is around 76.000 m². It was occupied by China in 1988 and soil reclamation started in 2014. On the reef there is an access channel, coastal walls, four defense towers, a port of 292,000 m², a 35,350 m² pier, a multi-level military facility, a possible radar facility, a pre-existing helicopter runway, a pre-existing lighthouse, reinforced sea walls and a cement factory.27

    cinadasi738 Image 0002

    Figure 10. Hughes Reef

    26 Southfront, ibid.
    ⦁ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Johnson Reef, , 05.25.2019.
    27 Southfront, ibid.
    ⦁ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Hughes Reef, , 05.26.2019.

    ⦁ The Evaluation of China’s Artificial Islands in terms of International Law

    If we were to evaluate China’s man-made islands according to international law, in this case The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), we can see that these artificial islands are not considered as islands and cannot benefit from an islands legal status. Article 121. Regime of Islands, subparagraph 1 of UNCLOS states that an island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high-tide.28 China’s artificial islands are not naturally formed and is not above water at high-tide. Before moving on to the second subparagraph of this article, it is better to move on to subparagraph three to better comprehend subparagraph two of Article 121. Subparagraph three of Regime of Islands state that rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own should not have an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.29 From this subparagraph we understand that an island needs to sustain human habitation or have an economic life of their own. Since the word ‘or’ here instead of ‘and’, it indicates that one is enough for a piece of land to be considered as an island. Although China’s man-made islands do not sustain human habitation or economic life on their own, therefore they do not have the right to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. The second subparagraph of Articile 121 states that “Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory”.30 The notions of exclusive economic zone and continental shelf are important here. From this, we can understand that an island has the same marine jurisdictions as any land area, including 12 nm of territorial waters, 200 nm of EEZ and a continental shelf that can exceed 200 nm.31 On the other hand, while it states that states dominating the islands may declare EEZ around the island, artificial islands do not have any rights to maritimes zones besides the 500 meters of security.32

    ⦁ Why China’s Man-made Islands are Raising Concern
    ⦁ Conflicts within the Region with South China Sea States

    As we mentioned before, the South China Sea is important for its energy resources, fishing and shipping lanes. These are all factors that are both economically and

    28 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, PART VIII. REGIME OF ISLANDS, Article 121 (1), p. 66.
    29 Ibid., Art. 121 (3).
    30 Ibid., Art. 121 (2).
    31 Robert C. Beckman, et.al., Beyond Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Legal Frameworks for the Joint Developement of Hydrocarbon Resources, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013, p. 55.
    32 Cemre Pekcan, “Uluslararası Hukuk Çerçevesinde GÇD Krizinin Değerlendirilmesi”, ANKASAM, Vol. 1 (3) , December 2017, p. 59.

    strategically important for South China Sea states, hence they form the basis of the South China Sea territorial conflicts. The five big islands that are located in the South China Sea and are subject to these conflicts are the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, Scarborough Shoal, Pratas Island and Macclesfield Bank. China claims sovereignity on all of these islands and the waters surrounding them. In fact China claims to have rights on almost all of the South China Sea with it’s “nine-dash line” policy (see Figure 11). Taiwan’s claims in the South China Sea are exactly the same as China’s claims, as it’s claims are based on the same elements as China’s claims. Vietnam also claims to have rights on all islands, but unlike China and Taiwan, it doesn’t claim any rightson Pratas Island. The Philippines and Malaysia claim rights on only some features located in the South China Sea. Currently, Brunei doesn’t claim any of the features except for Louisa Reef located in the Spratly archipelago which actually falls within it’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The South China Sea conflicts are and have been a hot topic for awhile within the region between region states, and because China’s man-made islands are located in such a strategic point that gives China the upperhand, China’s man-made islands raise a big concern for region states.

    cinadasi740

    Figure 11. Controversial islands in the South China Sea

    If we were to look at these claims accordingly with international law, we can see that the Spratly archipelago only falls within the EEZ zone of the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam (see Figure 12). Some of the islands in the Spratly archipelago actually isn’t located in any states EEZ zone and falls under international waters. China on the

    ⦁ Some changes were made on map, for original map, see: Craig HILL, “America warns China about South China Sea claims”, China Daily Mail, 03.06.2017, warns-china-about-south-china-sea-claims/, 03.03.2018.

    other hand claims to have rights on all of the Spratly archipelago and most of the South China Sea based on it’s “nine-dash line” policy. Some of the South China Sea states openly objected to China’s historical claims and nine-dash line policy and brought this subject to the UN Arbitration Court. On July 1 of 2016, The Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague came to decision that China’s nine-dash line policy, which China used to determine the boundaries of China’s claims in the South China Sea, were not based on a legal basis and China’s actions are contrary to international law.33 However, China rejected the court’s decision and although China is a party to UNCLOS, it had refused to participate in arbitration from the beginning, so the court’s decision does not directly have any binding on China.34

    cinadasi741

    Figure 12. EEZ zones in the South China Sea and China’s Nine-Dash Line Policy

    33 Euan Graham, “The Hague Tribunal’s South China Sea Ruling: Empty Provocation or Slow-Burning Influence?”, Council on Foreign Affairs, 18.08.2016, , 23.05.2019.
    34 Ibid.
    ⦁ DW, China keeps building infrastructure on disputed islands in South China Sea, 15.12.2017, ⦁ https://www.dw.com/e⦁ n/china-keeps-⦁ building-infras⦁ tructure-on-disputed-islands-in-south-china-sea/a- 41805980, 17.05.2018.

    ⦁ China’s Man-made Islands on a Global Level

    ⦁ China’s ‘Strategic Triangle’ in the South China Sea

    The Spratly archipelago consists of 12 island groups with a total of over 100 islands. Half of these islands have been occupied by China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam.35 As we mentioned above, China has seven man-made islands in the Spratly archipelago and these seven man-made islands are all located in a way that benefits China. China has also occupied the Paracel Islands and has established 20 advanced outpost on the islands. The biggest island in the Paracel Islands is Woody Island, which China first occupied in 1955. China started soil reclamation activities on the island in 2014 and started militarizing the island in 2015; that being said, China’s military activities on the Paracel Islands are no where near as advanced as it’s military activities in the Spratly Islands. China also has a general control over the Scarborough Shoal. Scarborough Shoal is a high-tide reef claimed by China, Taiwan and the Philippines. There are no building built on the reef, but China, which has consistently maintained a coast guard around the reef since 2012, effectively controls the reef.36 The biggest concern here for global dominant states and region states, is the fear of the South China Sea becoming a huge “Chinese Lake”.37 If China were to militarize all three of these island groups, the Spratly’s, Paracels and Scarborough Shoal, then it could form a “strategic triangle” in the South China Sea (see Figure 13). In this case, China would have the ability to control the region under an air defense identity that would cover most of the South China Sea, effectively transforming the sea into a “Chinese lake”, which would pose a serious threat to all region states and global dominant powers such as the US.

    35 CIA, The World Factbook, Spratly Islands, world-factbook/geos/pg.html, 03.03.2018.
    36 AMTI, Scarborough Shoal, , 02.06.2019.
    37 Jesse Johnson, “China planning ‘monitoring station’ on hotly contested South China Sea shoal”, The Japan Times, 17.03.2017, monitoring-station-hotly-contested-south-china-sea-shoal/#.XPfrf4gzY2w, 02.06.2019.

    cinadasi743

    Figure 13. The Strategic Triangle in the South China Sea

    ⦁ The Strait of Malacca

    Another important matter globally is the Strait of Malacca. It is believed that China is building a new strategic maritime route by building artificial islands in the Spratly archipelago and installing land-to-air missiles on the Paracel Islands. The importance of the Strait of Malacca globally for both economic and strategic matters was mentioned earlier. After passing the Strait of Malacca, ships would have to pass by Spratly Archipelago and the Paracel Islands in order to pass through the South China Sea. Therefore, the dominant power or state controlling this region would be the dominant power of the South China Sea in general. The dominant power of the South China Sea would also be considered a global power at seas, as a third of the world’s

    ⦁ Kōda Yōji, Confronting China’s Island-Building Campaign, Nippon, 15.09.2015, ⦁ https://www.nippon.com/⦁ en/currents/⦁ d00190/confronting-china%E2%80%99s-island-building- campaign.html, 10.30.2019.

    maritime trade passes through it. This is why China’s man-made islands in the Spratly’s, especially Cuarteron Reef for this matter, is important for the future of the Strait of Malacca.

    ⦁ China’s Progress in the Region

    Last of all, China’s man-made islands raise a global concern for the island chains in the Asia-Pacific. China currently has a general control over the Spratly archipelago and the Scarborough Shoal which are along the south part of the First Island Chain. If China were to have control over Taiwan too, it would be the dominant power within the First Island Chain (see Figure 14). This is something the US and Japan especially want to prevent because then China would move on to the Second Island Chain. This is why both countries are closely involved with China’s actions towards Taiwan.

    cinadasi744

    Figure 14. The Island Chains in the Asia-Pacific

    ⦁ Right Side News, The United States Should Lead with Power and Purpose on China, 29.12.2013, ⦁ https://www.rightsidenews.com/us/hom⦁ eland-security/the-united-states-should-lead-with-power-and- purpose-on-china/, 25.06.2019.

    Conclusion

    China’s man-made islands are a concern both regionally, for South China Sea states, and globally, for dominant powers at sea. These artificial islands are a result of China’s successful salami-slicing tactics. The artificial islands are strategically located in an area which gives China a great advantage for both economical and strategical reasons and complete China’s wish to gain control over the South China Sea, which it sees as it’s own ‘backyard’. These islands give China the mobility it desires in the Spratly archipelago. Combined with other islands China has control over, they form the South China Sea into what can be referred to as a “Chinese Lake”. Because of this control, China is currently the dominant power in the South China Sea and it’s man-made islands are one of the main reasons China is where it is.

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    BRENNAN David, “U.S. Could ‘Take Down’ Man-Made Islands In South China Sea If It Needed To Says Pentagon Official”, Newsweek, 06.01.2018, sea-if-it-needed-says-pentagon-952451, 24.05.2019.

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  • Ukraine’s Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility: a well-calculated project or an unwarranted risk?

    Ukraine’s Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility: a well-calculated project or an unwarranted risk?

    2006 Chernobyl NB 3
    Photo credit: Bellona

    Concerns have been raising among environmentalists and nuclear power engineers as Ukraine continues the loading of used fuel into the into the containerized dry storage systems of the new Chernobyl Interim Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility (ISF-2).

    Designed by Holtec International, the project poses dangerous risks to the global environment, and here is why.

    According to the official website of Holtec International and John Heaton’s presentation at the “ELEA – Holtec International” Congress, the U.S. company claims to have some competences and expertise in storing the nuclear energy waste. Among them are: technologies for the construction of dry storage facilities of the CISF type for the temporary storage of containers with spent nuclear fuel and radioactive wastes; the reliability of the storage facilities that is ensured by a dry climate system, which prevents corrosion of structural materials and excludes the ingress of water into the waste tanks. Finally, the company already has its own functioning storage.

    However, the Holtec International has no expertise in building large, capacious storage facilities for long-term (more than 50 years) storage of spent nuclear fuel in a humid and cold climate, with a pronounced change of seasons.

    For 6 years of work on the territory of Ukraine, “Holtec International” has so far the only one achievement concerning the loading of the two double-walled tanks with spent nuclear fuel from the RBMK reactor in the Interim Storage Facility (ISF-2) at the Chernobyl NPP site. It is shown that containers with nuclear waste are placed in the ISF-2 building that is already under operation, and not in a dry storage facility of the CISF type. In addition, the arrangement of tanks in the ISF-2 storage facility is horizontal, not vertical (i.e., it does not correspond to the American technology of storage of tanks), and it is not known what risks and consequences this may lead to. For this reason, the launch of ISF-2 by “Holtec International” specialists was delayed, since it was not known in advance whether it would be possible to safely place the canister in the storage facility.

    According to the study by Ukrainian experts, Ukraine’s 15 reactors – all of which were built while the country was still a republic of the Soviet Union – supply more than half of the domestic electricity supply. This means that reactors built during the Soviet era in Ukraine has more trust among nuclear power engineers rather than an ambitious U.S. project.

    Ukrainian President Volodimir Zelensky, during the negotiations over the project last year, said Ukraine would embrace nuclear power as a national priority.

    “In the coming years, many countries will work against nuclear power generation,” he said. “We, on the other hand, will defend it. We must do this because today we have every opportunity to be among the first [in nuclear energy], both in Europe and in the world.”

    But at the same time the Ukrainian government is creating an extremely dangerous situation for the global environment and its border neighbors.

    By entrusting the project to a company with no experience in building large nuclear storage facilities and limited scientific and technological base for the elimination of nuclear accidents and the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel planned for accumulation, the Ukrainian authorities might yet but provoke an uncontrolled environmental disaster that might dramatically change the Eurasia’s landscape.

  • Will China Turn to Maritime Great Power Politics in Pacific Sea?

    Will China Turn to Maritime Great Power Politics in Pacific Sea?

    Prof. Dr. Mesut Hakkı CAŞIN İstinye Üniversitesi

    cinsavasgemileri denizkuvvetleri

    China is at once a continental power and a maritime power (haiyang daguo) and it possesses broad maritime strategic interests…These achievements have laid a solid foundation for building a strong maritime power (haiyang qiangguo).

    Xi Jinping

    International community and scholar’s discussion now the post-Cold War world as we know it is coming to an end that great power politics is back, consequently the role of naval forces national navies will continue to grow. Indeed, the XXI st century will be the rise of China’s dramatic economic growth over the past two decades has fundamentally changed the global and regional geo-economic and geo-political landscapes its wider implications for international politics form the most important issue in our time. The main goal of Xi’s signature initiative- Belt and Road Initiative- BRI, with current estimates ranging between $1 to $8 trillion and some 70 countries involved -is to expand Chinese global political and economic networks and to secure a more active position in “global governance” without waiting for the West to give China more roles and responsibilities in existing institutions. In spite of historical Chinese foreign policy objectives mainly focused on land territories; new strategic doctrine of the Chinese is organized around the will to make the Pacific Sea and to expand its immediate maritime interests. Beijing has been serious changing policy objectives recently toward solidifying a sphere of influence in the Asia-Pacific. China also has expanded its maritime reach as it modernizes its navy and air force. China’s ongoing maritime transformation from a traditional land power to a sea power. As Andrew Erickson argues, “China’s naval build-up is only part of an extraordinary maritime transformation-modern history’s sole example of a land power becoming a hybrid land-sea power and sustaining such an exceptional status. Underwriting this transition are a vast network of ports, shipping lines and financial systems, and-of course-increasingly advanced ships.” At the beginning of 2017, the Chinese Navy had 328 ships. It now possesses nearly 350 ships and is already larger than the U.S. Navy. China is the largest ship-producing country in the world and at current production rates could soon operate 400 ships. Its commissions nearly three submarines each year, and in two years will have more than 70 in its fleet. The Chinese Navy also operates growing numbers of cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and corvettes, all equipped with long-range anti-ship cruise missiles. Between 2013 and 2016, China commissioned more than 30 modern corvettes. At current rates, China could have 430 surface ships and 100 submarines within the next 15 years. China’s leaders are laying both the intellectual and material groundwork for out-of-area ventures. As a result,

    Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chiefs aim to guaranteed passage about access from the time a ship leaves harbor China sea and the Pacific in East Asia until the time it docks in an Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, or European seaport. Unfortunately for Chinese leaders and national-level documents characterize the goal of becoming a maritime power as essential to China’s national development strategy. China making a quick move to secure a military or strategic advantage in the Pacific region. The international community has been viewing China’s recent moves challenge the status quo relating to the seas as representing “maritime expansion,” and the Chinese themselves have come to talk about making their country a maritime power. The 18th Party Congress thus marks an important defining moment. China’s future is to be a haiyang qiangguo-that is, a strong or great maritime power. However, China has also been cooperating with neighbors to establish codes of conduct to reduce conflict in the maritime arena.

    The Chinese navy justifies itself to its neighbors, necessarily worried, by the necessity of escorting the commercial vessels essential to the economy of the country; but it is known that the priority of the new strategies. Beijing considers the majority of the South China Sea to be its sovereign territory, a claim that is disputed by international law. China’s military have been turning what were once small rocks and reefs into heavily fortified remote military installations. These installations give China a strategic advantage. The installation on the Spratly Islands, for example, has the capacity to deploy fighter aircraft that could control key shipping lanes. The commander of US forces in the Indo-Pacific, Admiral Philip Davidson, said during his confirmation hearing that China is capable of dominating the South China Sea in “all scenarios short of war.” This academic article aim to briefly analysis that will transition China’s passivity naval modernization policy into maritime power.

  • The Effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

    The Effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

    nukleersantral

    Among the international security regimes, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime has a prominent rank due to the destructive power of the nuclear weapons over regional and global peace and stability. Since any failure, deception or deviation from the NPT Regime may bring about catastrophic outcomes; the regime is expected to have the ability and tools to cope with probable challenges. 

    The NPT Regime has come across with two major challenges in the recent decade: North Korea and Iran. Because North Korea withdrew from the NPT, it is no longer subjected to the NPT Regime, directly. Contrariwise, Iranis determined to stay as a state party to the NPT; thusly it is still subjected to the processes of the Regime.

    Though, the Regime still did not confirm the character and extent of Iranian nuclear program. Iran has been demonstrating that it is possible to remain in the Regime without providing the necessary transparency to let the IAEA verify the absence of undeclared materials and inhibited activities. The question of my statement is “why the processes of the NPT Regime cannotspecify the nature and scope of Iran’s nuclear program?” I examine the processesof the Regime in order to determine the weaknesses of the Regime and toaddress them. The aforementioned processes are the procedures run by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN Security Council (UNSC)and the multilateral negotiations. I argue that, the Regime is modulated to cope with operational challenges and it remains relatively incompetent when a political challenge arises.

    The_Effectiveness_of_the_Nuclear_Non_Proİndir
  • Azerbaijani NGOs Appeal to the International Community

    Azerbaijani NGOs Appeal to the International Community

    niyazi

    By Azer HASRET

    As is known, on September 27, 2020 Occupational Armed Forces of Armenia had started military offensive against Azerbaijani positions and civil settlements. As a result Azerbaijani Armed Forces had to react and started counter-attacks. Thus the war, which lasted 44 days and ended with the victory of Azerbaijan, had started. Day by day Armenian Army had to step back and on November 10, 2020 the sides signed a Statement to stop war operations. The Statement was initiated by the Russian Federation.

    During those terrific days Armenian Armed Forces launched hundreds of rocket attacks on civil settlements. Mostly those settlements were outside of war scene and even hundreds of kms off. Thus one of the most suffered cities was Ganja, some 60 km away from Karabakh and war zone.

    On October 3, 2021, on the eve of the first Armenian rocket attack on Ganja, a group of Azerbaijani NGO representatives traveled to the city to express their solidarity with the suffered people and even with the all inhabitants. The city of Ganja was attacked with rockets 5 times and saw huge damages to the city killing dozens of peaceful civilians.

    NGO representatives, visiting one of the most suffered areas, convened a conference in Ganja dedicated to the attacks on the civil settlements. At the end of the conference participants adopted An Appeal to the International Community which is included below.

    An Appeal to the International Community in Regard to the Military Crimes Committed by Armenia Against Cities and Districts of Azerbaijan in 2020

    03 October 2021, Ganja City

    As a reply to the next military provocation committed against our country by armed forces of the Republic of Armenia on September 27, 2020, the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan had started contra attack operations and had liberated the lands belonging to the Republic of Azerbaijan.

    As a result of successful military operations conducted by our army the military forces of Armenia were completely destroyed. With the aim to compensate the loss in the field of battle the Government of Armenia had chosen the civil population living in the cities and districts out of the frontline of the war shooting from different types of heavy weapons including artillery and ballistic rockets committing crimes and military crimes against the mankind and killed civil population including women and children making damage to the property of population as well as infrastructure facilities in a large scale

    Thus, the second largest city of Azerbaijan Ganja faced heavy artillery and rocket attacks during the dates of October 4, 5, 8, 11 and 17. In general, as a result of these horrible terroristic acts 26 persons lost their lives, 175 persons were wounded, and a huge number of civil infrastructure facilities and vehicles faced significant damage.

    In general, based on the order of the Government of Armenia not only Ganja and Barda, also Yevlakh, Beylagan, Tartar, Gabala, Goranboy, Aghjabadi, Khizi and other cities and districts were attacked with ballistic rockets and other type of heavy artillery weapons. As a result of this military aggression 454 civilians were wounded, 93 civilians died including 12 children and 27 women, totally 12.292 residential and non-residential areas as well as 288 vehicles had been significantly damaged.

    Because of this above-mentioned reasons, we as the NGOs of Azerbaijan with the deep feeling of concern would like to attract the attention of international community to the crimes committed against mankind by the political and military government of Armenia a year ago and we are stating that the international humanitarian law especially Geneva Convention adopted in 1949 had been seriously violated.

    We, the NGOs that are active in Azerbaijan who are signing this appeal on behalf of civil society of our country would like to apply to human rights protection organizations, NGOs, media representatives, parliament members and governments in all over the world calling them to express their protest regarding the military crimes committed against the civil population of Azerbaijan by Armenia and to announce this type of military acts against civil population as unacceptable.

    Signed by 49 NGOs